














Richard H. Anderson 
 
 
Submitted to the graduate degree program in History and the Graduate Faculty of the University 

























John M. Curatola, Ph.D. 
 
 











The dissertation committee for Richard H. Anderson 











































In late spring, 1941, a small group of U.S. Army officers traveled to Britain to plan for 
Anglo-American cooperation if and when the U.S. entered World War II.  Because the United 
States was still a neutral country and to prevent potential enemies from knowing the group's 
purpose, the U.S. Army called its mission to Britain the "U.S. Army Special Observer Group" 
(SPOBS).  From May, 1941 until June, 1942, SPOBS (known as U.S. Army Forces in the British 
Isles or USAFBI after January 8, 1942) developed plans with the British for establishing U.S 
forces in the British Isles.  Changing strategic conditions however, made much of this work 
obsolete.  As a result, the Allies had to develop new plans for establishing U.S. combat power in 
Britain.  The fact that the Allies never implemented SPOBS’ plans in their entirety has led 
scholars to underestimate the significance of the group’s work with the British.  This study 
asserts that the process of planning that the Special Observers engaged in with their British 
counterparts played an essential role in setting the conditions for Anglo-American cooperation in 
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On 14 November 1957, members of the National Defens Executive Reserve (NDER), a 
subunit within the Interstate Commerce Commission, gathered in Washington D.C. The 
organization’s purpose was to recruit people from various public and private occupations, to 
include agriculture, business, education, energy, labor, management, and transportation, and train 
them to augment the staffs of federal departments and agencies during national emergencies.1  
Appropriately, the guest speaker for the event was a man well-acquainted with national 
emergencies.  As a U.S. Army officer during the Second World War, he had led British, 
American, and Canadian forces on one of the most complex military operations in history, the 
Allied invasion of Normandy.2  As president of the United States, he struggled to keep the Cold 
War cold, implementing a doctrine of massive retalia ion with nuclear weapons to prevent overt 
communist expansion.3  Now he would try to impart some of his experience to the convention’s 
participants.   
After a brief salutary greeting, President Dwight D. Eisenhower began his speech with a 
short story: 
Some years ago, there was a group in the staff college of which some of you may 
have heard, Leavenworth Staff College. This was before our entry into World 
War One, and in that course it was necessary to use a number of maps and the 
maps available to the course were of the Alsace-Lorraine area and the Champagne 
in France. But a group of ‘young Turks’ came along who wanted to reform 
Leavenworth. They pointed out it was perfectly silly for the American Army to be 
using such maps which could after all be duplicated in other areas without too 
much cost--they would get some area maps where the American Army just might 
                                                          
     1 Code of Federal Regulations, Title 32A Revised December 31, 1956 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1957), 207; and Request for Records Disposition Authority, from Federal Emergency Management 
Agency to General Services Administration National Archives and Records Service, 6-1-87, National Archives and 
Records Administration (NARA) website, http://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt/rcs/schedules/g neral-records-
schedules/n1-grs-87-010_sf115.pdf, accessed 3 November, 2015.  
     2 Accounts of the D-Day invasion are legion.  Anthony Beevor provides an excellent overview of Battle of 
Normandy in D-Day: The Battle for Normandy (New York: Penguin Books, 2009). 
     3 Adrian R. Lewis, The American Culture of War: The History of U.S. Military Force from World War II to 
Operation Iraqi Freedom (New York: Routledge, 2007), 147-52. 
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fight a battle. So they got, among other things, maps of the area of Leavenworth 
and of Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, and in succeeding years all the problems have 
been worked out on those maps. The point is, only about two years after that 
happened, we were fighting in Alsace-Lorraine and in the Champagne.4 
 
Upon ending his story, he explained how it was relevant to the assembled, would-be crises 
managers: 
I tell this story to illustrate the truth of the statement I heard long ago in the Army: 
Plans are worthless, but planning is everything.  There is a very great distinction 
because when you are planning for an emergency you must start with this one 
thing: the very definition of “emergency” is that it is unexpected, therefore it is 
not going to happen the way you are planning. 
 
So, the first thing you do is take all the plans off the top shelf and throw them out 
the window and start once more.  But if you haven’t been planning, you can’t 
work, intelligently at least. 
 
That is the reason it is so important to plan, to keep yourselves steeped in the 
character of the problem that you may be one day be call d upon to solve–or help 
to solve.5 
       
Eisenhower was attempting to convey two ideas that have long held currency with 
professional soldiers.  One was that plans almost never work out the way one intends them to do. 
Helmuth von Moltke the Elder, Chief of the Prussian General Staff during the Wars of German 
Unification, famously wrote that “no plan of operations survives the first collision with the 
enemy main body.”6  The second is that, despite the fact that plans almost never work out the 
way one intends them to, there is intrinsic value in planning as a process.  The U.S. Army has 
and continues to hold to these ideas in its own planing doctrine: 
All planning is based on imperfect knowledge and assumptions about the future. 
Planning cannot predict exactly what the effects of the operation will be, how 
enemies will behave with precision, or how civilians will respond to the friendly 
                                                          
     
4 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1957: 
Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and Statemen s of the President, January 1 to December 31, 1957
(Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1958), 818.  
     5 Ibid. 
     
6 Gunther E. Rothenberg, “Moltke, Schlieffen, and the Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment,” in Makers of Modern 
Strategy, Peter Paret ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 299-300. 
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force or the enemy. Nonetheless, the understanding and learning that occurs 
during planning have great value. Even if units do not execute the plan precisely 
as envisioned—and few ever do—the process of planning results in improved 
situational understanding that facilitates future decision-making.7 
 
These concepts are an integral part of modern military thought.  As such, this philosophy has 
become axiomatic to professional soldiers trained i modern, industrialized warfare.   
 The first concept lends itself well to historical analysis.  History is replete with accounts 
of battles and campaigns that did not go according to plan.8  As most combatant forces do not 
enter into conflict expecting to lose, the results of just about every military operation deviate 
from the intended outcome for at least one side.  Even the victors rarely win in exactly the way 
they planned to.  Allied success during Operation OVERLORD, in spite of the scattering of 
American forces during airborne drops and the failure of naval transports to land many troops in 
the right places, is a prime example.9  This aspect of planning is fairly visible.  One mrely has to 
examine the plan for a given operation and, provided that sufficient documentation of the actual 
operation is available, determine to what extent the reality of a military operation matched the 
plan military leaders had developed for it.  
 The second concept is less susceptible to historical analysis.  While the truth that 
planning has intrinsic value has become axiomatic for military professionals, it can be quite 
difficult to articulate this value using historical methodology.  Planning produces effects that are 
straightforward and effects that are not immediately apparent.  Straightforward effects typically 
                                                          
     7 Department of the Army, ADRP 5-0: The Operations Process (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 2012), 2-1-2.   
     8 A cursory examination of any survey of military history will illustrate this phenomena.  For examples s e 
Geoffrey Parker ed., The Cambridge History of Warfare, Revised and Updated (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009); Allan R. Millett, Peter Maslowski, and William B. Feis, For the Common Defense: A Military History 
of the United States from 1607 to 2012, Third ed. (New York: Free Press, 2012); and Clifford J. Rogers and J. T. 
Seidule senior ed., The West Point History of Warfare (New York: Rowan Technology, 2014).   
     9 Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, A War to Be Won: Fighting the Second World War (Cambridge: 
Belknap Press, 2000), 420-24; and Adrian R. Lewis, Omaha Beach: A Flawed Victory (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2001), 22-23.   
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are the plans and policies planners develop to accomplish an intended goal.  Effects that are not 
immediately apparent typically include the knowledg actors gain from the act of planning itself 
and the impact that knowledge has on subsequent planing. When works of military history have 
analyzed planning, their tendency has been to focus n the straightforward effects, establishing 
cause and effect relationships between a given plan or policy (or lack thereof) and a specific 
historical event.10  Less adequately analyzed have been those aspects of the planning process that 
are less immediately apparent, what Eisenhower refes to as being “steeped in the character of 
the problem that you may be one day be called upon to solve,” and what U.S. Army doctrine 
refers to as “improved situational understanding that facilitates future decision-making.”  
Providing evidence that a given individual was “steep d in the character of a problem” or had 
“improved situational understanding” can be challenging.   
 The scholars who have tackled the second concept best, the idea that there is intrinsic 
value to planning as a process, are those that have examined military education systems.  In most 
cases, the students in these schools develop plans rimarily for the more intangible benefits that 
the planning process provides, although some military organizations have used these schools as 
supplemental staffs to develop actual war plans.  The U.S. Army War College is a prime 
example of an institution that did both.  From the earliest days of the Army War College, the 
planning exercises conducted by it were meant to serve two functions.  One was to supplement 
the Army General Staff, providing assistance in developing plans that the Army would use to 
defend the United States and its interests abroad.  The other was to educate.  By considering 
                                                          
     10 For examples, see Marvin A. Kriedberg and Merton G. Henry, History of Military Mobilization in the United 
States Army, 1775-1945 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955); Charles E. Kirkpatrick, An 
Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present: Writing the Victory Plan of 1941 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1990); Martin Van Crevald, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton Second Edition 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Haywood S. Hansell, Jr., The Air Plan that Defeated Hitler (New 
York: Arno Press, 1980); and Samuel Elliot Morison, History of United States Naval Operations, Volume XI: The 
Invasion of France and Germany, 1944-1945 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2011). 
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strategic problems posed by both the Army War College faculty and the General Staff, officers 
attending the course would learn the art of war planning through practical application.  As Henry 
G. Gole noted in his study of the development of war pl nning in the interwar years, "This 
applicatory theory of learning remained the basic educational concept of the college until 1940," 
when the War College closed and its faculty was absorbed into the General Staff to meet 
looming wartime requirements.11  As part of their analysis, the scholars who examine these 
schools generally attempt to evaluate how well the curriculum, to include planning exercises, 
familiarized students with the problems they subsequently encountered in planning and 
conducting military operations.12   
 Scholars have had mixed success in applying this type of analysis to the history of Anglo-
American war planning during the Second World War.  There are several methodological and 
historiographical reasons for this.  First, historians have devoted most of their analysis to war 
plans that were actually carried out.  To be sure, th  planning efforts that led up to the major 
military operations of the war have been extensively chronicled, to include war plans that the 
Allies never actually executed.  However, while a good narrative for these early planning efforts 
exists, most notably in the U.S. Army, U.S. Army Air Force, and U.S. Navy official histories of 
World War II, historians have typically neglected to examine the effects these early planning 
                                                          
     11 Henry G. Gole, The Road to Rainbow: Army Planning for Global War, 1934-1940 (Annapolis: Naval Institute 
Press, 2003), 17 and 103.     
     
12 For examples see, Gole, The Road to Rainbow; John W. Masland and Laurence J. Radway, Soldiers and 
Scholars: Military Education and National Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957); Martin Van 
Crevald, The Training of Officers: From Military Professionalism to Irrelevance (New York: The Free Press, 1990); 
T. I. G. Gray ed., The Imperial Defence College and the Royal College of Defence Studies, 1927-1977 (Edinburgh: 
Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1977); Peter J. Schifferle, America’s School for War: Fort Leavenworth, Officer 
Education, and Victory in World War II (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2010); T. N. Dupuy, A Genius for 
War: The German Army and General Staff, 1807-1945 (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall Inc., 1977); Lawrence J. 
Korb, ed., The System for Educating Military Officers in the U.S. (Pittsburg: International Studies Association, 
1976); George Pappas, Prudens Futuri: The U.S. Army War College, 1901-1967 (Carlisle: Alumni Association of 
the U.S. Army War College, 1967); and Harry P. Ball, Of Responsible Command, Revised Edition (Carlisle: Alumni 
Association of the U.S. Army War College, 1994). 
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efforts had on the organizations that planned them in terms of improving their understanding of 
the types of problems they were confronting.13          
Second, those scholars who have attempted to examine the less apparent effects of the 
planning process in Anglo-American war planning have tended to focus their analysis on 
relationships between the Americans and the British at t e expense of analysis of the 
functionality of the planning process.  This is largely the responsibility of Winston Churchill.  
Most scholars of Anglo-American relations today, British and American, acknowledge the role 
of Churchill in fostering the idea of the 'special relationship' and how his own account of the war, 
published between 1948 and 1954, shaped the historiography of Anglo-American relations for 
the first thirty years after World War II.14  One of the reasons Churchill's six volume history, The 
Second World War, was so influential was because it contained information drawn from highly 
classified documents unavailable to other historians t the time.  Churchill was also the only 
Allied head of government to have his writings published.  The problem with Churchill's work 
was that he had a very concrete political agenda in writing it.  He used the history to justify 
controversial decisions he made during the war.  Reacting to the souring of relations between the 
Soviet Union and the West, he also used the history to evangelize his concept of the 'special 
relationship' between the United States and Britain.  U der his concept, the wartime alliance of 
                                                          
     13 For examples see Mark Skinner Watson, Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations (Washington D.C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950), 367-408; Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, Strategic Planning for 
Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1953), 32-51, 97-114, and 273-
84; Richard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940-1943 (Washington D.C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955); James Lea Cate, “Plans, Policies, and Organization,” in The Army Air 
Forces in World War II, Volume One: Early Plans and Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, Wesley Frank 
Craven and James Lea Cate ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), 557-611; and Morison, The Invasion 
of France and Germany, 1944-1945, 18-38. 
     
14 For examples see Mark A. Stoler, Allies in War: Britain and America Against the Axis Powers 1940-1945 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), xxi-xxii; Alex Danchev, On Specialness: Essays in Anglo-American 
Relations (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998), 2-3; and Warren F. Kimball, Forged in War: Roosevelt, Churchill, 
and the Second World War (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1997), 10.  
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Britain and the U.S. was the political expression of an underlying cultural unity between the two 
nations.  To support this concept and avoid alienatng a Cold War ally, he downplayed conflicts 
that occurred in Anglo-American relations both prior to and after U.S. entry into the war.15  
 This Churchillian paradigm held sway over the historiography of Anglo-American 
relations for thirty years until a major declassification of World War II records at the end of the 
1970s revealed that relations between the Americans and the British had been plagued by much 
more conflict than Churchill had been willing to admit.16  With this new evidence, scholars 
began a full-scale attack on the concept of the special relationship.17  While these scholars 
successfully refuted the Churchillian paradigm, U.S. and British officials continued to use the 
concept of the special relationship to support their political agendas throughout the 1980s, 1990s, 
and 2000s.18  As such, scholars of Anglo-American relations have continued to see the need for 
addressing the concept of the ‘special relationship,’ both in response to the works that 
emphasized conflict and to contemporary use of the ‘sp cial relationship’ in political discourse.19  
                                                          
     15 Stoler, Allies in War, xxi and David Reynolds, The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance 1937-194 : A 
Study in Competitive Co-operation (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), 1.  Also see Winston S. 
Churchill, The Second World War, 6 volumes (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1948-1953). 
     16 Stoler, Allies in War, xxi-xxii. 
     17 For examples see Christopher G. Thorne, Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain, and the War Against 
Japan, 1941-1945 (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1978); James R. Leutze, Bargaining for Supremacy: Anglo-
American Naval Collaboration, 1937-1941 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1977); William 
Roger Louis, Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire, 1941-1945 (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1978) and Reynolds, The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance. 
     
18 David R. Reynolds, From World War to Cold War: Churchill, Roosevelt, and the International History of the 
1940s (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 1; and David R. Reynolds, "A 'Special Relationship'? America, 
Britain, and the International Order Since the Second World War," International Affairs 62, no. 1 (Winter, 1985-
1986): 16. 
     
19 For examples see Alan P. Dobson, U.S. Wartime Aid to Britain, 1940-1946 (London: Croom Helm, 1986);  
Randall Bennett Woods, A Changing of the Guard: Anglo-American Relations, 1941-1946 (Chapel Hill: University 
of North Carolina Press, 1990); Warren F. Kimball ed., Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence, 
Volume I, Alliance Emerging, October 1933-November 1942 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); Kevin 
Smith, Conflict Over Convoys: Anglo-American Logistics Diplomacy in the Second World War (Cambridge: 
University of Cambridge Press, 1996); Steve Weiss, Allies in Conflict: Anglo-American Strategic Negotiations, 
1938-44 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996); Mark Stoler, Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, he 
Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in World War II (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); Robin 
Renwick, Fighting With Allies: America and Britain in Peace and at War (New York: Random House, 1996); John 
Charmley, Churchill's Grand Alliance: The Anglo-American Special Relationship, 1940-57 (New York: Harcourt 
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 To be sure, relationships exert an important influence on the success or failure of any 
alliance.  However, this general obsession with arguing over whether or not relations between the 
U.S. and British were special has, to a certain extent, led scholars to overlook other factors that 
were important in establishing the systems needed for coalition warfare.  The Americans and the 
British had to cope with a multitude of problems asociated with conducting a global coalition 
war.  Inter-alliance conflict was only one of them, albeit a very important one.  To remedy this 
situation, scholars need to ask a question that is more fundamental than how ‘special’ relations 
were between the U.S. and British were.  Rather, th question we should ask is: how did the two 
nations collectively solve the problems associated with conducting coalition war?20     
 This study proposes to begin answering this question by examining a small group of U.S. 
Army officers, collectively known as the U.S. Army Special Observer Group (SPOBS), who 
traveled to Britain in May, 1941 to engage is collaborative war planning with the British.  These 
planners were among the first U.S. Army officers to engage in collective problem solving with 
officers from the U.K and it is the purpose of this study to examine the significance of their work 
in establishing the machinery for conducting Anglo-American coalition war in the European 
Theater.  
                                                          
Brace & Company, 1995); and Kimball, Forged in War; Alex Danchev, Very Special Relationship: Field-Marshal 
Sir John Dill and the Anglo-American Alliance, 1941- 4 (London: Brassey’s, Defence Publishers, 1986); Alex 
Danchev, Establishing the Anglo-American Alliance: The Second World War Diaries of Brigadier Vivian Dykes 
(London: Brassey’s Defence Publishers, 1990); and Danchev, On Specialness: Essays in Anglo-American Relations.  
     20 All works pertaining to Anglo-American relations during the Second World War attempt to answer his 
question in some way.  However, there are still many fu ctional aspects of Anglo-American cooperation that we do 
not fully understand, largely because scholars have been so focused on the ‘special relationship’ at the expense of 
taking a functional approach to analysis of Anglo-American collaboration.  There are some exceptions t this 
general trend.  For examples see Donald F. Bittner, The Lion and the White Falcon: Britain and Iceland i  the 
World War II Era (Hamden: Archon Books, 1983), 122-37;   Waldo Heinrichs, Threshold of War: Franklin D. 
Roosevelt and American Entry into World War II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988); and Theodore A. 
Wilson, "Coalition: Structure, Strategy, and Statecraft," in Allies at War: The Soviet, American, and British 
Experience, 1939-1945, ed. David Reynolds, Warren F. Kimball, and A.O. Chubarian (New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1994), 79-104.      
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 Although the Special Observers have appeared in a number of works pertaining to Anglo-
American relations during the Second World War, scholars of World War II, for the most part, 
have underestimated their role in laying the ground work for Anglo-American coalition war in 
Europe.  Accounts of the Special Observers’ activities are sprinkled throughout the U.S. Army 
and U.S. Army Air Force official histories of the Scond World War as well as personal memoirs 
of officials serving in Britain and a small number of works about diplomatic history.  In these 
works, the authors generally depict the Special Observers as minor supporting characters or offer 
just enough information about the group’s activities to serve as the backdrop for analysis of 
Dwight D. Eisenhower and what would become the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary 
Force (SHAEF).  The most detailed examination from this body of literature is a fifty page 
summary of the group’s work which serves as the introduction to Ronald Ruppenthal’s, 
Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume I: May 194-September 1944.  The minor place that 
these authors have assigned the Special Observers in their works has fostered the misleading 
impression that the group did little to advance Anglo-American military cooperation during their 
tenure in Britain.21      
                                                          
     21 For examples see Ronald Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume I: May 194-September 1944 
(Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1953), 13-51; Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning for 
Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942, 34-43; Lida Mayo, The Ordnance Department: on Beachhead and Battlefront 
(Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968), 3-16; Stetson Conn, Rose C. Engleman, and Byron 
Fairchild, Guarding the United States and its Outposts (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), 
459-91;  Dulany Terrett, The Signal Corps: The Emergency (To December 1941) (Washington D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1956), 291;  George Raynor Thompson, Dixie R. Harris, Pauline M. Oaks, andDulany 
Terrett, The Signal Corps: The Test (December 1941 to July 1943) (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1957), 339;  George Raynor Thompson and Dixie R. Harris, The Signal Corps: The Outcome (Mid-1943 
Through 1945) (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), 76; William F. Ross and Charles F. 
Romanus, The Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against Germany (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1965), 13-18; Alfred M. Beck, Abe Bortz, Charles W. Lynch, and Lida Mayo, The Corps of 
Engineers: The War Against Germany (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), 7-34; Graham 
A. Cosmas and Albert E. Cowdrey, The Medical Department: Medical Service in the European Theater of 
Operations (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), 5-24; and James Lea Cate, “Plans, Policies, 
and Organization,” 577-589; John Kennedy, The Business of War: The War Narrative of Major-General Sir John 
Kennedy (London: Hutchison & CO., 1957), 156, 237, and Albert C. Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports! (New York: 
Henry Holt & Company, 1958), 104, 111, 122-124; James Parton, “Air Force Spoken Here”: General Ira Eaker & 
the Command of the Air (Bethesda: Adler & Adler, 1986), 134 and 159; Harry C. Butcher, My Three Years With 
10 
 
There is a small body of literature which, while not offering a comprehensive analysis of 
the group’s activities, attempts to highlight the important role the group played in fostering 
Anglo-American cooperation.  A few of the Special Observers serve as key actors in David 
Reynold’s Rich Relations: The American Occupation of Britain, 1942-1945, a social history of 
U.S. forces in Britain.  While Reynolds masterfully incorporates the Special Observers into his 
analysis, a comprehensive examination of the group’s work with the British is not the focus of 
his book.  His aim is much more ambitious: to capture he essence of the Anglo-American 
relationship by examining it through the eyes of U.S. and British people from many different 
backgrounds in a multitude of settings.22  As such, there was simply not enough room in his 
work for a comprehensive functional analysis of SPOBS.  
The Special Observers play a key role in a paper written by Theodore A. Wilson for the 
Hall Center for the Humanities Seminar on War, Peace, nd Diplomacy called “Arguably Joint 
But Never Combined: BOLERO as Exemplar of the American Attitude Regarding Military 
Coalitions and Status of Forces Agreements.”  In it, he examines the role SPOBS played in the 
development of coalition policy regarding legal jurisdiction for U.S. forces in Britain.23  Like 
Reynolds, the scope of his paper did not permit a comprehensive analysis of the group’s 
influence on Anglo-American cooperation in the European Theater.   
                                                          
Eisenhower: The Personal Diary of Captain Harry C. Butcher, USNR, Naval Aide to General Eisenhower, 1942 to 
1945 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1946), 6; John Gilbert Winant, Letter From Grosvenor Square: An Account 
of Stewardship (New York: Greenwood Press, 1969), 187; Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate 
History (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948), 314-15 and 385; and DeWitt S. Copp, Forged in Fire: Strategy and 
Decisions in the Air War Over Europe, 1940-1945 (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1982), 231-62.  
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 The best functional analysis currently available for the group’s work can be found in 
William T. Johnsen’s The Origins of the Grand Alliance: Anglo-American Military 
Collaboration from the Panay Incident to Pearl Harbo .  Johnsen provides a more in-depth 
examination of SPOBS’ work than what Ruppenthal provided in Logistical Support of the 
Armies, making use of personal papers from SPOBS officers that few historians had exploited.  
However, like Reynolds and Wilson, a comprehensive examination of the group’s activities is 
not the focus of his work.  Rather, he seeks to demonstrate, from a global perspective, the 
important role that U.S. and British military staff o icers played in laying the foundations of the 
Anglo-American alliance prior to U.S. involvement i the Second World War.  His analysis of 
the group’s work ends at December, 1941, which is appropriate given his research question.  
However, one cannot fully assess the significance of Special Observers’ role in establishing the 
machinery for Anglo-American coalition warfare by reading his book, as the group continued to 
function, as the first headquarters for U.S. forces in Britain, for six months after Pearl Harbor.24        
 That most historians have failed to assess adequatly the significance of SPOBS’ role in 
establishing the machinery for Anglo-American cooperation in Europe is not surprising.  Many 
of the assumptions on which the group based their initial plans with the British were no longer 
valid once the U.S. entered the war, rendering much of t eir work obsolete.  Further, the group 
was perennially plagued by a shortage of personnel and War Department policies that 
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Panay Incident to Pearl Harbor (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2016).  The author also consulted, 
William T. Johnsen, "Forging the Foundations of the Grand Alliance: Anglo-American Military Collaboration, 
1938-1941." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University, 1986, the dissertation from which this book was 
published.  In addition to Johnsen’s work, the Special Observers make minor appearances in a small number of 
dissertations that deal with Anglo-American war planning.  See David Royce Reagan, "American-British Strategic 
Planning for Coalition Warfare Prior to the Entrance of the United States in World War II," unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Tufts University, 1965; and Alfred Goldberg, "Air Logistics: Its Role in the European Theater in World 




undermined the group’s authority, interfering with the ability of its members to implement the 
vision of Major General James E. Chaney, the man who served as head of SPOBS and its 
wartime incarnation, United States Army Forces in the British Isles (USAFBI).  His position as 
head of USAFBI made him the first commander of U.S. forces in Britain.  But by the end of his 
tenure, his influence had waned to the point that General George C. Marshall, the U.S. Army 
Chief of Staff, decided to replace him with Major General Dwight D. Eisenhower, a man whose 
efforts have overshadowed this relatively obscure planning and headquarters staff in the 
historiography of the Second World War.  
 Even those historians who have made an earnest attmpt o assess the significance of 
SPOBS’ work have found the task to be challenging, as the group’s influence on Anglo-
American cooperation, in many cases, is not immediat ly pparent.  Ruppenthal noted in 
Logistical Support of the Armies, “it is difficult to evaluate the work of SPOBS and USAFBI, for 
much of what they accomplished was intangible.”25  Johnsen also noted the importance of 
intangible factors in the process of developing the Anglo-American alliance of which SPOBS 
was a part, “while the significance of these [tangible] accomplishments cannot be overrated they 
are possibly overshadowed by other less tangible, but equally crucial factors that contributed to 
the development of the coalition.”26  
 Ruppenthal and Johnsen chose to tackle the challenge of analyzing the intangible in 
different ways.  While noting the potential importance of effects from SPOBS’ work that are not 
immediately apparent, Ruppenthal largely confines his assessment of SPOBS’ influence to the 
aspects of the group’s work that are most visible: plans and policies that the group was actually 
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able to implement.27  Johnsen also notes SPOBS’ more visible accomplishments prior to 
December 1941.28  However, he includes intangible factors in his analysis by highlighting the 
importance of personal relationships developed in the process, “the individuals involved in the 
negotiations came to understand one another, to garner insights into the personal idiosyncrasies, 
traits, and perceptions of their counterparts . . . the lengthy negotiations . . . allowed the 
participants, at all levels, to establish professional and personal relationships based on mutual 
trust, confidence, and respect.”29  He also notes that the process of working together prior to 
Pearl Harbor allowed U.S. and British staff officers to learn from one another and begin to 
identify the problems that they would have to solve to fight as allies.30   
 To assess fully the role of SPOBS in establishing the machinery of Anglo-American 
coalition warfare will require a different approach from what Ruppenthal, Johnsen, and other 
scholars have used in examining the group’s work.  The majority of scholars who have included 
SPOBS in their works have taken Ruppenthal’s approach, focusing on the most visible products 
of SPOBS’ work, plans and policies that the group actu lly executed during its time in Britain.  
The vast majority have elected to ignore the effects of SPOBS work that are not immediately 
apparent.  Johnsen’s interpretation of the group’s legacy, one rolled up in his overall assessment 
of the importance of pre-Pearl Harbor Anglo-American military collaboration, while currently 
the most nuanced, is not complete.  To fully assess the influence the group had on Anglo-
American coalition warfare, one has to examine the work the group conducted after Pearl Harbor 
as well. 
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 Resolving the limitations in Johnsen’s analysis is much easier than resolving the 
limitations of Ruppenthal and other scholars who have examined SPOBS, one merely needs to 
expand the temporal scope of the study to the first s x months of 1942.  Examining the less 
visible aspects of the planning and policy-making process SPOBS engaged in with the British, 
however, is a more challenging proposition.  Military thinkers might look at the problem of 
analyzing SPOBS and fall back on the two concepts that Eisenhower attempted to convey to the 
NDER convention: that plans almost never work out the way one intends them to and that 
despite the fact that plans almost never work out the way one intends them to, there is intrinsic 
value in planning as a process.  If Eisenhower and co temporary U.S. Army doctrine are correct, 
there was intrinsic value to the work the Special Observers conducted with their British 
counterparts, in spite of the fact that much of it ended up not being used.  But how can one assess 
the intrinsic value of this work?   
This study proposes to resolve this historical problem by adopting two methodological 
approaches to its analysis of the Special Observer Group.  The first is to provide a 
comprehensive narrative of the group’s planning and policy-making work.  Only by analyzing all 
of the group’s work, from the time of its creation to its dissolution, can one gain a full 
understanding of the planning processes the group engaged in as well as the influences of those 
processes on subsequent planning efforts.   
The second is to use an analytical framework that will facilitate identification and 
articulation of the effects of SPOBS’ work that arevisible and straightforward and the effects of 
the group’s work that are less visible and not immediat ly apparent.  This framework, used by 
practitioners of functional analysis in sociology, relies on two contrasting terms: manifest and 
latent.  Robert K. Merton, who himself borrowed theerms from Sigmund Freud, defined 
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manifest functions as, “those objective consequences for a specified unit (person, subgroup, 
social or cultural system) which contribute to its adjustment or adaptation and were so 
intended.”31  He defined latent functions as the, “unintended an  unrecognized consequences of 
the same order.”32  In other words, manifest effects are effects thatare the intended and 
recognized result of an action.  Latent effects are the unintended and unrecognized result of an 
action.  
 Applying this framework to an examination of SPOBS/U AFBI requires adaptation.  
Professional soldiers expect that military plans and operations will have unintended results, an 
expectation that makes them somewhat sensitive (if they are effective professionals) to the 
unintended consequences that typify latent phenomena, although there are certainly still effects 
from military planning and operations that can and will go unnoticed.  For the purposes of this 
study, a latent effect is merely an effect that wasnot consciously intended, regardless of whether 
or not the person or group that generated the effect is conscious of the result.  Manifest effects 
are both intended and recognized.     
 SPOBS/USAFBI’s contributions to Anglo-American coalition warfare in the European 
Theater were both manifest and latent.  From May, 1941 to June, 1942, the group engaged in a 
continuous planning dialogue with their British counterparts and officials in the United States.  
Out of this dialogue came many plans and policies that served as the bedrock for Anglo-
American collaboration in the European Theater, the manifest effects of the group’s work.  More 
importantly, this continuous planning dialogue produced a latent effect as well: a common 
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understanding between U.S. and British planners regarding the ever changing requirements for 
waging Anglo-American coalition war in what would become the ETO.  In short, 
SPOBS/USAFBI’s work with their British counterparts kept U.S. and British officials, steeped in 
the character of the problems that they would one day be called upon to solve.  
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Chapter 1: Prelude and Establishment 
 On Tuesday, October 8, 1940, Brigadier General Raymond E. Lee, the U.S. Military 
Attaché to Britain, made the following entry in his journal: 
A cable from home announced the dates of departure of a swarm of observers, 
mostly Air Corps.  I am delighted to have them sent over for circumstances now 
make written reports almost useless . . . these fellows will have the chance to see 
the RAF in action.  This is without question today the eighth wonder of the world.  
Their fighter pilots, no matter the odds, fly headlong at the Germans and disperse 
them as a hawk does sparrows.1 
 
Lee was not the only U.S. Army officer to admire thcapabilities of the Royal Air Force.  
The Battle of Britain had been raging in the skies over the United Kingdom since July, and 
through the subsequent months, the outnumbered pilots of the RAF's Fighter Command had 
stymied the Luftwaffe's attempts to bomb England into submission.2  To be sure, the ability and 
the dedication of its pilots was a major factor in the RAF's ability to repeatedly frustrate the 
efforts of its opponents.  But the fighter forces were not the only component of Britain's air 
defense.  Daily, British fighters had operated in co cert with radio direction-finding (RDF) 
stations, human observers, and anti-aircraft artille y, in a system centrally controlled by the 
British Fighter Command.3  The success of this system had aroused the interest of the U.S. 
Army, prompting the Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall, to send officers to observe its 
workings.4 
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 The Air Corps observers arrived in England the following Friday.  Among them was an 
old friend of Lee's, Major General James E. Chaney, h ad of the Air Corps Air Defense 
Command.5  Lee described his impression of Chaney upon meeting him again, "Chaney is just 
the same as he was thirty years ago, tall, rangy, black-eyed, silent and Indian-looking, although 
his black hair is now grey.  He never used to express himself on any subject then and does not do 
so now."6  Chaney, known as “Eugene” to his friends and relatives, was descended from a long 
line of Maryland planters who had first settled in Calvert and Anne Arundel counties in the late 
seventeenth century.  Indeed, the Chaney presence was so pervasive in the region, that the town 
of his birth bore the family name while his own parents were both from distant branches of the 
Chaney family.7  With the family name came a tradition of military service, the Maryland 
Chaneys having served in the American Revolution, the War of 1812, and the American Civil 
War.  Chaney’s own father, Dr. Thomas Chaney, had served as both a medical cadet and an 
assistant surgeon for the Union Army before going into private practice after the war.8  General 
Chaney’s brother, Thomas M. Chaney, elected to follw in his fathers’ footsteps, serving as a 
Medical Officer in the U.S. Army while Eugene, after graduating West Point and serving 
initially as an Infantry Officer, elected to enter he pioneering field of Aviation during the First 
World War.9         
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Lee perhaps exaggerated his friend's penchant for silence.  When given a clear mandate 
by his superiors, Chaney could express himself quite freely, making his reports detailed and his 
recommendations with conviction.10  On this particular mission his instructions were 
unambiguous.  The Air Corps had charged his organization with developing a system of unified 
air defense to protect U.S. cities, industry, bases, and troops in the Zone of the Interior.11  He was 
to learn all he could about British air defense andreport his findings to the War Department.  
Additionally, he was to become familiar with the operation and capabilities of British and 
German aircraft.12  By the end of his trip, he would be one of the best informed officers in the 
U.S. Army Air Corps on the organization of the RAF and its operations against Germany.  Little 
did he know that his new-found expertise would lead to his selection by the War Department 
months later to be the head of the U.S. Army Special Observer Group (SPOBS), a small military 
staff charged with traveling to Britain and planning for Anglo-American cooperation if and when 
the United States joined Britain in the war against Germany. 
 The United States and Britain had been attempting diplomatic and military collaboration 
for over two years by the time Chaney went to Englad.  These attempts at cooperation began 
when the Japanese invaded mainland China in 1937.  Officials in the Chamberlain government 
and the Roosevelt administration had feared that Japan's aggression would undermine the 
stability of the entire Far East, a region in which the U.S. and U.K both had interests.13  In 
                                                          
     10 For example, see Chaney's report for this mission, Memo, Major General James E. Chaney to Assistant Chief 
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13 Britain had extensive imperial assets in the region including Hong Kong, Malaya, Singapore, and Burma.  The 
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response to the escalating crisis in Asia and concerns that Japan had signed secret military and 
naval agreements with Germany and Italy, President Franklin D. Roosevelt ordered the Navy's 
War Plans Division to study how America's one-ocean n vy could cope with a potential two-
ocean war.  After conducting its study, the Navy told Roosevelt that the U.S. needed to greatly 
expand its ship building program and conduct staff conversations with the British Admiralty 
about collaboration in the Pacific.14 
 To determine whether or not cooperation between the U.S. and Royal navies was 
possible, Roosevelt sent the Director of the Navy's War Plans Division, Captain Royal E. 
Ingersoll, to England in December, 1937.  While he was in Britain, Ingersoll and members of the 
British Admiralty Staff exchanged information on the status of their countries' respective naval 
assets in the Pacific and Far East as well as their plans for action in the event of increased 
Japanese hostility.  They also identified issues concerning the exchange of intelligence between 
their organizations and determined what communications procedures would have to be worked 
out before cooperation between the two navies could take place.  Additionally, Ingersoll and the 
Admiralty staff delineated tentative areas of responsibility in the Pacific and Far East for the U.S. 
and Royal navies.15  Talks between the two organizations continued into 1939, but after Britain 
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and Germany went to war, the U.S. and the U.K. temporarily restricted naval cooperation with 
one another.16 
 The Royal Navy was not the only organization affiliated with the British Commonwealth 
with which U.S. officials attempted to collaborate with prior to the outbreak of World War II.  
As the stability of Europe and the Far East deteriorated in the late 1930s, Lee used his position as 
Military Attaché to expand his contacts in the British Army and sent what information he could 
about British intentions regarding Germany and Japan back to the War Department.17  
Additionally, military officials from the U.S. and Canada met in 1938 to discuss potential 
cooperation in the defense of North America.  As in the talks between the U.S. and Royal navies, 
the meetings focused on the threat posed by Japan, with the representatives discussing their plans 
for defending the Pacific coast against a possible attack.  The participants also discussed the 
possibility of standardizing war material between the wo countries.18  That same year, France 
and Britain began drawing on U.S. industry for war material by placing orders for aircraft in an 
attempt to compensate for their lack of preparation for a war against Germany.  These purchases 
resulted in ad hoc collaboration with the U.S. military, as French and British purchasing agents 
had to coordinate their purchases with the U.S. Army and U.S. Navy in order to mitigate their 
interference with the Army and Navy's own aircraft procurement programs.19 
 Of these early efforts at collaboration, deconflicting U.S. and British procurement 
programs played the greatest role in the creation of SPOBS.  For the first few months after war 
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broke out in Europe, U.S. industry was able to support munitions orders from Britain, France, 
and the United States because their requirements remain d relatively small.  During this period, 
U.S. policy remained focused on the defense of the Western Hemisphere, prompting only modest 
increases in manpower and equipment for the U.S. military.20  Further, with the Neutrality Act of 
November 1939, the U.S. adopted a policy of "cash and carry" regarding munitions supplied to 
nations involved in the war against Germany.  In essence, this policy required countries wishing 
to purchase munitions and military equipment from the United States to pay for them in full and 
transport the equipment through their own means.  I order to conserve their limited funds of 
dollars, Great Britain and France restricted their expenditures, utilizing the U.S. as a source of 
emergency and reserve supply while focusing on building up their own industries.21  Even with 
these limitations, however, Britain and France were encroaching on the procurement programs of 
the U.S. Army and Navy.22  Thus, the potential for any one of these nations t  disrupt the 
procurement programs of the others by increasing their own purchases was great. 
 As the German Army tore through the defenses of the Allies in spring, 1940, the U.S., 
France, and Britain all frantically attempted to expand their procurement programs.  Britain and 
France abandoned their cautionary spending policies and appealed to the U.S. to provide them as 
much war material as it could muster, placing increased pressure on an armament industry 
unprepared for wartime mobilization.23  Although France eventually fell to Axis forces, this 
pressure did not abate, as Britain took over all French purchasing contracts.24  With France 
defeated and Britain forced to flee the continent at Dunkirk, the threat the Axis posed to the 
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Western Hemisphere became critical, causing the U.S. to embark on its own expanded 
rearmament and mobilization program.  Because the capabilities of the U.S. armament industry 
were still very limited, many military officials beli ved the U.S. would have to decide between 
allowing British orders to continue or fulfilling the imperatives its own rearmament program.25  
The predominant view among War Department planners entering the summer of 1940 was that 
the U.S. should not enter into any further material agreements with the British, as it would be 
squandering material that the U.S. Army and U.S.  Navy desperately needed to defend the 
Western Hemisphere.26   
 Although he agreed in principle with his advisors that the U.S. should not accept British 
orders if they would interfere with America's own procurement programs, Roosevelt ordered the 
Army and Navy to continue looking for ways to releas  war material to the United Kingdom.  
The President reasoned that releasing small amounts f material to the British would contribute 
to the national defense of the United States, as long as Britain used it against Germany.27  
However, these equipment releases would only be benficial if Britain was strong enough to 
stave off a German invasion.  Before he could commit fully to his policy of providing material 
aid to Britain, Roosevelt needed more information about its prospects for survival. 
 A willingness on the part of Britain to resume sharing information about its war plans 
with United States provided Roosevelt with the opportunity he needed to assess British strength.  
The disaster at Dunkirk and France's apparent defeat convinced many British officials that 
substantial American assistance would be required for the U.K. to stand against the Axis powers 
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in both Europe and the Far East.28  Among these officials were Winston Churchill, therecently 
appointed Prime Minister of Great Britain, and the British Ambassador in Washington, Lord 
Lothian.  Towards the end of June, Lothian had a personal meeting with President Roosevelt 
where, acting on behalf of Churchill, he requested that the two countries organize a staff 
conference between naval officers to exchange information on fleet plans for the Atlantic and 
Pacific.29 
 Roosevelt enthusiastically agreed and subsequently decided to expand the scope of the 
conference by sending representatives from the U.S. Army as well.  In all, three officers traveled 
to England on 6 August 1940 to observe the British war effort and discuss matters concerning 
possible joint planning and cooperation between Great Britain and the United States.30  To 
discuss naval matters, the U.S. Navy sent Rear Admiral Robert L. Ghormley, the Assistant Chief 
of Naval Operations.  The U.S. Army sent Brigadier G neral George V. Strong, Chief of the War 
Plans Division (WPD) of the War Department General St ff, and Major General Delos C. 
Emmons, the commanding general of General Headquarters (GHQ) Air Force, to discuss Army 
war plans and aviation planning respectively.31 
 Joined by the U.S. Naval and Military Attachés to Britain, these officers met with the 
British Chiefs of Staff under the official guise of "The Anglo-American Standardization of Arms 
Committee."  The topics covered during the meetings of this committee, however, covered much 
more than the mere standardization of arms between the two nations.  The British Chiefs of Staff 
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briefed the American members of the committee on their expectations and future plans for 
conducting the war.  Subjects covered during the brief included the necessity for continued U.S. 
material aid to Britain, Britain's desire for support from the U.S. Navy in the Pacific, and the 
outline of Britain's peripheral strategy for defeating Germany. 32  The American participants 
revealed little about U.S. war plans, as they lacked th  authority to make any commitments to the 
British on the part of the United States.  The U.S. representatives did, however, make 
recommendations concerning British policy based on the amount of support they believed the 
United States would likely provide.  Additionally, they proposed that the U.S. and Britain begin 
exchanging information on a regular basis.33 
 When the formal conferences ended, the U.S. represntatives dispersed to meet with their 
counterpart British services, gaining information that would encourage the U.S. Army and U. S. 
Navy to seek further cooperation with the British military.  Ghormley observed British naval 
operations and engaged in discussions concerning possible collaboration with the Royal Navy.  
He stayed in Britain for the rest of the year, examining the possibility of Anglo-American 
cooperation at sea.34   Strong and Emmons spent much less time in Britain, but their observations 
would prove decisive in changing the attitude of War Department planners regarding Britain's 
chances for survival.  After the conferences ended, they witnessed the Battle of Britain firsthand, 
gaining a newfound appreciation of Britain's capabilities.  Strong and Emmons respected British 
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coolness and determination under fire and admired th ir organization, training, equipment and 
tactics.  They were particularly impressed with the m asures that Britain had developed against 
air attack and the strategic possibilities of air bom ardment.35  After observing the performance 
of British forces, Strong and Emmons became convinced that Germany could not successfully 
invade England and that as long as Britain maintained control of the seas, Germany would 
eventually lose the war.36  Shortly after returning to the United States in September, they 
compiled a report of their observations for Marshall.  While the War Department staff did not 
immediately adopt the views of Emmons and Strong, their report did lead planners to conclude 
that Britain would be able to hold out for at least six months.37 
 U.S. officials were now more optimistic about Britain's chances for survival than they 
had been at the beginning of summer, an assessment that opened doors for further Anglo-
American collaboration.  The Ghormley-Strong-Emmons mi sion, along with a visit to England 
by William J. Donovan, the flamboyant future head of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), 
provided confirmation to F.D.R. and the War Department that Britain was strong enough, at least 
temporarily, to continue making effective use of materi l aid sent to it by the United States to 
prevent a German invasion of the British Isles.38  Additionally, the War Department paid heed to 
Strong and Emmons' positive impressions concerning the organization, training, tactics, and 
equipment of the British Army and Royal Air Force.  The air war over Britain provided the U.S. 
Army with an irresistible opportunity to observe new doctrinal concepts and equipment in action 
against a potential enemy.  Thus, Marshall did not wai long to initiate the periodic information 
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exchanges that the Anglo-American Standardization of Arms Committee had agreed to.  On 23 
September 1940, he ordered the Air Corps to send observers to England to learn what they could 
from the British by observing their defense of the United Kingdom.39 
Marshall’s decision to send Air Corps observers, headed by Chaney, to England was not 
the only indication that collaboration between the United States and Great Britain was increasing 
in the fall of 1940.  On 2 September, after months of negotiations, the Roosevelt Administration 
agreed to help Britain alleviate its chronic shortage of ships by sending it fifty World War I era 
destroyers in exchange for basing rights in the Bahamas, Jamaica, Antigua, St. Lucia, Trinidad, 
and British Guiana.40  Additionally, the British inaugurated scientific cooperation between the 
two countries by sending a team of experts under Henry Tizard to the United States to divulge 
technological secrets in exchange for access to resea ch and production resources.41  The 
Destroyer-for-Bases Agreement, the Tizard mission, and Chaney's mission to observe the 
operations of the RAF were indicative of a newfound appreciation of Britain's capabilities on the 
part of U.S. officials by autumn, 1940. 
 If there were any doubts in Chaney's mind about the capability of the British to defend 
their island, they were erased once he saw the British in action.  Over a period of six weeks, he 
and his assistant, Captain Gordon P. Saville, conducte  a comprehensive examination of Britain's 
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entire effort in the air war against Germany. During the mission, they visited and observed 
fighter and bomber operations, Royal Navy and Coastal Command stations, British maintenance 
and production facilities, and the use of barrage balloons in combat.  Additionally, they inspected 
Britain's anti-aircraft artillery defenses, their air raid warning system, their air raid shelters, and 
toured London to observe bomb damage.  The British al o granted them access to some of their 
most sensitive areas, including the Air Ministry's War room.  The British even afforded them the 
opportunity to inspect flight logs from bomber missions and granted them post-mission 
interviews with some of the pilots.42  When they returned to the U.S. on 23 November 1940, 
Chaney and Saville were among the best informed officers in the U.S. Army Air Corps on the 
organization of the RAF and its operations against Germany.43 
 On his return to the United States, Chaney made no secret of his views regarding 
Britain’s chances in the war against Germany and whether or not the U.S. stood to gain by 
establishing closer relations with Britain. In an interview with the New York Times less than two 
weeks after he came back from England, he declared that he "did not believe England would lose 
the war unless it became careless or overconfident," a d noted that "most people don't seem to 
realize how much we are getting in the form of secret and technical information that will aid us 
in our rearmament efforts."44  Chaney had come away from his trip convinced that t ere was 
much to gain from collaborating with Britain, in spite of the fact that it opposed an Axis alliance 
that controlled most of Europe. 
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 On 15 December 1940, eleven days after the article h t print, Chaney sent a detailed 
report of his trip to the War Department's G-2 (Intelligence) Office, in which he articulated the 
reasons for his optimistic appraisal of Britain's ability to stand against the Axis forces.  His report 
contained a study of each of each agency involved in the air war against Germany, as well as an 
analysis of the Battle of Britain itself.  Additionally, he included a substantial amount of 
technical data regarding aircraft, RDF systems, radios, anti-aircraft weapons, and a host of other 
equipment used by Britain and Germany.  He ended his report by making a list of 
recommendations regarding equipment and organizational procedures the British used that he 
urged the U.S. Army to adopt as part of its own mobilization and rearmament program.45 
 Chaney devoted a substantial portion of his report to praising the merits of Britain's air 
defense network.  Referring to the RAF Fighter Command's system of RDF stations and the 
organization of its ground Observer Corps he argued, "It is my opinion that one of the main 
reasons for the British success in the air has beenthis effective ground organization and 
equipment by which the British are able to make 100fighter planes and 100 fighter pilots do the 
work of many times that number."  Chaney noted that t is system enabled the British to keep 
their aircraft on the ground until the last possible moment.  By doing so, they were able to 
dispense with costly air patrols that dispersed their forces, caused increase pilot fatigue, and wear 
and tear on the aircraft.  With the advanced notice that RDF and observers provided, he noted, 
the British were able to mass their aircraft effectively and place their squadrons at advantageous 
altitudes for attacking German bombers and fighters.46 
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 To Chaney, the relationship of Fighter Command to the rest of the air defense forces was 
even more critical than the organization of its observer and RDF stations.  Under the British 
system of air defense, the Commander-in-Chief, Fighter Command served a dual role.  He was 
both commander of Great Britain's fighter forces and the Air Officer in charge of all Britain's air 
defense organizations.  Chaney noted, "The commanders of the Antiaircraft Command, the 
Balloon Command, and the Observer Corps, are unanimous in their opinion that all active air 
defense units must be disposed and coordinated by the air officer commanding the fighter forces 
. . . fighter forces alone are capable of defending a large area as a whole, and . . . local defenses 
should be disposed and operated so as to assist and not hinder the defense as a whole."  To the 
British, unity of command under the fighter forces was essential.  Chaney quoted Lieutenant 
General Sir Frederick Pile, Commanding General of the Antiaircraft Command, "Any air defense 
system which does not charge the commander of fighter forces with full responsibility for the 
whole air defense is unworkable."47 Chaney came away from his observer mission convinced 
that the British were correct.  His adoption of British views regarding air defense would 
profoundly influence the Anglo-American war planning i  which SPOBS participated as well as 
his relationship with his superiors in the War Department in the coming year. 
 While Chaney had still been in Britain, officials in the War and Navy Departments 
adopted a strategic policy that would eventually result in the creation of SPOBS and its naval 
counterpart, the office of the Special Naval Observer, London (SPENAVO).  Based on a 
strategic appraisal drawn up by the Chief of Naval Operations, Harold R. Stark, called the "Plan 
Dog" memorandum, officials in the War and Navy Departments adopted the view that a British 
victory over Germany was essential to U.S. security, and that the U.S. should reorient its strategy 
                                                          




towards keeping Britain in the war and preparing for active U.S. intervention in Europe.  With 
this shift in policy, War and Navy Department officials decided the time had come to meet with 
the British and develop a common strategy to be employed in the event the U.S. became an 
active participant in the war.48 
 U.S. and British military officials developed this common strategy in a series of secret 
meetings in Washington D.C. from January to March, 1941, an episode known as the American-
British Conversations (ABC).  As the United States was still neutral when these meetings 
occurred, the U.S. representatives made no formal or binding agreements.  Rather, the plans 
developed during the conferences were contingencies, to be executed only in the event the U.S. 
entered the war.  The conferees agreed that among the Axis powers, Germany was the primary 
threat.  Reflecting this assumption, the broad strategy the participants formulated called for both 
countries to conduct offensive operations against Germany first and maintain a defensive posture 
against Japan in the Pacific.  The participants drew up the results of their deliberations in a 
conference report, entitled ABC-1, which they meant to serve as a guide for further collaborative 
planning.  To facilitate this planning, the two countries agreed to exchange of missions 
composed of representatives from the military servic s of each nation.49 
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 The Army started the process of building what would eventually become SPOBS within a 
week after the end of the conferences.  Only a few individuals were initially cognizant of this 
effort. Among them were Marshall; Major General Stanley Embick, the senior U.S. Army 
representative at ABC; Brigadier General Leonard T. Gerow, the new Chief of WPD; Colonel 
Joseph T. McNarney, head of the Joint Planning Committee of WPD and a participant in ABC; 
Brigadier General Wade H. Haislip, Assistant Chief of Staff (ACS), G-1(Personnel); and 
Brigadier General Sherman Miles, ACS G-2 (Intelligenc ).50  As the mission took shape, others 
from the War Department gradually became involved in the project.   
 The first task these individuals tackled was determining the mission's scope of 
responsibility as well as the number and type of officers needed to staff it.  In terms of structure, 
the War Department staff was in general agreement. The mission was to be composed of the 
"nucleus" of a headquarters staff.  Prior to U.S. entry into the war, the mission would only have 
the minimum essential personnel needed to conduct joint planning with the British.  This pre-
belligerency staff would include a head of mission; a chief of staff; a general staff of five 
officers; and a special staff that included representatives from the Ordnance Department, the 
Corps of Engineers, the Quartermaster Corps, Signal Corps, and Medical Corps.  In all, the 
mission would consist of seventeen officers and ten enlisted clerks. 51   
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 While the War Department staff was in general agreem nt concerning the basic form of 
the Nucleus Mission, planners in WPD and Miles develop d two different views regarding the 
mission's function and its relationship to the Military Attaché in London.  Among the proposals 
that circulated concerning the group's function after U.S. entry into the war was that it would 
exercise command and control of all U.S. forces sent to Britain.  Miles felt commanding troops 
in the United Kingdom was incompatible with what he believed to be the group's primary 
purpose: developing broad policy with the British that had application beyond the confines of the 
North Atlantic and the British Isles.  To Miles, this duty would require the full attention of the 
mission, making it likely that the Army would need to appoint a separate commander of troops if 
the United States entered the war.  He argued that instead of designating a head of mission 
intended to command U.S. troops in Britain, the War Department should place the mission under 
the Military Attaché, at least temporarily, to establish a close working relationship with the U.S. 
Embassy and take advantage of its position as a conduit of information between the British and 
American governments.52 
 The WPD staff disagreed with Miles' assessment on ma y points.  They felt that the first 
and most important task of the Nucleus Mission was to prepare for the arrival of U.S. forces in 
Britain.  This did not mean that they discounted Miles' assertion that the mission should be 
involved in developing broad policy with the British.  Rather, the planners in WPD felt that the 
mission should engage in both the formulation of brad policy concerning Anglo-American 
cooperation, and the planning and execution of joint tasks that directly concerned U.S. troops in 
the British Isles.  As to whether or not the head of the mission would also serve as the future 
head of U.S. forces, they urged that the War Departmen  defer this decision until the U.S. had 
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defined its role in the war more clearly.  However, one can see at this point that WPD planners 
were already envisioning placing command and control of U.S. Forces in Britain under the 
Nucleus Mission.  Included in their recommendation f r the formation of the group was a plan to 
expand the mission to a full general staff upon U.S. entry into the war. 53  Regardless of the role 
of the head of mission following active U.S. belligerency, WPD argued that the mission should 
not serve under the Military Attaché.  They felt the Attaché was subject to too much political and 
diplomatic control as part of the embassy staff.  Instead, the planners at WPD felt that the 
mission "should be directly controlled by the Chief of Staff," which would require designating a 
separate head of mission who reported directly to Marshall.54 
 Marshall's final approval for the Nucleus Mission conformed to the views of WPD, a 
decision to be expected given that WPD's plan enabld him to bypass the U.S. Embassy and 
work directly with the British Chiefs of Staff.  The head of the Nucleus Mission was to be "a 
Major General qualified and intended for command of United States forces that may be sent to 
England or as Chief of Staff to any other commander who may be designated."55  The Military 
Attaché was to continue to perform his normal duties for both the U.S. Embassy and the Military 
Intelligence Division and would not oversee the activities of the Nucleus Mission.56  
 Marshall’s instructions appeared to define clearly the mission's relationship to the 
Military Attaché's office.  Marshall, however, did not realize that the "normal duties" of the 
Military Attaché in London were changing daily.  The primary duties of the Military Attaché's 
office had been to gather information about Britain's military activities and serve as a military 
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advisor to the U.S. Ambassador.57  However, as the U.S. became increasingly involved in 
preparing for a possible alliance with the United Kingdom, Lee and his staff became the primary 
means through which U.S. Army agencies attempted to interface with the RAF and the British 
Army.  In the process, Lee's office assumed many ad-hoc duties in terms of coordinating, 
planning, and negotiating with these two agencies.58  No single individual in the War 
Department, including Miles, Lee's superior, was fully aware of all the activities in which the 
Military Attaché's office was engaged.59  Reflecting this lack of awareness, the initial 
instructions for the Nucleus Mission addressed command relationships, but they did not clearly 
define separate spheres of responsibility for the mission and the Military Attaché's office.60  The 
failure on the part of the War Department to clearly differentiate the missions of these 
organizations created a situation where conflict betwe n the two groups over roles, 
responsibilities, and resources was almost inevitable.  
 That War Department planners did not adequately factor in the role of the Military 
Attaché in Britain is understandable, given that Marsh ll's acceptance of WPD's vision for the 
group made implementing ABC-1 and establishing a prope  relationship with the British the 
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focus for the Nucleus Mission.  Marshall's choice to serve as chief of staff for the mission, 
Colonel Joseph T. McNarney, was an indication of the priority he accorded these two tasks.61  
McNarney was a tall, dark man of Scotch-Irish heritage with a receding hairline and reputation 
for being dour, taciturn, officially ruthless, and shrewd at poker.  For these last four qualities, hi 
peers regarded him highly.  A fellow officer on the War Department General Staff explained, 
"McNarney is distressingly logical, but absolutely fair.  He will break an overenthusiastic 
officer's heart by quietly, icily pointing out the oles in his idea.  But if the idea is sound, he will 
put it into effect immediately–and see that the officer gets credit for it.  He's ruthless, all right, 
but just as ruthless with himself.  Only what's best for the Army counts with him."62  The 
personal qualities that McNarney possessed were ideal for the position he was assuming.  The 
War Department was determined that this mission would not make commitments to the British 
that exceeded the provisions laid out in ABC-1, andy chief of staff overseeing the mission 
would require a disciplined and forceful personality like McNarney's to ensure the mission's staff 
did not overstep the authority the Army delegated to it.63 
 The choice of McNarney was logical for other reasons as well.  As a participant in the 
staff conversations between Britain and the United States, he had been directly involved in the 
development of ABC-1.  Additionally, ABC-1 envisioned that most units that the U.S. Army 
would send to Britain after the outbreak of war would be aviation units, and as an Air Corps 
officer intimately familiar with the agreements in ABC-1, McNarney was ideally suited to head 
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the Army staff responsible for future collaboration with the British.  Having served as the head 
of the Joint Planning Committee, McNarney was also one of the few officers in the Army 
thoroughly familiar with the Army's current war plans.64 
 Reflecting the increased level of responsibility inherent in his new position, the Army 
promoted McNarney to Brigadier General and soon after, he began drafting the letter of 
instructions that Marshall would give to the head of the Nucleus Mission.65  The War 
Department was still working on determining who the letter's recipient would be.  Logic dictated 
that the Major General selected to serve as the head of the Nucleus Mission should have two 
distinct qualities.  First, as the force the U.S. Army planned to send to Great Britain upon entry 
into the war was predominantly an aviation force, an Air Corps officer would be best suited to 
serve as the head of mission.  Second, since the mission's leader would be serving as Marshall's 
representative to the British Chiefs of Staff, a background in overseas service was highly 
desirable, especially if that service had been withthe British. 
 By mid-April Marshall selected an officer to lead the mission who possessed both 
qualities: Major General James E. Chaney.66  In addition to his expertise regarding British air 
operations, Chaney had extensive experience in both command and staff positions in the Air 
Service and Air Corps, including a stint as Assistant Chief of the Air Corps from 1935-1938.  He 
also had a unique blend of aviation technical expertise and extensive overseas service.  From 
August 1918 to June 1924 Chaney served in various duties involving aviation all over Europe, 
including service as the U.S. Aviation Officer in the Provisional District of Great Britain from 
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August to October 1919 and service as Assistant Mili ary Attaché for Aviation in Rome from 
October 1919 to June 1924.  Additionally, Chaney returned to Europe again in 1932, to serve as 
a technical advisor on aviation matters to Brigadier G neral George S. Simonds during the 
Disarmament Conference in Geneva, Switzerland.67  Chaney's background in the Air Corps and 
in overseas service made him an ideal choice for head of the Nucleus Mission. 
 His most attractive qualities remained, however, his recent experience as an Air Corps 
observer in Britain and his experience in developing air defense doctrine as the head of Air 
Defense Command.  After submitting his report on his visit to Britain, Chaney and his staff at 
Air Defense Command had set to work incorporating British methods into U.S. air defense 
doctrine.  From January 21 to January 24, 1941, as the American British Conversations began, 
the group tested this revised doctrine in a four-day exercise simulating an air attack against a 
"test sector" corresponding to the states of New York and Massachusetts.  For the purposes of 
the exercise, Air Defense Command assumed a role ana ogous to that of the British Fighter 
Command, having overall control of all air defense a sets in the sector.  Using Coast Guard 
observation stations, 10,000 civilian observers organized in a fashion similar to the British 
Observer Corps, and three Signal Corps SCR-270 radar systems for detection of aircraft, the 
group allocated Signal, Coast Artillery, and Air Corps assets to subordinate regional 
commanders to respond to "enemy" aircraft coming from the sea.68 
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 To Chaney, the "Test Sector" exercise confirmed th applicability of British air defense 
doctrine to the circumstances of the United States.  Problems did arise during the event, but 
Chaney and his staff concluded that these problems arose from inadequate equipment, 
inadequate training, and a lack of standard operating procedures, flaws to be expected when 
testing new doctrine.  Nowhere in the report of the ex rcise did Chaney criticize the fundamental 
organizational model, based on British Fighter Command, the group had employed.69  Rather, 
the exercise made Chaney aware of the improvements that would have to be made in Army's 
Signal, Coast Artillery, and Air Corps assets in order for it to be able to perform air defense 
operations in a manner similar to the British.  Thus, in addition to his technical expertise, his 
long history of dealing with foreign governments in aviation matters, and the first-hand 
knowledge of both British and German aviation capabilities he gained during his trip to England 
in the fall of 1940, Chaney had practical experience that made him aware of the challenges the 
Army would face in attempting to perform aviation operations jointly with the United Kingdom. 
 With the mission's leader and chief of staff chosen, the War Department's G-1 set about 
selecting the mission's other members.  This task fell to General Haislip's "pick and shovel" man, 
Colonel James E. Wharton.70  In selecting members for the mission, Wharton appe rs to have 
focused on two key requirements: the necessity of having qualified and experienced officers on 
the staff and expediency.  The majority of the officers he selected came from the War 
Department General Staff, U.S. Army GHQ, GHQ Air Foce, and the headquarters of the Army's 
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various arms and services.71  Their positions in these organizations gave the saff members the 
most current picture of the Army's status concerning their areas of expertise.  Additionally, these 
organizations were the only place where officers could get the experience necessary for 
conducting planning in collaboration with high level British military staffs.  Finally, all of these 
organizations were either in Washington D.C. or close to it, making it easier for McNarney to 
gather the individuals for the mission once the Chief of Staff approved them, an important factor 
since Marshall had directed the General Staff to esabli h the mission at the earliest practicable 
date.72   
 As he wanted the mission to begin as soon as possible, Marshall wasted no time 
providing Chaney with his instructions.  He was to erve as the Special Army Observer in 
London, responsible directly to the Chief of Staff, United States Army.  In conjunction with the 
Special Naval Observer, Admiral Ghormley, his primary mission was to "negotiate with the 
British Chiefs of Staff on military affairs of common interest relating to joint United States-
British cooperation in British areas of responsibility."73  Marshall emphasized to Chaney that he 
was limiting the scope of his authority to strictly military matters.  He was not to enter into any 
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political commitments.  Further, he and his staff were to conduct combined planning with the 
British according to the provisions contained in ABC-1.  Marshall's instructions also stated that 
Chaney's appointment was preliminary to his possible appointment at a later date as Army 
Member of the United States Military Mission in London, which meant he would be serving as 
commander of U.S. forces in the British Isles if the War Department decided to invest the head 
of the mission with both responsibilities upon U.S. entry into the war.74 
 The tasks Marshall assigned to Chaney and his staff had the potential of creating 
problems both domestically and diplomatically for the Roosevelt Administration.  The United 
States at this point was still a neutral country with a substantial noninterventionist movement.75  
Sending U.S. military officials to confer with an active belligerent for many would have brought 
the United States too close to active involvement.  Domestically, Anglo-American military 
collaboration had the potential of creating a political firestorm. 
 Diplomatically, relations between the United States and Germany could only have 
worsened if plans for military cooperation between Britain and the U.S. had come to light.  This 
was especially troubling in light of the fact that Germany had signed the Tripartite Pact with 
Japan and Italy on 27 September 1940 in part, as a message to the United States not to provide 
any further assistance to Britain.76  Increased collaboration on the part of the U.K. and the United 
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States could have caused a corresponding increase in collaboration between potential enemies.  
At the very least, it would have been unwise for the U.S. to tip its hand to Germany by revealing 
that it was engaged in planning for offensive operations in Europe.  These sensitive issues were 
among the reasons that U.S. and British representatives had conducted the American-British 
Conversations in secret.77  Chaney's mission had to operate under a similar veil of secrecy, or 
risk causing a political and diplomatic crisis for the Roosevelt Administration.  For this reason, 
the U.S. Army attempted to conceal the group’s truep rpose by calling it the "U.S. Army 
Special Observer Group" or “SPOBS” for short.78  After Chaney received the group's 
instructions, McNarney set about getting those not already in the city to Washington D.C.79  The 
mission's officers came together for the first time in arly May.  Approximately one week later 
the first group of Special Observers left for Englad.80 
Some of the Special Observers found the trip to be an njoyable experience.  Lieutenant 
Colonel John E. Dahlquist, the SPOBS G-1 (Personnel Officer) indicated as much in the first of 
many letters to his wife Ruth, written as he sat in his room in New York City’s Astor Hotel on 14 
May 1941.  Dahlquist was an Infantry officer who had been serving in the G-1 Office of the War 
Department General Staff, which was probably one of the main reasons he had been assigned to 
go to England.  He was a tall man of fair complexion, a product of his Swedish ancestry of which 
he was immensely proud.  He loomed over most of the o r Special Observers, his size giving 
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him an air of awkwardness that was reinforced by a look that gave the impression that he was 
perpetually uncomfortable, even when he was happy. 
Dahlquist noted to his wife that his trip had begun rather pleasantly, his words looking 
more like they were from a man who was beginning a vacation than embarking on a secret 
mission to Britain.  To kill time while waiting to depart, he and other members of the group had 
walked up Broadway and went to see the play Hellzapoppin’.  Now, writing to Ruth, he 
reminisced about a week the two had spent at the Astor almost nineteen years before.  The only 
note of seriousness came towards the end of the letter, when he praised her for handling his 
departure well, making it less difficult for him toleave.81  
For Dahlquist, most of his journey to England was straightforward.  He and the rest of his 
party boarded a Pan American Airlines plane the next day and flew until reaching Bermuda.  
After refueling the airplane, they continued on to the Azores where they stopped, staying at the 
Pan American Hotel.  After their stay in the Azores, the group flew to Lisbon, staying in a hotel 
that was right on the water.  While waiting for a pl ne to Britain, Dahlquist and some of his 
traveling companions walked around the city, taking t me to see a bull fight and lose money at 
roulette in a casino.82     
It was during this time this time that Dahlquist began expressing his impressions of his 
fellow Special Observers to his wife in his letters.  He particularly enjoyed the company of 
Major Townsend “Pinky” Griffiss, Chaney’s aide-de-camp.83  Griffiss, was an Air Corps officer, 
a dashing man, with good looks and a mischievous smile.  His family wealth permitted him to 
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indulge in hobbies that would have proven difficult for most men of his rank to sustain.  An avid 
polo player who had played on the Army team in Hawaii, a team trained by Major George S. 
Patton, he maintained three polo ponies of his own.84  He had a love of travel and was a good 
storyteller, even putting his storytelling skills to good use writing a travel guide to Hawaii.85  He 
was also daring.  Griffiss had served in the Military Attaché’s office in Spain during the Spanish 
Civil War and, according to one of his nephews, had w nted to see a German Messerschmitt Bf 
109 close up so badly, he convinced his hosts to loan him a Russian fighter plane so he could go 
up and see the aircraft in action.86  
Based on Dahlquist’s description, Griffiss and Chaney made a strange pair, “General 
Chaney is the most taciturn man I have ever met.  H keeps largely to himself.  He is most 
pleasant when spoken to but has little to say.  I imagine he has plenty on his mind.  He also looks 
a little tired.”87  To be sure, this mission was unlike any that Chaney had been on before.  The 
U.S. Army had never engaged in collaborative planning of this kind with an active belligerent in 
a war while at the same time maintaining an officially neutral status.  A wrong move on the part 
of Chaney or his staff had the potential of causing a  international incident.  That possibility 
alone was enough to cause anyone to take pause and r flect on their circumstances.  But the 
heaviest burden for Chaney must have been the possibility that he would serve as commander of 
U.S. forces in Britain if and when the U.S. entered the war, a duty that would make him 
responsible for the lives of thousands of U.S. servic  men. 
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The potential consequences for failure were certainly not lost on Dahlquist.  On 19 May, 
an hour into his flight to Britain on a Sunderland flying boat, he admitted to Ruth in a letter that 
he was feeling anxious about the mission, “I keep wondering what I will do and how I will act, I 
hope I do both creditably.”88  His brief revelation of self-doubt was the only indication of 
discomfort he communicated to his wife during his trip. 
Lieutenant Colonel Charles L. Bolte, the SPOBS Plans Officer, had quite a different 
experience on his trip to England. Bolte was a dark-haired, square-jawed, Infantry officer, whose 
face was just beginning to crease with age.  The son of a veteran of the Spanish-American War, 
his association with the military had begun with attendance at what would come to be known as 
“Plattsburg Camps,” an outgrowth of the Preparedness Movement which had sought to provide 
U.S. civilian volunteers with military training during the summers of 1914, 1915, and 1916.89  
Bolte obtained a reserve commission in the Army in 1916, and subsequently traveled to France 
in 1918 with the Fourth Division where he fought in he Aisne-Marne, St. Mihiel, and Meuse-
Argonne offensives, ending the war recovering from a chest wound in a base hospital in 
Nevers.90  He spent the interwar years serving in a variety of positions including a stint at the 
Infantry School working as an instructor under Lieutenant Colonel George C. Marshall, an 
assignment to the Fifteenth Infantry Regiment in Tientsin, China, and instructor duty at the Army 
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War College.91  He had been serving as the operations and training officer for IV Army Corps in 
Jacksonville, Florida when, without warning, he gota telephone call to come to Washington for 
extended overseas service.92   
Bolte was certainly no coward.  However, unlike Dahlquist, he found his trip to England 
to be very disconcerting.  Traveling with separate party of Special Observers, Bolte arrived in 
Lisbon about a day later than Dahlquist.  To him, the city seemed to be a hotbed of intrigue.93  
Although they were wearing civilian clothes to conceal the fact that they were U.S. Army 
officers, everyone seemed to know who they were, and he was sure that his bags had been rifled 
through.  To him, it seemed as if every spy in the world was there to watch them.  Whether the 
threat of espionage against the party was real or imagined, Bolte and his traveling companions 
did not stay in Lisbon long.  Within a few days, they followed Dahlquist’s party, boarding 
another British Sunderland flying boat and starting he final leg of their journey to the U.K.94  
The flight proved to be a somewhat hair-raising experience for Bolte and his group.  As the plane 
flew over the Bay of Biscay on the way to the U.K., a British fighter suddenly made a run on 
their flying boat.  The passengers found out later that the fighter had been part of a British effort 
to locate and destroy the German battleship Bismarck, which had recently sunk the battlecruiser 
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HMS Hood and with it almost all her crew, before it escaped to France.95  The encounter was a 
clear indication to the party that they had just entered a war zone.     
Eventually, the Special Observers all safely reached London.  Chaney officially activated 
the group on 19 May 1941, establishing a temporary headquarters at the U.S. Embassy.  They 
began their planning work there, making do with the cramped accommodations until the British 
could repair first two floors of a bombed out apartment house at 18-20 Grosvenor Square.96  The 
first order of business was for the Special Observers to meet with their British counterparts and 
determine how they would begin to develop plans for implementing ABC-1.  On 22 May, 
Chaney and McNarney met with the British Chiefs of Staff Committee to introduce themselves.  
There, Chaney read excerpts of the instructions Marshall have given to him, explaining his 
mission to the group of assembled leaders.97 
 Before the Special Observers had even arrived, the British had decided to incorporate 
them as much as possible into their planning machinery for ABC-1.  The Chiefs of Staff 
designated Chaney and Ghormley as associates of theChiefs of Staff Committee, a status which 
allowed them to participate in committee meetings that dealt with subjects of interest to both the 
U.S. and British military services.  They also provided Ghormley and Chaney with direct access 
to the First Sea Lord, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and the Chief of the Air Staff on an 
individual basis.  Additionally, they designated the Special Observers as associates of the Joint 
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Planning Staff (JPS), Britain’s multiservice military planning subcommittee, and authorized 
them to work directly with the various branches andsections of each military service.98  Indeed, 
the Special Observers were to be treated almost as if hey were British staff members, with the 
Chiefs of Staff directing that, “subject to the proviso that future operations will not be disclosed 
without special authority, the United States Mission in London should be treated with frankness 
in accordance with the practice which was maintained during the staff conversations in 
Washington.”99  Thus, Chaney and McNarney (and Ghormley as well) had the full support of the 
British Chiefs of Staff in getting the Special Observers access to the information and people 
necessary for developing plans to implement ABC-1.           
Five days after Chaney and McNarney met with the Chi fs of Staff, McNarney and the 
SPOBS G-3 (Operations), Colonel Harold M. McClelland, attended a meeting of the JPS to 
discuss liaison arrangements between SPOBS, the Chiefs of Staff Committee and its subordinate 
organizations, and the separate Service Departments.  At the beginning of the meeting, Colonel 
Oliver Stanley, Director of the Operational Planning Section, informed the meeting’s participants 
that the JPS was to serve as the primary means of liaison between SPOBS and the Chiefs of Staff 
Committee.100 After Stanley’s introductory remarks, Lieutenant Colonel A. T. Cornwall-Jones, 
the Secretary to the JPS, briefed McNarney and McClelland on the structure of the Chiefs of 
Staff Committee as well as the form and functions of its subordinate organizations.101  
McNarney, in-turn, briefed the members of the Operation l Planning Section on the structure of 
the U.S. War Department as well as the functions of the War Department G-1, G-2, G-3, and G-4 
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(Logistics).102  He then briefed SPOBS’ mission, the group’s structure, and, in keeping with his 
straightforward personality, emphasized to the British hat, because the U.S. was not an active 
belligerent, they should not expect SPOBS to engage in planning outside the parameters of what 
the U.S. and British military services had agreed to in Washington.103  Stanley, for his part, 
provided additional input during McNarney’s brief, asserting that the Special Observers should 
begin making contact with the British Service Departments relevant to their duties as soon as 
possible.104  
The War Office and the Air Ministry, the two Service Departments SPOBS would have 
the most interaction with, attempted to handle this t i  process in different ways.  The War 
Office initially put forth a more formal arrangement.  On 3 June, Chaney, McNarney, 
McClelland, Bolte, Griffiss, and Lieutenant Colonel George W. Griner, the SPOBS G-4, met 
with Major General J. N. Kennedy, the War Office Director of Military Operations and Plans, 
and representatives from the War Office Directorates that would have a role in developing plans 
to implement ABC-1.  Kennedy and the other War Office representatives proposed to divide 
planning for ABC-1 among four different planning committees, with representatives from the 
War Office and SPOBS assigned to each committee according to their areas of expertise.  The 
first would deal with personnel, discipline, welfare, and medical issues.  The second was to cover 
issues pertaining to accommodations, bases, maintenc , and movements.  The third, 
communications.  And the fourth, coast defense in Iceland.  Over these committees there would 
be a coordinating committee to guide their work105  The Special Observers agreed to the system 
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the War Office representatives proposed and Chaney designated which members of SPOBS 
would serve on each committee.106  
  The Air Ministry put forth a proposal for a much less centralized procedure.  On 6 June, 
Chaney, Griffiss, McNarney, McClelland, Colonel Alfred J. Lyon, the SPOBS Air Officer, and 
Major Ralph A. Snavely, the SPOBS Assistant Air Officer, met with the Vice Chief of the Air 
Staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Wilfrid Freeman, and representatives from various directorates in 
the Air Ministry.  At the meeting, the Air Ministry Director of Plans, Air Commodore W. F. 
Dickson, proposed that the Special Observers meet regularly with those present to discuss 
questions of major policy and assess progress made in planning. Essentially, these meetings 
would serve the same function that the coordinating committee meetings for the War Office.  
Detailed planning, under Dickson’s proposal, was to take place directly with the appropriate Air 
Ministry Department rather than as part of formal committees.107  As in the case of the War 
Office, the Special Observers agreed to plan with the Air Ministry according to the procedure 
they presented.108  
The Special Observers and their British counterparts would follow neither procedure 
completely during their time in Britain.  Most planni g, with the War Office, Air Ministry, and 
other agencies in the British defense establishment would  take place according to the Air 
Ministry procedure, with the Special Observers sending their subject matter experts to coordinate 
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directly with the relevant departments and directorates to develop plans and policies for Anglo-
American cooperation in Britain and the North Atlanic region.109  However, some of the 
committees the War Office first proposed did meet intermittently and the Special Observers 
often formed ad-hoc committees with their British counterparts to solve problems that involved 
multiple organizations.  Additionally, the British would often invite the Special Observers to 
participate in their own defense committees, using the existing British structure to solve Anglo-
American planning problems. 
These initial efforts at devising liaison procedures were important, but not because they 
resulted in procedures that worked in actuality.  These initial meetings were where the Special 
Observers begin to imbed themselves within the British defense establishment.  It was at these 
meetings that the SPOBS staff and their British counterparts began to learn how U.S. and British 
organizations functioned.  These meetings were especially important because they educated each 
members of Chaney’s staff on the individuals and agencies with whom they would have to 
conduct their planning work.  Armed with this knowledge, they were ready to start performing 
the tasks Marshall had sent them to Britain to do, the most important of which was preparing 
plans for implementing ABC-1. 
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Chapter 2: Operation INDIGO  
 The Special Observers spent most of the two and a half weeks after Chaney activated the 
mission becoming acquainted with the new environment in which they were going to be 
working.  Their British hosts subjected the U.S. officers to an array of lunches, dinners, and 
cocktail parties as a means of introducing them to key players in the U.K. defense establishment.  
When they were not conducting meetings with the British, Chaney’s staff focused on meeting the 
more mundane requirements for executing their mission, such as purchasing furniture for their 
offices, arranging for lodging, and learning how to pr cure items using the British rationing 
system.1 
 They also toured London and its surrounding countryside.  On 2 June, Dahlquist, Bolte, 
Major Arthur B. Welsh, the SPOBS Surgeon, and Lieutenant Colonel Dale D. Hinman, the 
SPOBS Antiaircraft Officer, embarked on one such trip, hiring a car to take them around London 
to look at damage from German bombings.  Because of their areas of expertise, it was 
particularly appropriate that Welsh and Hinman were accompanying Bolte and Dahlquist.  Welsh 
was a stout man with a plump face, friendly eyes, and slicked back hair that accentuated a 
hairline that was starting to recede.  He had been a medical officer in the U.S. Army since 1926.  
His last job prior to coming to SPOBS was as the Assistant Chief of the Planning, Plans, and 
Training Division in the Office of the Surgeon General.  While there he had helped develop 
emergency and war plans for the U.S. Army Medical Department.2  In the bombing of London, 
both emergency and war had intersected, and observing the damage allowed Welsh to begin 
assessing what medical challenges might confront U.S Army forces operating in the British Isles. 
                                                          
     1 See Letters, Dahlquist to his wife, May 29 – June 6, 1941, Personal Correspondence, Box 5 Personal 
Correspondence 1941-1945, John E. Dahlquist Papers, USAHEC. 
     2 Cosmas and Cowdrey, The Medical Department: Medical Service in the European Theater of Operations, 9. 
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 Where Welsh’s interests lay in mitigating the effects of bombing, Hinman’s lay in its 
prevention.  Hinman was a forty-nine year old Coast Artillery officer who had received his 
commission into the U.S. Army in 1916.  Dahlquist described him as “a great big rawboned 
guy.”3  Others described him as a man well-liked by his peers with unlimited confidence in his 
own abilities.  In his younger years superiors commented on his tendency to favor action over 
reflection, frequently going off “half-cocked” in an effort to get his job done quickly.4  
Eventually, he mellowed enough with age to have the discipline to graduate from the U.S. 
Army’s Command and General Staff College and Army War College.  For much of the interwar 
period, he had worked on projects to improve the U.S. Army’s antiaircraft capability.5  Now he 
was responsible for developing the anti-aircraft plans for ABC-1. 
 Dahlquist, Bolte, Welsh, and Hinman traveled for about thirty miles that day, touring the 
East End of London as well as the Dock area.  In some places they saw block after block of 
uninhabited structures.  In others, blocks that conained the residue from buildings that were 
completely destroyed.  All were a testament to the price Londoners had paid for Britain’s policy 
of opposing Axis continental hegemony.  To Dahlquist it was a sobering experience.6  It must 
have been sobering for the others as well for they had to wonder, after looking at the vast 
destruction, if the plans they developed with the British would be effective enough to achieve 
victory if and when the U.S. entered the war.                        
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Until then, planning would remain largely theoretical. Appropriately enough, the Special 
Observers would base their plans on theoretical work that had been ongoing in the U.S. since the 
early twentieth century.  The bedrock for Anglo-American planning in Britain was a joint, 
Army/Navy war plan for implementing ABC-1 called RAINBOW-5.  A synthesis of several 
prior plans, RAINBOW-5 had a pedigree that stretched back decades, with its oldest elements 
having been in development since 1904, when the first class of Army War College students, as 
part of their planning exercises, began contemplating how the U.S. would fight wars against 
Germany and Japan.7 These initial planning exercises evolved over the course of thirty-seven 
years, eventually incorporating the Naval War College, the Navy's War Plans Division, the War 
Plans Division of the War Department General Staff, and the Joint Army and Navy Board as 
well as British representatives from the Admiralty, War Office, and Air Ministry through their 
participation in the American-British Conversations.8  Carrying RAINBOW-5 to England, 
SPOBS continued that evolution, taking the strategic stimates that made up RAINBOW-5 and 
attempting to develop operational plans that both met intent of ABC-1 and addressed the 
problems posed by conducting operations in the British Isles and the North Atlantic region.     
 For reasons of security and coordination between th  two services, the Army and Navy 
had adopted a common classification scheme for U.S. strategic war plans between 1904 and 
1941.  Countries that had the potential to be involved in a conflict with the U.S. were given color 
designations–examples being Green for Mexico, Red for Great Britain, Orange for Japan, and 
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Black for Germany– and the plans to counter the thrat posed by these counties in case of an 
emergency were collectively dubbed the "Color Plans."9  As Japan, Italy, and Germany 
demonstrated an increased willingness to use force t  achieve foreign policy objectives in the 
1930s, these plans became both more complex and more realistic, better reflecting the 
contemporary diplomatic and strategic environment.  Planners, especially those at the Army War 
College and Naval War College, began incorporating allied and enemy coalitions into their 
exercises, and the War College eventually devoted a portion of its curriculum to segment called 
"Participation with Allies."10  U.S. plans for coalition warfare eventually received the designation 
"RAINBOW" from the Joint Army and Navy Board in 193, when it directed its Joint Planning 
Committee to produce five basic war plans, each contemplating war involving more than one 
"color."11  These war plans, RAINBOW-1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, drew h avily on the prior Color Plans 
and the Participation with Allies exercises.12 
 Of all the scenarios the RAINBOW plans covered, a still unfinished plan, designated 
RAINBOW-5, was best suited in meeting the strategic imperatives that Stark had called for in his 
Plan Dog memorandum.13  The RAINBOW-5 scenario assumed that France and Britain were 
about to be defeated and that the United States would ally with the European democracies to 
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defeat Germany and Italy.  The plan, however, had not factored in a simultaneous war with 
Japan.  Soon after the American-British Conversations, the Joint Planning Committee 
incorporated Japanese participation into the plan's assumptions as well as the basic strategy 
articulated in ABC-1.  The committee completed RAINBOW-5 in April, 1941 and although not 
officially approved until November, it became the Army and Navy's plan for implementing 
ABC-1.14  The primary mission of SPOBS was, in essence, to conduct theater level planning 
with the British for potential execution of the porti ns of RAINBOW-5 that pertained to the 
United Kingdom and the North Atlantic region. 
 According to RAINBOW-5, U.S. Army forces operating in the United Kingdom and 
North Atlantic had four tasks: 
a. In cooperation with the Royal Air Force conduct offensive air operations 
primarily against objectives in Germany, and against attempted invasion or 
blockade as demanded by the situation. 
 
b. Provide for the ground defense of occupied bases nd air defense of those 
general areas in the British Isles in which bases us d primarily by United States 
Naval Forces are located, and subsequently as other areas as may be agreed upon. 
 
c. Provide a token force for defense of the British Isles. 
 
d. Relieve as soon as practicable, the British garrison in Iceland and in 
cooperation with the Navy defend that island.15  
 
To fulfill these tasks the U.S. Army planned to send the following forces to Britain and Iceland if 
and when America entered the war:  
a. British Isles. 
    3 Heavy Bombardment Groups 
    2 Medium Bombardment Groups 
    3 Pursuit Groups 
    Approximately 10 Anti-aircraft Regiments 
    Approximately 10 Infantry Battalions (Bases) 
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    One Reinforced Regiment (Token Force) 
 
b. Iceland. 
         One reinforced Division16                                 
Planners projected the total number of troops that the U.S. Army would initially send to the 
British Isles to be approximately 77,000 plus an additional 28,000 for Iceland.17   
 In planning for the tasks the Army was to perform in the U.K. and North Atlantic regions 
as part of RAINBOW-5, SPOBS and the British were essentially continuing a process of 
development that had been ongoing since the first cla s of Army War College students began 
conducting theoretical war planning.  While the early Color Plans had been highly theoretical 
and abstract, the process of working through the problems posed by each color scenario had 
given the Army's (and Navy's) brightest officers hands-on experience in planning for war. This 
experience became more relevant and realistic with the institution of the Participation with Allies 
exercises and the subsequent development of the RAINBOW Plans.  However, to truly prepare 
for coalition war, the Army needed actual experience in developing war plans with a coalition 
partner.  The American-British Conversations had provided officers from both nations an 
introduction to this process through their joint development of ABC-1.  It now fell to SPOBS to 
continue the learning effort for both the U.S. Army and the British military services by testing 




                                                          
     16 Ibid. 
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Iceland Takes Priority 
Soon after the Special Observers arrived in England, the relief of the British garrison in 
Iceland became SPOBS’s top planning priority.  Britain had occupied Iceland for a little over 
year when the Special Observers came to London.  With U.K.’s entry into the war against 
Germany, British officials had determined that the Royal Navy would need Iceland as a northern 
base to patrol the waters between the island and Scandinavia.18  However, the British were 
initially hesitant to occupy the island because Iceland wished to remain neutral in the conflict.  
The fall of Norway, however, led to a change in British policy.  With Norway under its control, 
Germany was in a better position to threaten Iceland, d if the British allowed Germany to 
occupy the island, Germany could wreak havoc on Britain's North Atlantic supply routes.  This 
threat, coupled with the necessity for establishing a base for a northern patrol, led Britain to 
occupy the island.  The Icelandic government filed an official protest, but accepted the fait 
accompli of a British occupation.19  
 While SPOBS was still in the process of establishing itself in England, changing strategic 
considerations in the Atlantic led Roosevelt to direct the U.S. Army and Navy to relieve British 
forces in Iceland earlier than planned.  U.S. officials had previously feared that Germany would 
invade Spain and Portugal, thereby allowing them to seize the Portuguese Azores islands for a 
base from which to launch expeditions in the Western Hemisphere.20  However, by the end of 
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May, the United States and Britain were both receiving intelligence that Hitler was preparing to 
attack the Soviet Union.  Although there is no direct vidence, some scholars argue that 
Roosevelt believed this intelligence and saw an opportunity to take more forceful action in the 
North Atlantic, with little risk of German retaliaton or having the U.S. brought into the war.21 
  On 28 May the President proposed to the British Ambassador that the U.S. take over the 
defense of Iceland.  The British readily agreed.  They had recently experienced setbacks in the 
Mediterranean and the ability to transfer troops from duty in Iceland would help them greatly.  
Before a final agreement could be reached however, th re was still much that both governments 
had to do.  The two nations had to consult the Icelandic government, and the President flatly 
stated that the U.S. would not take over security of he island unless the Icelanders sent an 
invitation to do so.22  Additionally, legal restrictions complicated any U.S. effort to assume 
responsibility for defending Iceland.  At the time, laws prevented men drafted under the 
Selective Service Act, as well as members of the Nation l Guard and the Reserve from serving 
outside the Western Hemisphere.  The Selective Service Act also limited the terms of military 
service for draftees to twelve months.  This limited he U.S. to using forces that were part of the 
regular military establishment as well as draftees who volunteered to waive the restriction on 
their service to the Western Hemisphere.23   While the Roosevelt Administration and the War 
Department tackled these problems, the Special Observers and their British counterparts began 
planning for the Iceland relief.        
 Functionally, the planning SPOBS conducted for the reli f of British forces in Iceland 
had both manifest and latent effects that influenced th  development of Anglo-American 
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     22 Bittner, The Lion and the White Falcon, 128-130.   
     23 Conn, Engleman, and Fairchild, Guarding the United States and its Outposts, 469. 
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cooperation in the European Theater.  The manifest effect of the group’s work with the British 
was the development of a plan for occupying Iceland that the War Department did not implement 
because of faulty calculations on the part of the Sp cial Observers as well as changing strategic 
circumstances that made their plan obsolete.  However, the latent effects of their planning work 
proved significant in facilitating the U.S. occupation of the island.  Planners back in the states 
used SPOBS’ data and analysis regarding Iceland and the British Armed Services when 
developing an updated operations plan for Iceland.  Of even greater significance, planning for the 
occupation of Iceland served as a template for other planning efforts with the British.   
To obtain the data that U.S. Army planners needed, the Special Observers had to learn 
about the structure of British defense establishment, its constraints, capabilities and limitations, 
and establish the means to interact with the organizations that belonged to it.  Furthermore, 
planning for Iceland required the Special Observers and their British counterparts to identify and 
solve problems associated with incorporating U.S. combat power into British-controlled 
territory.  Throughout the group’s time in Britain, SPOBS, along with their British counterparts, 
would continually encounter the same types of problems that they first encountered in planning 
for the occupation of Iceland.  Through the knowledg  they gained by solving these problems, 
the Special Observers and the British planners they worked with would continually facilitate 
common understanding of these problems on both side of the Atlantic.  This common 
understanding, in turn, facilitated future decision-making regarding Anglo-American cooperation 
in the British Isles.  Put more simply, Iceland was where SPOBS and their British counterparts 
began getting U.S. and British officials “steeped in the character of the problem.”    
The Special Observer Group had barely settled in when WPD sent General Chaney a 
request to send a reconnaissance mission to Iceland.  WPD's original intent was to send officers 
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from units slated for the occupation.  However, the officers were not able to leave for Iceland 
until the end of the month.  WPD chose SPOBS to perform the mission in order to get 
information about the island quickly, so the U.S. Army could complete plans for Iceland as soon 
as possible.24 
 The British had already broached the subject of Iceland with Chaney and his staff.  
Shortly after Chaney arrived in London, the War Office had sent him a questionnaire concerning 
U.S. requirements and desires in implementing ABC-1.25  The questions in the document 
concerning Iceland covered such items as maintenanc of equipment, vehicles, medical care, 
supplies, and communications.  The British had geared lmost all questions toward determining 
whether or not the U.S. would take responsibility for providing these services for their own 
forces.  SPOBS and the War Office discussed Chaney's answers at a meeting on 3 June.  At the 
meeting Chaney informed the representatives from the War Office that most of the services they 
had outlined would be a U.S. responsibility.  Those items on the questionnaire for which Chaney 
could not immediately provide an answer, such as the possibility of U.S. forces taking over 
British coast defense weapons, were deferred for further investigation.26     
 Soon after the meeting, Chaney's staff members began gathering their own information 
about Iceland as well as general information concerning how the British military organized itself. 
On 4 June, the staff members responsible for supply and logistics met with representatives from 
Britain's Quartermaster General Department and briefed one another on the logistics and supply 
services of the U.S. and British armies.27   In the days that followed, the Special Observers also 
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62 
 
learned British methods of medical organization andsignal organization, as well as reviewing 
Britain's antiaircraft capabilities in both the British Isles and in Iceland.  They also conducted 
tours of British camps and depots.28  While the War Department did not give them much time to 
familiarize themselves with the British system, these initial explorations allowed them to gain a 
better understanding of British military organization than what they could get by merely reading 
data that had been gathered by the Military Attaché’s office.   They were also able to do an initial 
assessment of where organizational friction points might exist between the U.S. Army and the 
British Army.29  On the British side, these exploratory meetings helped them identify which 
departments and directorates of the British defense stablishment would have a role in 
developing plans and policies with SPOBS.  As a result of these meetings, SPOBS established 
contact with many organizations that would play a role in developing plans for Iceland as well as 
other plans associated with RAINBOW-5, including the War Office directorates of Signals, Anti-
Aircraft and Coast Defence, Movements, Supplies and Transport, Warlike Stores, and Army 
Medical Services as well as the Ministry of Health and the Royal Army Ordnance Corps.30                 
 In addition to educating one another on the structure heir respective organizations, the 
Special Observers and their British counterparts began a process of collective problem solving 
that would continue throughout the group’s time in Britain.  One problem SPOBS and the British 
were to examine repeatedly was the transportation and reception of U.S. forces into British 
controlled territory.  The member of Chaney’s staff most responsible for examining this problem 
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was Lieutenant Colonel George W. Griner, the SPOBS G-4.  Griner was a man of slight build, 
with a thoughtful countenance and a penetrating stare.  Like many of the other Special 
Observers, he seemed tailor made for his position.  He received his commission in 1917 and 
subsequently served in the First World War, where he received a Silver Star.31  An academic by 
nature, Griner had spent two years as a teacher befo e joining the Army and spent many of the 
interwar years as the Professor of Military Science at Allen Academy in Bryan, Texas.32  A 
contemporary described him as a brilliant and driven officer who worked well with others and, 
despite being rather nervous and high strung, had a pleasing personality.33   
 In the years immediately preceding his assignment to SPOBS, Griner had held positions 
that made him especially suited for this assignment.  In 1939, he graduated from the Army War 
College, and subsequently served in the G-4 Division of the War Department General Staff.34  
There he worked under Lieutenant Colonel Henry S. Aurand in Requirements and Distribution 
where he was heavily involved developing plans to equip a U.S. Army that was in the throes of 
expansion and modernization. 35  As a function of his duties, he served as an observer during the 
1940 Louisiana Maneuvers, the largest scale training exercises that the U.S. Army had conducted 
up to that time, an exercise in which many of the Army's weaknesses in terms of doctrine and 
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organization came to light.36  Griner was among a select few officers who had comprehensive 
knowledge of the Army's overall logistics capabilities.    
At a meeting with British Army and Royal Navy logistics officers on 5 June, that 
included Deputy Directors of Movements, Colonel C. S. Napier and Colonel W. D. A. Williams, 
he learned that Iceland would pose many problems for U.S. Army and U.S. Navy logistics.  
Napier and the others informed him that Iceland’s environment would inhibit both the reception 
of U.S. forces onto the island and movement of troops and equipment within the island itself.  
Facilities were small, with the port at Reykjavik only deep enough to berth ships with a draft of 
twenty-one feet.  Space on the dock was also limited, lending to congestion at the port, and–to 
complicate matters further–transportation of supplies over roads in large quantities was 
impossible.  Because of the inadequate roads, British forces currently had to use small boats if 
they wanted to move supplies to different parts of the island.37 
 To overcome challenges posed by the U.S. occupation of Iceland, such as the logistical 
constraints Napier had conveyed to Griner, the Special Observers and their British counterparts 
decided to form a committee whose sole purpose was to ddress issues pertaining to the Iceland 
occupation.  Composed of both SPOBS members and representatives from the Admiralty, Air 
Ministry, and War Office, this committee was to develop a detailed plan for relief of British units 
in Iceland by U.S. forces.38  SPOBS would then send this plan to the War Departmen  so 
planners back in the states could use it as the basis for their own operations plan.   However, 
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before the committee could begin planning, the Special Observers had to survey conditions in 
Iceland first-hand to identify any other problems that the Iceland operation would pose as well as 
determine requirements for U.S. forces designated to carry out the occupation.      
 The SPOBS staff selected seven of its members to perf rm the reconnaissance, choosing 
those officers with expertise in areas the group needed to examine while in Iceland.  Griner was 
selected as the head of the reconnaissance mission.  The rest of the party consisted of Lieutenant 
Colonel Donald A. Davison, the SPOBS Engineer Officer; Major Ralph A. Snavely, the SPOBS 
Assistant Air Officer; Lieutenant Colonel Jerry V. Matejka, the SPOBS Signal Officer; 
Lieutenant Colonel John W. Coffey, the SPOBS Ordnance Officer; as well as Welsh and Hinman 
to examine medical and antiaircraft issues respectiv ly.39  Napier accompanied the party to assist 
with the reconnaissance and coordinate planning with the British Army units stationed on the 
island, collectively known as the “Iceland Force.”40   
 The members of the reconnaissance party traveled with far greater care than had the 
Special Observers on the trip from the U.S. to Engla d.  On the recommendation of the Iceland 
Force General Officer Commanding, Major General Henry O. Curtis, they posed as a mixed 
delegation of officials from Canada and the U.S. who ere investigating the possibility of 
providing Britain with petrol, building material, foodstuffs, and military equipment via Iceland 
as part of the Lend-Lease program.41  As yet, it was too early to reveal to the world that the U.S. 
was to assume responsibility for defending Iceland from an Axis invasion.  Arriving in Iceland 
on 11 June by plane, the group began its reconnaissance of the island while the rest of the 
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Special Observers and their British counterparts began drafting an outline plan for the U.S. 
occupation.42  
The Iceland Reconnaissance  
Ultimately, the reconnaissance and the planning that took place after it would result in a 
report of reconnaissance that Chaney would send to WPD for planners in the states to use in 
drafting the operations plan for the Iceland occupation.  “Report of reconnaissance” is a term that 
SPOBS would use repeatedly during its time in Britain o refer to the reports the group sent back 
to the War Department.  This term, however, is somewhat misleading.  It implies that Chaney 
and his staff merely relayed data to War Department planners with the Special Observers 
conducting little analysis of what they were seeing.  What SPOBS was really sending to the War 
Department when it sent these reports was what the U.S. Army currently calls “running 
estimates.”  According to the September 2011 U.S. Army Commander and Staff Officer Guide, a 
running estimate is, “a continuous assessment of the current situation used to determine if the 
current operation is proceeding according to the commander’s intent and if planned future 
operations are supportable.”43  For a given operation, each staff section will maintain its own 
running estimate that covers all pertinent facts and ssumptions about its area of expertise 
pertaining to the problem a staff is attempting to solve, including the conclusions and 
recommendations of the members of the section.44   
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Each of the reports Chaney sent back to the War Department represented the collective 
estimates of his staff regarding current conditions in the British Isles and Iceland as well as what 
was required on the part of the U.S. and Britain to implement the provisions of ABC-1 and 
RAINBOW-5.  To support their recommendations, the Sp cial Observers drafted outline plans 
with their British counterparts, using the data they collected during their reconnaissance trips.45  
Although changing conditions rendered many of these plans obsolete, a latent effect of 
maintaining these planning estimates was to provide Chaney’s staff, planners in the British 
defense establishment, and U.S. planners back in the states with a comprehensive understanding 
of the issues pertaining to Anglo-American cooperation in Iceland and the British Isles.   
The reconnaissance of Iceland and the planning between SPOBS and their British 
counterparts that took place afterwards, started this process.  After arriving in Iceland, the 
members of the reconnaissance party crisscrossed the island, investigating British and Icelandic 
infrastructure as well as Iceland's environmental conditions.  For each of their areas of expertise, 
they identified the constraints and limitations under which the relief force would have to operate, 
determined what British facilities they could use, and what work advance parties of U.S. troops 
would need to do to adapt British facilities to American needs.46     
                                                          
     45 For example, see Memo, Chaney for Chief of Staff, Sub: Report of Reconnaissance of Iceland, 19 June 1941, 
WPD 4493-20, War Plans Division (WPD) General Correspondence, 1920-1942, RG 165, NARA. 
     46 SPOBS was not the only group from the U.S. to send a reconnaissance party to Iceland in June.  Before 
SPOBS arrived, a U.S. Navy Officer named Lieutenant William C. Asserson briefly stopped in Iceland to inspect 
patrol plane bases.  However, the War Department did not receive his report until the end of the month, w en 
planning was well underway.  Another party of Army and Marine Corps officers stopped in Iceland the day after 
SPOBS arrived and spent about thirty hours on the island.  As such, their report to the War Department was very 
general and much of it was derived from information that SPOBS gave them.  See Byron Fairchild, "Decision to 
Land United States Forces in Iceland, 1941," in Command Decisions, Kent Roberts Greenfield ed. (Washington 
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960), 87-88 and Memo, Lieutenant Colonel G. M. O'Connell and Captain 
R. R. Arnold, Report on Trip to Iceland, June 9 to 16, 1941, Box 2130, Security Classified General Headqu rters 
(GHQ) Correspondence, 1941-1942, RG 165, NARA. 
68 
 
 To get an idea, specifically, of what type of information the staff members collected, it is 
useful to examine a few of the party members’ activities during their stay on the island in more 
detail.  Davison, as the SPOBS Engineer Officer, spent much of his time inspecting the condition 
of Iceland's roads, which was a change from the work he had most recently been doing in the 
states.  As the Engineer Officer for GHQ Air Force, h  had primarily dealt with engineering 
problems having to do with airfields.  However, hisyears of experience in engineer units prior to 
his time at GHQ Air Force prepared him to evaluate Iceland's road conditions.47   
His analysis confirmed the problems that Napier had w rned Griner about in their 
meeting about logistics in Iceland.  Davison found that the Icelanders constructed most of their 
roads from gravel and only made them wide enough to acc mmodate one vehicle.  Turn-outs 
approximately every eight miles allowed two way use; however, such a situation precluded the 
possibility of heavy traffic getting through efficiently.  He also found that most bridges on the 
island were too narrow and would have to be strengthened in order to accommodate heavy 
military vehicles.  During the summer months the road situation was difficult and hazardous.  
During the winter, conditions were even worse as the weather made roads impossible to 
maintain.  The poor roads to both the north and east parts of the island became impassible in the 
winter because of snow, essentially turning Iceland into three separate regions, since the only 
way to the north and east sectors was by water.  To make matters worse, winter storms made 
passage to the small northern and eastern ports extemely dangerous.  The end result, Davison 
concluded, was that after October, any forces stationed in the north and east sectors would have 
to have enough supplies to last them for six months.48 
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 Coffey, in his analysis of ordnance requirements, also highlighted the importance of 
stocking the three areas of the island with 180 days of supplies because of transportation 
limitations.  He also noted the defensive advantages of such a situation.  He had prior experience 
in the Coast Artillery before transferring to the Ordnance Corps in the early 1920s after which he 
served in a variety of ordnance positions, the latest b ing the Executive Assistant to the Chief of 
Field Services.49  His experience as both a Coast Artilleryman and an Ordnance Officer showed 
through in his assessment of nature of fighting that would take place during a German invasion.  
Any combat on the island, Coffey noted, would involve very little maneuver because of limited 
roads and the severity of environmental conditions.  Based on his observations, he concluded that 
a German invasion of the Iceland would not consist of a long period of continuous combat.  
Rather, they would have to take the island quickly or be thrown back into the sea.  Thus, when 
calculating his ammunition figures, he advocated storing munitions calculated for ten days at 
combat consumption rate and 170 days garrison consumption rate, confirming that the 
ammunition load of five times mobilization allowance urrently planned for in RAINBOW-5 
was sufficient for the occupation forces.50 
 Coffey found that British facilities posed more of a problem for him than Iceland's 
environment.  He took it upon himself to examine British depots in Iceland and assessed which 
should serve as ordnance and quartermaster depots under an American system of organization.  
This proved to be difficult as the British organized their supply and ordnance services in ways 
that were different from the U.S. Army.51  To report his findings, he expressed his observations 
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in percentages.  Depots containing a higher percentag  of ordnance supplies he declared suitable 
for ordnance depots, while those with higher percentages of quartermaster supplies he declared 
suitable as quartermaster depots.  To serve as the main ordnance depot for the occupation force, 
he advocated the use of the currently existing British depot at Lagafell, in an area to the 
northwest of Reykjavik.  He also determined what specialized equipment the occupation force 
would need to handle artillery pieces the British were planning to leave behind for U.S. forces.52 
 In spite of his efforts to incorporate existing British facilities into U.S. plans, there were 
some British practices Coffey found utterly intolerable, “British ammunition storage is 
deplorable . . . under present conditions any blow at any of the depots would probably wipe out 
the entire depot.”53 In his opinion, the British concentrated their munitio s in quantities that were 
extremely dangerous.  Further, he judged that the British placed these ammunition points too 
close to inhabited structures, a potentially catastrophic situation if one of the bombs or shells 
were to go off and ignite the entire magazine.  He also found the structures the British used for 
storing ammunition to be completely inadequate for the task.  He therefore recommended that 
the occupation force eschew British buildings and store ammunition in U.S. Army "Igloos."54 
 As with Coffey, Welsh found much that he did not like when examining British medical 
practices and facilities.  What he saw on the island disappointed him greatly.   He found himself 
unimpressed with the standards of medical care in the British Army.  The British made 
provisions for fewer officers and medical beds than U.S. units, and they also provided inadequate 
dental care compared to U.S. standards.  The task th t was most prominent in his mind was 
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raising the number of available hospital beds.  He surveyed existing British and Icelandic 
hospital facilities, and formulated a plan to raise th  number of hospital beds on the island to be 
able to cover ten percent of the U.S. occupation force.  He also identified key shortages in 
medical equipment.  There were many.  He noted that British medical conditions were essentially 
equivalent to those found in a field hospital, and Icelandic facilities were far too few in number 
to provide comprehensive care to the almost 30,000 troops who would be coming to the island.  
Based on data from British medical units, he calculted that admission rate to hospitals for non-
battle related reasons in Iceland was approximately 2.5 soldiers per thousand.  He also estimated 
that because of Iceland's environmental limitations, the evacuation of soldiers for medical 
conditions would require 120 days.55 
  Snavely, while not as critical as Welsh, also encou tered issues pertaining to his area of 
responsibility. His primary interest in Iceland was its airfields.  Having flown for the Army for 
almost twenty years, he was well aware of what facilities the aviation element accompanying the 
occupation force would need.  He also had experience with aviation staff work from serving in 
the Office of the Chief of the Air Corps.56 Two major considerations became apparent during his 
survey: current British air strength was woefully inadequate, and the size and number of 
Iceland's current airfields prevented the expansion of U.S. air units in Iceland beyond that 
already planned for in RAINBOW-5. At a minimum, Snavely believed that the U.S. needed to 
send a pursuit interceptor squadron to defend the island against air attacks.  To transport the 
initial squadron to Iceland, he recommended that the Army send the planes by aircraft carrier and 
have them fly to Reykjavik when within range.  Snavely saw the most important task in the area 
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of aviation to be the expansion of existing airfields and the construction of new ones.  This 
would serve two purposes.  First, it would allow the United States to increase its air strength on 
the island beyond the initial force called for in RAINBOW-5.  More importantly, in Snavely's 
eyes, construction of more airfields would allow the Army to disperse its aircraft.57 
 These are just a few examples of what the reconnaissance party examined while they 
traveled around the island.  The party also examined Ic land's port facilities, housing, 
communications infrastructure, and British defensive positions.58  Additionally, they conducted 
preliminary negotiations with Curtis’s staff, comparing U.S. and British requirements during the 
relief and jointly developing planning recommendations to send back to SPOBS and the War 
Office in London.  During these discussions, they learned from Curtis’s staff what supplies were 
scarce and negotiated tentative agreements with the British for the U.S. to take over some of their 
stocked items and weapons during the relief.  They also worked out a division of labor between 
U.S. and British forces regarding construction projects during the period of time that both forces 
would be present on the island.59   Overall, the reconnaissance party spent approximately a week 
gathering data and drafting plans to include in Chaney’s report to the War Department.60  
Together, their observations painted a comprehensiv picture of the conditions under which U.S. 
forces would have to operate while conducting the reli f mission.  
   After the reconnaissance party finished its mission, it traveled back to London, arriving 
on 18 June.  That day, they gathered with the rest of the SPOBS staff and, with British 
assistance, produced a reconnaissance report for WPD.  Included in the main section of the 
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report was a detailed schedule for movement of the reli f forces to Iceland, a schedule the 
Special Observers coordinated with corresponding move ents of British forces off the island.  
The plan also prioritized the units and equipment in the movement by function in order to ensure 
that adequate forces were present to defend the island at all times.  Attached to the main report 
were nine annexes containing the findings of each of t e reconnaissance party members.61  After 
completing the report, the SPOBS staff drafted a cable that Chaney subsequently forwarded to 
the War Department that highlighted major concerns from the about the Iceland project, 
emphasizing the issues concerning port facilities, housing, and weather.  Three days after the 
reconnaissance party returned from Iceland, Griner left England for Washington D.C. carrying a 
hard copy of the plan to present to the War Departmen .62            
From Relief to Reinforcement 
While Griner was in Washington briefing the plan to the War Department, wheels were 
turning in diplomatic circles.  The United States finally received an invitation from the Icelandic 
government (under pressure from Britain) to take responsibility for security of the island, and on 
1 July, Roosevelt ordered approximately 4,000 marines to begin the occupation.63  However, the 
Icelanders included in their list of stipulations a requirement that the U.S. maintain enough forces 
on the island to defend it against any "eventuality."64  This stipulation fed into a concern 
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Roosevelt had that the forces the U.S. currently planned to send were insufficient to provide an 
adequate defense for the island.  To address this issue, Marshall approached WPD about 
increasing the number of troops allotted to the mission.  The planners balked at the idea.  The 
Iceland relief mission was already having an adverse impact on the Army's ability to implement 
its basic mobilization plans.  Drawing further resources from the nation in its unready state, in 
the view of the officers in WPD, was out of the question.  The planners asserted that the only 
workable solution for increasing forces above those alr ady planned for the Iceland occupation, 
was to reinforce the British instead of relieving them.  Roosevelt agreed.65  
 The change of mission prompted SPOBS, their British counterparts, and War Department 
officials to draw upon the latent effects of the planning activities in which the Special Observers 
had already engaged.  The intended effect of all plnning for Iceland up to this point was to 
produce a plan to relieve all British forces on the island.  Roosevelt’s decision to increase combat 
power in Iceland had made complete relief impossible for the time being.  The fact that the 
SPOBS staff and their British counterparts had developed plans for relief instead of 
reinforcement did not mean that all their prior work was useless in solving this new problem.  
Rather, their prior work provided them, as well as U.S. Army planners back in the States, with an 
understanding of the capabilities and limitations of British forces in Iceland as well as the 
environmental challenges that Iceland posed.  Drawing on the knowledge they gained as a result 
of these early planning activities, Chaney’s staff, planners in the War Office and the Iceland 
Force, and planners back in Washington D.C. developed new plans, plans with the intended 
effect of reinforcement instead of relief.  This is an example of what Eisenhower was trying to 
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get at when he spoke of being “steeped in the charater of the problem.”  This process would 
occur repeatedly with other plans and policies that SPOBS developed.  As historians have tended 
to forgo an examination of the latent effects of SPOBS’ planning for Iceland as well as other 
operations, they have yet to fully assess the group’s influence on the development of Anglo-
American collaboration in the European Theater.   
 The first word the Special Observers received from the War Department that the 
occupation mission had changed from full relief to only reinforcement came in a cable on 2 
July.66 The next day, the staff at WPD notified SPOBS thatey were going to keep Griner in the 
states longer because they needed his assistance in deal g with the changing circumstances 
regarding Iceland.67  Understandably, the Special Observers and their Brit sh counterparts were 
perplexed.  The War Department provided an official explanation in a cable two days later, 
telling Chaney that the President's request to remov  legal restrictions to enable reserve officer 
and selectees to serve in Iceland was expected to generate "bitter controversy" and that the U.S. 
Army could not execute a full relief mission until the Roosevelt administration resolved the 
issue.68 
 The problem that the War Department, SPOBS, the War Office, and the Iceland Force 
now had to deal with was to determine exactly how many forces the U.S. was going to send 
under its new mission of reinforcement.  The War Department's first proposal for relief forces 
reflected some of the recommendations the Special Observers had made in the report of 
reconnaissance.  The initial proposal called for the U.S. to send approximately 6,000 troops, 
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including a pursuit squadron as Snavely had recommended.  Further, the proposal also included 
an element of aviation engineers, the type of soldiers necessary to implement what Snavely saw 
as a necessary expansion of Iceland's airfields.  The War Department also requested that these 
forces all go to the Reykjavik area, indicating an awareness of the limitations on intra-island 
movement that SPOBS highlighted in its report.69   
 While Chaney’s staff and their counterparts in the War Office were reviewing the War 
Department's proposal, a presidential order prompted th  U.S. Army to implement Snavely's 
recommendations.  Roosevelt had made it no secret that he wanted the Army to get more planes 
to Iceland fast, as one of his main concerns about the island was Britain's woefully inadequate air 
component.  He initially left it to the War Department to fulfill this requirement how it saw fit.  
However, he grew impatient, and before SPOBS had a chance to reconfirm Snavely's 
recommendations, he ordered the Army to send the planes to Iceland as soon as possible.70  Soon 
after, the Army began preparations to send the pursuit squadron, as well as a sizeable component 
of aviation engineers and additional support personnel, all together about 1,100 soldiers.  War 
Department officials dubbed this group “First Echelon, Task Force 4” and scheduled its 
departure for the end of July.  To transport the planes, the War Department planners followed 
Snavely's recommendation that they go by aircraft carrier and fly themselves into Reykjavik 
when within range.71 
 Meanwhile, SPOBS and the group’s counterparts in the War Office responded to the War 
Department's proposal for U.S. reinforcements with one of their own, a proposal they were able 
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to generate rather quickly because of the knowledge they gained during the reconnaissance.  The 
reconnaissance and previous planning with the British had provided the Special Observers with 
sharp awareness about how to translate British combat power into American terms and vice 
versa.  Instead of having to calculate the combined combat power of two ever shifting forces 
over the course of numerous movements into and out of the island, the group, along with their 
counterparts in the War Office, now merely had to calculate the current deficiency in British 
power and recommend appropriate American forces to bring the garrison up to its needed 
strength.  SPOBS and the British recommended raising the figure to 7,500, with an eye toward 
relieving the U.S. marines on the island as well as a token force of British soldiers.  WPD 
accepted their recommendations and revised its figures.72  
 In addition to collaborating with the British in determining the number of forces the U.S. 
needed to send to Iceland, SPOBS worked with officials from the War Office to determine how 
to integrate the force into the British defensive scheme.  When the 1st Marine Brigade 
(Provisional) landed in Iceland on 7 July, the British adopted the simplest solution for integration 
by basing the Marines in camps around Reykjavik and having them serve as a mobile reserve.  
This enabled the Marines to focus on constructing shelter for both themselves and the rest of the 
initial relief force.  The decision also minimized the number of British forces that had to move to 
accommodate the Marines, since British units would maintain responsibility for the same 
defensive areas that they had prior to the arrival of American forces.73 
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 SPOBS and representatives from the War Office addressed the issue of integrating U.S. 
forces into Iceland's defenses at a meeting on 12 July.  Previously, SPOBS had passed along the 
War Department's request that the U.S. be able to snd reinforcements to the Reykjavik area.  
Before the meeting, the War Office had asked Curtis, for his views on the request.  He concurred 
that Reykjavik was the most appropriate area to send the initial reinforcements, recommending 
that U.S. forces take over the Marine headquarters at Alafoss, and that the contingent serve, as 
the Marines currently were, as a mobile reserve.74  After a discussion of the views of both the 
War Department and the British commander in Iceland with War Office representatives, SPOBS 
obtained approval for basing U.S. forces in the Reykjavik area and assigning them the role of 
mobile reserve.75 
 The agreement to use U.S. forces in a mobile reserv  demonstrates the interconnected 
nature of logistics, tactics, and diplomacy in the initial stages of the U.S. occupation of Iceland.  
As a result of the SPOBS reconnaissance and other surveys, the War Department knew that 
logistically, Reykjavik was the area in which the U.S. could most easily maintain its forces until 
they grew enough to expand their operations into other areas.  Tactically, identifying U.S. forces 
as a mobile reserve allowed the British to strengthen t eir defensive scheme without disrupting 
it.  The decision also reflected the diplomatic constraints under which U.S. forces were 
operating.  Since the United States was no longer taking over complete responsibility of Iceland, 
its forces had to work within the British defensive scheme.  However, the United States and 
Britain were not yet allies.  Because of this, British and American forces would not operate under 
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a single command.  Instead, they would operate under the principle of "mutual cooperation."76  
Operating under this principle dictated that defensive agreements between the U.S. and Britain 
concerning Iceland would have to be very general unti the commander of U.S. forces was on the 
ground and could negotiate tactical areas responsibility with the British commander. All these 
limitations made planning and executing the Iceland occupation a very difficult proposition.  One 
of the ways the Special Observer Group played an essential role during the occupation was by 
participating in negotiations with the British and by drawing on its knowledge of the situation in 
Iceland to help coordinate planning efforts on both sides of the Atlantic.   
The Iceland Base Command Operations Plan 
Another way the group played an essential role in the U.S. occupation of Iceland was 
through its influence on the development of the operations plan for Iceland Base Command.  
Byron Fairchild has previously examined the group’s role in developing the operations plan for 
the U.S. occupation of Iceland, an operation the War Department had by early July dubbed, 
“INDIGO,” Iceland’s color according to the War Department color classification scheme.77  
According to his accounts in both Guarding the United States and its Outposts and Command 
Decisions, the plan Chaney and his staff developed after the Iceland reconnaissance foundered 
because of two major problems: the calculations the group made for the shipping required to 
move U.S. forces to Iceland and the group’s estimate of he amount of housing that the U.S. 
forces would need once they arrived.78       
 By SPOBS’ estimates, the British had enough housing to accommodate approximately 
22,000 of the almost 30,000 troops slated for the occupation.  As part of the SPOBS negotiations, 
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the British agreed to provide the materials necessary to build the remaining buildings needed for 
the American occupation force.  While the plan seemd to be quite satisfactory on the surface, 
planners in the United States soon discovered that their calculations departed significantly from 
those SPOBS had provided.  They estimated that the occupation force would need almost twice 
the amount of material that SPOBS had calculated for building housing.  Fairchild argues 
convincingly that the source of this discrepancy was the failure of Chaney’s staff to factor in 
space for buildings that were not living accommodations (i.e. orderly rooms and other offices) 
and that they likely calculated the figures based on the amount of space the British allotted each 
soldier, which was substantially less than the U.S. number.79 
A lack of communication between SPOBS and the War Department, an issue that would 
plague the group throughout its existence, led the Sp cial Observers to miscalculate shipping 
requirements for INDIGO as well.  War Department officials neglected to tell Chaney and his 
staff what kind of shipping was available to conduct the occupation.  At the time the operation 
was to take place, there would not be enough ships available with drafts small enough to dock at 
Iceland’s ports.  Reflecting this limitation, War Department staff members developed shipping 
plans that depended on lightering troops and cargo sh re from ships anchored away from the 
piers.  Because the Special Observers were unaware of this limitation, they calculated shipping 
requirements using only vessels with a twenty-one foot draft or smaller.  As a result, their plan 
called for almost twice as many ships to conduct the operation, an impossibility at the time 
INDIGO was supposed to take place.80  Fairchild assessed that SPOBS’ miscalculations 
regarding housing and shipping, coupled with the change of mission from relief to reinforcement 
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led the War Department to confine the group’s role t  a fact finding mission with little influence 
on the actual planning and conduct of INDIGO.81 
SPOBS’ negotiations and joint planning with the War Office after the mission change 
from relief to reinforcement have already demonstrated that the group played a greater role in 
INDIGO than that for which Fairchild gave them credit.  Fairchild similarly underestimated the 
group’s role in the subsequent planning and execution of the U.S. occupation of Iceland.  He 
understandably focused on what were probably the two most significant problems confronting 
planners for INDIGO: housing and shipping.  He approached his analysis of SPOBS with a view 
of determining what manifest effects the group had on planning for Iceland; namely, did the War 
Department execute the plan Chaney and his staff developed as they had intended it to be 
executed?  The answer is most certainly no.  However, he failed to assess the latent effects of the 
plans SPOBS developed as part of the Iceland reconnaissance report.   
To do this, one has to examine all the annexes contained in the SPOBS Report of 
Reconnaissance to Iceland, and not confine one’s analysis to the portions of the group’s plans 
dealing with housing and shipping.  Fairchild was either ignorant of or ignored the habitual 
tendency on the part of military staff members to use work that others have previously done to 
help them with their projects.  Often chronically overworked, staff officers typically are loath to 
do work that someone else has already done.82  Fairchild’s assumption that planners back in 
Washington ignored the remaining annexes of SPOBS’ report because the housing and shipping 
calculations were flawed is dubious at best.       
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In a 5 July letter to Ghormley, Brigadier General Leonard T. Gerow, the head of WPD, 
described the value of SPOBS’ work with the British, “As you know, the situation with regard to 
our future policy is still quite clouded and its uncertainty makes positive planning very difficult.  
The establishment of our Missions in London was a wise move because Chaney and his outfit 
have already been of tremendous assistance to us in plan ing for minor operations.”83 In terms of 
the Iceland operation, planners in the states made use of the SPOBS Report of Reconnaissance to 
Iceland as well as drawing on Griner’s expertise as the head of the reconnaissance mission.  
While the rest of the Special Observers were negotiating troop numbers and missions with the 
British, Griner was still in the United States, helping the GHQ develop a new plan for the 
occupation of Iceland.   GHQ’s involvement in the development of the operations plan came 
about as a result of the U.S. Army’s experience in World War I.  During the conflict, all U.S. 
Army forces in Europe served under a general headquarters commanded by General John J. 
Pershing.  The War Department expected that the U.S. Army would operate under the same type 
of organization if and when it participated in another major conflict.84  Up to this point, GHQ 
had been responsible mainly for overseeing the U.S. Army’s training programs.  Recognizing 
that U.S. involvement in a war against the Axis was likely, War Department officials during 
early summer of 1941 decided the time has come to expand GHQ’s functions beyond training. 
On 3 July 1941 its duties expanded to include planning and commanding operations the War 
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Department assigned to it.  Soon after, the headquarters took over responsibility for planning the 
Iceland occupation from WPD.85       
 Assessing what specific contributions Griner made to the plans GHQ developed for 
Iceland is difficult.  He was a visiting subject matter expert, as opposed to a regular member of 
the GHQ staff, and therefore, his signature does not appear on any papers.  Marshall, for his part, 
felt his assistance was invaluable.  In a letter to Chaney on 8 July he wrote, “Colonel Griner has 
been of great help to us in working out the plan for Iceland relief.  It was a wise decision to send 
him over.  I am holding him here until all the troublesome questions are settled.  I hope to be able 
to release him by the 12th of July.”86  Griner ended up working with GHQ to develop the 
operations plan for Iceland until 21 July, when he traveled back to England carrying an initial 
draft of the document.87    
The staff at GHQ completed the final draft of the plan, dubbed “Operations Plan of 
Iceland Base Command” or “GHQ-IBC” for short, on 1 August.  An examination of the plan’s 
annexes reveals that the document’s authors made use of Griner’s knowledge as well as the plans 
SPOBS developed in the Iceland reconnaissance report.88  The most explicit use of the SPOBS 
report was in the G-4 section of the plan concerning supplies that the British would make 
available to U.S. forces in Iceland.  Instead of goin  through the trouble of making their own 
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table and delineating each commodity, the plan's drafters merely wrote "see Report of 
Reconnaissance of Iceland - June 19, 1941."89  The G-4 ration plan also reflected Coffey's 
assessment of the nature of combat in any invasion of Iceland, allotting 180 days' supply of food, 
with only ten days field rations.90  Additionally, the Quartermaster portion of the plan used 
information from the SPOBS report to identify what food supplies were locally available.91  In 
the medical plan, the drafters adopted Welsh's recommendations to base evacuation plans on 120 
days, to provide the force with enough hospital beds available for ten percent of the troops 
assigned to it, and to calculate admission rates for non-battle injuries at approximately 2.5 per 
thousand soldiers.92   
GHQ ordnance planners made extensive use of Coffey's r port.  As Coffey 
recommended, the plan located the main ordnance depot at Lagafell.  The plan also specified the 
use of supplies he specifically recommended, including specialized equipment for handling 
artillery pieces and the use of U.S. Army "Igloo" style buildings over Nissen huts for storing 
ammunition.  GHQ planners additionally followed Coffey's recommendation that the Army keep 
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the ammunition plan originally called for in RAINBOW-5, and initially issue units five times 
their mobilization allowance in ammunition.93 
GHQ planners used the work of other members of the reconnaissance party as well.  Even 
though Davison miscalculated housing requirements for the occupation force, planners still made 
use of the Engineer annex that he wrote for the reconnaissance report.  They used his report to 
identify locally available building materials and the limitations on local labor that would prevent 
U.S. forces from being able to fully utilize these resources.  They also used his survey of roads 
and bridges, as well power data he had gathered by surveying Iceland’s electrical 
infrastructure.94  GHQ air planners incorporated the information Snavely had gathered about 
Iceland’s airfields into the plan’s Air annex.95  The staff at GHQ also incorporated arrangements 
that Hinman had made with Curtis’ staff to hand over British coast artillery pieces to U.S. forces 
to use in coastal defense.96        
 Even though miscalculations on the part of the Special Observers and Roosevelt’s 
directive for the U.S. Army to reinforce instead of relieve the British in Iceland made much of 
their initial work unusable, the group’s planning work with the British continued to influence 
planning for the U.S. occupation of Iceland.  GHQ staff officers recognized what they could use 
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from the original plans that SPOBS had developed and incorporated it into their own operations 
plan for sending U.S. forces to Iceland.  To assist them in this process, they extended Griner’s 
stay in the U.S.  Collectively, SPOBS’ reconnaissance work and Griner’s presence helped 
planners at GHQ understand the problems they were attempting to solve.    
SPOBS and the U.S. Reinforcement of Iceland 
In addition to facilitating a common understanding of U.S. occupation of Iceland between 
the War Department, GHQ, the War Office, and the Iceland Force, SPOBS served as a means 
though which officials in Washington adapted to the ev r changing requirements for cooperating 
with the British in the occupation of Iceland.  SPOBS had already served as a means for 
adaptation when Roosevelt changed the U.S. mission in Iceland from relief to reinforcement.  As 
the summer of 1941 progressed, White House input once again required a revision of the U.S. 
Army’s concept for relief.  By the end of July, the War Department, SPOBS, and the British 
were all in agreement concerning the number of troops the United States would send to the 
island, as well as the role the force would play.  However, Roosevelt disagreed with the 
assessment that 7,500 troops were sufficient for reinforcement of the Iceland garrison, and 
directed that the Army send a force of 10,000 to Iceland by 1 October 1941.97  Faced with no 
other choice, GHQ had to adjust its figures in GHQ-IBC to meet the President's directive.98           
Top-level officials, however, added further complicat ons to the implementation of GHQ-
IBC.  Marshall and Stark had always been lukewarm towards the Iceland project, and the 
diversion of forces for Iceland threatened to wreak h voc on the Army's expansion program.99  
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Marshall's desire to protect resources identified for expanding the Army, coupled with the fierce 
debate in congress over selective service extension caused him to delay preparations, and then 
alter the premise on which GHQ based GHQ-IBC.  Staff officers at GHQ had drafted the final 
version of the plan under the assumption that Army forces would replace U.S. Marines currently 
serving on the island.  The process was to take place in a total of three movements, the first 
having been completed by the First Echelon, Task Force 4 when it conducted its movement to 
Iceland.  The Second Echelon was to follow in two separate convoys on 22 August and 5 
September.  Marshall, however, decreed that the Marines would have to stay as part of the 
10,000.  This reduced the force going to Iceland as part of the Second Echelon down to 5,000.100  
That meant that many of the figures in GHQ-IBC were now invalid.  However, while the staff at 
War Department did not feel they could issue the plan as a directive under the changed 
circumstances, staff members did feel that the material in the plan was relevant enough to serve 
as a reference by which the commander of the U.S. forces going to Iceland could base his 
operations.  At this point, War Department officials did not really have a choice as they did not 
have an alternative plan to issue to him.  Thus, when t e Second Echelon sailed for Iceland, the 
plan, although obsolete, served as the guide for establi hing operations in Iceland.101   
 SPOBS continued to review plans from the War Department concerning Iceland. 
However, with the arrival of the Second Echelon on 15 September, the planning role of SPOBS 
receded.102  The involvement of the Special Observers in the earlier planning process provided 
U.S. forces in Iceland with an awareness of the limitations they would face and the equipment 
they needed on the island, as well as tentative plans which they could execute immediately on 
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arrival.  Once there, however, the newly established forces that were part of U.S. Iceland Base 
Command were able to survey conditions for themselves and negotiate directly with British 
forces on the island to develop their own plans.103  Thus, after the arrival of the Second Echelon, 
SPOBS involvement in the Iceland occupation shifted to two major activities: they coordinated 
with the British for supply of items that the U.S. was unable to provide, and they served as the 
conduit through which the Army conducted the gradual replacement of the British by U.S. 
forces.    
 The most pressing issue concerning the supply of U.S. forces was building material.  
American occupation forces needed housing, storage, and hospital space, and in the case of 
housing, they needed it quickly as winter would make living in tents untenable. At the end of 
July, SPOBS had arranged with the British to provide Nissen huts for all U.S. relief forces 
arriving in Iceland in 1941.104  Soon after, the Marines on Iceland began a prodigi us building 
program to get housing ready for the Army before the onset of winter.  Thanks to the Marines, 
there were enough huts for the entire Second Echelon to cram into when they came ashore at the 
end of September.105  However, storage space was still critically short th oughout autumn and 
early winter and SPOBS was unsuccessful at alleviating this problem.  The ports at Reykjavik 
were still too small to handle the supplies both the British and the Americans were trying to 
funnel into the island.  Consequently, U.S. forces on the island experienced shipping delays, as 
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the British were unwilling to have the badly needed v ssels waste time in an Icelandic harbor, 
waiting for other ships to unload their cargoes.106     
 Chaney’s staff was more successful in helping U.S. officials adapt to changing 
requirements regarding the relief of British forces on the island.  GHQ’s plans did not call for the 
U.S. Army to send any further forces to Iceland until spring.  For the original relief mission, 
SPOBS and officials in the War Department had agreed that the U.S. would have to complete all 
troop movements by 1 October, since winter weather made water travel around Iceland risky, 
and this view had not changed during subsequent planing.  However, approximately a week 
after the Second Echelon arrived in Iceland, Roosevelt told Marshall that he wanted to continue 
sending U.S. forces to Iceland in small increments throughout the winter.107 
 Roosevelt's directive was not as unreasonable as it might seem.  The southwest part of 
Iceland, where all U.S. forces were located, was not subject to weather that was as harsh as the 
other two sectors of the island.108  Outside of the potential threat that German submarines posed, 
the U.S. Navy could conduct the passage to Reykjavik in relative safety.  Given adequate 
shipping and coordination with forces already on the island to ensure ports were open when 
troops arrived, winter movements were workable.  The key issue was housing.  U.S. and British 
forces had just enough shelter to house all the forces on the island.  Any further addition of U.S. 
forces would require a corresponding decrease in British forces.  Added to this was the fact that 
the defensive plans of both U.S. and British forces on the island were now inextricably 
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connected.  For one party to move forces without the consent of the other risked jeopardizing the 
collaborative relationship they had already built.  As British forces evacuated, U.S. forces would 
have to assume the defensive positions they abandoned.   Because of this, generally speaking, 
units the British moved from the island had to be substituted by units with equivalent capabilities 
from the United States.  This was not necessarily an easy proposition as the British and 
American militaries organized certain occupations, such as supply and ordnance, in different 
ways as well as using different types of equipment.  Thus, the two nations had to coordinate 
closely to accomplish even the smallest movements. 
 The Special Observers played an instrumental role in this process.  On 9 October, SPOBS 
received instructions from the War Department to obtain British views concerning winter 
relief.109  The British, for their part, were enthusiastic.  They still urgently needed forces on the 
island for use elsewhere, especially their engineer and antiaircraft units.  The War Office 
promptly presented SPOBS with a document outlining what they believed were practical goals 
concerning the relief of British forces on the island.  McNarney then passed along the essential 
elements of their proposal to War Department, including in the message a rough estimate of what 
British units equated to in American terms.  He also included information concerning equipment 
that the British might be willing to hand over to U.S. forces as well as possible issues concerning 
housing if the War Department attempted to relieve certain types of units (such as those manning 
coastal defenses) before April.110 
 The same day they requested that SPOBS obtain Britain's views about winter relief, War 
Department officials contacted the commander of U.S. forces in Iceland, Major General Charles 
                                                          
     109 Cable, TAG to SPOBS, Sub: Troops to Indigo, 9 October 1941, WPD 4493-50, WPD General 
Correspondence, 1920-1942, RG 165, NARA. 
     110 Cable, McNarney to TAG, Sub: RE: WPD 4493-153, 9 October 1941, Box 2130, Security Classified GHQ 
Correspondence, RG 165, NARA. 
91 
 
H. Bonesteel, and asked him to prioritize the units he wanted sent to Iceland.111  He responded 
with a list of the units he wanted and the order in which he wanted them.  By 1 November, the 
staff at GHQ developed a tentative plan for moving U.S. relief forces to Britain, based on 
Bonesteel's priorities.112  The British, in response, drafted their own plan for withdrawing 
forces.113 
 Both plans for the Iceland relief remained fluid prior to Pearl Harbor and the Special 
Observers had to continually coordinate planning efforts on both sides of the Atlantic.  Most 
changes that took place involved a simple adjustment of umbers and unit types.  But some 
involved more analysis by the Special Observers, their counterparts in the War Office, and War 
Department officials.  The following example is illustrative.  Toward the end of November, 
SPOBS notified the War Department of a British plan to withdraw the units that serviced Royal 
Navy ships and Royal Air Force aircraft.  However, the British still desired to keep a small 
component of ships and aircraft on the island to protect their North Atlantic supply routes.  To 
keep the planes and ships in working order, they requested that U.S. Army forces take over the 
servicing duties.114  As noted previously, however, British supply and service organizations did 
not correspond directly to U.S. organizations, requiring the Special Observers and their British 
counterparts to review War Department plans very caefully to ensure that the U.S. Army 
provided adequate service to British units remaining in Iceland.115   
 The role Chaney and his staff played in U.S. troop movements to Iceland decreased 
substantially in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor.  With U.S. entry into the war, Chaney and his 
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staff, as well as the War Department and the British defense establishment found themselves 
confronted with numerous problems associated with es ablishing U.S. combat power in the U.K.  
Fortunately for all involved, the pre-Pearl Harbor planning work that SPOBS had conducted with 
their British counterparts had provided all these ag ncies with both practical and conceptual 
experience in attempting to solve these types of problems.  Iceland set the template for these 
planning efforts.  Planning for Iceland required the Special Observers to educate themselves 
quickly as to the constraints, capabilities, and limitations of the British defense establishment.  It 
also required the Special Observers and British planners to examine how to move U.S. troops 
and integrate them into the British defensive scheme in Iceland.  Most significantly, the Iceland 
operation required both British and U.S. planning agencies to draw upon the knowledge that the 
Special Observers had gained through planning, knowledge that facilitated common 
understanding of the problems involved with establishing U.S. combat power in British 
controlled territory.  
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Chapter 3: Chasing the RAINBOW 
 On 17 July 1941, LTC Charles Bolte stood on the bank of Lough Erne, a lake system in 
County Fermanagh in Northern Ireland.  According to legend, the body of water had received its 
name from a noblewoman named Erne, who drowned in the lake while fleeing a giant voice.1  As 
was the case with many rivers and lakes in the Emerald Isle, Lough Erne had a tradition of being 
a location steeped in magic and the supernatural.2  Bolte scanned the lake and the surrounding 
area intently, not in the hopes of catching a hint of the lake’s supposed magical qualities, but 
rather, for more mundane and pragmatic reasons.  According to an agreement between Britain 
and the U.S. Navy, Lough Erne was to serve as the location of a U.S. naval installation if and 
when the U.S. entered the war against the Axis.  Bolte was trying to determine how the U.S. 
Army would protect the installation from ground and air attack.            
   After seeing all the he could see from his current vantage point he turned to an RAF Air 
Commodore and said, “Well, I got to look at this thing from the air.”3  His British hosts indicated 
that he could make use of their Catalina flying boat.  Bolte examined the crew.  Most were 
members of the RAF.  He was surprised, however, to see that the pilot bore the uniform of a U.S. 
Navy lieutenant, an indication that ties between Britain and the U.S. Navy were already 
strengthening in the aftermath of the American-British Conversations.4  Bolte boarded the plane 
with Lieutenant Colonel Frank Augustus Hart, an officer in the U.S. Marine Corps, and another 
officer, most likely Hinman.  Hart was a member of the Naval Attaché’s staff and would soon 
join SPENAVO, serving as the organization’s resident expert in ground combat and amphibious 
                                                          
     1 Patricia Monaghan, The Encyclopedia of Celtic Mythology and Folklore (New York: Facts on File Books, 
2004), 160-61. 
     2 W. B. Yeats ed., Fairy and Folk Tales of the Irish Peasantry (London: Walter Scott Publishing CO., LTD, 
1888), 306-318. 
     3 Burg/Bolte Interview, 70. 
     4 Ibid., 71. 
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warfare.5  After they entered the cabin, the atmosphere turned somewhat sophomoric, as often 
happened when officers had the rare opportunity to be with their peers, away from both superiors 
and subordinates.  The pilots had trouble getting the overloaded flying boat off the water.  As the 
occupants watched the crew struggle to get the Catalin  irborne Hart said, “That’s like old 
Sophie Nisbee.  She was dancing around there at the grand ball . . . and she slipped and fell, sat 
down on the floor and she was rocking herself and everybody says, ‘Sophie Nisbee, you hurt 
yourself?’  She said, ‘No.  I just trying to get my set-down unstuck.’”6  While Hart was amusing 
Bolte and the other officer, the Catalina finally got off the water, and the trio refocused on the 
task at hand.  They flew around the lake for about three miles, having to stay relatively close 
because the aircraft had no radio and, thus, had to remain in visual hailing distance.  After the 
group finished their observation of the potential bse local, they landed roughly and made their 
way back to shore.7 
 Bolte, Hinman, and Hart found themselves conducting a  aerial reconnaissance again the 
next day, this time in the sky over a valley near Londonderry, another site that was serve as a 
naval installation for U.S. forces in Northern Ireland.  Each rode in the rear facing gunner’s 
position of a tandem seat fighter.  After finishing the flight, Bolte got out of his aircraft and 
looked over at Hart, noticing that something didn’t look quite right.  Hart had not known how to 
prepare his parachute correctly before going up in the aircraft.  Unable to resist, Bolte went up to 
Hart and said matter-of-factly, “Well, Frank, if you had to bail out you were supposed to pull 
this,” pointing out to Hart how he would have been unable to deploy his parachute if he had 
                                                          
     5 Michael Robert Patterson, Biography of General Franklin Augustus Hart, USMC, posted on 
arlingtoncemetery.net, September 17, 2006, accessed December 29, 2015 at 
http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/fahart.htm.    
     6 Burg/Bolte Interview, 72. 
     7 Ibid., 72. 
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needed to use it.8  Hart turned white as the realization of what could have happened to him sunk 
in.  Bolte, in the great tradition of military comrades, found amusement in his friend’s 
discomfort, now that the risk of death had passed.9 
  At times, an atmosphere of fun prevailed within the group of Americans, but Bolte and 
the other Special Observers never let horseplay interfere with accomplishing their mission.  
Northern Ireland was one of many areas the group surveyed as part of their efforts to develop 
plans to implement the task forces called for in RAINBOW-5.  Planning for Iceland had 
provided them with their first opportunity to grapple with the problems associated with 
integrating U.S. combat power into British controlled territory.  In tackling those problems the 
Special Observers and their British counterparts gained a rudimentary understanding of the 
capabilities and limitations of U.S. and British organizations in terms of integration, identified 
which departments in the British defense establishment would have to coordinate with U.S. 
planners, and developed planning procedures and relationships that both sides would build upon 
as they prepared plans for the other RAINBOW-5 tasks forces.  What happened with planning 
for Iceland would happen on a much larger scale for the rest of Anglo-American planning for 
RAINBOW-5.  As with regard to planning for Iceland, the most obvious effect of SPOBS’ pre-
Pearl Harbor work would be plans that the War Department, for the most part, would not 
execute.   However, the latent effects of SPOBS’ planning with the British were significant in 
facilitating a common understanding among U.S. organizations and the British defense 
establishment concerning the problems associated with bu lding up U.S. combat power in 
Britain, an understanding that would remain relevant after most of Chaney’s staff had left 
theater.           
                                                          
     8 Ibid., 73. 
     9 Ibid. 
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Planning for the Defense of U.S. Naval Installations in Britain 
After the Iceland occupation, planning for the defens  of proposed U.S. Navy 
installations in the United Kingdom was the most pressing matter that SPOBS and the British 
addressed.  According to RAINBOW-5, the U.S. Navy had two tasks to perform in the British 
Home Waters: "Escort convoys in the Northwest Approaches, acting under the strategic direction 
of the British Commander-in-Chief of the Western Approaches," and "Raid enemy shipping in 
an area to be designated later, acting under the strategic direction of the British Vice Admiral, 
Submarines."10  To facilitate these tasks, the U.S. and British governments made arrangements in 
April, 1941 to construct naval bases at Londonderry and Lough Erne in Northern Ireland and 
Rosneath and Loch Ryan in Scotland through the Lend-Lease program.  By 12 June, the British 
government had hired an American contractor to undertak  the projects and work on the naval 
facilities began soon thereafter.11    
  As preparations for U.S. naval facilities in the United Kingdom were already underway, 
SPOBS and officials in the War Office and Air Ministry felt it was imperative that they make 
arrangements to defend the bases from ground and air attack as soon as practicable.  Like the 
U.S. occupation of Iceland, the War Office initiated discussion concerning the defense of these 
bases in its 31 May questionnaire to Chaney.  The questions the War Office asked and Chaney's 
responses to them revolved around the fundamental issue that SPOBS and British military 
officials would have to solve before they could draft plans for protecting the bases: how to fit 
American forces into the British system of ground a ir defense.12   
                                                          
     10 Ross, Plans for Global War: Rainbow-5, and the Victory Prog am, 1941, 20. 
     11 Department of the Navy, Building the Navy's Bases in World War II: History of the Bureau of Yards and 
Docks and the Civil Engineer Corps, 1940-1946, Volume II (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1947), 61; and Elliot, "The Predecessor Commands,” 65. 
     12 Johnsen, "Forging the Foundations of the Grand Alliance," 254; and War Office Questionnaire to General 
Chaney and His Replies, 31 May 41; and Minutes of Meeting With U.S. Special Observers and the War Office, 3 
June 1941, Box 2147, AG, RG 498, NARA. 
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  SPOBS attempted to address this issue at its firs meeting with the Air Ministry on 6 
June.  When the topic of discussion during the meeting shifted to the naval installations, 
McNarney spoke for the group, outlining U.S. proposals for defending the bases. He told the 
representatives of the Air Ministry that War Department planners envisioned protecting U.S. 
naval installations in Britain by concentrating all three pursuit groups the Army had allotted to 
the British Isles in Northern Ireland, along with five antiaircraft regiments and five battalions of 
infantry for airdrome defense.  Governing this concept, he noted, was a desire on the part of the 
U.S. Army was to keep the pursuit units close enough to compose a single pursuit wing under a 
U.S. commander, rather than dispersing the aircraft among various British units.  McNarney also 
highlighted a secondary benefit from consolidation.  The U.S. Army could also use Northern 
Ireland to instruct American squadrons on Fighter Command organization and procedure.13  
 At first glance, the War Department's concept for employing the pursuit aircraft in Britain 
hearkened back to the U.S. Army's experience with fighting in a coalition during the First World 
War.  During World War I, Pershing had refused to fill shortages in British and French armies by 
distributing American battalions piecemeal to Allied brigades.14  He had argued, "We cannot 
permit our men to serve under another flag except in an extreme emergency and then only 
temporarily . . . no people with a grain of national pride would consent to furnish men to build up 
the army of another nation."15  McNarney's call for maintaining unit integrity did, in part, stem 
from the U.S. Army's continued abhorrence with the idea of dispersal and amalgamation of its 
combat forces with those of the British.  As Steve W iss noted in his study, Allies in Conflict: 
                                                          
     13 Minutes of First Meeting Between United States Special Observer Group and the Air Ministry, June 6, 194 , 
Minutes - Meetings w/ Air Ministry, Box 2147, AG, RG 498, NARA. 
     
14 Sir Frederick Maurice, Lessons of Allied Co-operation: Naval, Military, and Air, 1914-1918 (1947; repr. 
Cranbury: Scholar's Bookshelf, 2006), 116-117.   
      
15 Pershing, My Experiences in the World War, 254-255.  This passage from Pershing's memoir is also quoted in 
Maurice, Lessons of Allied Co-operation, 117.      
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Anglo-American Strategic Negotiations, 1938-44, "many senior American Army officers, were 
Anglophobic, anti-Empire, and isolationist; the word 'allies' was alien to them."16  Traces of this 
attitude were present among members of the SPOBS staff. When in more private settings, 
Dahlquist repeatedly criticized plans to disperse U.S. forces in the United Kingdom and place 
them under British control.17  Additionally, Lee noted an incident in his journal in which 
McNarney emphatically opposed a proposal that the U.S. Army Air Corps supply pilots to ferry 
American bombers to England, based on his suspicion that acceptance would be "the thin edge of 
the wedge which would ultimately be expanded so as t  disperse our military effort all over the 
map."18   
 While these attitudes certainly influenced U.S. Army planners, they were not the sole or 
even the primary reason that McNarney presented a scheme that would allow the U.S. to keep its 
forces close together.  Dispersion of the task forces and British strategic and operational control 
of U.S. troops was inherent in RAINBOW-5, a fact that McNarney certainly recognized.  It 
seems more likely that organizational and technical ch lenges were what motivated McNarney's 
call for concentration in this instance, rather than a cultural aversion to dispersion and 
amalgamation. The U.S. had no doctrine for integrating i s forces with those of an ally.  
Concentrating U.S. forces as much as possible would simplify both integration into the British 
system of air and ground defense as well as administration by a theater level headquarters.  
                                                          
     16 Weiss, Allies in Conflict, 21.  Ghormley received reports that there was growing antagonism towards British 
officers in the Department of the Navy as well.  See L tter, Ghormley to Stark, July 24, 1941, Special N val 
Observer, London, England: Admiral H. R. “Betty” Stark Letters Sent (8/23/1940-4/6/1942), 1153.11, Robert L. 
Ghormley Papers, Joyner Library, ECU.    
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  John E. Dahlquist Diary, 14 July, 21 July, 24 July, and 31 July 1941, Dahlquist Papers, Box 1, USAHEC.  
     
18 Journal entry for 26 May 1941 in Leutze ed., The London Observer.  Officers continued to object to the idea of 
serving under British command after the U.S. entered th  war.  According to Bolte, when Brigadier General Ira 
Eaker arrived in theater in 1942 to begin setting up the U.S. Bomber Command, he said, “Charlie, I’ll tell you one 
thing, I’ll never take an order from a Britisher.”  See Interview of General Charles L. Bolte, USA Retired by Edward 
M. Coffman, 1986, Box 17, Charles L. Bolte Papers, USAHEC.     
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Simplicity is what motivated U.S. and British planners to advocate integrating the initial 
complement of U.S. forces to Iceland into the British defensive scheme by having them 
concentrated as a mobile reserve.  Similar motivations seemed to be at work here as well.         
 In principle, the Air Ministry did not object to the U.S. scheme for concentrating its 
pursuit forces in Northern Ireland.  However, the Vice Chief of the Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal 
Sir Wilfred Freeman, pointed out that U.S. plans were potentially unworkable because of the 
scarcity of airdromes in Northern Ireland.  He offered the possibility that the Air Ministry could 
station U.S. forces in Northern Ireland, southwest Scotland, and northwest England, noting that 
this would still allow those forces to function under a single U.S. commander operating at the 
direction of Fighter Command.  Chaney entered the discussion at this point, requesting that the 
Air Ministry provide SPOBS with a recommendation con erning how the U.S. should allocate 
pursuit units in the British Isles. 19           
The allocation problem would take the Special Observers and their British counterparts 
more than a month to resolve.  The questions that SPOBS and the Air Ministry needed to answer 
were deceptively simple: what was the minimum number of fighters the U.S. needed to station in 
Northern Ireland and–if there were excess combat aircraft–where should the U.S. place them?  
According to RAINBOW-5 the answer to the first question was obvious: as many as necessary to 
defend the U.S. naval installations.  But the Special Observers and planners in the Air Ministry 
had to factor more than ABC-1 and RAINBOW-5 in their calculations.  The scarcity of airfields 
in Northern Ireland would not permit the British to keep their own fighter force in areas the 
United States occupied.  As such, any U.S. pursuit forces in Northern Ireland, in addition to 
providing air defense for U.S. bases, would have to provide air support for the entire sector of 
                                                          
     
19 Minutes of First Meeting Between United States Special Observer Group and the Air Ministry, June 6, 194 , 
Minutes - Meetings w/ Air Ministry, Box 2147, AG, RG 498, NARA.   
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which their airfields were a part.  This, in turn, produced additional planning requirements.  
Planning required coordination with organizations outside of the Air Ministry, as the War Office, 
Coastal Command, and the Ministry of Aircraft Production (MAP) all had resources in Northern 
Ireland that required protection.  They would also have to share these resources with U.S. forces 
to facilitate protection of sectors containing American controlled airfields.  Additionally, the U.S. 
pursuit units were unlikely to all arrive at the same time, so SPOBS and the Air Ministry would 
have to devise a method of gradual relief, similar in fashion to what they were doing for British 
forces in Iceland. 20 
 In the process of solving the allocation problem, the Special Observers and the staff at the 
Air Ministry became intimately familiar with the cap bilities of pursuit craft from each nation as 
well as the limitations the U.S. Army Air Force would face when operating with the RAF in the 
British Isles.21  The Special Observers and the staff at Fighter Command spent the rest of June 
and early July examining the employment of U.S. pursuit forces in the United Kingdom.  The 
two organizations conducted a detailed study of airdromes in Northern Ireland, balancing the 
limitations posed by their scarcity with the capabilities of U.S. and British fighter squadrons.  By 
10 July, working jointly, British and American planners had developed a tentative plan for 
stationing U.S. pursuit units in the United Kingdom, prompting McNarney to request a meeting 
                                                          
     
20
 Minutes of Conference held on Wednesday 25th June, 1941 in Room 71A, King Charles Street to discuss the 
allocation of aerodromes in N. Ireland; and Minutes of 3rd meeting between Air Ministry and U.S.A. Special 
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NARA. 
     
21 The Special Observers made their plans on the assumption that the pursuit groups would be equipped with Bell 
P-39 Airacobras, an aircraft that performed poorly at high altitudes when compared to the British Hawker Hurricane 
and Supermarine Spitfire.  See Martin W. Bowman, USAAF Handbook 1939-1945 (Mechanicsburg: Stackpole 
Books, 1997), 114. 
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with the Chief of the Air Staff to come to a final agreement between SPOBS and the Air 
Ministry.22 
 The Special Observers met with representatives from the Air Ministry and War Office on 
15 July, with Chaney and McNarney briefing the plan Chaney’s staff and planners at Fighter 
Command had developed.  Out of the three pursuit groups that would come to Britain upon U.S. 
entry into the war, two would go to Northern Ireland, occupying aerodromes at Ballyhalbert, 
Eglinton, St. Angelo, and Kirkistown, supported by a total of four infantry battalions and four 
antiaircraft regiments.   As the primary mission of the pursuit craft was to protect future U.S. 
naval installations, the location of the third pursuit group was to be in Scotland along with a 
single infantry battalion and antiaircraft regiment for support.23 
 After an analysis of defensive requirements in these regions, Chaney’s staff and the staff 
at Fighter Command determined that the U.S. would have to make both technological and 
organizational changes to the pursuit forces it was sending.  Initial plans had all U.S. pursuit 
groups composed of daytime fighter squadrons.  To meet British air defense requirements, each 
group would need to have a squadron equipped with night fighters, an aircraft type that the 
British were so short of that Fighter Command planners and the Special Observers made 
provisions for these aircraft to assist in the defense of British controlled areas should the need 
arise.24  Additionally, despite what Freeman had said in the Air Ministry's first meeting with 
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SPOBS, the dispersion of U.S. aircraft would not permit all groups to operate under the control 
of a single U.S. commander during combat.  Chaney’s staff and the staff at Fighter Command 
determined that the Northern Ireland pursuit forces would have to assume a role in the British 
defensive scheme equivalent to a RAF "fighter group," with Fighter Command assuming 
operational control of the unit during actual combat.  In examining the requirements for 
Scotland, the two staffs determined that U.S. pursuit craft allocated to this region would have to 
operate under the command of British fighter groups.25  Freeman and the other representatives 
from the Air Ministry agreed to the plan Chaney and McNarney briefed, prompting SPOBS to 
move immediately into the next phase of its planning.  With a general concept in hand, a 
reconnaissance party, headed by Davison, left England by air for Belfast. 
 Griner, as the SPOBS G-4, would normally have been in charge of the survey, but his 
work in the United States on INDIGO required that Dvison serve as his proxy.  A third 
generation Army officer, Davison was a graduate of the United States Military Academy 
(USMA) class of 1915, “the class the stars fell on.”  Of 164 graduates, 59, the most of any class 
in USMA’s history, would ultimately attain general officer rank, among them McNarney, Omar 
Bradley, and Dwight D. Eisenhower.26  Davison’s first job out of USMA had been to work on a 
project making military maps of New England.  After working on the map project he served in a 
variety of engineering jobs for the U.S. Army, including service with the 11th Engineers in the 
Panama Canal Zone, assignment as District Engineer at Louisville Kentucky, and command of 
                                                          
Battle of Britain, night fighting capability assumed increased importance. See Chaz Bowyer, Fighter Command, 
1936-1938 (London: J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1980), 77-85.       
     25 Ibid. Planners eventually agreed to place U.S. pursuit units in Scotland under one British fighter group.  See 
Memo, McClelland to the Adjutant General, Sub: Army pursuit units for service in the United Kingdom, July 25, 
1941, Air Defenses, Box 2184, AG, RG 498, NARA. 
     26 General Officer Biography, Brigadier General Donald A. Davison, 19 May 1944, U.S. Army General Officer 
Official Biographies, Historical Resources Collection II, U.S. Army Center of Military History.  For an account of 
the USMA class of 1915, see Michael Haskew, West Point 1915: Eisenhower, Bradley, and the Class the Stars Fell 
On (Minneapolis: Zenith Press, 2014). 
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the 21st Engineers at Fort Benning, Georgia.  While in command of the 21st and later as the 
Engineer for GHQ Air Force, he was heavily involved in the development of specialized 
Engineer units, designed to support the U.S. Army Air Corps by constructing and maintaining 
airfields.27  Dahlquist, in describing Davison to his wife, characterized him as a “very fine man,” 
and was glad that he had been chosen to be a part of Chaney’s staff.28                       
Davison took seven members of the SPOBS staff with him to Northern Ireland.  As in the 
reconnaissance for Iceland, the task for each member of the team was to survey conditions in 
Northern Ireland and develop an estimate pertaining to their specific areas of expertise.  Coffey, 
Matejka, Hinman, and Welsh, would once again examine ordnance, signal, antiaircraft, and 
medical issues respectively.  This time, Lieutenant Colonel William H. Middleswart, the SPOBS 
Quartermaster officer, would accompany the reconnaissance party to examine general issues 
pertaining to supply, while the SPOBS Air officer, Colonel Alfred J. Lyon, would serve as the 
aviation expert for the group.  Bolte, as the SPOBS plans officer was responsible for integrating 
all of their efforts into a cohesive tentative plan to send back to the War Department.  
Additionally, Hart accompanied the group to represent the views of the U.S. Navy while two 
British officers, one from the Air Ministry and another from the War Office, came as well to 
assist the party in making the necessary contacts with relevant British organizations in Northern 
Ireland. 29   
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 For the Air Ministry's representative, Wing Commander H.I. Cozens, the reconnaissance 
was the beginning of what would become a very close working relationship with the SPOBS 
staff.  Cozens had joined the RAF in 1923, on a short-service commission after leaving St. 
Dunstan's College in Catford, London.  Obtaining a permanent commission three years later, he 
spent the interwar years gaining experience in a number of assignments, including service as a 
member of the 1930 British Arctic Air Route Expedition to Greenland, where he was able to 
indulge in his passion for photography as the expedition's camera man, as a member of the Air 
Staff in Headquarters, Iraq Command, and as commander of No. 19 Squadron, where he 
successfully lobbied to have his unit receive the first Supermarine Spitfires to enter RAF 
service.30  By the summer of 1941, the RAF had removed him from field service and assigned 
him to the Air Ministry's Directorate of War Organization to work on issues concerning 
aerodrome defense, supply, and salvage.31       
 From 15-19 July, Cozens assisted Davison and the rest of the group in their 
reconnaissance of Northern Ireland, from which SPOBS gained two major benefits.  First, the 
party obtained the data that would enable the SPOBS to complete plans for employing U.S. 
forces in Northern Ireland.  As they did during planning for the U.S. occupation of Iceland, the 
SPOBS staff would later compile their observations a d recommendations in the form of an 
occupation plan for the War Department, complete wih annexes for each of the services.32   
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 Of equal importance, the party members established contact and gained experience in 
planning with agencies operating in Northern Ireland that would play a major role in subsequent 
Anglo-American planning for the region.  While gathering data on conditions in Northern 
Ireland, the group observed administrative arrangements that the Royal Air Force and British 
Army had in place to cooperate with one another, arrangements that U.S. forces would need to 
mimic in order to function in Britain's system of air nd ground defense.33  To further their 
examination, the Special Observers participated in staff conferences at the headquarters of both 
the Northern Ireland District (NID) and British Troops in Northern Ireland (BTNI), the two 
agencies responsible for overseeing British Army operations in the region.34  These two 
organizations would later play a key role in planning for the first U.S. ground forces to come to 
the British Isles after Pearl Harbor in an operation dubbed “MAGNET.”  
 Unlike planning for Iceland, there was a significant delay between when the Special 
Observers started planning for the defense of U.S. naval installations in Britain and when they 
sent their estimates to the War Department.   For a variety of reasons, the Special Observers put a 
two-month hold on planning after the July reconnaiss nce.  One of the factors involved in the 
delay had to do with logistics planning.  The reconnaissance had highlighted the necessity of 
resolving questions concerning the coordination of British and U.S. aviation logistics.  This was 
an issue that the group had been aware of upon arrival in Britain, but in the process of drafting 
plans for defending the U.S. naval installations, they gained a better understanding of the 
problems associated with developing combined policy for aviation logistics.  To continue with 
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further preparations to defend the naval bases by air, SPOBS had to establish, at a minimum, 
tentative aviation logistics agreements with the British.  This task fell to Lyon, who initiated a 
series of negotiations with British aviation authorities on these matters shortly after returning 
from Northern Ireland.35                  
 The other reasons for the planning delay had to do with the tendency of U.S. officials to 
use SPOBS as an instrument to adapt to the changing requirements for preparing for coalition 
war.  During this period, the group began taking on projects that were outside of its original 
scope of responsibility.  The War Department increased the group's role in the Lend-Lease 
program, assigning it responsibility for relaying technical data regarding the British use of 
American aircraft.  In the weeks that followed, theWar Department also tasked the group with 
participating in negotiations with the British and the Soviets regarding Lend-Lease to Russia as 
well assisting in developing an estimate of combined resource requirements for winning the 
Second World War known as the Victory Program.  Additionally, the SPOBS staff spent much 
of their time supporting a U.S. Army Air Force mission to assist the British in maintaining 
aircraft the British government had purchased from the United States.  The War Department 
assigned SPOBS all of these additional duties without allocating the additional personnel 
necessary for the group to accomplish these mission and still perform its planning duties in 
implementing ABC-1.  As a result, the theoretical pl nning the group was engaged in took a 
backseat to the immediate requirements the Special Observers' new duties engendered.36 
                                                          
     
35 These negotiations are examined in Chapter 4.   
     36 Cable, SPOBS to AGWAR, Sub: Scotland Reconnaissance Report, September 20, 1941, SPOBS - Cables - Air 
Force June 1941-June 1942, Administrative History 1942-1946, Historical Division, RG 498, NARA.  The 
involvement of the Special Observers in the mission to assist the British in maintenance of American aircr ft is 
examined in Chapter 4.  SPOBS involvement in the Lend-Lease program is examined in Chapter 6.   
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 SPOBS was never able to completely overcome its shortfall in personnel, but by fall of 
1941 Lyon had negotiated a tentative plan for an Anglo-American air logistics program, allowing 
SPOBS to finalize plans for defending U.S. naval installations in Britain.  On 25 September, 
Bolte, Davison, Dahlquist, Coffey, Middleswart, Snavely, Matejka, Griner, and Colonel Paul R. 
Hawley, who replaced Welsh as SPOBS Surgeon after he returned to the states due to illness, 
traveled to Scotland to survey conditions for the pursuit group SPOBS and the staff at Fighter 
Command had allocated to the region.  Cozens accompanied the party, assisting the group as 
they visited a variety locations, including Gare Loch, Loch Ryan, and Ayr. 37  Shortly after 
returning to England, the party completed a report similar the one developed for Northern 
Ireland, consisting of an occupation plan for the War Department, complete with annexes for 
each of the arms and services.38  With the submission of this report, on 12 October 1941, SPOBS 
had completed the basic planning required for defending U.S. naval installations in the British 
Isles.              
 Although the British and the Americans would ultimately change their concept for 
employing U.S. forces in Britain, the plans SPOBS and their British counterparts developed to 
defend the proposed naval installations would play an important role in the evolution of Anglo-
American cooperation in Europe.  MAGNET drastically changed the premise on which SPOBS 
had based its plans.  However, as MAGNET would still have the U.S. Army sending its forces to 
Northern Ireland, albeit in greater numbers, a latent effect of this planning was that SPOBS and 
their British counterparts would be able to draw on many elements of this prior planning to 
execute U.S. troop movements to the region.  Another lat nt effect of planning for the defense of 
                                                          
     
37 Dahlquist Diary, 26-28 September 1941; and Bolte Diary, 26-28 September 1941.   
     38 Memo, Chaney for Chief of Staff, Report of Reconnaiss nce of Scotland, October 12, 1941, Recon of Scotland 
Folder #3 (Papers) 1942, Box 2071, AG, RG 498, NARA. 
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U.S. naval installations in Northern Ireland was to pr vide the Special Observers and their 
British counterparts a general understanding of the problems associated with integrating U.S. 
combat power into the region.  SPOBS and numerous organizations within the British military 
services, including the War Office, Air Ministry, Fighter Command, British Troops in Northern 
Ireland, and the Northern Ireland Department, colletiv ly engaged in the planning for the task 
force.  In a manner similar to students at military staff schools such as the Command and General 
Staff College and Army War College, the planners at each of these organizations were learning 
how to solve specific types of problems, in this cae those associated integrating U.S. combat 
power into the British defense establishment, by engaging in what was essentially a theoretical 
planning exercise, albeit one that had a basis in reality.  The problems they encountered during 
this theoretical exercise would be the same types of problems they would later encounter in 
planning the actual build-up of U.S. forces in Britain.  
Planning for the Token Force 
The Special Observers and the staffs at the War Office, Home Forces, and South Eastern 
Command gained similar experience when making plans for employing the Token Force in 
England.  Befitting its name, the mission of the Token Force was largely symbolic.  Bolte 
asserted, in an interview after the war, that the regiment's true purpose in Britain was "to show 
the flag."39  To be sure, it was unlikely that a single reinforced regiment of infantry from the U.S. 
would have turned the tide if Germany had decided to invade Britain.  But committing ground 
troops  to the defense of England would send a messag  to Britain's enemies that the United 
States was willing to commit more than aircraft and ships to assist its ally should the need arise.      
                                                          
     
39 Burg/Bolte Interview, 87.   
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 The limitation of this ground force to one reinforced regiment reflected a temporary 
acceptance on the part of the U.S. Army of Britain's concept for offensive operations against 
Germany.  At the time of the American-British Conversations, most British officials held that the 
principle offensive action against Germany should be air and naval operations, with the Allies 
sending ground forces to the continent only after bom ardment, blockade, and operations against 
the periphery of the Axis territory had sufficiently weakened Germany.40  Acceptance of this 
idea was by no means universal and there were military officials on both sides of the Atlantic 
who advocated a more "direct approach" for defeating Germany.41  However, during the 
American-British Conversations, the participants accorded air and naval forces the predominant 
role in implementing the Germany First Strategy.42  As a result, Air Corps units and their 
supporting elements made up a majority of the U.S. Army's troop basis for RAINBOW-5.43    
Planners in the War Department began moving away from this concept in the summer of 1941, 
eventually advocating a build-up of large numbers of U.S. ground troops in England for a direct 
invasion of Europe across the English Channel.44  Notably, SPOBS remained unaware of the 
                                                          
     40 Trumball Higgins, Winston Churchill and the Second Front, 1940-1943 (New York: Oxford University Press, 
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42 Higgins, Winston Churchill and the Second Front, 1940-1943, 47.   
     43 War Department Operations Plan Rainbow No. 5, 1941, paragraph 28c., Forces; and Annex II, Concentration 
Tables to War Department Concentration Plan Rainbow N . 5, 1941, Table 6, Force B-5; both on file at USAHEC. 
     44 Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports!, 65-67; and Kent Roberts Greenfield, American Strategy in World War II: A 
Reconsideration (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1963), 26-27.   
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changes Army planners were making until after U.S. entry into the war, continuing the entire 
time to jointly-develop a plan with the British to employ a relatively small ground force of U.S. 
troops in England. 
 Officials in the War Office were the first to broach the subject of the Token Force.  Along 
with the U.S. occupation of Iceland and the defense of future U.S. naval installations in the 
British Isles, War Office planners addressed the Token Force in the questionnaire they had sent 
to Chaney soon after he arrived in England.   Their chief concern regarding the Token Force was 
how to utilize the regiment within Britain’s current defensive system.  In submitting questions to 
Chaney, the planners included a concept, proposed by General Sir Alan Brooke, the 
Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces, and his staff for using U.S. ground troops in a manner 
similar to the way the War Office eventually employed U.S. Marines and the initial elements of 
the U.S. Army in Iceland, as a mobile reserve.  In this case, Brooke proposed assigning the 
Token Force to 4 Corps reserve in Sussex.45        
 Brooke's plan to bolster the defenses of Sussex with U.S. forces was a logical one.  Both 
Sussex and its neighboring county, Kent, were particularly vulnerable to invasion because of the 
proximity of their coasts to the narrowest parts of the English Channel.  The two counties also 
stood directly between German forces on the continet and London.  These issues prompted the 
British to form a new command including Sussex and Kent in early 1941 called South Eastern 
Command, with Lieutenant General Sir Bernard Paget s its commander.46  Along with the War 
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Office, and Home Forces, Paget and the staff at Souh Eastern Command would play a major 
role in developing plans for the Token Force with SPOBS. 
 The Special Observers along with representatives from the War Office undertook the first 
of many visits to the South Eastern Command area on 24 June, traveling to the command's 
headquarters at Reigate, a historic market town approximately twenty three miles south of 
London.  There the group received a briefing from General Paget providing an overview of the 
issues confronting any force attempting to defend the area.  Following the brief, his chief 
administrative officer provided the Special Observers with an overview of logistics in the region.  
Paget then took the SPOBS staff on their first tourof facilities, visiting a munitions depot, a 
supply depot, petrol dump, and a battalion camp as well as having tea with the 8th Royal Welsh 
Fusiliers.47  
 Throughout the summer, the Special Observers and the staff of South Eastern Command 
jointly studied the problem if integrating the Token Force into the Home Forces' defensive plans.  
The greatest obstacle that the SPOBS staff encountered in completing plans for the Token Force 
was the weakness of British beach defenses in the area that Brooke wanted U.S. troops to 
support.  Recalling a 14 July visit Bolte noted:  
"A group of us, including McNarney, went down to the South Eastern Command 
to look at the defenses, we'll say of the British Iles, in case the Germans were to 
go to invade.  And among other things, we went down to the Dungeness 
Peninsula, which is a triangle of rather flat land that goes out into the English 
Channel down there, down south of the mouth of the T ames.  And we looked 
and on the fields there–it's fairly flat–there were th  remnants of an old ditch 
which had been put there by Pitt at the time when Napoleon was going to land 
over here.  I mean we looked at this thing going back there, and Joe McNarney 
said to me when we went back . . . 'Charley, I feellik  a murderer.'  Those were 
his words after having looked at this, at the weaknss of this thing–of the idea of 
                                                          
     47 Ibid.; and Draft report of planning activities concerning Token Force, Personal Gen. Chaney, James E. Chaney 
Papers, Chaney Family Private Collection. 
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Hitler and the Germans crossing, and this is what te British had to stop it . . . it 
was pathetic."48 
 
The weakness of the defenses to which Bolte referred were the product of the hasty evacuation of 
the British Expeditionary Force from Dunkirk and the priority the British government had 
accorded to the Royal Air Force, Navy, and forces overseas for equipment.  The British Army 
had managed to save most of its personnel during the Dunkirk evacuation, but had been forced to 
abandon much of its materiel, so much that there was only enough modern equipment left in the 
U.K. to fully equip one division.  With the Royal Air Force and Navy as well as overseas forces 
receiving the lion's share of equipment, Home Forces would not be able to overcome the 
shortfalls from the losses at Dunkirk until late 1942.49  Because of his participation in the 
American-British Conversations, McNarney could not help but feel that he was partly 
responsible for committing American troops to a potential slaughter on British beaches.  
Dahlquist was even more critical about the state of Britain’s defenses.  In a curmudgeonly tone 
he often used in his own diary he wrote, "My contention a month ago that we should not commit 
ourselves to sending a Token Force over was very well substantiated by today's 
reconnaissance."50  Dahlquist, who was by nature prone to skepticism, was of the mind that there 
were many flaws in RAINBOW-5 as well as the method by which the War Department was 
handling Anglo-American war planning.  He would grow even more critical of the War 
Department policy after the U.S. entered the war.    
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50 Dahlquist Diary, 14 July 1941. 
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 Conditions soon improved in South Eastern Command, llaying McNarney's fears and 
challenging Dahlquist's cynicism.51  By early September, after a month and a half of study and 
negotiations with the staff at South Eastern Command, the SPOBS staff developed a plan for 
employing the Token Force.  The general mission of the Token Force as Brooke had first 
proposed in the War Office questionnaire to Chaney was essentially unchanged.  It was to serve 
as a mobile reserve for South Eastern Command.  Specifically, the regiment was to conduct a 
counterattack should Axis forces attempt to cross the Medway River east of Wrotham, invade via 
the Isle of Sheppey and the peninsula between the Thames and the Medway, or attempt to force 
their way onto the Dungeness Peninsula.  Rather than station the units in Sussex, however, the 
Special Observers and the staff at South Eastern Command planned to quarter the American 
regiment in an area immediately northeast of Wrotham in Kent, as this would place the Token 
Force in a location that would allow it to quickly support any of the areas for which it was 
responsible.52  Chaney submitted this plan, complete with annexes for each of the arms and 
services, to the War Department on 4 September in a memo titled, "Report of Reconnaissance of 
Kent Area for Token Force."53  As with the other reports he sent back to the WarDepartment, 
the Token Force report contained the collective estimates of the SPOBS staff, this time focused 
on solving the problem of integrating a reinforced U.S. infantry regiment into Britain’s defensive 
system.      
 Ultimately, the War Department would never implement the plan that the Special 
Observers and their counterparts in the War Office, Home Forces, and South Eastern Command 
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had developed for the Token Force.  U.S. and British military officials were to agree to a new 
strategic concept in the months after the U.S. enter d the war, one that involved replacing the 
reinforced regiment called for in RAINBOW-5 with a massive force of American troops sent to 
prepare for an invasion of France.  At first glance, this change in orientation would seem to 
render work on the Token Force irrelevant.  Such an interpretation, however, ignores the latent 
effects of the planning process for the Token Force.  The pre-Pearl Harbor planning SPOBS 
conducted with the staffs at the War Office, Home Forces, and South Eastern Command 
provided all agencies involved with experience in planning for the accommodation of U.S. 
ground forces in the British Isles as well as their integration into the British defensive apparatus.  
As in the planning for the U.S. occupation of Iceland and planning for defense of U.S. naval 
installations in Britain, the fundamental problems that SPOBS and their British counterparts 
tackled in planning for the Token Force represented th  same types of problems that U.S. and 
British staffs would encounter during the actual bui d- p of U.S. forces in Britain.  While the 
U.S. would not execute the plan for the Token Force as Chaney’s staff had intended, all parties 
involved gained a general understanding of the problems pertaining to establishing U.S. combat 
power in British territory.       
Planning for the Bombardment Force 
While conducting planning for the other task forces, the Special Observers began laying 
the groundwork for the Bombardment Force.  Discussions about this task force began at the first 
meeting between SPOBS and the Air Ministry on 6 June 1941.  In addition to outlining the War 
Department's proposal for defending U.S. naval installations in Britain, McNarney described the 
composition of the Bombardment Force and explained how the U.S. Army envisioned it would 
operate in England: under the strategic direction of the British but operationally under a single 
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U.S. commander.  To facilitate employing U.S. bombers in this manner, he told the Air Ministry 
officials that the War Department wanted to concentrate these forces in a single area.54  In 
response, Freeman indicated that the Air Ministry would support U.S. desires to keep the 
Bomber Force unified, recommending that the U.S. concentrate it at aerodromes in Huntingdon, 
a region located approximately seventy-seven miles north of London in Eastern Command.  
Chaney gave provisional assent to Freeman's proposal, pending further investigation of the area 
by his staff.55   
 The discussion then moved to other topics concerning the Bombardment Force.  In 
addition to talking about concentration plans, the participants briefly addressed issues that both 
SPOBS and the Air Ministry would have to examine before U.S. Bombers could operate in 
British airspace.  Topics included operational training for bombardment crews, the training of 
operations, intelligence, and aerodrome control officers, and the signal equipment the U.S. 
aircraft would need to communicate with British forces.56 
 Chaney’s staff and their counterparts in the Air Mnistry, Bomber Command, and the 
War Office examined all of these issues throughout the pre-Pearl Harbor period, but the vast 
majority of work for the Bombardment Forces prior t 7 December 1941 consisted of the 
assessment and selection of airfields.  In many ways, the Special Observers' work on the bomber 
airfields was similar to the work they were doing con urrently on airfield allocation for the 
pursuit forces defending the naval installations.  The SPOBS staff had to educate their 
counterparts in RAF Bomber Command about the capabilities and organization of U.S. 
Bombardment units, while the Bomber Command staff hd to help the SPOBS staff determine 
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the limitations these units would face when operating out of Britain, forging a relationship 
between the two organizations that was not unlike the one SPOBS had with the staff at Fighter 
Command.    
 The Special Observers and the staff at RAF Bomber Command worked on the airfield 
problem for a month after the group’s first meeting with the Air Ministry, with Chaney 
eventually meeting the organization's Air Officer Administration, Air Vice Marshal Ronald 
Graham, in early July to hear his proposal for basing U.S. bombers in Huntingdon.  In the course 
of the meeting, Graham and Chaney made a tentative greement that Bomber Command would 
release five two-squadron aerodromes, along with five satellites without facilities, to 
accommodate the bombardment forces.  The two also agreed to the minimum characteristics and 
facilities that each aerodrome would possess and that–as the U.S. Army would need to use these 
airfields strictly for bombing operations–the Bombardment Force would use separate facilities 
for repair and supply depots.57  Graham sent a summary of the aerodrome accommodations 
through the Air Ministry to McClelland later that month.58  With these figures in hand, the 
SPOBS staff spent the first two weeks of August conducting an analysis of aerodrome facilities 
in Huntingdon by checking their accommodations and dimensions against the table of 
organization for the projected U.S. Bombardment Force.59 
 In the final stages of planning for the airfields prior to Pearl Harbor, SPOBS dealt 
primarily with the Air Ministry and the War Office.  In late September, Snavely conducted 
inspections of aerodromes that the group had examined during their studies in early August.  
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After checking the group's paper calculations against the reality of what he saw, he identified 
airfields that would not support requirements for the bombardment task force and had McNarney 
petition the Air Ministry for replacements, which, as Bomber Command's higher headquarters, 
served as the final approval authority for releasing airfields to American Forces.  Once again, 
Cozens served as the Air Ministry's principal representative to the group, assisting Snavely in 
finding replacements for the airfields he found defici nt.60  The Chief of the Air Staff, Air Chief 
Marshal Sir Charles Portal, subsequently approved th  airfields that Snavely and Cozens 
proposed. 61     
 Upon Portal’s confirmation of the new airfields, work on the airfields shifted to 
accommodation and logistics, the province of the War Office Quartermaster General's 
Department (QMG). QMG's principal representative to SPOBS for this project as well as others 
was Brigadier J.M. Benoy, Deputy Director (Q Maint).62  Like Cozens, Benoy had developed 
close working relationship with the Special Observer Group, especially Griner, by the fall of 
1941.  As much the Special Observer Group's preparations involved arranging for the reception, 
accommodation, and logistics of the RAINBOW-5 task forces, Benoy, as D.D. (Q. Maint), was 
heavily involved in many of the group's activities.  Benoy's role in this particular project 
concerned the development of an occupation plan for the Bombardment Force.  After meeting 
with Benoy on 20 November, the SPOBS staff developed a "map solution" to the distribution of 
U.S. bombardment forces in Huntingdon and submitted  to Benoy's office.  Based on the 
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requirements the Special Observers provided to QMG, Benoy's staff drafted a plan for U.S. 
occupation of airfields in the Huntingdon Area sending it to SPOBS on 8 December, 1941.63 
 The selection and assessment of airfields in Huntingdon was the only significant progress 
that SPOBS and their British counterparts made in pla ning for the Bombardment Force prior to 
Pearl Harbor, but even the limited progress accomplished in this area provided benefits to 
subsequent Anglo-American cooperation in England.  The air element that the U.S. would 
eventually send to England would be far greater than e Bombardment Force that RAINBOW-5 
called for.  Still, concentration of U.S. bombers in the Huntingdon area would remain a central 
element in the American strategic bombing campaign.  As such, it was one of the few manifest 
effects of the Special Observers’ work with the British that would survive the changes that would 
take place after Pearl Harbor.  In working with theBritish in the selection and assessment of 
airfields for U.S. bombers, SPOBS literally laid the groundwork for the establishment of an 
American bombardment force in England.  More signifcant were the latent effects of the 
planning process.  Planning for the airfields required SPOBS and the staffs at the Air Ministry, 
Bomber Command, and the War Office to assess the feasibility of the Bombardment Force 
against the constraints and limitations posed by fighting from the British Isles and to balance 
U.S. capabilities with British resources.  As such, all parties involved came away from the 
planning process with an understanding of the requiments for establishing a U.S. bomber force 
in the U.K., and their shared understanding served as a key element of Anglo-American strategy 
after the U.S. entered the war. 
Although most of the plans developed for implementing he RAINBOW-5 task forces 
became obsolete after Pearl Harbor, the planning activity itself had intrinsic value.  In preparing 
                                                          
     
63 Letter, Griner to Benoy, December 11, 1941, Huntingdon, Box 2310, AG, RG 498, NARA.  
119 
 
for the defense of U.S. naval installations in Britain, the employment of the Token Force, and the 
Bombardment Force, the Special Observers gained experi nce in conducting operational level 
planning with key agencies within the British defens  establishment that would subsequently 
play a vital role in the conduct of Anglo-American coalition warfare.  In turn, the staffs at the Air 
Ministry, Fighter Command, Bomber Command, the War Office, Home Forces, South Eastern 
Command, BTNI, and NID all gained their first experience during the Second World War in 
conducting operational level planning with the Americans.  Although the overall concept for 
employing U.S. forces in Britain would ultimately be radically different after Pearl Harbor, 
Anglo-American war planners would confront many of the same problems that they first 
grappled with when conducting theoretical planning for RAINBOW-5.  As such, the planning 
gave the Special Observers and their British counterparts a better understanding of what was 
required to establish U.S. combat power in Britain.
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Chapter 4: Ground and Air Logistics Planning for RAINBOW-5 
   
 At approximately 12:00 noon on November 3, 1941, Hart and a U.S. Navy officer from 
Ghormley’s staff grabbed Dahlquist, Bolte, and Middleswart from their work and told them to 
come to Hinman’s office.  Upon entering his office, they saw that the two SPENAVO officers 
had gotten a bottle of champagne and some glasses.  Over the weekend Hinman had been 
notified that he was selected for promotion to Brigadier General, and the two had brought the 
champagne so they could all toast Hinman’s success.1 
 Hinman’s promotion had come as a shock to the members of Chaney’s staff, including 
Hinman himself.  He had only received a temporary promotion to Colonel the week before and 
was now going to be a general officer.  This was in marked contrast to what promotion had been 
like for officers in the U.S. Army prior to the outbreak of war.  Most of the Special Observers 
had languished under the agonizingly slow promotion rates that had characterized the interwar 
period.2  Almost all of Chaney’s staff members would experience rapid promotions before they 
left Britain for other assignments as the massive expansion of the U.S. Army created a need for 
experienced officers in senior positions.  
 For now, they would celebrate Hinman’s news.  Hart’s companion grabbed the bottle of 
champagne to prepare drinks for the toasts.  As Dahlquist and the others watched him open it, 
Middleswart went up to Hinman and kicked him as hard as could.  He then looked at the rest of 
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the group and said, “I have always wanted to kick a brigadier general in the ____________ 
(Dahlquist censored) and this is the first time I have ever had a chance.”  Apparently, the rest of 
the officers thought that was a good idea, for they followed Middleswart’s lead and all took 
advantage of the opportunity to kick a brigadier general.  Toasts then followed.  Dahlquist noted 
to his wife, “I do not yet know which Heinie enjoyed most, the toasts in champagne or the 
kicks.”3 
 William “Red” Middleswart had surely favored the kic s.  A pleasant but mischievous 
man, he was short and thick-set, with a bull-dog like appearance.  His face filled with glee when 
he was happy, his thick cheeks puffing out as he smiled, seeming all the larger as his eyes 
became narrow slits.  He began his military career in 1917 as an Ordnance officer before 
transferring to the Quartermaster Corps in 1920.  Like most of the other members of SPOBS he 
was a graduate of Army War College and had served in a variety of assignments in his career 
field.  One of his more specialized assignments was as a student at the Philadelphia Textile 
School of the Pennsylvania Museum and School of Industrial Art where he spent three years 
studying textile manufacturing.  He was also a graduate of the Army Industrial College.  Prior to 
coming to SPOBS he had been serving in the Clothing and Equipage Branch of the Office of the 
Quartermaster General.  As the SPOBS Quartermaster officer, Middleswart worked under 
Griner, developing supply plans and policy as part of the logistics plans for the RAINBOW-5 
task forces.        
After arriving in England, Griner, Middleswart, and the other Special Observers 
discovered that there were serious deficiencies in the RAINBOW-5 plan regarding logistics.  
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There had been only a few weeks between the time McNarney assembled the Special Observers 
in Washington D.C. and their subsequent departure to England in a series of separate groups.  
Having to spend most of that time getting their personal affairs in order, there had been little time 
for extensive study of RAINBOW-5.  The staff members really didn't have the chance to study 
the plan comprehensively until McNarney initiated formal planning for the portions dealing with 
the British Isles and North Atlantic on 9 June.4  As the Special Observers engaged in operational 
level planning with the British, the logistical flaws in the plan came to light.          
 Dahlquist articulated some of these problems in a study he completed approximately one 
month after formal planning for RAINBOW-5 began: 
The War Department Operations Plan, RAINBOW-5, the Concentration Plan, and 
Annex II . . . contain no directive for establishment of a headquarters for the 
United States Army Forces in Great Britain . . . no pr vision is made in the troop 
basis for the officers and enlisted men for the force headquarters that will have 
administrative control of the forces [the task forces listed in RAINBOW-5].  Nor 
is any provision made in the troop basis for the supply elements which will be 
necessary to establish and operate base establishments.  All service elements 
contained in the troop basis are broken into small detachments for each element of 
the forces.5 
 
The War Plans Division had failed to include provision  for a headquarters to control the 
disparate task forces called for under RAINBOW-5 as well as a logistics organization to support 
them.   
 One wonders how War Department planners could haveneglected these requirements.  
Any force sent to the British Isles would need both a eadquarters and logistics apparatus to 
support it.  Possibly, the War Plans Division was biding its time until it had more information 
about U.S. involvement in the war.  In a draft of a memo to General Marshall dating from May, 
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     5 Memo, Dahlquist to McNarney, Sub: The problem of command and administrative arrangements, July 10, 
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1941, Lieutenant Colonel Charles W. Bundy explained why WPD had not included plans for the 
eventual use of ground troops to invade Germany: "Very correctly no plans for these land 
operations were formulated; a plan must be formulated upon a situation and no predication of the 
situation which will exist when such a plan can be implemented should be made now."6  WPD 
likely did not want to commit itself to a command and logistics plan for U.S. forces in Britain 
and the North Atlantic until the nature of U.S. participation, if and when it occurred, was clear.    
 WPD's omission of a command and logistics plan, whatever its reason, was a serious 
obstacle in developing operational level plans to execute RAINBOW-5.  Although the War 
Department had not determined whether or not Chaney would ultimately assume command, 
planners had envisioned from the beginning that there would be a general staff overseeing U.S. 
Army elements in Britain.  To carry forward its mission, SPOBS needed to have an idea of the 
composition of this headquarters to determine how it would administer the separate task forces 
and interface with Britain's military establishment.  Additionally, the task forces, while they were 
to be relatively small, would collectively have subtantial logistics requirements, more than 
could be met by the small detachments of troops that provided them with local services.  To 
address these issues, the Special Observers would have to make substantial revisions to 
RAINBOW-5.  Bolte and Dahlquist took on the task of resolving RAINBOW-5’s problems with 
command organization.7  It was left to the members of the SPOBS Special Staff, principally 
Griner, Middleswart, and Davison for ground portions, and Lyon for the air portions, to develop 
logistics plans and policies with their British counterparts to support the projected RAINBOW-5 
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task forces.  As with other planning functions the group conducted prior to Pearl Harbor, their 
efforts would provide them and their British counterparts with a better understanding of the 
problems associated with establishing U.S. combat power in Britain.  
Logistics Planning for Coalition Warfare: Ground Logistics 
The RAINBOW-5 Operations Plan had provided the following guidance regarding 
logistics: "Annex III, Logistics, to this Operations Plan will be issued in a separate folder at a 
later date."8  The War Department was perhaps hesitant to develop a gistics plan for U.S. 
forces without having a clear picture of what U.S. involvement would entail.  Still, the absence 
of a basic plan in this document to supply and maintain U.S. forces in Britain is perplexing.  
Although the task forces themselves were not standard units, the elements that made them up did 
conform to War Department Tables of Organization, and planners at WPD should have been able 
to provide a tentative estimate of service troops for SPOBS to work off in the development of its 
plans with the British.  For whatever reason, they did not, and the Special Observers had to 
develop both ground and air logistics plans from scratch.   
 The dispersion of the task forces as well as their integration into the British defensive 
scheme made it imperative that any logistics plan SPOBS developed was compatible with the 
service and supply institutions of the British Army and Royal Air Force as well as the multitude 
of civilian agencies Britain employed in support of its armed forces.  The Special Observers and 
their British counterparts began tackling this problem on 4 June 1941 when Griner, Coffey, 
Matejka, and Welsh met with representatives from QMG, the agency within the War Office that 
was responsible meeting the logistics requirements of the British Army.9  This meeting was the 
first meeting of the logistics subcommittee that Kenn dy and other representatives of the War 
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Office had agreed to form with Chaney and the other Special Observers as part of the War 
Office’s formalized procedures for coordinating thework of SPOBS and its own planners.10  
General Sir Walter K. Venning, the Quartermaster General spoke first, welcoming Griner and the 
other Special Observers.  He then handed over control of the meeting to Colonel J.M Benoy, 
whose position as D.D. (Q. Maint), made him, for all s kes and purposes, the executive officer 
for Venning's deputy.11  It was Benoy's responsibility to coordinate the activities of the various 
directorates of QMG dealing with supplies, transportation, and accommodations.12   For the next 
six months, Benoy would serve as Griner's principal point of contact with QMG, the two using 
their close working relationship to facilitate joint logistics planning between the War Office and 
SPOBS. 
 In his opening comments Benoy stated that the meeting's purpose was to prepare the 
ground for discussions at future committee meetings.  As a first step in coordinating logistics 
between the U.S. and British Armies, he had assembled either the heads or deputies of all the 
directorates of the QMG that would have a role in developing plans to implement ABC-1.  
Benoy invited the Special Observers to brief these officers as well as himself on the organization 
of their staff.  Griner spoke for the Special Observers, explaining roles and responsibilities of 
each of the five divisions of a U.S. general staff and the seven services that made up the special 
staff.  When he finished, Benoy briefed the Special Observers on the organization of the War 
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 Meeting Minutes, U.S. Army Delegation and Representatives of the Quartermaster General's Department, 4 
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Office, and then had each QMG representative explain the role and responsibilities of his 
directorate.13   
 This meeting was significant, for it served as the point when the U.S. and British armies’ 
service and support agencies began a process of limited integration between the British and U.S. 
logistics systems.14  As each side briefed their respective organization, the two quickly 
discovered that, while there were similarities between the logistics systems of the British and 
U.S. armies, there were many instances in which the two organizations organized their service 
and support activities differently.15  These differences posed a potential obstacle to the effective 
coordination of service and support activities between the two countries.  The most immediate 
problem was coordination of planning efforts between the two staffs, as the responsibilities of 
the SPOBS special staff members and their British counterparts did not entirely match.  As a 
short term fix, Griner proposed that the War Office designate one staff officer for each Special 
Observer to work though who would then coordinate with other members of the War Office staff 
as necessary.  The QMG representatives agreed to Griner's proposal, as a first step in solving the 
more complex problem of how to interface U.S. and British logistics in support of the 
RAINBOW-5 task forces.16   
 Having made preliminary arrangements to coordinate logistics planning between SPOBS 
and the directorates of the War Office, Griner and the members of the special staff wasted no 
time in familiarizing themselves with the British system of logistics.  The day after the meeting 
the members of the special staff began immersing themselves in the multitude of agencies that 
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     16  Meeting Minutes, U.S. Army Delegation and Representatives of the Quartermaster General's Department, 4 
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were involved in supplying and supporting the British Army.  The mission from the War 
Department to conduct a reconnaissance of Iceland cut short their initial investigations.  
However, they were able to gain enough knowledge to go to Iceland with a basic understanding 
of how British logistics functioned.17    At this point, Middleswart was still on a ship crossing the 
Atlantic with the group's supplies and enlisted staff.  This left Griner to begin making supply and 
accommodation arrangements himself, meeting with Benoy to discuss how the British quartered 
their soldiers and what supplies the British Army could provide to the initial contingents of U.S. 
troops sent after U.S. entry into the war.18 
 Roosevelt's decision to send U.S. troops to Iceland and WPD's request for SPOBS to 
conduct a reconnaissance of the island quickly shifted the nature of the group's investigation of 
British logistics from the general to the specific.  The same day that Griner met with Benoy to 
discuss quartering, he began collecting information on Iceland's logistical infrastructure.  
Additionally, Griner began conducting negotiations with representatives from QMG and the 
Admiralty regarding the division of logistics responsibilities between the British and American 
forces during the relief process.19  The rest of the special staff followed suit, gathering data from 
directorates in both the War Office and Air Ministry regarding their particular spheres of interest 
in Iceland.20  
 As in other planning the group conducted, the preparation of logistical plans for the 
Iceland relief served as a model for the planning process for the other tasks forces.  Griner and 
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the members of the special staff that accompanied him on the reconnaissance began their work 
with the various directorates of the War Office and Air ministry and then engaged in planning 
down to the level of geographic commands, each special staff member meeting with a British 
counterpart who most closely approximated their specialty while also conducting a physical 
inspection of British facilities.  They repeated this procedure in each of their subsequent 
reconnaissance and planning efforts, providing staff officers throughout the British military 
establishment with experience in developing combined logistical plans with a U.S. staff. 
 The development of local logistical arrangements for each of the task forces, however, 
did not resolve RAINBOW-5's fundamental logistical deficiency, the lack of any sort of plan for 
a logistical infrastructure that connected each of the tasks forces.  Griner and the special staff had 
to engage in a process with the British that was analogous to developing a completely new task 
force from scratch, one that would perform the higher level logistics functions necessary to 
supply and maintain the task forces–a theoretical organization eventually known as the "Base 
Area." 
 Combined planning for the Base Area began at the third meeting of the logistics 
subcommittee on 10 July 1941.  Only Davison and Middleswart were present as Griner was still 
in the U.S. helping the staff at GHQ draft an operations plan for the U.S. occupation of Iceland.  
Few specific decisions arose out of this discussion.  However, Davison and Middleswart were 
able to provide Benoy and representatives of the directorates with a general idea of what U.S. 
requirements would be in terms of depots and construction supplies.  The QMG directorates in 
turn informed them of the constraints and limitations they would face in developing a base area 
for U.S. forces, specifically addressing issues concer ing port allocation, geography, and labor.21  
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 By the end of July, plans for the Base Area were more mature, although many questions 
in terms of execution remained unanswered.  Griner, B noy, and their respective staffs agreed 
that the Base Area would only be able to serve U.S.troops in England and Scotland.  Troops in 
Northern Ireland would have to receive support from their own depots.  They also agreed that, 
while facilities within the Base Area could be run strictly by U.S. personnel with minimal 
assistance from British liaison officers, depots outside this area and closer to the task forces 
would have to expand to meet U.S. requirements and be shared with the British who still needed 
the facilities to support their own troops.  The two staffs also conducted an assessment of 
Britain's logistical infrastructure, eliminating many potential locations for the Base Area because 
of choke points in the rail system, the requirement for he Base Area to have a central position 
between the task forces, and the Base Area’s defensive requirements.  Most importantly, the 
planning process at this point highlighted the question  Anglo-American planners would have to 
answer in order to integrate the U.S. Army intro the British system of logistics.22                   
 QMG was only one among many agencies responsible for managing Britain's logistical 
infrastructure and, as the planning process progressed, SPOBS and QMG gathered additional 
participants like a ball gathering snow as it rolls down a hill.  The first set of additional agencies 
became involved during the group's fourth meeting with QMG on 31 July.  One of the issues the 
meeting attempted to address was the selection of aactual location for the Base Area, based on 
the requirements that SPOBS and QMG had identified pr viously.  It was at this point that the 
staff at Home Forces became involved in Base Area planning, sending its Quartermaster 
General, Colonel H. L. Longden, who after negotiating with SPOBS and QMG, agreed to locate 
the Base Area in the general area of Sheffield - Derby - Leicester – Nottingham in central 
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England, with future expansion to take place to the south and south-west.  As one of missions of 
the Base Area was to support the Bombardment Force, the Air Ministry and Ministry of Aircraft 
Production (MAP) became involved as well, sending Cozens to deal with matters pertaining to 
aviation supply.23  
 Through the summer and fall of 1941, as the Special Observers and their counterparts at 
QMG set out to answer the questions they identified n July, they drew more and more 
organizations into the planning process.  In August, the staff at Eastern Command became 
involved in contingency planning for the U.S. to use storage facilities in the command’s area of 
responsibility in the event U.S. forces arrived befor  construction of facilities for the Base Area 
took place.24  The staff at South Eastern Command became involved as well, making 
arrangements to incorporate the Base Area into its system for supplying fuel, identifying 
potential sites for Base Area facilities, and planning to temporarily requisition British medical 
facilities for U.S. forces until construction finished on permanent facilities for American 
troops.25   By 18 September, Griner and the special staff developed a logistical troop basis from 
which the Special Observers articulated exactly what t e U.S. Army needed from the British in 
terms of facilities for the Base Area, prompting Benoy to bring in representatives from the Board 
of Trade and the Ministry of Supply, the two agencis that controlled storage allocation for Great 
Britain.  Negotiating with SPOBS, the representatives identified specific locations where the 
British government could provide storage and land to U.S. forces, prompting the staffs at QMG 
and SPOBS to begin formulating plans for surveying the areas.  This, in turn, drew in additional 
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agencies, including the Ministry of Food, to plan for cold storage requirements, as well as the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Lands, and the staff at Western Command.26  By 7 December 1941, 
Griner and his staff had made arrangements to supply the task forces through two Base Areas: 
one in the Midlands and one in Northern Ireland.27  They had also made emergency 
arrangements for the British to provide them with facilities in case U.S. troops arrived before 
construction on the Base Area finished. 
 The U.S. and Britain really began to understand the logistical requirements for 
establishing U.S. combat power in the British Isles by means of this initial planning. Although 
Griner and the special staff operated on a plan based on a fundamentally different premise than 
what the U.S. and the British would actually agree on after American belligerency, a latent effect 
of planning ground logistics for the RAINBOW-5 task forces was that many British 
organizations gained practical experience in developing plans to integrate U.S. logistics into the 
logistical system of Great Britain.  QMG, the Board of Trade, the Ministry of Supply, the Air 
Ministry, MAP, Home Forces, Eastern Command, South Eastern Command, Western Command, 
the Ministry of Food, and the Ministry of Agriculture and Land all played important roles in this 
preliminary planning, all the while gaining experienc  in the theoretical integration of U.S. 
forces into their respective logistical spheres.                   
Logistics Planning for Coalition Warfare: Air Logis tics  
As air units made up a substantial portion of the RAINBOW-5 task forces, the Special 
Observers also had to pay particular attention to the requirements for supplying and maintaining 
these units in their logistical planning.  The SPOBS Air section conducted most of the work in 
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developing a combined Anglo-American aviation maintenance and supply program.  While the 
SPOBS general staff could handle the broader issues involved in implementing ABC-1, 
developing a combined aviation logistics program called for an officer who had expertise in 
aviation technology, aircraft production, and aircraft procurement.  Fortunately for the Special 
Observers, the British, and the U.S. Army Air Force, th  War Department had selected Colonel 
Alfred J. Lyon to serve as the SPOBS Air Officer.28 
 Lyon had a long history of involvement in the U.S. Army's aircraft research and 
procurement programs.  He began flying for the Army in 1918 and began serving in the Air 
Service Aeronautical Engineering Division less than two years later.  As part of his duties in the 
Engineering Division, he attended the Massachusetts Ins itute of Technology, graduating as a 
Master of Engineering in 1921.  Between 1921 and 1939, he held numerous research, aircraft 
procurement, and instructor positions until finally serving as the Technical Executive for the 
Material Division, Office Chief of the Air Corps.29 
 Lyon's experience in the Material Division made him uniquely qualified to develop air 
logistics policy with the British.  While serving as the Technical Executive, he directed planning 
for the Army's Aircraft production program, a very complex task by 1940.  In May of that year, 
President Roosevelt requested that Congress approve a 50,000 airplane production program for 
the Army and Navy, inaugurating a massive expansion of the U.S. air arsenal.30  Lyon's office 
had to determine the types and numbers of airplanes to buy as well as which manufacturers to 
buy them from.  In order to accomplish this task, Lyon had to be aware of the latest aviation 
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technical developments and be intimately familiar with the capabilities of civilian manufacturers.  
Since the British and French were also purchasing from American industry at this time, Lyon had 
to be cognizant of their needs as well in order to forestall conflict with their purchasing 
programs.31  By the time he joined the Special Observer Group, Lyon's experience in jump-
starting the Army's expanded aircraft production program had provided him with detailed 
knowledge of the U.S. Army Air Corp's logistics needs as well as Britain's requirements for 
American aircraft.32 
 Lyon's work was essential to any U.S. air effort that was to operate out of the Britain.  In 
describing the establishment of the Eighth Air Force, Alfred Goldberg provides a good 
summation of why: 
No part of the problem of establishing an American air force in Britain was more 
fundamental, or entailed more difficulties, than that of providing adequate supply 
and maintenance.  A modern air force . . . consumes almost unbelievable 
quantities of fuel and lubricants; requires in addition to the normal supplies of any 
military organization vast stores of spare parts and tools; and depends for its 
continuing operation upon facilities for repair and maintenance ranging all the 
way from the relatively simple equipment used by ground crews to elaborate and 
extensive base depots.33   
 
In short, without an effective maintenance and supply system, an air force could not fight.  
Further, an air force's maintenance capability dictated the scale and tempo of its operations.  
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Thus, the success of any U.S. air effort in the British Isles fundamentally depended on Lyon 
developing an adequate system of air logistics withthe British.34 
   The Special Observers began discussing air logistics with their British counterparts at 
the first meeting between SPOBS and the Air Ministry on 6 June.  During the meeting, the Air 
Member for Supply and Organization (AMSO), Air Marshal Sir C. L. Courtney, emphasized the 
need for Chaney’s staff and the staff at the Air Ministry to jointly develop policies for combining 
U.S. and British air logistics programs.  The British were already grappling with integrating 
American aircraft into their own programs and Courtney worried that a lack of coordination 
between the two nations would cause maintenance and supply problems for both.35  Thus, he 
argued that SPOBS and the Air Ministry needed to develop policies for supply, repair, and 
salvage at the earliest opportunity to serve as the basis for more detailed plans for operating U.S. 
air units in Britain.36 
 To develop a policy of joint maintenance and supply with the British, Lyon needed to 
learn their systems for repair, supply, and salvage.  This process began a week after the group's 
first discussions with the Air Ministry when Lyon iitiated the first of many meetings with 
officials involved in Britain's aircraft maintenance and supply program.  For the next three 
weeks, he familiarized himself with British procedures for determining requirements for aircraft 
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(characteristics desired in ordnance, armament, aircraft equipment, engines, and air frames), their 
aircraft modification program, and their system of maintenance classification. He also learned 
how the British divided responsibilities among the numerous organizations involved in their 
aviation maintenance program, their system for storing and distributing spare parts, their method 
of distributing petroleum, oil, and lubricants, and the programs they had already put in place to 
incorporate American aircraft from purchasing contracts and Lend-Lease into the British 
maintenance system.  Additionally, Lyon obtained valuable data based on British combat 
experience regarding the organization of their maintenance units.37  By the end of June, he knew 
the fundamentals of British aviation maintenance and was ready to use his newfound knowledge 
to begin developing plans to support American aircrft in Britain. 
 His first major project was to conduct planning and surveys for what would become one 
of the three major depots supporting U.S. aircraft in the British Isles during the war, a site in 
Northern Ireland known as Langford Lodge.  Lyon wanted to procure the site from the British 
because it was in a good location to support the pursuit units that would defend the U.S. naval 
installations at Londonderry and Lough Erne.  However, the Air Ministry was one of only three 
organizations currently using the site.  MAP used Langford Lodge as a dispersal site and the 
British Army used facilities there as well, and Lyon would have to obtain permission from all 
three organizations using Langford Lodge before he could appropriate it for American use.38  
After confirming that Langford Lodge would meet U.S. requirements during SPOBS’ 
                                                          
     37 Memo, Lyon to McNarney, Sub: Military Characteristic  and Military Requirements (Aircraft), June 13, 941; 
Memo for Record, Lyon, Sub: Conversations With Air Commodore Bailey (Technical Assistant to Air Vice Marshal 
Sir C. Courtney Regarding Maintenance, June 16, 1941; and Memo for Record, Lyon, Sub: Conversations With Mr. 
Devereux Controller of North American Aircraft Supply in the Ministry of Aircraft Production, June 18, 1941.  All 
in Rpts. to Gen McNarney on Contacts, Conf. and Visits 1941-42, War Department Decimal 319.1, Box 2072, AG, 
RG 498, NARA 
     38 Minutes of 2nd Meeting With U.S. Special Observer Group Held in the Air Ministry at 1100 Hours on 
Tuesday, 15th July, 1941, Minutes - Meetings With Air Ministry, Box 2147,  AG, RG 498, NARA. 
136 
 
reconnaissance to Ireland, he worked out arrangements with each of these organizations for U.S. 
forces to use their portions of the site.39  When the SPOBS staff drafted the reconnaissance report 
for Northern Ireland, he included his plan for Langford Lodge in the report.40   
 Although a significant step forward in the development of a maintenance program for 
U.S. aircraft in Britain, Lyon's initial planning for Langford Lodge was only the beginning of a 
long process of surveys and negotiations that would eventually result in the establishment of the 
three major depots that would support American aircr ft during the war.  Lyon and his 
counterparts in Britain’s air establishment still had to determine how they would construct 
facilities at Langford Lodge, work that could not begin until the War Department approved 
Lyon's plan.  Further, Lyon had to determine how to support the rest of the air units in Scotland 
and the Huntingdon area of England. 
 Lyon’s work on Langford Lodge also highlighted the need for SPOBS to develop 
aviation supply and maintenance policies with the British, as Courtney had asserted, in order to 
facilitate further planning.  Lyon began this process on 2 August, when he and Colonel Raymond 
A. Dunn, a visiting Air Corps officer, met with officials from MAP and the Air Ministry.  Dunn, 
was investigating aircraft maintenance and supply in the United Kingdom for the Chief of the 
Army Air Force, and was due to return to the United States on 5 August.  All involved in the 
meeting hoped that they would be able to work out basic policy agreements before he left so he 
could carry them back to the U.S.41 
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 Regardless the progress in developing policy, the me ting was valuable in that Lyon and 
Dunn learned about the constraints and limitations Britain's logistics capabilities imposed on 
future planning.  Eric V. Bowater, a Director General for MAP, opened the meeting by 
informing Lyon and Dunn that Britain's maintenance infrastructure was barely meeting its 
current requirements and would probably be unable to meet the needs of additional U.S. aircraft.  
The British had attempted to build up a system that could cope with a crash rate of 3,000 aircraft 
per month, a figure they derived from their loss rates from August to October 1940, during the 
Battle of Britain. The end of the Battle of Britain saw a decrease in the number of aircraft that the 
RAF was losing per month.  Still, even eight months later, MAP and the RAF were barely 
keeping their heads above water.  Bowater offered to provide Lyon the estimates on which MAP 
and the RAF had based their projected production and maintenance requirements.  Lyon was 
enthusiastic.  He and the rest of the SPOBS staff were orking off of loss rates derived from 
World War I, figures that were entirely inadequate given the expanded scale of air warfare.42  If 
they were to plan adequately for replacement aircraft, they would need to use figures that 
reflected present wartime conditions.43 
  After their introductory overview, Bowater and Air Commodore C. W. Weedon, MAP’s 
Director of Repair and Maintenance, delved into the sp cifics of their maintenance program, 
which they divided into two main types: engine repair and airframe repair.  They then presented 
Lyon and Dunn with what they saw as possible options f r increasing maintenance capability to 
accommodate American aircraft.  For engine repair they could use British facilities, build 
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entirely new depots, or do a combination of both.  Each had its own limitations, all having to do 
with labor.  Bowater and Weedon noted that the current epair facilities themselves could tolerate 
increases in repair requirements but labor limitations inhibited expansion.44  If the U.S. elected to 
build its own depots under Lend-Lease, it would take t least a year and both material and labor 
would have to come from the U.S.  For airframes, they recommended conducting repairs on the 
planes at their parent airfields, since British roads were too small to transport the large 
components that made up American heavy bombers.  They also noted that they were unable to 
repair American instruments but could repair any British instruments, including radios, the U.S. 
Army Air Force elected to use in its aircraft.45  
 Lyon, Dunn, and the MAP representatives spent the rest of the meeting discussing 
procedural issues.  Bowater argued that creating separate systems for conducting certain 
rudimentary maintenance activities would be wasteful.  He asked if the U.S. would be willing to 
adopt Britain's procedures for reporting and collecting damaged aircraft.  Lyon replied that he 
would recommend to Chaney that the Air Corps do so.  Weedon then requested that the U.S. 
Army Air Corps include the RAF in its system for reporting equipment defects to American 
manufacturers.  Lyon wholeheartedly agreed and, drawing on his prior experience in the Material 
Division, made recommendations to streamline the process so the reports would reach American 
manufacturers as fast as possible.  Bowater additionally offered to incorporate Air Corps aircraft 
into their dispersal system and use British pilots t  move U.S. aircraft as needed.46 
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 Based on the information from MAP, Lyon and Dunn realized that the U.S. Army Air 
Force would have to alter its maintenance organizations to operate within the limitations posed 
by Britain's maintenance infrastructure.  Specifically, the Army would have to reorganize its 
maintenance teams so that they had the capability to be mobile in order to service American 
bombers that were too large for bombardment units to disassemble and transport on Britain’s 
road system.47  Armed with this data, Dunn returned to the United States, where he began to 
study the problem of reorganization.  Lyon, in turn, continued to work on joint policy with the 
British.  
  After Lyon and Dunn's meeting with Bowater and Weedon, the Special Observers 
developed tentative agreements with the Air Ministry and MAP regarding the maintenance and 
supply of American air units in the United Kingdom, which Chaney forwarded to the War Plans 
Division in a memo on 7 August.  Chaney urged that e War Department use these tentative 
agreements as the basis for U.S. planning.  The proposals envisioned the U.S. eventually 
constructing its own depots, with the British responsible only for supplying petroleum products.  
Given the length of time required to build these facilities, MAP officials agreed to make 
available the services of civilian firms operating under their management until U.S. facilities 
were operational.  Chaney ruled out taking over MAP facilities completely because the vast 
majority were privately owned, an issue that Bowater nd Weedon, curiously, did not address in 
their meeting with Lyon and Dunn.  He emphasized the importance procuring these facilities at 
once because of the time involved in building them.  Chaney also urged the War Department to 
use the information on operational conditions that Dunn was taking back to the U.S. to 
reorganize maintenance units bound for England, specifically that they make provisions for 
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mobile maintenance teams to conduct on-site repairs.48  Because War Department officials were 
hesitant for political reasons to enter into any binding commitments with the British, the U.S. 
Army did not immediately initiate the actions that Chaney advocated.  However, Lyon and 
Dunn’s initial work did provide the SPOBS staff and planners back in the states with a better 
understanding of the problems associated with establi hing a logistics system for U.S. aircraft in 
the U.K.   
 On the British side, the progress SPOBS, MAP, and the Air Ministry had made in 
developing tentative maintenance policy with the U.S. merely highlighted the fact that these 
informal agreements were just the beginning.  In the mind of plans and policy makers serving on 
the Air Staff, SPOBS and the Air Ministry needed to develop more comprehensive policies 
regarding cooperation in order to truly prepare for implementing ABC-1.  Musgrave-Whitham 
articulated the reasoning behind this view in a letter to the Vice Chief of the Air Staff on 4 July: 
I am not fully in the picture about our dealings with the Americans but I have a 
strong feeling that we are tending to deal with them in matters of detail whilst not 
ensuring that major questions of policy are covered.  Failing to get a clear outline 
of initial policy has the inevitable results of firstly, giving rise to a large number 
of difficulties which would otherwise have been avoided and secondly, calling for 
subsequent policy decisions in circumstances which ave been seriously 
prejudiced by preceding events.49 
 
To avoid the consequences of planning without having developed adequate policy, he 
recommended forming a committee with the Special Observers to develop a comprehensive set 
of policies for cooperation.  In addition to developing maintenance policy, he asserted that the 
committee should develop policies regarding supply and administration, accommodations, 
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rationing, canteen, medical, and postal services, construction, local defense, and discipline.50  
Musgrave-Whitham’s views gained the support of the C ief of the Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal 
Charles Portal, who sent a letter to Chaney on 6 August making a formal proposal to establish a 
policy-making committee with SPOBS.51 
 The Special Observers eventually acted on Portal’s proposal, but not until after Pearl 
Harbor.  Chaney responded to Portal on 9 August that he greed to the need to form the 
committee and that he would have members of his staff participate.  The committee was 
supposed to have its first meeting on 16 September, but was cancelled at the last minute “owing 
to the urgency of other matters.”52  The group’s task to participate in Lend-Lease negotiations 
with the British and the Soviets coupled with its perennial shortage of personnel appear to have 
forced policy-making for cooperation between the two air forces to the backburner until U.S. 
entry into the war made it an immediate requirement.     
Although efforts to develop a comprehensive policy for cooperation between the U.S. and 
British air forces stalled, Lyon continued working with his counterparts in the Air Ministry and 
MAP to develop a combined air logistics program.  As fall came, he received some unexpected 
assistance.  In October, after a brief inspection trip to the Middle East, Major General George H. 
Brett, the Chief of the Army Air Corps, came to Lond  to assist the British in adapting their 
maintenance system to repair American aircraft theyhad received from purchasing contracts and 
Lend-Lease.53  
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 While the War Department did not directly task him with developing joint plans for 
maintenance between Britain and the United States, Brett's recommendations, if implemented, 
would greatly impact the maintenance preparations that Lyon had been engaged in.  Thus, 
SPOBS quickly became involved in his mission, sharing what information they had already 
gained about the British defense establishment as well as showing him maintenance plans they 
had already completed.54  Lyon worked hand in hand with Brett's staff, accompanying them in 
their negotiations with the Air Ministry and MAP and ensuring that their plans conformed to the 
previous agreements SPOBS made with the British as well as ensuring they met the needs of 
RAINBOW-5.55  During Brett's time in Britain, SPOBS completed the rest of their surveys and 
Brett conducted personal inspections of areas in Northern Ireland and England that Chaney’s 
staff and their British counterparts had selected as locations for stationing U.S. forces. He agreed 
with Lyon that Langford Lodge was the most suitable ar a to establish a depot in Northern 
Ireland and helped the SPOBS staff identify an aerodrome at Wharton, a location north of 
Liverpool, as suitable for servicing airplanes in Scotland and England.56  
 At the end of October, Brett submitted his recommendations for improving Britain’s 
maintenance program for U.S. aircraft to the War Department.  His proposals followed the 
general thrust of the tentative agreements Lyon and the rest of the SPOBS staff had developed 
with the Air Ministry and MAP.  However, because he was making recommendations for 
immediate changes, his proposals were more aggressive. He wanted the U.S. Army Air Force to 
immediately assume responsibility for maintenance on all American aircraft the British were 
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using and, owing to the current Army-wide shortage of personnel, envisioned most of the work 
initially being done by civilians.  Like Lyon and Chaney, he recommended that maintenance 
groups form mobile teams to function within the operational limitations that Lyon and Dunn had 
identified in their investigations.  He also supported the immediate establishment of a depot at 
Langford Lodge according to the plan Lyon had laid out in the SPOBS reconnaissance report for 
Northern Ireland.57  General Henry “Hap” Arnold, the Chief of the Army Air Forces, refused to 
permit the Army Air Force to immediately assume the responsibilities that Brett outlined in his 
cable.  But he did send a cable to Brett authorizing him to begin negotiations to establish the 
Langford Lodge depot.58 
 Although the War Department's reluctance to enter i to any binding commitments with 
the British stymied most of Brett's proposals, his cooperation with SPOBS was a significant 
contribution to the development of an Anglo-American aircraft maintenance program.  First and 
foremost, his mission brought additional personnel to assist Lyon in survey work and 
negotiations with the British.  Further, by spurring the War Department to approve the Langford 
Lodge project, Brett enabled SPOBS to begin establihing the depot system.  Additionally, with 
their survey of Wharton, SPOBS and Brett's staff identified the second of the three major depots 
that would support American aircraft operating from Britain during the war. 
 The logistics planning the SPOBS staff engaged in with their British counterparts was to 
have both manifest and latent effects that influenced Anglo-American cooperation after the U.S. 
entered the war.  Many of the plans and policies regarding aviation maintenance that Lyon and 
the other Special Observers developed with the MAP and the Air Ministry would function as 
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they had intended them to.  In spite of the fact tha e overall strategy for using U.S. forces 
would change during the winter of 1942, SPOBS’s plans to use Langford Lodge and Wharton as 
depots to service American-made aircraft would not. 1942 would also see the Special Observers 
and their British counterparts expand on the maintenance agreements that they had already 
developed.  A latent effect of the planning work Lyon, Dunn, and Brett had engaged in with 
officials from MAP and the Air Ministry was to facilitate a better understanding of the problems 
associated with maintaining units of the U.S. Army Air Force in the British Isles.  Griner, 
Middleswart, and Davison’s logistics work similarly have effects that were both manifest and 
latent.  As the initial component of U.S. forces would go to Northern Ireland, SPOBS would 
have the opportunity to implement its logistics plan for the region.  Of even greater importance, 
SPOBS’ planning with Britain’s principle logistics organizations created a shared understanding 
between all involved of the problems that any U.S. force would face in attempting to supply and 
maintain itself in the U.K.
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Chapter 5: Learning to Communicate with Your Significant Other  
 
  On the morning of 15 February 1942, Townsend Griffiss, now a lieutenant colonel, flew 
as a passenger on a B-24 Liberator in the service of British Overseas Airways on a non-stop 
flight from Cairo to England.1  He was returning to Britain after spending over two months in the 
Soviet Union attempting to gain information that would allow the U.S. to fly Lend-Lease 
airplanes to Russia across Siberia.2  As the plane was crossing the English Channel, two Polish 
pilots working with the Royal Air Force intercepted it.  The pilots failed to establish 
communication with the aircraft, and the ground controllers, presumably aware of the aircraft's 
identity, failed to relay that information to the two Poles.  When the Liberator reached a point 
approximately five miles southwest of Eddystone Lighthouse, near Plymouth, England, the 
pilots, assuming the plane was an enemy aircraft, shot it down.  The plane crashed into the 
English Channel, killing Griffiss and all others onboard.3  The only trace of Griffiss rescue 
teams were able to find was the dispatch case he had been carrying during his trip.4  Griffiss was 
the first U.S. Army Air Force officer to die in Europe after the U.S. entered the Second World 
War.5    
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Needless to say, Griffiss’ death came as a shock to his fellow staff members.  Chaney 
took the death of his aide particularly hard.  Dahlquist noted in a letter to his wife Ruth on 25 
February, “I think we are going to have a memorial service for Pinky on Friday.  The old man 
[Chaney] has never said anything, but I believe he was very much upset over Pinky’s death.”6  
The group arranged a memorial service for Griffiss on 27 February at St. Martin-in-the-Fields, an 
Anglican church not far from Grosvenor Square.  Dahlquist summed up the group’s feelings the 
day after the service, “It was a tough break for Pinky and for us.”7 
Griffiss’ death is an extreme example of what can hppen when the communications 
system of a military organization fails to operate effectively.  Effective communication is a 
fundamental requirement for success in war, from the soldier on the ground all the way to the 
highest levels of government.  The ability to communicate allows commanders and political 
leaders to orchestrate ends, ways, and means, to reduce the uncertainty that is present in all 
conflicts, and adapt when confronted with unanticipated events.  Without effective 
communication, leaders cannot direct subordinates, nor can they receive the information they 
need to make informed decisions about what actions  take next.  Effective communication is 
essential for military units to cooperate with one another on the battlefield, to synchronize their 
actions, and to prevent fratricide.8  
Maintaining effective communication within the armed forces of a single political entity 
is difficult, but the problem becomes even more complex when the armed forces to two separate 
nations attempt to cooperate in war.  Sir Frederick Maurice, in his book, Lessons of Allied Co-
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operation: Naval, Military, and Air, 1914-1918, wrote of the problems the British Army 
encountered when it first attempted to work with French forces during the First World War: 
The tactics of an army are greatly influenced by natio l character, and the 
differences between the character of the British and French people had their 
counterpart in the tactical methods of the two armies.  Further, under the French 
system a great deal more latitude was permitted to sub rdinate commanders in the 
execution of orders of their superiors than was the practice in the British Army.  
The result of this was that when we received copies of French orders to troops, 
who were to operate alongside of us, we expected results which did not always 
mature.  This at first produced misunderstandings which were only overcome as 
mutual understanding and a sound system of inter-communication developed.9 
 
Differences in organization, procedure, technology, politics, and culture all serve as potential 
sources of friction between two allied forces attempting to work with one another.  To ensure 
that effective communication takes place, allies need to identify these points of friction and agree 
on the means through which they will mitigate the eff cts of these friction points.  
The Special Observers came to England knowing that communication between the U.S. 
and British forces was one of the major problems that ey would need to solve in order to 
implement the provisions of ABC-1 and RAINBOW-5.  As in their other pre-Pearl Harbor 
planning work with their British counterparts, planni g for communication between U.S. and 
British forces had both manifest and latent effects.  Upon U.S. entry into the war, the group 
would be able to implement some of its communication plans, most notably the communications 
plans for Northern Ireland.  Their planning work would also facilitate common understanding 
among the Special Observers, Britain’s communications agencies, and War Department officials 
regarding the problems associated with developing Alo-American communications policy for 
the British Isles.                                
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An Education in British Communications   
Lieutenant Colonel Jerry V. Matejka, the SPOBS Signal Officer, was responsible for 
working with the British on most issues pertaining to communication between U.S. and British 
forces.  Matejka was a skinny man of Czech descent, with dark hair that was rapidly receding.  
He had sad looking eyes and was prone to adopting a tightlipped expression, one the made it 
look as if he knew something that he was unable to divulge.  Matejka began his military career in 
the Engineer Reserve in 1917, subsequently changing over to the Coast Artillery Corps and 
finally the Signal Corps in 1923.   Prior to coming to SPOBS he had served on the staff at GHQ.  
While there, he had worked as a Signal Corps observer during the May, 1940 Third Army 
Maneuvers, an experience that made him keenly aware of the U.S. Army’s strengths and 
weaknesses regarding its ability to conduct military communication.10      
Matejka would put this knowledge to good use in his planning work, but before he could 
begin collaborating with the British, he had to learn everything he could about how the British 
organized signal activities and familiarize himself with British equipment.  He set out to learn the 
British signal system within a week after his arrival in London. Matejka met with both the 
Director and Deputy Director of Signals for the War Office, Major General G. G. Rawson and 
Colonel C. W. Fladgate, respectively,  obtaining from them access to the Records of the British 
General Post Office.11  Access to these records was vital to Matejka's mission.  The General Post 
Office managed nearly all fixed communications facilities in Britain, and he needed the 
schematics of Britain's signal installations in order to develop a plan for establishing 
communications for U.S. forces.  He also visited a central ordnance depot in order to inspect 
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British communications equipment firsthand and observe how the British Army organized its 
storage and supply of signal equipment.12 
 In a fashion similar to Chaney’s logistics staff, Matejka discovered that the U.S.  Army 
and Britain organized some of their communications activities differently.  One example was in 
their management of communications supplies and equipment.  Where the U.S. Army placed all 
categories of communications and electronics equipment it used within the sphere of the Signal 
Corps, the British spread responsibility for this equipment among a multitude of agencies 
including the Ministry of Supply, the Ministry of Aircraft Production, the Air Ministry, and the 
Royal Corps of Signals.  For the British to distribute signal supplies to U.S. forces or vice versa, 
all these agencies would potentially be involved.13  Developing plans to effectively coordinate 
signal supply procedures was one of many problems that Matejka had to work on with his British 
counterparts.   
 By the end of his first two weeks in Britain, Matejka and his British counterparts had 
identified the fundamental differences between U.S. and British signal equipment as well 
differences in their signal organizations.  This knowledge provided them with an awareness of 
potential points of friction in the integration of the two nations’ communications systems.  With 
a rudimentary understanding of these problems, Matejka and Britain’s communications officials 
were now ready to begin communications planning for ABC-1 and RAINBOW-5.   
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Communications Planning for the RAINBOW-5 Task Forces 
Planning for the U.S. occupation of Iceland provided Matejka with his first opportunity to 
solve problems associated with integrating U.S. and British communications systems.  The work 
he did on Iceland was similar to the work that he would later to do in developing plans for the 
other RAINBOW-5 task forces. As such, planning for Iceland provided him and his counterparts 
in the War Office with experience they would be able to draw upon during later planning efforts.  
As a result of his participation in the Iceland reconnaissance, Matejka found that the U.S. forces 
were able to adapt British communications systems for their own use.  However, he did find the 
existing communications system in Iceland inadequate for American purposes.  The Icelanders 
had established a system to meet their own needs and not much more.  When the British arrived 
and began using the system, they taxed it to capacity.  The Iceland Force had, however, made 
significant progress in establishing its own independent communications system.  The main issue 
Matejka found himself confronting was the fact that U.S. forces were to outnumber the British 
forces they replaced by approximately 7,000.14  While Matejka saw British equipment as suitable 
for American use, the communications infrastructure was simply not present to support an 
increase in the size of the Iceland garrison.  To deal with this issue, Matejka recommended that 
U.S. forces take over as much of the British communications system in Iceland as possible.  He 
also advocated using British types of wire for future expansion of the island's communications 
infrastructure.  Doing so would save valuable time by continuing the work the British had 
already begun and ensure that all subsequent communicatio s construction would be compatible 
with the system currently in use.15           
                                                          
     
14 Report of Reconnaissance to Iceland, 3; and Conn, E gleman, and Fairchild, Guarding the United States and 
its Outposts, 466. 
     15 Report of Reconnaissance to Iceland, Annex 4, Signal.   
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 Matejka subsequently applied his planning experience from the Iceland occupation to 
planning for the other RAINBOW-5 task forces.  At each of those areas the Special Observers 
and their British counterparts identified as locations for the task forces, he examined the existing 
communications infrastructure, if there was any, and determined requirements to meet the future 
communications needs for forces planners projected for each area.  He also determined how all 
these bases and supply depots would maintain contact with one another.  This was a challenge.  
Shipping at this point in the war was very scarce and he had to take into account the probability 
that initial U.S. forces sent to the British Isles would not be able to bring much more than their 
tactical equipment, i.e. field radios, which were inappropriate for a garrison environment.16  
Matejka additionally developed plans to supply these units with communications supplies, as 
well as provide maintenance on communication equipment that was too difficult to handle at the 
unit level.  He foresaw, however, that U.S. forces initially would not be able to perform all these 
tasks on their own.  Until personnel and equipment arrived in numbers where U.S. forces could 
begin sustaining themselves, they would have to rely on the British for much of this work.            
          Matejka worked out most of his plans for utilizing Britain's services at a meeting with 
communications experts from the War Office, Air Ministry, and Admiralty on 28 October 1941.  
Together, Matejka and the British experts formulated a general plan for providing a 
communications infrastructure for U.S. forces when they arrived in the British Isles.  They 
envisioned that the center of all U.S. signal traffic on the island would be at a yet-to-be-identified 
"headquarters base area."  From there, they would establish major lines of communication to 
base and depot areas throughout the British Isles including Belfast, Glasgow, Carlisle, 
                                                          
     
16 For an excellent study of Allied shipping constraints during the Second World War see Kevin Smith, Conflict 
Over Convoys: Anglo-American Logistics Diplomacy in the Second World War (Cambridge: University of 
Cambridge Press, 1996). 
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Huntington, Wrotham, and Litchfield.  Communications lines would then run to local depots and 
administrative areas surrounding these major bases.  Additionally, the group made provisions for 
communications with both London and the United States.17  
 Participants in the meeting also identified existing equipment American forces would be 
able to take over from the British and established procedures for the U.S. to fulfill its 
communications requirements in the British Isles through British agencies.  The procedure 
Matejka and the communications experts agreed upon was to match U.S. organizations with their 
British equivalents.  The Air Ministry would fulfill all communications requirements for the Air 
Corps and the War Office would fulfill all U.S. Army communications requirements.  Further, 
the Admiralty was already coordinating communication services for proposed U.S. naval bases 
the British Government was constructing under the auspices of the Lend-Lease program.18  
 In planning to implement ABC-1 and RAINBOW-5, Matejka and his British counterparts 
had developed solutions to many of the problems associated with integrating U.S. and British 
communications systems.  The change in strategic con ept for employing U.S. forces after Pearl 
Harbor would render much of this planning work obsolete.  However, Matejka and his British 
counterparts would be able to execute parts of the plans they developed, namely the portions 
dealing with communications in Northern Ireland, Huntingdon, and London, as well as the 
general procedures the U.S. Army would use in getting communications services from Britain’s 
defense establishment.  More importantly, by developing solutions to the theoretical problems of 
providing communications to the RAINBOW-5 task forces, Matejka and his counterparts in the 
                                                          
     17 Minutes of a Meeting held in the War Office (Montagu House) on 28th October, 1941, Minutes – Meetings 
War Office – 1942, Box 2147, AG, RG 498, NARA. 
     
18 Ibid. and Elliot, "The Predecessor Commands," 218.   
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War Office, Air, Ministry, and Admiralty gained a better understanding of the issues associated 
with integrating U.S. and British communication systems.           
Annex IV and the Associated Communications Committe 
Most of the problems Matejka and communications officials in the War Office, Air 
Ministry, and Admiralty dealt with during planning for the task forces were tactical and 
operational level issues.  However, in planning to implement ABC-1, Chaney’s staff became 
involved in the development of Anglo-American communications policy at the strategic level as 
well.  One of the ways SPOBS influenced the Anglo-American communications policy was in 
their efforts to implement a combined communications policy-making body called the 
“Associated Communications Committee.”       
 British and U.S. representatives had attempted to address the issue of combined 
communications policy during the American-British Conversations.   As part of their 
deliberations, they drafted a communications plan which they attached to the main report as 
“Annex IV.”   The communications plan to which the conferees agreed was very general, and 
because the U.S. did not expect to be able to send ground forces anywhere where they would 
communicate with British forces prior to 1 September1941, the plan focused on policy-making 
organizations and communications between the U.S. and Royal navies.  Included in the plan was 
an agreement that the United States and the United K ngdom would establish an "Associated 
Communications Committee" in London with representatives from the U.S. Army and Navy, 
along with members of the British Combined Signals Board.  The plan’s drafters envisioned that 
the Associated Communications Committee would be "th supreme controlling body with 
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relation to intercommunications by radio (W/T), wire, visual, and sound affecting the armed 
services and the merchant marines of the two nations."19              
 SPOBS, SPENAVO, and Britain’s communications establishment began examining how 
to implement the Associated Communications Committee on 31 July, when representatives from 
the two observer groups met with members of the British Wireless Telegraphy Board, a 
multiservice group of officers involved in developing communications policy for the United 
Kingdom.  During the discussion, Matejka served as the chief representative for SPOBS while 
Lieutenant Commander J. H. Leppert represented the views of SPENAVO.  The board’s chair, 
Lieutenant Colonel C. V. L. Lycett, presided over the meeting for the British side, while Admiral 
A. J. H. Murray, Major General G. G. Rawson, and Air Commodore O. G. Lywood represented 
the Admiralty, War Office, and Air Ministry respectively.  The meeting had two stated purposes: 
to give all the representatives a chance to get to know one another, and to try to conceptualize 
how the Associated Communications Committee would work. The representatives from the 
British military services also hoped to get input from the Americans on an updated draft of 
Annex IV they had recently written.  All involved in the meeting acknowledged that neither side 
had the capability of making commitments, and that e results of their discussion would serve 
only as a recommendation of policy for their respectiv  superiors to approve.20   
  The first part of the meeting was essentially a brainstorming session, with the 
participants putting forth ideas on how they might set up the committee and how they thought the 
committee should interface with communications organiz tions that already existed in Britain.  
                                                          
     19 ABC-1, Annex IV, 1-5, Box 2144, AG, RG 498, NARA; also see Johnsen, "Forging the Foundations of the 
Grand Alliance,” 310 and Vernon E. Davis, The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in World War II, Volume II: 
Development of the JCS Committee Structure (Washington D.C.: Historical Division, Joint Secretariat, Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, 1972), 288. 
     
20 Minutes of Meeting Between Members of the Wireless Telegraphy Board and Representatives of the United 
States Army and Navy, 31 July 41, Minutes – Meeting w/Associated Communications Committee, Box 2145, AG
RG 498, NARA. 
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Then, at the suggestion of Lywood, they collectively r viewed the new draft of Annex IV, 
discussing it paragraph by paragraph.  It was during this review that the British and American 
representatives discovered that each side had a different interpretation of Annex IV.  The British 
interpretation of the document called for the two nations to establish the Associated 
Communications Committee as soon as possible, while the Americans understood that they 
would not form the committee until certain "political questions had been settled," meaning, until 
the U.S. decided to fully ally itself with Britain.21  Their review of the rest of the document was 
less contentious.  Most of the revisions the British had added merely addressed issues that the 
original document had not answered.  Their revision ide tified the Wireless Telegraphy Board as 
the organization that would preside over the Associated Communications Committee, and added 
provisions concerning communications policy for ground and air forces that participants in the 
American-British Conversations had omitted in the original report.22  At the end of the meeting, 
all involved agreed that Matejka and Leppart should take the new Annex IV back to their 
respective staffs for more extensive study.23    
 In keeping with the views of Matejka, Leppart and the other American participants in the 
meeting, Chaney did not feel that he had the power to stablish the Associated Communications 
Committee in London.  After Matejka and the other attendees briefed him on the results of the 
conference, he sent a letter to Lycett stating such, but that he would be happy to send 
representatives to participate in preliminary planning to prepare for the time when the U.S. 
formally agreed to establish it.24  Chaney's response to Lycett was typical in the way he handled 
                                                          
     
21 Ibid. 
     22 Ibid.; and Draft Revision of ABC-1, Annex IV, Box 2145, AG, RG 498, NARA. 
     
23
 Minutes of Meeting Between Members of the Wireless Telegraphy Board and Representatives of the United 
States Army and Navy, 31 July 41, Minutes – Meeting w/Associated Communications Committee, Box 2145, AG
RG 498, NARA. 
     
24
  Letter MG James E. Chaney to COL C. V. L. Lycett, 7 August 1941, Box 2145, AG, RG 498, NARA. 
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negotiations with the British prior to Pearl Harbor.  He was conservative by nature and his 
instructions from Marshall were both vague and restrictive.  His orders authorized him to consult 
with the British on matters pertaining to future Anglo-American cooperation, but they did not 
authorize him to make any commitments without the approval of the Chief of Staff.25  Virtually 
all preliminary planning and policy determination between the British and SPOBS had to be 
considered nonbinding, unless the War Department rei fo ced it with a directive.  Compounding 
these restrictions was the generally inadequate communication that existed between SPOBS and 
officials back in the U.S.  Many on the SPOBS staff, such as Bolte, felt that War Department 
staffers had forgotten that the purpose of their mission was more than mere information 
gathering, that they were beginning to take the “Special Observer” label too literally. 26  As such, 
Chaney had to attempt to make progress in establishing combined policy while still operating 
within the limitations his orders,  U.S. political neutrality, and a general lack a of guidance from 
the War Department. 
 Chaney did believe that reviewing the British revision of Annex IV was within the scope 
of his staff’s current responsibilities.  Fulfilling the promise Matejka made to the members of the 
Wireless Telegraphy Board, the Special Observers review d the document and, with the 
cooperation of the staff at SPENAVO, prepared their own revision.  They made a number of 
changes.  The most important concerned the future shape of the Associated Communications 
Committee.  Instead of establishing one committee in London to oversee all matters concerning 
combined communications policy, the American draft of Annex IV called for two Associated 
Communications Committees: one in the United Kingdom t  handle matters concerning British 
                                                          
     
25 Letter of Instructions, Chief of Staff to Chaney, 24 April 1941, Box 230, WPD General Correspondence, RG 
165, NARA. 
     26 Memo, Bolte to McNarney, 6 December 1941, Sub: Points of Discussion in Washington, Box 2145, AG, RG 
498, NARA.   
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areas of strategic responsibility, and another in the United States to handle American areas.  
After the two special observer groups completed work on the American draft, Chaney sent it to 
Lycett on 28 August.27 
 Approximately two weeks later, Lieutenant Colonel A. T. Cornwall-Jones contacted 
SPENAVO, letting the group know that the Wireless Telegraphy Board had reviewed the annex 
and that, based on their examination, the British Chiefs of Staff had directed them to establish the 
Associated Communications Committee.28  While their review of the document was their stated 
reason for instituting the committee, the timing of the Chiefs of Staff’s decision as well as their 
willingness to move forward on the committee without fficial U.S. participation indicates that 
there were other factors involved.  The Chiefs of Staff issued their directive in mid-September, 
well past the date prior to which the U.S. said it would not be able to operate in areas where 
communication with British forces was necessary.  Additionally, the U.S. already had troops in 
Iceland, and the possibility now existed that other U.S. forces could operate in British strategic 
areas within weeks. Roosevelt recently had approved U.S. protection of all shipping in the 
Western Atlantic at a meeting with Winston Churchill in August as well.  The first naval incident 
to occur as a result of this new policy happened on 4 September.  On that day, a German 
submarine fired two torpedoes at the USS Greer, an American destroyer on patrol in the North 
Atlantic, inaugurating a shooting war between the U.S. and German navies three months prior to 
Pearl Harbor.29  Full U.S. participation in the war seemed imminent, a d the Chiefs of Staff were 
                                                          
     27 U.S. Revision of ABC-1, Annex IV, 28 August 1941, 2; and Letter, MG James E. Chaney to COL C. V. L. 
Lycett, 28 August 1941; both in Box 2145, AG, RG 498, NARA; and Davis, The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
in World War II, Volume II: Development of the JCS ommittee Structure, 289. 
     
28 Letter, A. T. Cornwall-Jones to Lt. Commander K. W. McManes, 16 September 1941, Box 2145, AG, RG 498,
NARA.  
     29 Wilson, The First Summit, 126-27; and Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared War, 1940-1941, 743-46.  It 
should be noted that the Greer was not entirely innocent in this encounter.  The s ip had been tailing the German 
submarine for several hours, reporting its position o British aircraft.  The submarine probably saw attacking the 
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no doubt anxious to resolve outstanding issues concerning communications policy before 
American forces began arriving in Britain.      
 In an attempt to work through the challenges of setting up the committee, representatives 
from SPOBS and SPENAVO, headed by Matejka and Captain R. S. Wentworth respectively, 
met with the Wireless Telegraphy Board on 2 October–with the understanding that they were to 
take part in the committee only as interested parties and not full members.  At the meeting, the 
British presented the Americans with yet another revision of Annex IV.  This time, however, the 
conferees were able to agree to the general provisions the British drafted into the latest 
document, including their acceptance that Washington w uld have its own communications 
committee.  Both sides also agreed that the document still needed minor revisions.  In an effort to 
work more efficiently, they decided to have British and American officers jointly revise the 
document for review at the next committee meeting.   Matejka and Colonel A. L. Harris from the 
War Office Directorate of Signals would revise the portions dealing with communication policy 
between U.S. and British ground forces, while Snavely and Wing Commander J. G. W. Weston 
from the Air Ministry Directorate of Signals would revise the portions dealing with 
communication policy between the two nations’ air forces.30 
 Before SPOBS, SPENAVO, and the Wireless Telegraphy board had a chance to meet and 
review what they thought would be the final solution t  the problem of establishing an 
organization to determine Anglo-American communications policy, the Chief of Naval 
Operations and Chief of Staff advised both Chaney and Ghormley that they were instituting 
                                                          
Greer as its only means of making an escape.  F.D.R. subsequently issued an order to the U.S. Navy to capture or 
destroy any Axis controlled ships in waters under U.S. protection. 
     
30 Letter, A. T. Cornwall-Jones to Lt. Commander K. W. McManes, 25 September 1941; and Minutes of Meeting 
Between Members of the Wireless Telegraphy Board and Representatives of the United States Army and Navy , 2 
October 1941; both in Box 2145, AG, RG 498, NARA. 
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Annex IV of ABC-1, and that they had approval to formally take part in the Associated 
Communications Committee in London.31  The leadership in Washington had finally 
acknowledged the wisdom of resolving Anglo-American ommunications issues before sending 
U.S. forces into battle.  Along with approval for participation in the Associated Communications 
Committee came the news that Washington was working on its own revision of Annex IV based 
on the first revision SPOBS and SPENAVO produced during the summer.   
The War and Navy Departments’ revision causes a serious kink in the efforts of the 
American representatives and British in London to resolve issues concerning Anglo-American 
communications policy.  SPOBS and SPENAVO could not pr ceed any further in the 
development of the Associated Communications Committee n London until Washington 
completed its revisions and issued its guidance.  With no other alternative for further 
development of the committee, the U.S. and British representatives on the newly formed 
Associated Communications Committee jointly agreed to send what work they had already 
completed to Washington in the hopes that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff would incorporate it into the 
new annex.  Until Washington responded, the London committee was essentially on hold.32 
Regardless of the response they would get from Washington, the work SPOBS, 
SPENAVO, and the members of the Wireless Telegraphy Board had already completed was 
significant.  In the process of establishing the Associated Communications Committee in 
London, they identified numerous requirements for developing an Anglo-American 
communications program that the original Annex IV to ABC-1 failed to meet.  Further, they 
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 Author unknown, "Brief History of W.C.B.;" (unpublished timeline, 19 May 1942), Box 248, RG 218, Records 
of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, NARA; and Minutes of First Meeting of Associated Communications Committee, 
12 November 1941, Box 2145, AG, RG 498, NARA; and Johnsen, "Forging the Foundations of the Grand 
Alliance," 312. 
     
32 Johnsen, "Forging the Foundations of the Grand Alliance," 312; and Minutes of First Meeting of Associated 
Communications Committee, 12 November 1941, Box 2145, AG, RG 498, NARA.  
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established an organizational framework for making combined communications policy in the 
British Isles.  The process of establishing this framework, as well as attempting to address the 
issues with Annex IV, provided the staffs at SPOBS and SPENAVO, as well as the members of 
the Wireless Telegraphy Board with a shared understanding of the problems associated with 
developing and implementing combined communications policy in the British Isles.   By sending 
their work to the War and Navy Departments, they also shared this understanding with planners 
back in the States.  How the War and Navy Departments used this information would remain 
uncertain until after the U.S. entered the war.       
The RDF Policy Sub-Committee 
Although work on the Associated Communications Committee had stalled, the Special 
Observers and their British counterparts found another avenue for developing combined 
communications policy.  This avenue was Britain's Radio Direction-Finding (RDF) Policy 
Subcommittee.  The RDF Policy Subcommittee was one among a plethora of technical 
committees that the British had set up to advise the War Cabinet in its employment of technology 
against Germany.  Because the U.S. had a keen interest in Britain's advances in radio direction-
finding, of which radar was one application, the British invited SPOBS to have a representative 
from the group participate in the sub-committee meetings.  As the Signal Corps was responsible 
for the Army's RDF programs, Matejka served as the group's primary representative.33     
 Matejka's involvement in the subcommittee was a continuation of a collaborative process 
of technological exchange between the United States and Britain that began in 1940.  During the 
spring of that year, Sir Henry Tizard, the chairman of Britain's Aeronautical Research 
                                                          
     
33 Letter, D. A. Boyle to Matejka with instructions for attending the RDF Policy Sub-committee meeting, 3 
September 1941, Box 2147, AG, RG 498, NARA and Elliot, "Administrative and Logistical History of the ETO, 
Part I, The Predecessor Commands: SPOBS and USAFBI," 217. 
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Committee, came to the conclusion that Germany would soon outstrip Britain in its capacity for 
research and production.  He was particularly concerned about Britain's ability to develop and 
produce electronics, because electronics technology was proving to be a crucial component of 
Britain's war effort. He addressed this potential issue by proposing to the British government that 
the U.K. provide its technological secrets to the U.S. in exchange for access to production and 
research facilities.  British officials gave his pro osal a lukewarm reception, and it did not 
receive serious consideration until Churchill became Prime Minister and took personal interest in 
facilitating a mission.  By September, 1940, Tizard, along with a small group of British scientists 
and military representatives, had traveled to the United States and divulged many of Britain's 
technological secrets to the U.S.  A number of these secrets had concerned advances in RDF 
technology.34   
Shortly after Matejka began attending its meetings, Tizard became the chairman of the 
RDF Policy Subcommittee, a body composed of representatives from all Britain’s military 
services as well as ministries involved in RDF technology.35  Most of the committee's business 
involved coordination among the U.K.’s various armed s rvices regarding Britain’s RDF 
resources.  Among the topics the subcommittee typically discussed were standardization of 
techniques and terminology, studies of new technology and its possible application, and 
distribution of technological secrets to the dominions and Britain's allies.36      
                                                          
     34 E. G. Bowen, "The Tizard Mission to the USA and Canada," in Radar Development to 1945, ed. Russell Burns 
(London: Peter Peregrinus Ltd., 1988), 296-307.  For in-depth examinations of the mission, see Zimmerman, Top 
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     35 Organizations represented included: the Admiralty Department of Signals, the Air Ministry Directorate of 
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 Matejka's role on the sub-committee was to present Washington's views concerning RDF 
policy and to keep Chaney and his staff aware of decisions the committee made so they could 
pass that information on to the War Department.  As with the Associated Communications 
Committee, Matejka had no authority to make binding commitments.  However, his position was 
a little less ambiguous because the Tizard Mission had already established channels for 
collaboration in communications technology between the United States and Britain.  These 
channels allowed Matejka and the other members of the SPOBS staff to influence the 
development Anglo-American RDF policy prior to U.S. entry into the war.  
 One way that the Special Observers and their British counterparts used the committee 
was as a mechanism to facilitate shared understanding of problems associated with technological 
collaboration between the U.S. and Britain. This collaboration had created an inadvertent 
competition over resources.  During the Tizard Mission, the British had shared the secrets to 
making key components for their advanced radar technology.  Their original intent for divulging 
these secrets was to use the production capability of the U.S. to produce these items in larger 
quantities.  However, increased production had not kep pace with the growth of the U.S. radar 
program, eventually causing shortfalls in Britain.  To address this problem, the British used the 
RDF Subcommittee to air their difficulties to the Special Observers, along with requests for help 
in facilitating increased production in the U.S.  Although Matejka and the other Special 
Observers officially stated they could not act on a matter of this nature without it coming from 
the British Chiefs of Staff, they sent the British requests as part of their reports of the 
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NARA.   
163 
 
proceedings to the War Department, ensuring that their superiors knew about Britain's 
shortfalls.37 
 Matejka and the other committee members also used the RDF Policy Subcommittee as a 
means to develop Anglo-American communications policy prior to Pearl Harbor.  By far the 
most important contribution the Special Observers made in this regard was to facilitate an 
agreement between the United States and Britain to adopt a common Identification Friend or Foe 
(IFF) system.  In order to reduce the likelihood of fratricide, Britain had already established a 
means to electronically identify aircraft using its chain home radar system.  The U.S. soon 
followed suit.  However, both Britain and the U.S. began to encounter issues with IFF 
technology as the two countries developed more sophi ticated radar systems.  The main issue 
had to do with frequency bands.  For the most part, e ch radar system operated on its own 
frequency band. This created a requirement to also construct an IFF system to match the 
frequency band of the system that was supposed to detect it.  As a result, there were a multiple 
IFF systems and radars, making the adoption of a common system difficult.   By fall 1941, the 
British developed an IFF system that could cope with the different radar systems that were in 
use, a system they dubbed the "IFF Mark III."38  They soon set their sights on, not only 
standardizing IFF technology among their own forces, but also standardizing it between the U.S. 
and the U.K.   
 In September 1941, Air Chief Marshal Sir Philip Joubert, Air Officer Commanding in 
Chief of Coastal Command and chair of the RDF Policy Subcommittee until Tizard took over, 
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impressed upon the Special Observers the necessity of America adopting a system compatible 
with the Mark III. Joubert, wisely broached the subject at a time when technical experts from 
both the U.S. Army Air Corps and Signal Corps were on a tour of the country.  Taking advantage 
of an opportunity to influence the American experts, the British arranged a demonstration of the 
technology, while Chaney informed the War Department of Britain's proposal.  Over the 
following two months, Matejka and the other Special Observers served as the conduit through 
which discussions concerning the adoption of the Mark III between the United States and Britain 
took place.  U.S. officials toyed with various ideas, including configuring American airplanes to 
use both U.S. and British IFF equipment.  However, by November they decided to adopt the 
Mark III IFF for all aircraft and ships working in the Atlantic area.  After American entry into 
the war, it became the standard IFF system of the Alli s.39  Tragically, although it would 
safeguard thousands of British and American servicemen, it failed to protect Griffiss.  His death 
highlighted how important it was for the U.S. and Britain to develop effective communications 
plans and policies.  
Communicating Strategy 
The Special Observers’ work on the task forces for RAINBOW-5 as well as their efforts 
to develop combined communications policy were significant in that they helped British and 
U.S. planners understand the problems associated wih establishing the means for U.S. and 
British forces to communicate with one another in what would become the European Theater of 
Operations.  The Special Observers helped to develop and improve communication between the 
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U.S. and Britain in other ways as well.  The mere act of planning and coordinating with both 
British and U.S. agencies required the Special Observers to establish the means to facilitate the 
flow of information between the U.S. and Britain.  Often, the group itself was the instrument 
through which communication between Britain and the U.S. took place.  SPOBS’ role as an 
instrument of communication was inherent in its function.  The parameters of this function, 
however, were fluid.  There were many avenues through which U.S. and British officials could 
communicate with one another, SPOBS was only one means.  As both the U.S. and Britain 
fumbled towards cooperation with one another, officials on both sides had to learn how to 
communicate.  SPOBS’ efforts in facilitating this communication was indicative of the learning 
process that was taking place on both sides of the A lantic prior to U.S. entry into the war.  
 This work has already examined instances where SPOB  facilitated communication 
between the War Department and the British military services.  Throughout planning for the 
Iceland operation, the War Department used SPOBS in its negotiations and as a means to 
coordinate with the War Office.  The reconnaissance reports that Chaney submitted for the 
RAINBOW-5 task forces also constituted communication between British agencies and the War 
Department, as the Specials Observers and their Brit sh counterparts jointly developed the 
outline plans they contained.  Lyon’s work on developing a combined policy for air logistics was 
in-part an effort by MAP and the Air Ministry to inform U.S. planners of the limitations U.S. air 
forces would face when operating from Britain.  In each of these instances both U.S. and British 
officials used SPOBS as a conduit for transferring information. 
 While all this planning and coordinating was taking place, Chaney’s staff was also 
involved in efforts by the War and Navy Departments and the British Chiefs of Staff to establish 
formal communications procedures between the U.S. and British military services.  By the time 
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Chaney and his staff arrived in England, U.S. and British officials were supposed to have 
resolved this issue, as ABC-1 contained provisions that laid out how the U.S. and British military 
services would communicate.40  However, the imminent arrival of SPOBS in London and the 
British Joint Staff Mission (BJSM) in Washington D.C. raised questions concerning how much 
information Britain should share with the U.S. about its war effort as well as how they should 
transfer that information, prompting the British to reexamine the system for communication 
contained in ABC-1.  
 The British Joint Planning Staff (JPS) began to examine the question of how much 
information to share with the U.S. shortly after the American–British Conversations wrapped up.  
By the end of April, the group finished its initial investigation of the issue and submitted its 
recommendations to the British Chiefs of Staff.  Looking at the issue from a planning 
perspective, the group asserted that Britain should share all pertinent information about its war 
effort with the Americans including, as Johnsen noted, “daily operational reports, intelligence 
evaluations, and periodic strategic appreciations.”41  Providing unrestricted access to American 
planners would ensure that they had all the information they needed to draft war plans for 
cooperation with the British.    
 The JPS proposal provoked a mix of reactions among British officials.  The Chiefs of 
Staff, as well as Major General J. N. Kennedy, the Dir ctor of Military Operations for the 
Imperial General Staff, were initially hesitant to endorse the JPS recommendation.  Portal and 
Kennedy asserted that full disclosure would be appro riate once the U.S. entered the war.  To 
provide this information before the U.S. was a fullally, however, would give its officials too 
much influence in the development of British policy.   
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 The British were also concerned about providing sensitive information about ongoing 
operations to a neutral power they believed to have inadequate security policies.42  Their 
concerns were not entirely unwarranted.  Dahlquist noted an incident that occurred in July, 1941 
that seemed to confirm British fears, “Summers went home sick this afternoon.  The AG office is 
not functioning very well.  A very secret document has been lost.”43  Lieutenant Colonel Iverson 
B. Summers, the SPOBS Adjutant, was responsible for tracking all correspondence and 
documents that circulated in and out of SPOBS.  A graduate of the West Point class of 1915, he 
had originally been commissioned in the Coast Artille y but joined the newly formed Adjutant 
General’s (AG) Department in 1924.  He spent the int rwar years primarily in administrative and 
secretarial positions.  His more notable assignments included a stint as the Assistant Adjutant 
General of IX Corps Area at the Presidio, San Francisco, where he organized and administered 
camps for the Civilian Conservation Corps, and a job as aide and military secretary to the U.S. 
Army Chief of Staff, General Malin Craig.44  In spite of his broad experience, his section was 
having trouble effectively accounting for classified material, perhaps an indication that the 
Special Observers themselves had not fully adjusted to the wartime environment they 
confronted.  Fortunately, Dahlquist was able to find the document before the British found out 
that it had been lost.45   
Although many British officials objected to providing open access to Americans, others 
saw it as vital if the U.K was to take maximum advantage of U.S. assistance.  Rear Admiral R. 
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M. Bellairs, from the Admiralty staff, and Lord Halif x, the British Ambassador to the United 
States, among others, endorsed the JPS position.  They based their endorsement on two points.  
First, the Roosevelt administration needed access to a much information as the British could 
provide it in order to effectively execute its Lend-Lease program to Britain.  Second, U.S. 
officials were already providing much needed information to British representatives in 
Washington and they argued that Britain should recipro ate.46 
 Eventually, the Chiefs of Staff relented and accepted the JPS proposal.  However, they 
wanted to employ a different procedure for communications than that outlined in ABC-1.  As the 
U.S. and British military services each had representatives in the other’s capital, the question of 
communication between the U.S. Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations and British 
Chiefs of Staff revolved around which representatives to communicate with.  U.S. military 
officials in Washington wanting to raise an issue with British military officials in London could 
either go through the BJSM or through SPOBS/SPENAVO.  British officials in London had the 
same options available to them to communicate with U.S. officials in the states.  To 
communicate effectively, the heads of the U.S. and British military services had to come to an 
agreement on which organization to use and when to use it.   
 ABC-1’s drafters appeared to have devised a simple solution to this conundrum.  
According to the procedure outlined in ABC-1, the subject of the communication determined 
which representatives to use.  If the subject concerned a British strategic area of responsibility, 
such as Iceland, British and U.S. officials would go through SPOBS/SPENAVO to effect 
communication.  If a subject concerned a U.S. strategic area of responsibility, such as U.S. war 
production, U.S. and British officials would go through the BJSM.47 
                                                          
     46 Ibid., 245-46. 
     
47 Johnsen, “Forging the Foundations of the Grand Alliance,” 247. 
169 
 
 The British Chiefs of Staff, after a review of the ABC-1 procedure, determined that it was 
too inflexible.  They gave the following reason: 
Questions on which it will be required to exchange views will cover a wide field, 
e.g. major strategic policy, operations, intelligenc , administrative details, routine 
matters etc.  It would seem to be a mistake to stipulate that subjects of such varied 
nature should always be transmitted through any particular channel.  In some 
cases the originator will prefer to initiate discussion with the mission at his 
headquarters and in others he will wish to raise a ubject through his own 
representatives on the other side of the Atlantic.48    
 
In an attempt to establish a system of communication between the U.S. and Britain that was more 
flexible, the Chiefs of Staff devised a procedure where the originator of an issue would decide 
which representatives to go through when attempting to communicate with officials on the 
opposite side of the Atlantic.49   After gaining Chaney and Ghormley’s endorsement for 
changing the procedure called for by ABC-1, they sent their proposal to the U.S. Chief of Staff 
and Chief of Naval Operations via the BJSM.50  Marshall and Stark both rejected the proposal, 
stating that they wished to adhere to the procedure U.S. and British representatives had 
previously agreed to during the American British Conversations, likely wanting to avoid the 
potential confusion that could take place if they did not clearly delineate communications 
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responsibilities between the U.S. and British mission .  Eventually, the British Chiefs of Staff 
acquiesced and agreed to use the ABC-1 procedure.51                       
 As Johnsen noted in The Origins of the Grand Alliance, the debate over which 
representatives to use to talk to one another seems trivial at first glance, but was actually 
significant in the development of Anglo-American cooperation.52  A second order effect of the 
British analysis of the communication procedure in ABC-1 was the decision to provide full 
access to U.S. planners of sensitive information regarding the British defense establishment, a 
necessity for developing effective coalition war plans.  Additionally, analysis on the British side 
led to an examination of the ways and means that SPOBS and SPENAVO would interact with 
the British defense establishment.  In order to take full advantage of the open access that they 
were recommending the British government provide, th  JPS had also recommended that the 
members of Chaney and Ghormley’s staff interact directly with the directorates and departments 
in the War and Air Ministries when developing plans to implement ABC-1.53  This decision 
ultimately led to the procedures both the Air Ministry and the War Office proposed to the Special 
Observers shortly after they arrived in England.  The Special Observers would accomplish most 
of their planning by working directly with their British counterparts, a procedure that had its 
origins in British analysis on channels of communication between the U.S. and Britain.54  Thus, 
while it seems that the British Chiefs of Staff had wasted months of effort in attempting to sway 
Marshall and Stark to use a different communications procedure, the analysis that went into that 
effort was significant in that it was part of the learning process U.S. and British officials were 
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going though in figuring out how to use SPOBS/SPENAVO and by extension, learning how to 
cooperate with one another.  
 SPOBS and SPENAVO’s participation in a dialogue betwe n U.S. and British officials 
about global strategy is also indicative of this learning process.  The two groups’ involvement in 
this discussion was an after effect of the Atlantic Conference, the first meeting between 
Roosevelt and Churchill as President and Prime Minister.  The meeting had taken place in early 
August, 1941.  The veil of secrecy surrounding it had been so great that some participants 
initially had not known its true purpose.  Arnold, who had taken part in the conference, recalled:  
“While making an inspection of the training schools in the southeastern States, I 
received a message from General Marshall: ‘Return to Washington; arriving not 
later than ten P.M. Saturday, the second.  Marshall.’ When I arrived in 
Washington, General Marshall told me that we would leave on a trip on Sunday, 
August 3rd at noon, from Gravelly Point, Washington Airport.  Heavy uniforms 
would be required, he said, and I was to be prepared for an absence of about ten 
days.  He did not tell me anything about where we were going, or what we were 
to do.”55      
 
Arnold did not find out that the President was meeting with the Prime Minister of Great Britain 
until after he was on board the USS Tuscaloosa, a New Orleans-class cruiser, anchored at 
Martha’s Vineyard, preparing to travel to Placentia Bay, Newfoundland, the site of the 
conference.56  
 The results of the conference were largely political, with Roosevelt and Churchill jointly 
issuing a declaration of goals the U.S. and Britain had for the post-war world, subsequently 
known as the “Atlantic Charter.”  However, the conference participants discussed other topics 
pertaining to Anglo-American cooperation as well.  Both the President and the Prime Minister 
brought their closest diplomatic and military advisors, including two of the British Chiefs of 
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Staff as well as Marshall and Stark.  The British had igh hopes that they would be able to 
convince the U.S. of the strategic logic in entering the war immediately as a British ally. 
 Their chief instrument of persuasion was the “General Strategy Review by the British 
Chiefs of Staff,” a global estimate that outlined Britain’s strategy for winning the war.  As 
Theodore Wilson noted in The First Summit: Roosevelt & Churchill at Placentia Bay, 1941, “it 
was a strategy derived from weakness, one reflecting painful awareness of the limitations 
imposed by Britain’s deficiencies–material and human–and of the need to husband those already 
inadequate reservoirs of capital, manpower, and industrial potential against the certain 
difficulties of the future peace.”57  The first necessary step, according the Chiefs, wa  to ensure 
the survival of the United Kingdom while building up forces for an eventual offensive.  The key 
to achieving these goals was to protect Britain’s sea communications and to occupy the Canaries, 
French Morocco, and West Africa to prevent Germany from cutting off Britain’s Middle East 
possessions.  Unfortunately for the British, they did not have the resources to accomplish these 
tasks alone.  They required the United States to intervene both at sea in the Atlantic and on the 
ground in Africa.  Immediate U.S. entry into the war, the Chiefs asserted, “would revolutionize 
the whole situation,” providing immediate relief from Axis pressure and securing Britain’s 
position against Japan should the nation decide to join Germany and Italy.58 
 After securing the Britain’s survival and building the requisite combat power, the Allies 
could shift to the offensive. In the Chiefs’ minds the central element of any future offensive 
operations against Germany was a bombing campaign.  Employing bombers against Axis 
controlled Europe, when coupled with a blockade at se , would destroy the foundations of the 
German war machine by wrecking the economy and weakening German morale.  Once Germany 
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was sufficiently weakened, partisans in occupied Europe, with Allied assistance, would rise up 
and take back the lands that the Axis had taken from them.  The Allies would send small, mobile 
invasion forces to seal a victory won largely by bom ing, blockade, and subversion.59   
 In spite of British hopes, the conference did not result in immediate U.S. entry into the 
war.  The American representatives provided little feedback on the General Strategy Review at 
Placentia, preferring to let their staffs analyze th  document first.60  After a few weeks of 
analysis, the War Department General Staff prepared comments that the Joint Army-Navy Board 
used as the basis for its response to the General Strategy Review, which the board forwarded to 
SPOBS in September, 1941 for presentation to the British.  The Joint Board reply was critical of 
British strategy on many points.  The most significant critiques concerned U.S. involvement in 
the war and the British strategy for strategic bombing.  First, the Joint Board argued against the 
assertion that immediate U.S. belligerency “would revolutionize the whole situation.”  The 
strength of the U.S. armed forces the board asserted, was not sufficient to execute the program 
the British had outlined.  Rather, the U.S. would be more effective serving as a neutral providing 
material aid to Britain.  U.S. involvement now the Joint Board argued, “would at best involve a 
piecemeal and indecisive commitment of forces against a superior enemy under unfavorable 
logistic conditions.”61  
 The members of the Joint Board were also critical of British assertions regarding the 
efficacy of its strategic bombing program.  They felt the British objectives in the bombing 
program lacked precision.  It placed too much emphasis on German morale, which in their 
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estimation, did not constitute a legitimate military target.62  Further, the board felt the strategy 
placed too much weight on winning the war through bom ardment.  The board members argued 
that “dependence cannot be placed on winning important wars by naval and air forces alone.”  
According to the Joint Board, victory over the Axis would require a large number of ground 
forces, a requirement, the board asserted, the General Strategy Review had neglected.63   
 After spending six weeks reviewing the Joint Board’s comments, the British came to the 
conclusion that the staffs at the War and Navy Departments had interpreted the document 
incorrectly.64  It was at his point that the British attempted to use SPOBS and SPENAVO both as 
a means to clarify U.S. views regarding British strategy and as a means for ensuring the War and 
Navy Departments understood what they were saying.  On 21 November, Chaney, McNarney, 
and Bolte, along with Lee, Ghormley, and members of the SPENAVO staff, met with the 
members of the British Joint Planning Staff, headed by Brigadier Vivian Dykes, the Director of 
Plans for the War Office.65  Dykes began the meeting by explaining that the General Strategy 
Review was merely a summary of British strategic intentions.  As such, the JPS felt that the 
document may not have explained certain aspects of British strategy sufficiently, resulting in 
misunderstandings on the part of U.S. officials.  He stated that he felt an informal conversation 
among all present would be valuable in that it would afford both sides the opportunity to expand 
on points in both the General Strategy Review and the Joint Board comments.66 
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 Dykes’ attempt to use SPOBS and SPENAVO as a means for discussing British strategy 
did not live up to his expectations, an indication that the U.S. and Britain still had much to learn 
in terms of how to effectively coordinate strategic policy.  Ghormley did most of the speaking 
for the U.S. side and he was less than accommodating.  Bolte, who had taken notes at the 
meeting, summarized his response to Dykes’ opening remarks: “Admiral Ghormley pointed out 
that the comments signed by the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations was a Joint 
Board paper prepared and transmitted to the British Chief of Staff in response to their request for 
a formal reply to the British Strategy Review and that it should be apparent that any discussion 
by this meeting of these comments would be superfluous.”67  Undeterred by Ghormley’s 
position, Dykes pressed on anyway, attempting to exract what information he could get out of 
the Americans regarding the Joint Board comments.  Ghormley remained obstinate, and although 
some of the other participants, especially McNarney, did eventually attempt to provide Dykes 
and other members of the JPS with answers to their qu stions, they had to qualify their responses 
as personal opinions and guesses.68  
 The hesitancy on the part of Chaney, Ghormley, and their staffs in providing the JPS with 
answers to the questions they sought was a symptom of the one-way communication that 
characterized relations between officials in Washingto  and the Special Observers.  Although 
SPOBS and SPENAVO continually funneled information t  the War and Navy Departments, 
officials in the United States were not reciprocal in exchanging information.  Chaney and his 
staff especially, were often ignorant of the current status of planning in the War Department.69  
Ghormley, Chaney, and their staffs had nothing more than the Joint Board comments to go off of 
                                                          
     67 Memo, Bolte to Chaney, November 22, 1941, War Dep. Dec. 319.1 SPOBS Reports, Box 2066, AG, RG 498, 
NARA. 
     68 Ibid. 
     69 Burg/Bolte Interview, 29-31. 
176 
 
in answering Dykes’ questions.70  As such, the War and Navy Departments had not equipped the 
Special Observers to engage in the kind of dialogue needed to effectively coordinate grand 
strategy with the British.  To be effective in the future, the War and Navy Departments would 
either have to provide the Special Observers with the background information necessary to 
engage in these discussions or devise a new mechanism for coordinating Anglo-American grand 
strategy.   
 The meeting, however, was not a complete failure.  Dykes and the other members of the 
JPS were certainly equipped to provide responses to Joint Board criticisms of the General 
Strategy Review.  The first issue Dykes addressed was the Joint Board’s criticism of Britain’s 
bombing strategy, specifically with regards to German morale.  Dykes asked the American 
representatives to clarify whether or not the Joint Board’s objections to targeting morale were 
based on U.S. policy or if it considered morale a poor military target.  Hesitantly, McNarney 
commented that the U.S. did not consider morale to be a primary military objective, interpreting 
the Joint Board criticism to mean that the British should be selecting specific targets, such as oil, 
rather than generally targeting German morale.71   
At this point, Air Commodore W. F. Dickson, the Air Ministry Director of Plans, and Air 
Commodore J. W. Baker, the Air Ministry Director of Bomber Operations, jumped in, providing 
a more detailed explanation of British bombing policy than that found in the General Strategy 
Review.  They argued that morale was a legitimate military target as undermining it would 
undermine the German military.  This, however, they asserted should not be taken to mean that 
the British set out specifically to bomb the civilian population.  Baker explained that British 
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practice was, “to pick [military] targets so located that near misses will fall into nearby congested 
or concentrated industrial or economic areas, not with the primary purpose of killing individuals, 
but of deteriorating their living conditions and driving them away from their work into 
discomfort.”72   The bombing policy that Baker described was one that recognized the limited 
resources at Britain’s disposal.  Its bomber force at this point in the war was small, and heavy 
casualties had prompted the British to bomb a night, w ich substantially reduced accuracy.  They 
had to make every bomb count, and the only way to do that was to select targets where their 
bombs would have an effect, even if they missed.73   
 After Baker had explained British bombing policy in more detail, McNarney believed he 
had determined where the miscommunication had occurred between British and U.S. strategic 
planners. He stated, “It would seem that the Joint Board had considered bombing German morale 
as area bombing instead of precision bombing.  It would seem that any British bombardment of 
civilian personnel was incidental to the bombing of p int targets whose destruction would 
contribute to the deterioration of their entire moral fabric.”74  Still, even though he had been able 
to identify how U.S. officials had misinterpreted British bombing policy in the General Strategy 
Review, McNarney was unable to provide a definitive answer to the British regarding how the 
Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations would view British bombing policy in light of this 
new information.   
 After discussion regarding Britain’s bombing policy, Dykes undertook a discussion of the 
Joint Board’s criticisms that the British had placed too much emphasis on bombing as a strategy 
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for winning the war, rather than using large land forces to invade the continent.  Dykes asserted 
that the British had always planned on sending forces to the continent and asked the Americans 
for more clarification regarding what the Joint Board objected to regarding Britain’s strategy to 
weaken Germany first through bombardment.  Again, Chaney, Ghormley, and their staffs were 
ill-equipped to provide Dykes with the clarification that he sought.75   
 In the face of the Americans’ reticence, Dykes deci d to adopt a different approach.  He 
asked Chaney if “U.S. authorities had thought seriously of how and where to land large land 
forces on the continent . . . [and] whether a thorough examination of this question had been made 
in the U.S.”76  Chaney replied that he believed the planners in the s ates had looked at the 
question superficially.77  Feeling that the Americans did not understand just what they were 
asking the British to do, Dykes led the group into a lengthy discussion of the problems associated 
landing a large force on the continent, a problem the British had examined in detail.  The 
conferees also discussed Britain’s limitations concer ing manpower and resources and how and 
where the U.S. should use its forces if and when it tered the war.  The end result of the 
discussion was an assertion on the part of the British that they did not have the resources to 
conduct a large-scale invasion of the continent, and that bombing was the only offensive 
operation they could currently conduct against Germany.  Chaney ended the meeting convinced 
they were correct.78 
 Chaney suggested that his staff pass the information they discussed to officials in 
Washington in order to ensure they fully understood Britain’s strategy and the limitations they 
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faced in deviating from it.  Dykes and the other memb rs of the JPS agreed.79  Before the Special 
Observers were able to transmit the JPS response, however, Japan attacked Pearl Harbor.  With 
the U.S. as a full ally, the strategic balance was changing and Anglo-American planners would 
reevaluate what resources were at their disposal and how best to utilize them to achieve victory.  
Among the problems they would examine in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor was how best to 
coordinate grand strategy in the Anglo-American alliance.  
 The discussions concerning the British General Strtegy Review, the channels of 
communication, and the Associated Communications Committee all represented failures on the 
part of the U.S. and Britain in establishing an effective system for communicating and 
coordinating grand strategy and strategic level communications policy in 1941.  However, they 
were important failures.  1941 was a period of trial and error for both U.S. and British officials.  
Given the complex bureaucracies that characterized th  military establishments of both nations, 
it was not immediately apparent how their respectiv military services should communicate with 
one another.  Although each effort had failed in its own way, a latent effect of these efforts was 
to highlight the problems associated with strategic level communication.  Armed with knowledge 
of these problems, American and British officials would devise better solutions for Anglo-
American communications policy in 1942. 
 The Special Observers’ efforts to develop an Anglo-American communications program, 
especially at the tactical and operational levels, did meet with some success.  Matejka and 
communications representatives from the Air Ministry, War Office, and Admiralty had devised 
procedures for integrating U.S. forces into Britain’s system of communications.  Matejka had 
also developed tentative communications plans for supporting the RAINBOW-5 task forces that 
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provided U.S. and British planners with an awareness of the problems associated with 
establishing an Anglo-American communications program in Britain.  In spite of the failure of 
the Associated Communications Committee in 1941, Matejk  and the other Special Observers 
were still able to influence Anglo-American communicat ons policy by participating in the RDF 
Policy Subcommittee.  To what extent the Special Observers would be able to apply this work to 
Anglo-American programs in Britain after U.S. entry into the war remained to be seen.  
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Chapter 6: Lend-Lease and Aid to the Soviet Union  
 
On 8 July 1941 three American-made B-17 heavy bombers w re flying 30,000 feet above 
the North Sea to a point about one-hundred miles north of the German port city of 
Wilhelmshaven.  After reaching this point, the crews ere to turn directly south, conduct a 
daylight bombing raid against the port, and return o England by retracing the same route.  
However, before the trio of heavy bombers reached tir arget, they began to run into trouble. 1 
 The first indication that all was not right occurred when one of the aircraft began 
vibrating excessively.  After a quick investigation, the crew determined that the vibration was 
being caused by oil that had leaked from the engine and frozen on the tail of the aircraft.  To 
prevent the aircraft from shaking itself apart, the cr w had to reduce altitude and divert from 
their primary target so the oil on the tail could melt.  As a result, the bombing mission lost one-
third of its combat power before it even reached the target.2  
 The two other aircraft reached Wilhelmshaven and dropped their bombs with little 
difficulty.  However, shortly after leaving Wilhelmshaven for the return route home, they began 
experiencing problems.  Both developed oil leaks in their engines and one had an engine 
shutdown.  It was at this point that one of the aircr ft spotted two German Messerschmitt Bf 109 
fighters on an intercept course.  One of the 109s took up a position on the aircraft's rear while the 
other passed ahead, climbing and turning to make a quartering attack on the front of the bomber.  
The pilot was able to disrupt the attack by turning directly into the 109's flight path.  The 
repositioning also placed the B-17's front gunner ito a good position to fire at the 109.  
                                                          
     1 Cable, SPOBS (McClelland) to AGWAR, Sub: Combat Operations B-17s, July 21, 1941, SPOBS - Cables - Air
Force, June 1941-June 1942, Box 3866, Administrative History 1942-1946, Historical Division, RG 498, NARA.  
Cozens and Johnson describe the problems the British encountered when using the B-17 during this mission and 
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However, the gunner was unable to see the fighter because the high altitude had completely 
frosted over his windows.  The task then fell to the B-17's rear gunner to engage the 109 as it 
passed from the front to the rear.  He too, however, was unable to fire effectively at the 109 as 
the B-17's internal communication system broke down, preventing the crew's fire control officer 
from warning the rear gunner of the aircraft's approach.  One can imagine the officer's frustration 
as he futilely screamed directions into the microphone.  Fortunately, the 109s elected not to give 
chase and all bombers from the flight eventually returned to Britain safely.3  
 The problems that the aircrews encountered were indicative of some of the challenges 
that the Allies faced when attempting to integrate U.S. built equipment, purchased or obtained 
through Lend-Lease, into their military forces.  This mission was the first time the RAF 
attempted to use B-17 aircraft on a bombing mission.  Most of the problems that the aircraft 
encountered arose because the British had flown the B-17s well above their normal operating 
altitude.4  This was not an isolated incident.  It was common for the British to use aircraft in 
ways the designers had not originally intended, largely because the British were constantly 
refining the way they conducted war.5 During Lyon's initial meetings with British officials 
responsible for air logistics, they had impressed upon him one of the most important lessons they 
had learned from the past year defending Britain against air attacks: tactics, technology, and 
operational conditions continually changed and in response, Britain continually had to modify its 
aircraft to meet new challenges as they arose.6  This requirement for continual modifications held 
true for aircraft the British received from the United States as well.          
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 The most obvious solution to this problem was to have American manufacturers build the 
equipment according to British specifications as they updated them.7  However, in summer 1941, 
the Lend-Lease program suffered from the effects of an inadequate system of communication 
between the U.S. and Britain.  When the Special Observer Group arrived in England, the aid 
program known as “Lend-Lease” had existed for just over two months.8  Although there had 
been some effort at coordination through French and British purchases of aircraft, machinery for 
coordination in early summer 1941 remained inchoate and inadequate.9  Germany’s invasion of 
Russia during the summer of 1941 only complicated matters further, as Churchill and, 
subsequently, Roosevelt’s decision to provide aid to the Soviet Union forced British and 
American officials to reassess and renegotiate how t e U.S. would allocate essential war 
materials between the three states.       
Coping with these challenges became an additional mission for the Special Observer 
Group soon after their arrival.  The absence of an effective system for communicating British 
requirements and coordinating Anglo-American aid policy forced the War Department and the 
Roosevelt administration to rely on the group to gather information, provide technical advice, 
and serve as key participants in negotiations with Great Britain and the Soviet Union concerning 
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aid policy.  This experience allowed the SPOBS staff, in cooperation with the Military Attaché’s 
Office, to identify communication and coordination shortfalls that inhibited the exchange of 
information and coordination of aid policy between Britain and the United States.  With this 
information in hand, SPOBS established a system to address these shortfalls, a manifest effect of 
the group’s pre-Pearl Harbor work with the British.  The Special Observers’ experience in 
handling the challenges posed by Lend-Lease and aid to the Soviet Union is an example of how 
the group served as a mechanism through which the War Department and the Roosevelt 
Administration responded to the unforeseen challenges of preparing for coalition war.       
The Special Observers’ Introduction to Lend-Lease 
Whether or not the War Department originally meant to involve SPOBS in Lend-Lease is 
difficult to determine.  Marshall did not specify in his initial instructions to Chaney that the 
Special Observer Group would have any duties regarding the program, although his directive that 
Chaney would, "negotiate with the British Chiefs of Staff on military affairs of common interest 
relating to joint United States-British cooperation n British areas of responsibility" could be 
interpreted as including Lend-Lease.10  At some point, it appears that Chaney received further 
instructions, as the task to "assist in the coordinatio  of the allocation of equipment from the 
United States" appeared on a list of duties SPOBS was responsible for that members of the 
British War Cabinet discussed on 27 May 1941.11  Lee confirms this in a sympathetic diary entry 
for 20 May: "I think it is too bad that his [Chaney's] directive charges him with these tangled, 
intricate questions of supply.  His mission should really be restricted entirely to matters of 
military cooperation.  Before he is through, he is going to be so sucked into the question of 
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machines and weapons that the other part, which is the main object in life, will be pushed to 
second place, I am afraid."12  Lee's statement was prophetic, as it accurately pr dicted the 
personnel problems and distractions that Lend-Lease would impose on the Special Observer 
Group.   
 SPOBS' actual involvement in Lend-Lease began haphazardly during the summer of 
1941, as the group attempted to deal with problems concerning the exchange of information 
between the U.K. and the U.S.  One major issue that confronted Americans and British alike was 
the chaotic way in which the two countries exchanged technical information.  At the start of the 
war the Military Attaché's office in the American embassy had served as the conduit through 
which this kind of activity took place.  However, following the Strong-Emmons mission in the 
summer of 1940, a host of military observers from the War Department made periodic visits to 
Britain to collect data.  Although nominally under the supervision of the Military Attaché's 
office, these missions came from separate departments that did not communicate with one 
another.  Snavely noted in a 1945 interview that, because these missions were not uncoordinated, 
their work often resulted in duplication of effort as well as contradictory observations and 
recommendations.13 
  A few weeks after their arrival in London, Lyon ad McNarney discussed another 
problem with Lee that they had discovered while meeting with their British counterparts. By the 
summer of 1941, numerous American aircraft manufactrers had sent representatives to England 
to teach the British how to use and handle their airpl nes.  MAP and the Air Ministry had put 
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many of these representatives to work on highly sensitive projects, and some had unwittingly 
telegraphed or telephoned British military secrets on unsecure lines back to the United States.14  
This gross breach of security constituted a potentially serious roadblock to Anglo-American 
cooperation.  The British were already reluctant to release sensitive information to the Special 
Observer Group and the Military Attaché's office.  These leaks merely confirmed their 
suspicions that American procedures for handling secret information were inadequate.15 
 Whether due to British reluctance or American disorganization, the U.S. Army Air Corps 
was not getting the full picture regarding Britain's use of American aircraft in its war against 
Germany.  In June, Arnold began sending inquiries to SPOBS in response to reports that the 
British were not employing U.S. aircraft in combat.  Because of their aviation expertise, Lyon 
and McClelland assumed the task of investigating British use of American aircraft–Lyon for the 
technical aspects and McClelland, for the operationl aspects.   
Prior to coming to England as a member of Chaney’s staff, Colonel Harold M. 
McClelland had been serving in the G-3 Division of the War Department General staff, likely the 
reason he had been selected to serve as the SPOBS G-3.  He was a lean figure, sporting a neatly 
trimmed moustache that gave him a distinguished, cultivated, almost aristocratic bearing.  He 
looked very much like a gentlemen officer, nothing i  his appearance to indicate that he was a 
Midwesterner from small-town, Tiffin, Iowa.  This was not the first time that McClelland had 
served under Chaney in England.  While Chaney had been the Air Officer of the Provisional 
District of Great Britain in 1919, McClelland had been his assistant.  During their service in 
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England, they had endeavored to create ties with Bri ish aviators, both becoming honorary 
members of the Royal Aero Club of the United Kingdom, a recreational flying club.16  .   
After he returned to the United States, McClelland time jumping back and forth between 
communications and aviation positions, a side effect of the Aviation Section of the U.S. Army 
originally belonging to the U.S. Army Signal Corps.  Ironically, one of his more memorable 
flights happened while he was assigned to Mitchell Fi ld, N.Y. as the Post Signal Officer.  In the 
summer of 1926, Major Benjamin Foulois, then serving as commander of Mitchell Field, 
organized a publicity stunt in an attempt to gain support for Citizens’ Military Training Camps 
(and most likely to generate publicity for the Army Air Corps as well.)  Foulois got Babe Ruth, 
then a baseball player for the New York Yankees, to don an Army uniform and come out to 
Mitchell Field.  With press, radio, and motion-picture reporters watching, Foulois had 
McClelland fly an airplane over Ruth and repeatedly drop baseballs, until Ruth finally caught 
one.17  The stunt was a testament to the popularity of both aseball and aviation feats during the 
1920s. 
McClelland and Lyon’s work on the B-17 issue was certainly less glamourous, but it was 
an important step in SPOBS’ efforts to improve communication and coordination between U.S. 
and British agencies involved in providing American aircraft to the British.  In the process of 
conducting their investigation, they found out that the rumors Arnold had been hearing were true.  
They also learned why.  Because of incidents like the one described above, the British often 
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failed to use these planes because they needed modifications, either because of structural 
deficiencies and component defects, or because of British operational practices.18   
 Why Arnold decided to use the Special Observer Group as a conduit of information is a 
mystery.  Chaney and his group were not in Arnold's chain of command.  As the head of the 
mission, Chaney worked directly for Marshall and in the event the U.S. entered the war, the 
headquarters in Britain was supposed to serve as a subordinate command to GHQ.  Of course, 
Arnold was not one to let technicalities like this get in his way when he wanted something.  
DeWitt S. Copp, in A Few Great Captains: The Men and Events That Shaped the Development 
of U.S. Air Power, described Arnold’s disdain for procedure: “From the outset [of his career] and 
throughout his life, he had difficulty in accepting the traditional method of working though 
prescribed channels when swift action was needed.”19  As Chief of the Army Air Forces, Arnold 
was in a position that allowed him to circumvent proper channels rather easily, especially since 
many members of SPOBS, including Chaney, were Air Corps officers.    
 Regardless of his influence, however, Arnold already had access to his own service in 
London that was supposed to provide him with exactly the type of information he was asking for 
from SPOBS.  As Military Attaché, Lee had four officers assigned to him as air attaches.  
Prompted by a suggestion from President Roosevelt in 1940, the Air Corps had increased the 
number of air attaches in London from two to four, with the intent that the two additional air 
attachés would serve as technical observers, relaying British technical and tactical lessons to the 
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War Department.20  Whatever his reasons, Arnold contributed to the communications and 
coordination problems in London through his requests to SPOBS, as Lyon, McClelland, and the 
other Air Corps officers in the group began serving as ad hoc technical observers regarding 
Britain's use of American aircraft, providing Arnold with the information that he was supposed 
to be getting from Lee's office.  This situation, combined with the other coordination issues, 
caused the British much consternation, as they did not know which American officials to whom 
they were supposed to talk and whether or not they could trust them with sensitive information.21  
The Hopkins Mission to Russia 
Although SPOBS and the Military Attaché’s Office had identified these fundamental 
problems by mid-summer, 1941, matters of higher priority prevented the two groups from 
developing an adequate mechanism to resolve them. On Sunday evening, 27 July at 
approximately 6:30 PM Dahlquist and McClelland were returning to the Dorchester Hotel, where 
most of Chaney’s staff were staying, when they ran into McNarney.  Upon seeing Dahlquist, he 
pulled his passport out of his pocket, handed it to him, and told him to take it to the embassy 
because he was leaving at 11:00.  After dropping off the passport Dahlquist found McNarney in 
McClelland's room and asked "You will be home Thursday?"  McNarney ignored the question 
and Dahlquist, taking the hint, did not pursue the matter further.  He told wife in a letter he wrote 
three days later, "Nobody knew where he had gone . . . I suspected Russia."22  Dahlquist's 
suspicion was well-founded.  McNarney did in fact leave for Russia that evening and though the 
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remaining staff did not know it yet, their work in Britain was going to become even more 
complicated.  
 McNarney's trip came about as a result of American and British efforts to coordinate 
Lend-Lease and military strategy in response to Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union on 22 
June 1941.  U.S. and British officials had greeted n ws of the invasion with a mixture of hope, 
skepticism, and fear.  Churchill, for his part, had no reservations about what course Britain 
should take, as he indicated in a speech to the public that evening: "Can you doubt what our 
policy will be?  We have but one aim and one single, irr vocable purpose.  We are resolved to 
destroy Hitler and every vestige of the Nazi regime . . . It follows therefore that we shall give 
whatever help we can to Russia and the Russian people.  We shall appeal to all our friends and 
allies in every part of the world to take the same course and pursue it, as we shall faithfully and 
steadfastly until the end . . ."23  The invasion similarly inspired Roosevelt: "Now comes this 
Russian diversion.  If it is more than just that it will mean the liberation of Europe from Nazi 
domination."24  Many of Churchill and Roosevelt's advisors, however, were less sanguine about 
the prospects of an alliance between Britain and the Soviet Union, fearing that Russia would 
collapse too quickly to be an effective partner in the war against Germany.25  Still, Hitler's 
invasion of Russia had bought the British some breathing space, and both the Roosevelt 
Administration and the Churchill Government wanted to reassess American aid policy.   
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 To facilitate discussion and invite Churchill to the Atlantic Conference, President 
Roosevelt sent Harry Hopkins, his closest personal advisor, to Britain on 13 July 1941.26  This 
was Hopkins' second visit to England as Roosevelt's r presentative.  The first had taken place in 
January when Roosevelt desired to sidestep American and British bureaucracy and engage in 
direct discussion with Churchill over a number of issues relating to Anglo-American 
cooperation.27  Hopkins noticed a number of changes since his last trip, foremost among them in 
his mind was how much the American military presence i  England had expanded with the 
establishment of the observer missions and increases in attaché personnel.28  
 Hopkins did not hesitate to coopt this talent to aid in his discussions regarding Lend-
Lease.  One of the most contentious issues he used SPOBS, SPENAVO and the Military Attaché 
to help him address concerned a disagreement between U.S. and British officials regarding the 
British commitment to defending its interests in the Middle East.  The Chief of Staff and Chief of 
Naval Operations felt, in spite of the Luftwaffe's repulse during the Battle of Britain and the 
commitment of most of Germany's ground forces to the invasion of Russia, that Great Britain 
was still vulnerable to invasion.  Therefore, it was a waste of precious resources to send men and 
equipment to the Middle East when they were needed to defend the Britain itself.29  The British 
Chiefs, however, felt that the importance of the Middle East to the defense of the rest of the 
British Empire was so important that it was imperative o send men and equipment there to balk 
the Axis.30  
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 Roosevelt and Hopkins were sympathetic to the British viewpoint, a fact that concerned 
American military representatives in London.  Lee wrote in his diary on 18 July: "I had just 
settled down to work again when Chaney came in, with his mind rather upset over the possibility 
of Churchill talking Hopkins and Harriman into sending big reinforcements out to the Middle 
East.  Chaney doesn't think they can be spared from England, and I am quite sure he is right."31  
With views that were more in line with Marshall and Stark than with the Roosevelt 
Administration, Chaney and Lee seemed rather ill-suted for providing Hopkins with assistance 
in his negotiations with the British.   
 If Hopkins was aware of their views, he did not seem bothered by them.  He began 
consulting with Lee and Chaney on the Middle East is ue soon after his arrival in England. On 
22 July he met with each of them separately.32  Hopkins presumably talked about the Middle 
East issue with Chaney in the morning because when met with Lee in the afternoon he said, 
"You and Chaney are the people we must rely upon to tell us the facts about the Middle East . . . 
there are a lot of observers out in Egypt who are sending back the most critical and caustic cables 
about what the British are doing and everyone prefers to believe bad news rather than good."33  
Hopkins had attempted to get the information he needed from Harriman, as he had recently spent 
six weeks in the Middle East evaluating conditions there for the Lend-Lease program.  Harriman, 
however, did not have the information Hopkins needed.  In Lee's opinion Harriman's lack of 
knowledge was not, "because he does not try hard and, or want to, but simply because he has no 
training which would let him give the proper answers."34  What both Harriman and Hopkins 
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needed were military experts who could understand the practical military implications of policy 
decisions regarding strategy and Lend-Lease. 
 Hopkins chose to use SPOBS, SPENAVO, and the members of the Attaché’s office as his 
experts.  On 24 July, Chaney, Ghormley, and Lee all went to No. 10 Downing Street to attend a 
late-evening meeting about British policy for the Middle East, waiting in an antechamber to the 
Cabinet Room with other officials until Churchill, Hopkins, and Harriman arrived after having 
dined together.  Everyone quickly sat themselves down at a long table with Churchill sitting in 
the middle of one side.  To his left and right sat Hopkins, Harriman, Ghormley, Pug Ismay, his 
chief military assistant, and Brigadier Leslie Hollis, the Senior Assistant Secretary to the War 
Cabinet. Across the table sat Dill, Portal, Pound, Chaney, and Lee.  Churchill lit one of his 
characteristically huge cigars, one Lee noted that was so big that "it gave the impression he was 
attached to it instead of its being attached to him," and the meeting began.35 
 After the Prime Minister opened the meeting, Hopkins spoke: 
"Insofar as I'm concerned, I am absolutely convinced that if it is decided to 
continue the campaign in the Middle East, the United States has got to send 
supplies there . . . our Chiefs of Staff–the men who make the big decisions in all 
matters relating to defense–believe the British Empire is making too many 
sacrifices in trying to maintain an indefensible positi n in the Middle East . . . 
now, the President has a somewhat different attitude.  He shares the belief that 
British chances in the Middle East are not too good.  But he realizes that the 
British have got to fight the enemy wherever they can find him.  He is, therefore 
more inclined to support continuing the campaign in the Middle East . . . But–you 
have got to remember that we in the United States just simply do not understand 
your problems in the Middle East, and the interests of he Moslem world, and the 
interrelationship of your problems in Egypt and India.  That is largely due to the 
facts that we have insufficient information on these subjects.  The President 
himself has never been given a comprehensive explanation of the broad strategy 
of the Middle East Campaign."36 
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 Chaney followed, briefing the views of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, a role that he was well-
suited for, as it allowed him to support Hopkins without violating his conscience about his 
position regarding the Middle East.  According to Chaney, the Chiefs of Staff thought the 
priority for defense should be: 
1. The defense of the United Kingdom and Atlantic sea lanes. 
2. The defense of Singapore and the sea lanes to Australia and New Zealand. 
3. The defense of the ocean trade routes in general. 
4. The defense of the Middle East.37 
Chaney urged that the British only divert the minimum amount of resources that were necessary 
to defend the Middle East, at least until September.  If the Russians were able to hold out that 
long, he reasoned, Britain would be relatively safe from German invasion until the following 
spring and the armed services would have time to for ify both the British Isles and the Middle 
East.  Lee supported Chaney’s assessment.38 
 Churchill politely but firmly dispelled any illusions the Americans might have had about 
convincing him and the British Chiefs of Staff to reduce reinforcements to the Middle East.  He 
acknowledged the dangers that each area Chaney mentioned held, but he asserted that British 
policy would be to maintain material reinforcements to the Middle East.  He then had Pound, 
Portal, and Dill present their arguments, each from a service perspective, as to why continued 
support to the Middle East, currently almost half of Britain's war production, was both necessary 
and feasible.  Thus Chaney and Lee were unsuccessful in waying the British from their chosen 
strategy.  But their participation did allow the Americans to articulate the military logic behind 
the position of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff in a way that Hopkins would not have been unable to do.  
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It also convinced Hopkins that the President would need representation of all the services to be at 
the Atlantic Conference to discuss matters of strategy with their British counterparts.39  
 With the British commitment to the Middle East settled, Hopkins set his eyes on 
improving the machinery for Lend-Lease in Britain.  At Hopkins’ request, Lee had been making 
daily visits to his room at nine-thirty each morning to give his thoughts on a wide variety of 
subjects.  On the morning of 25 July, Hopkins asked L e how the U.S. should set up a system for 
Lend-Lease in Britain, explaining that he did not have the expertise to make decisions on matters 
of military supply.40   
 Lee had already given some thought to how Lend-Lease should work in Britain because, 
before the President established the Harriman mission, there had been suggestions that the he 
would have responsibility for administering Lend-Leas  in the U.K.41  "What you need," Lee 
told Hopkins, "is some sort of machinery on this side to vet the British requirements before they 
are submitted to you, in light of expert military knowledge and an immediate acquaintanceship 
with conditions and plans as they here exist from day to day."42  Hopkins responded, "How can I 
go about getting this?" Lee then explained that there were three possibilities.  The first was the 
Special Observer Group, what Lee called the "Chaney Mission."  The problem he said with using 
SPOBS was that Marshall had sent the group to England for a very specific purpose, to develop 
plans with the British that the U.S. Army would use in the event that the United States entered 
the war, plans largely confined to the Atlantic area.  The group's concern for supply, he asserted, 
only pertained to implementing these plans.  The second possibility, he said, was his office, 
which primarily engaged in information gathering.  The third, was the Harriman Mission, which 
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had no military component.  "The fact is," Lee stated, "out of the three organizations here, none 
of them are properly equipped to do the job we are t lking about."43  Lee noted that both he and 
Chaney had been preparing their respective organizations to take on additional Lend-Lease 
responsibilities, but had been hesitant to take action for fear of undermining the Harriman 
Mission.44  Lee suggested that a committee might be set up inthe embassy that could do the 
job.45  
 Implementation of a committee, however, would have to wait as Hopkins soon found 
himself embarking on a mission of much greater urgency: a visit to Moscow to evaluate Russia's 
prospects for survival.  Who exactly generated the idea for the trip is unclear.  Forrest Davis and 
Ernst K. Lindley claimed that Churchill suggested the rip to Hopkins as a means of getting more 
information.46 Robert E. Sherwood claimed that Hopkins came up with the idea himself.47  John 
Gilbert Winant, the U.S. Ambassador to Great Britain, sserted that he proposed to Hopkins that 
he go and that Hopkins agreed before changing his mind and deciding to go himself.48  Ivan 
Maisky, the Soviet Ambassador to Great Britain, noted that during a meeting with Hopkins and 
Winant, Hopkins asked him what Russia needed in the way of armaments, supplies, and raw 
materials.  Maisky responded, "Mr. Hopkins . . . couldn't you yourself visit Moscow and there, 
on the spot, receive from the Soviet Government all the information you require?"49     
 Regardless of how the idea originated, by 27 July Hopkins had determined that he was to 
leave for Moscow that evening.  That morning he notified Lee that he needed to send a message 
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to the President to tell him the details of his trip and to ask if it would be acceptable from a 
political standpoint for him to take an officer with him.  Lee offered to go himself, should the 
President approve.  Independently of Hopkins and Lee, Winant telephoned Marshall about 
sending an officer with Hopkins to Russia.  Marshall s id that McNarney should be the one to go 
to the Soviet Union and Hopkins, acting on the Chief of Staff’s advice, elected to take McNarney 
instead of Lee.50  After Dahlquist dropped off McNarney's passport at the embassy, Winant 
rushed over to see Maisky, got him to approve Hopkins, McNarney and an aircraft expert named 
John R. Alison for entry into the Soviet Union, and made it to the station just as their train was 
pulling out, running up and thrusting the passports at Hopkins through the carriage window.51 
 Hopkins, McNarney, and Alison traveled throughout the night, reaching Invergorden 
Scotland the next day.  After a few hours delay, the trio boarded a PBY Catalina flying boat and, 
battling poor weather, departed for Russia.  The aircraft took a long and dangerous route to the 
Russian port city of Archangel, flying one hundred miles off the coast of German occupied 
Norway, all the while the crew and passengers, including Hopkins, scanning the skies for 
German planes.  For the last third of the flight, te occupants of the PBY endured arctic 
temperatures.  On arrival at Archangel, Hopkins' party was greeted by representatives from the 
British and American embassies, as well as Russian officers, commissars, and agents of the 
secret police.  The local commander then treated th party to a lavish dinner aboard his yacht that 
took almost four hours.  Early the next morning, the exhausted party departed on an American 
Douglas Transport, flown by Russian pilots, arriving  Moscow four hours later.52                              
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 After another reception by a large group of officials in Moscow, Hopkins met with the 
American Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Laurence A. Steinhart, to tell him the purpose of his 
mission and to get his views on Soviet prospects for urvival.  Steinhart noted that it was difficult 
for any outsider in Moscow to get a clear understanding of what was going on regarding the war 
against Germany.  The Russians were generally suspicious of all foreigners, and he and other 
diplomats had experienced continual frustration in all their efforts to work with Soviet officials.  
Steinhart admitted that Russian performance in offensive operations against opponents like 
Finland prior to the invasion had given many the impression that the Russians were inept.  
However, he felt that, when on the defensive, Russians were superb fighters and Germany would 
not achieve an easy conquest.53  His opinion, however, was not in accord with the pr dominant 
view of War Department officials, who had assessed that the collapse of Russia was imminent.   
 The War Department's pessimistic view of the Russian tuation came, in part, from the 
reports of the American Military Attaché assigned to Moscow, Major Ivan Yeaton.54  Yeaton had 
taken up his post on 7 September, 1939, just a few days after Germany had invaded Poland, with 
the conviction that Russia, as author Andrew Nagorski has noted, "was a sinister, violent 
netherworld."55  His assumption seemed confirmed when the Polish Military Attaché came to his 
door after the Red Army attacked Poland and said, "I have been warned that as soon as I leave 
the embassy for good I will be arrested and eventually shot . . . therefore I must escape . . . I will 
appreciate it if you buy any or all of my household equipment at your own price."56  Yeaton 
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provided him with all the money he had available in xchange for his wine cellar but never knew 
if the Pole had escaped.57  
 Yeaton experienced first-hand the interference and difficulties Steinhart mentioned in his 
discussion with Hopkins.  The extent to which the Soviet government had infiltrated the U.S. 
embassy appalled him.  Upon his arrival he noted that ballerinas from the Moscow ballet had 
open access to the embassy and the NKVD consistently provided female companions for 
embassy personal at parties.  Soviet employees also freely roamed the embassy grounds while 
hidden microphones were a continual problem.58 The Soviets also attempted to restrict his 
movements and control his access to information.  Soviet militia repeatedly caught him 
attempting to get out of the city and see fighting at the front and Soviet officials responded to his 
requests for information with outright lies.59  
 In this restrictive environment, Yeaton tried his best to gather information about 
conditions in Russia, moving around the capital, observing what he could see of the military 
effort, comparing his impressions with other foreigners, and talking to refugees.  He developed a 
highly pessimistic view of the Soviet military situation. This, coupled with his distaste for the 
Soviet government, led him to send reports back to the War Department that predicted Soviet 
defeat and argued vigorously against a policy of sending aid to Russia. 60  
 McNarney's role on this trip was to serve as an objective military advisor to Hopkins 
because Yeaton had become too hostile towards the Sovi ts to provide an unbiased assessment.  
However, McNarney soon found that the Soviets were no more willing to talk to him than they 
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had been to Yeaton.  Soviet officials refused to all w McNarney to attend Hopkins’ meetings 
with Stalin, even though Hopkins wanted him present.  I stead, at Hopkins' request, he waited by 
a telephone during all his conferences in case Hopkins needed to draw on his technical expertise.  
Then, after Hopkins returned to the embassy, the two would discuss what Hopkins and learned 
from Stalin, which mostly concerned Russia's general military situation and equipment the 
Soviets needed from the U.S.61  When he was not waiting for Hopkins to call or conferring with 
him at their post-meeting sessions, McNarney attempd to gain his own information about 
Russian prospects for survival.  He talked to Yeaton about conditions in Moscow as well as the 
British Air Attaché and members of the British Military Mission. 62  He also drove around 
Moscow, though he had to keep constantly moving, for every time he stopped armed militia 
immediately confronted him.  Forty kilometers down the Smolensk road was the furthest 
distance that he was able to travel outside of Moscow during his trip.63 
 The only direct military action McNarney saw was Moscow's air defense measures.  He 
noted that during daylight hours, a two-plane patrol flew constantly over the center of the city 
between 3,000 and 5,000 feet, too low to intercept enemy airplanes and too close to the city to be 
patrolling for aircraft coming from the front.  Listening, he could hear that the planes had their 
propellers set at low pitch, apparently to make as much noise as possible.  He could only surmise 
that these planes were flying this way to give the population of Moscow a feeling of security 
rather than serving as an actual air defense force.64  
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 Air defense activities that took place in Moscow on the nights of 30-31 July and 31 July-
1 August, seemed to confirm his observations.  At approximately 12:30 the first night, 
McNarney heard an air raid warning.  Ten minutes later, the city erupted in antiaircraft fire with 
all manner of machineguns and automatic cannons shooting ordnance into the air while 
searchlights roamed the sky.  The firing continued at intervals for about an hour and a half before 
it ended with what McNarney described as "a tremendous bust from all calibers."65  He noted 
that the Soviets staged a similar but shorter performance the next night.  Both days, when he 
came out of the embassy, he could see fragments from antiaircraft ordnance littering the embassy 
yard.  He interrogated embassy employees, newspaper corr spondents, and members of the 
British mission and could find no one who heard a plane flying or a bomb being dropped on 
either night.66  The Soviet government, it seemed, was attempting to generate morale through the 
use of overwhelming firepower.  While McNarney found the performance interesting, it 
contributed little to his understanding of the combat effectiveness of Soviet forces.       
 Hopkins attempted to help him in this regard by getting permission for McNarney to 
interview a member of the Soviet Military.  On 30 July, Hopkins, Yeaton, and McNarney met 
with Colonel General N. D. Yakolev, Chief of the Main Technical Artillery Administration.  
Yakolev, proved to be a disappointing source.  In response to questions from the three 
Americans, Yakolev merely parroted Stalin's remarks to Hopkins.  When the trio attempted to go 
beyond what Hopkins had previously discussed with the Soviet leader, Yakolev responded with 
ambiguity, said he didn't know, or said that he wasnot "empowered to say."67  Hopkins would 
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later make the observation that there was "literally no one in the whole Government who was 
willing to give any important information other than Stalin himself."68     
 Although McNarney's access to information in Russia was essentially as restricted as 
Yeaton's, with the exception of what he could get indirectly though discussions with Hopkins, he 
reached a fundamentally different interpretation of S viet chances for survival.  Acknowledging 
that his impressions were based on insufficient evidence he concluded that neither the 
information coming out of Germany (too optimistic in discussing German prospects for success 
in 1941) nor the information coming out of the Soviet Union (too optimistic in discussing the 
status of Soviet forces) was accurate regarding the war.  He also asserted that Yeaton's reports to 
the War Department were unduly pessimistic while he held that the British Military Mission's 
assessments were unduly optimistic.69  He noted that in terms of some key military equipment, 
like ammunition, the Red Army was in good shape.  Furthermore, the Russian Air Force was 
larger, better equipped, and better trained than anlysts had given it credit for.70  It was his 
assessment that the Red Army would not disintegrate in 1941, an assessment that Hopkins 
shared.71 
                                                          
     
68 Memo, Hopkins, Conference at the Kremlin on July 31, 1941, quoted in Lukas, Eagles East, 31.   
     
69
 Report on Trip From London to Moscow and Return in Company With Mr. Harry Hopkins By Brigadier 
General Joseph T. McNarney, TAB E: Observations on Office of U.S. Military Attaché.  Yeaton questioned 
McNarney’s abilities as a military observer.  According to Yeaton, McNarney seemed uninterested in meeting with 
him and when he attempted to brief him during a trip a ound the city McNarney was unreceptive to his ideas.  
McNarney was likely influenced by the fact that Yeaton and become persona non grata with Hopkins and British 
representatives in Moscow.  There were wide divergences between Yeaton’s reports and the reports the British were 
making on the Soviet situation.  Because of these div rgences and his general hostility to the Soviet government, 
Stafford Cripps, the British Ambassador to the Soviet Union, had tried to get Steinhardt to remove Yeaton s 
Military Attaché.  Yeaton attempted to push his views on Hopkins after he arrived, asserting that if the U.S. and the 
Soviets were to be Allies then he was entitled to have more freedom of movement and communication.  After 
Hopkins said no, Yeaton’s attitude was that “He wasan enemy of our country . . . regardless of his credentials and 
from then on I treated him as such.”  See Ivan D. Yeaton, Memoirs of Ivan D. Yeaton, USA (Ret.) 1919-1953 
(Stanford: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, 1976), 34-35 and 38-39,     
     
70 Report on Trip From London to Moscow and Return in Company With Mr. Harry Hopkins By Brigadier 
General Joseph T. McNarney. 
     
71 Ibid.; and Lukas, Eagles East, 33. 
203 
 
 Hopkins and McNarney left Moscow to begin their retu n trip to the British Isles on the 
afternoon of 1 August.  The two met their PBY crew in Archangel that evening, and departed at 
approximately 10:10 PM on a flight that was even more arduous than the one they had taken to 
get to Russia.  The group flew through very turbulent conditions and, because they were flying 
against prevailing winds, it took them twenty-four hours to reach Scapa Flow.  At one point, 
when they were off the Murman coast, an unidentified d stroyer began firing at them, some flak 
bursts coming close enough to shake the aircraft.  When they finally arrived at Scapa Flow, the 
crew had to land in rough water, jarring the occupants s they taxied alongside a launch that was 
to take Hopkins to the HMS Prince of Wales.  It was at that point that McNarney and Hopkins 
parted ways, Hopkins leaving to get some much needed rest before journeying with Churchill 
and other senior officials to the Atlantic Conferenc , McNarney continuing on to London to 
resume his duties with SPOBS.72 
 The obvious question to ask here is what influence did Hopkins and McNarney 
subsequently have on the development of U.S. aid pol cy t wards Russia?  With regard to the 
initial decision to provide aid to the Soviet Union, their influence was negligible.  F.D.R. had 
already decided by the time they had returned from their trip that the U.S. would send at least 
token aid to the Soviets to encourage them maintain their resistance to the German invasion.  In 
fact, during a Cabinet meeting on 1 August, he had dressed down the heads of the War and State 
Departments for dragging their feet in implementing his directive.73   
 However, Hopkins' assessment of Russia's prospects for survival in 1941 did shape 
further policy development regarding aid to the Soviet Union.  On the way to the Atlantic 
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Conference, he talked with Churchill about his meetings with Stalin.  His first words to 
Roosevelt upon seeing him at Argentia were "The Russian  are confident."74  He provided 
Roosevelt with a full report later that day and then, at a dinner that evening, recounted his trip to 
some of Roosevelt and Churchill's military and diplomatic staff members.75  As a result of his 
observations, the British and American delegations agreed that a supply conference with the 
Soviets should take place to determine a more long-term aid policy for Russia.76  As Herbert Feis 
noted, the Hopkins mission to Moscow was not so much a "turning point" in U.S.-Soviet 
relations as it was a "point of no return."77  Thus, the U.S. moved from a policy of providing 
token aid to a more substantive policy for supplying materials necessary for the Soviet war 
effort.   
 And what of McNarney's role?  When he returned to London, he drafted a report of his 
trip with Hopkins, detailing all the meetings he attended, as well as his efforts to gain 
information about the Soviet military situation.  He then submitted it to Chaney who sent the 
report to Marshall on 8 August.  The report did nottell Marshall much that he did not already 
know.  He had attended the Atlantic Conference as ws present at the dinner where Hopkins 
talked about his meetings with Stalin.  What the McNarney's report did do was provide Marshall 
with confirmation of Hopkins' observations from a mn whose judgment he trusted and 
respected.  Indeed, he would eventually designate McNarney as his deputy in 1942.78  Though he 
would continue to resist supplying Russia at the expense of U.S. forces, when he finally did 
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approve equipment for release, he did so with the knowledge that it would be used to resist the 
German invasion, at least until the spring of 1942.79 
The Harriman-Beaverbrook Mission to Russia  
Churchill and Roosevelt’s decision to send an Anglo-American mission to the U.S.S.R. to 
discuss a long-term supply program with the Russian drew SPOBS even further into the 
business of Lend-Lease.  At this point in the war, U.S. domestic political constraints prevented 
Russia from participating in the Lend-Lease program, requiring the Roosevelt Administration to 
develop other fiscal and legal means to send the Soviet Union material essential to the war 
effort.80  However, the U.S. had already allocated virtually  of its production into 1942 for its 
own defensive requirements as well as Lend-Lease.81  Churchill and Roosevelt’s directive to 
provide material assistance to the Soviet Union meant that the U.S. and the Britain had to revise 
current Lend-Lease agreements, as both would have to accept a reduction in the amount of 
production each were to receive in the coming months in order to provide the Soviet Union with 
material aid.  Thus, before Britain and the U.S. could send a mission to Russia to discuss a long-
term program for providing aid to the Soviet Union, they had to determine how they were going 
to reallocate U.S. production among themselves.  
 Efforts to prepare for the upcoming conference in Moscow and the Anglo-American 
conferences that would precede it merged with an ongoing effort in Washington to determine the 
total production requirements for the U.S. if it were to go to war.  On 9 July 1941, Roosevelt had 
sent a directive to the Secretaries of War and the Navy to jointly determine the total production 
                                                          
     
79 George C. Herring, Jr. Aid to Russia, 1941-1946: Strategy, Diplomacy, the Origins of the Cold War (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1973), 15.   
     
80 Dawson, The Decision to Aid Russia, 1941, 240-41. 
     
81 Ibid., 206. 
206 
 
requirements for the United States to defeat all of its potential enemies.82  After Hopkins and 
McNarney returned from their mission to Russia, the Pr sident expanded his directive to include 
resources that Great Britain and Russia needed as well. 83  Responding to the President’s 
directive, the War and Navy Departments submitted th ir estimates in a joint report on 10 
September 1941.  The plan to meet the requirements listed in the report, dubbed the “Victory 
Program,” would ultimately serve as the strategic blueprint for building up U.S. and Allied 
forces to fight World War II.84  
  SPOBS became involved in the Victory Program shortly after the President directed that 
planners include Britain and the Soviet Union’s requirements in the report.  On 21 August 1941, 
Brigadier General Leonard T. Gerow, acting Chief of the War Plans Division, sent Chaney a 
cable requesting that he and his staff obtain a statement from the British of the total amount of 
U.S. ground and air equipment they needed for the war against Germany.  Gerow also requested 
that Chaney include his own remarks and recommendations.85  Chaney’s staff subsequently 
obtained a statement of British requirements from Dykes, and sent the document back to the 
United States with Stacy May, an economist from the Office of Production Management who 
was in London at the time.86 
 In his comments to Gerow, Chaney identified problems with the British estimate.  While 
the estimate reflected what the British Joint Planning Staff thought the U.K would ultimately 
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require to defeat Germany, the Ministry of Supply, the organization responsible for coordinating 
equipment for all of Britain’s armed services, had not reviewed or approved the figures.  As 
such, the data remained unofficial.  Chaney wrote that the British were averse to releasing this 
information because “it might be subject to misconstruction,” that is, the data may lead 
Americans to draw the wrong conclusions about Britain’s wartime needs.87  To forestall future 
problems in terms of coordinating supply requirements, Chaney noted, the British had proposed 
to SPOBS and SPENAVO that the United States and Britain conduct a joint study of ultimate 
requirements for both countries.88  In essence, the British were requesting to become active 
participants in developing the Victory Program.     
U.S. and British officials eventually agreed that they should hold a conference in London 
to address both reallocation of U.S. production and Britain’s portion of the Victory Program 
before sending an Anglo-American mission to Russia at the end of September.89  On 15 
September, Harriman brought a party of U.S. representatives to London to participate in the 
conference and serve as the U.S. delegation to the Sovi ts, of which Harriman would be the 
head.90  After a contentious initial meeting with a delegation of British experts headed by Max 
Beaverbrook, Britain’s Minster of Supply, the Americans and their British counterparts agreed to 
form four primary subcommittees: one to deal with ground-force requirements, one to deal with 
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air matters, one to deal with naval requirements, and a fourth to deal with raw materials.  On the 
subcommittees, experts from both sides would determin  tentative figures regarding reallocation 
of U.S. production and aid in each functional category that the U.S. and the U.K would provide 
to the Soviet Union.91  The delegations subsequently added a fifth committee to determine 
Britain’s Victory Program requirements.92            
 Chaney and his staff played a major role in both the preliminary conference and the 
Anglo-American mission to Russia, although the War Department had initially not intended 
them to.  The U.S. Army Air Force had selected Brett to serve as the air expert on the delegation.  
However, at the time of the conferences he was in the Middle East working on improving 
Britain’s system for maintaining U.S. aircraft.  Ashe was making excellent progress, the British 
were loath to send him back to London and asked the War Department if he could stay.93   While 
Harriman waited for the War Department’s reply, Chaney, McNarney, Lyon, and Brigadier 
General Ralph Royce from the Military Attaché’s Office assumed responsibility for representing 
the U.S. on the Air Subcommittee.94  
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 Although unintended, there were several benefits to having the Special Observers 
conduct the negotiations in Brett’s place.  Chaney and his staff had already established a working 
relationship with many of the organizations represented on the Air Committee the members of 
which included: Harold Balfour, the British Under Secretary of State for Air, Air Chief Marshal 
Wilfred Freeman, the Vice Chief of the Air Staff, Air Vice Marshal D. Grahame Donald, Deputy 
Air Member for Supply and Organization, Group Captain William Yool, one of Freeman’s staff 
officers, and Charles Craven and E.S. Jackson from the Ministry of Aircraft Production.95  Also, 
through his experience in the Material Division of the Office of the Chief of the Air Corps and 
his work in developing an Anglo-American aircraft logistics program, Lyon had intimate 
knowledge of both British and American aircraft requirements and production programs, making 
him an ideal choice to serve as technical advisor on these matters to Chaney.  Finally, McNarney 
had been the primary negotiator with the British in drafting the original agreement for aircraft 
allocation, called ABC-2, during the American-British Conversations, making him well-suited 
for conducting negotiations to alter the agreement to incorporate Soviet needs.96     
Aircraft allocation proved to be one of the more contr versial aspects of the conference.  
U.S. planners calculated that, based on U.S. and Russian requirements, the British would have to 
receive approximately 1,000 fewer aircraft that they w re supposed to obtain according to ABC-
2.97  It is not surprising that the British members of the subcommittee expressed discontent when 
Chaney put forth this proposal on the first day of discussion.  Freeman asserted that the reduction 
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would have a significant impact on the expansion program the British had planned for the Royal 
Air Force while the effect of sending these aircraft to the Soviet Union on its war effort would be 
minimal.98  Chaney disagreed.  He held that the importance of s nding these initial aircraft to the 
Soviet Union was not so much that they would materilly affect the Soviet war effort, but that 
they would have a great impact in improving Russian morale.99  Seeing that neither Freeman nor 
Beaverbrook were convinced, Harriman stated that the allocations were open for discussion and 
proposed that the Air Ministry come up with its own proposal in light of the new strategic 
situation with the Soviet Union now in the war.100    
Throughout the next day Chaney, Freeman, and their respective staffs jousted, presenting 
arguments and counter-arguments about the type and number of aircraft each nation would give 
to the Soviets.  Donald, armed with an Air Ministry study, laid out in detail the effect the 
American proposals would have on British attempts to reinforce and expand their air effort, both 
in the British Isles and in the Empire, claiming that “the whole of the expansion which had been 
planned for the period [the next nine months] would have to be abandoned. 101  Chaney proposed 
a distribution of aircraft that included heavy bombers in Russia’s allocation to “enable them to 
start training, and then to form a squadron that might come in very useful for bombing Japan.”102  
Although forward looking, Chaney’s suggestion was probably not well thought-out, given that 
Russia was not at war with Japan and was fighting for its very survival against a massive 
German invasion.  Under these circumstances, Russia needed fighters and tactical bombers far 
more urgently than strategic bombers.  Freeman argued that it would be better to provide heavy 
                                                          
     
98
 B.H. (41) 7, Summary of Proceedings of Conference on British-United States Production, September 16, 1941, 
WPD 4557-4, Box 254, War Plans Division General Correspondence, 1920-1942, RG 165, NARA. 
     
99 Ibid.  
     100 Ibid.   
     
101 B.H. (41) 11, Summary of Proceedings of Conference on British-United States Production, September 17, 
1941, WPD 4557-4, Box 254, War Plans Division General Correspondence, 1920-1942, RG 165, NARA. 
     102 Ibid. 
211 
 
bombers to the British than the Russians as Britain w s in bomber range of all Germany’s vital 
targets while Russia was not. Indeed, Freeman and the other British members of the committee 
wanted to divert sizable portions of heavy bombers from the U.S. allocations to build up their 
own force in the U.K., a proposal that Chaney and the U.S. members of the committee firmly 
opposed, as it would deprive the continental United States of its own heavy bomber force.103  
The committee also spent a significant amount of time arguing over how many fighters and light 
bombers the U.S. and Britain would each provide to the Soviet Union.104  Eventually, as William 
Johnsen has observed, the British “caved.”  Bowing to the reality that the British were reliant on 
the goodwill of the U.S. for aircraft, Beaverbrook, accepted, with a few minor alterations, the 
figures for aircraft allocation to Russia that the Americans proposed.105 
With the work of the Aircraft Committee complete, all that remained was to determine 
which members of SPOBS would accompany the Harriman-Beaverbrook Mission to the Soviet 
Union.  After obtaining War Department approval, Harriman designated Chaney to serve as the 
head of the American delegation on the Aircraft Committee with Lyon and a handful of officers 
that had come to London with Harriman from the states serving as his technical advisors.106  
McNarney and the rest of the Special Observers would remain behind to continue working on 
other projects with the British during their absenc. 
The senior members of the American and British delegations traveled to Russia on a 
British cruiser, the HMS London, taking a long and dangerous route from Scapa Flow to 
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Archangel, through the gap between Bear Island and Spitsbergen in the Norwegian Sea.  Air 
attacks from German occupied Norway were an ever present threat.  The ship traveled alone, 
which decreased the likelihood that the Germans would detect the party, but this left the crew 
and passengers more vulnerable if found by enemy planes.107  If the ship’s vulnerability bothered 
Chaney, he did not express his anxiety in his diary.  When not occupied with meetings with the 
American delegation and the Air Committee, he recorded appreciation for the weather, had tea 
with the ship’s Captain, and went over charts with the ship’s navigator.  He seemed to find the 
trip somewhat relaxing.108 
That positive outlook did not survive the same absurd denial of reality that McNarney 
and Yeaton had encountered in their previous dealings with the Russians.  Upon arrival in 
Archangel, the Soviets treated the party to another of their sumptuous, late-night feasts before 
sending them off to sleeping quarters on a yacht.  T e following morning, the group boarded four 
Russian-built DC3s and began a flight to Moscow, escorted by three Russian fighters, flying 
between 100 and 800 feet above the tree line.  On the approach to Moscow, the party began 
hearing explosions and seeing black puffs of smoke appear around the aircraft, tell-tale signs of 
antiaircraft fire.  The pilots immediately dove to approximately ten feet above the tree line, 
zigging and zagging the ponderous, twin engine aircraft for about ten miles before climbing back 
to cruising altitude. 109  When Balfour, who was serving as Chaney’s British counterpart on the 
Air Committee, had a staff officer ask the pilot what ad happened, the pilot claimed that he had 
not seen anything.  The party later found out that t e antiaircraft fire had come from Soviet 
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batteries, and that–at Stalin’s immediate direction–there was now a vacancy in the ranks of 
Soviet Antiaircraft colonels.110  One can imagine the reservations Chaney and Balfour must have 
had after this incident.  Given the willingness of the Soviets to make denials that were manifestly 
untrue, was effective negotiation even a possibility?  
 Chaney and Balfour encountered difficulties in the early phases of the negotiations that 
cast further doubt on their ability to successfully come to an agreement with their Russian 
counterparts.  The American and British delegations began their deliberations with the Soviets 
the day after their arrival in Moscow.  As in the Anglo-American preliminary meetings, the 
delegations organized the conference into committees based on categories of aid to be given to 
the Soviet Union.111  Chaney and Balfour served as the heads of their respective delegations on 
the Aviation Committee, negotiating directly with A. I. Shakhurin, the Commissar for Aircraft 
Industry, and his staff.112  In theory, the negotiations should not have taken long, as the 
Americans and the British had already developed a solid proposal based on Soviet demands 
during the preliminary conferences.  However, a number of issues inhibited rapid agreement.  
First and foremost, the British and the Americans had based their proposal on the Soviet Union 
making a request to receive 300 fighters and 100 bombers a month.  When Shakhurin presented 
Chaney and Balfour with the Soviet Union’s official request at the first meeting of the Aviation 
subcommittee they discovered the Soviets actually wanted the inverse: a monthly allocation of 
300 bombers and 100 fighters.113  Shakhurin and his staff had also greatly overestimated the 
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number of bombers that the United States was capable of producing, citing monthly figures that 
exceeded U.S. bomber production for the whole period under negotiation as justification for 
Russian demands.114  Balfour also hampered quick progress by demanding the Soviets provide 
him and his staff with information regarding their first line strength, reserves, and production rate 
for Soviet aircraft, information that Shakhurin was unwilling to provide.115 Finally, all discussion 
took place through interpreters, a very awkward and cumbersome process given the complexity 
of the issues the participants on the Air Committee w re attempting to address.116  
 Over a period of two days, the Air Committee worked through the obstacles to effective 
cooperation.  Chaney and Balfour, by accident thoug not by design, assumed different but 
complementary roles during the discussions.  On the journey between Scapa Flow and 
Archangel, the members of the Harriman mission had agreed not to demand information from 
the Soviets in exchange for aid.117  Seeing that Balfour’s initial demands threatened to stall 
negotiations, Chaney intervened, stating that he did not care whether the Soviet delegation 
provided the information, that they were there to help them and wanted to know what they 
needed most and could use.  He asserted that there was no question in his mind that the Soviets 
could use all the combat planes that the British and the Americans could possibly spare them.  
Shakhurin and his staff seemed to warm to Chaney’s r marks, becoming less suspicious of the 
Americans and the British.118  Chaney then went through a lengthy explanation of U.S. aircraft 
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production, providing aircraft totals that were little more than what Shakhurin and his staff had 
estimated for bombers alone.  Chaney noted that bomber production specifically was 
approximately 300 per month.  Recognizing that it was unreasonable to expect the U.S. to 
allocate its entire bomber production to the Soviet Union, Shakhurin and his staff began to 
provide more realistic counter proposals.119   
Balfour, for his part, continued demanding information from the Soviets, but encountered 
the same reticence that McNarney had encountered during his discussions with Yakolev in July.  
Shakhurin, like most other Soviet officials, was unwilling to provide important information 
unless directed by Stalin himself.  Balfour solved this problem by going to Beaverbrook after 
each meeting and listing the information he needed that Shakhurin was unwilling to provide.  
Beaverbrook then brought up the issue with Stalin who ould then authorize Shakhurin to 
release the information. A cumbersome but effective process in the end.120  
 On the central issue of aircraft allocation, Chaney and Balfour remained united.  They 
consistently held to the 300 fighter 100 bomber ratio for Soviet allocations to which the 
American and British delegations had agreed during the preliminary conference in London.  
Through a combination of Balfour’s firmness and Chaney’s logic, they were finally able to 
convince Shakhurin and the Soviet members of the Air Committee to agree to the proposal that 
Chaney and Balfour had first presented.  The United States would provide Russia with 100 
fighters and 100 bombers while Britain would supply 200 fighters per month for a period of nine 
months.121   
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 By 2 October the other committees had finished their work.  On that day, Harriman, 
Beaverbrook, and Vyacheslav Molotov, the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, signed the 
Moscow Protocol, which outlined all the aid that Britain and the United States was to provide the 
Soviet Union until the end of June, 1942.122  With this agreement, the Grand Alliance that would 
ultimately defeat the Axis powers began to take shape. 
 With the formal negotiations completed, Chaney and Lyon focused on gathering 
information about Soviet air defenses, aircraft production, and the Soviet military’s use of 
American combat aircraft in Russia.  This information gathering was part of the continuing effort 
of the War Department to assess Soviet capabilities and determine whether or not it was in the 
best interest of the U.S. to send equipment to the U.S.S.R.  The two toured Moscow and visited 
two Soviet factories, one that made aircraft and another than made engines.123  Lyon also talked 
to American technicians in the Soviet Union that were helping the Russians assemble and 
maintain American P40 Tomahawk fighters that the British had given to the Soviets out of their 
own stock.124   
Overall, the two acquired positive assessments of Soviet capabilities.  Chaney praised the 
Soviet program for producing its MIG-3 fighter, rating the machinery, tools, and workmanship in 
the program as good.125  Lyon similarly praised the Soviet program, noting that the nation’s 
mechanics were superior to U.S. Army mechanics in skill, ingenuity, resourcefulness, and 
morale, a fact which had allowed them to assemble and maintain the first shipment of P-40s 
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without, due to American and British oversight, proper tools and instructions being included.126  
Chaney and Lyon’s overall assessment was that the Sovi ts were “fully capable of operating 
effectively the latest types of American aircraft.”127  Based on their assessment of Soviet 
capabilities, Chaney, in a report submitted to Harriman and subsequently forwarded to 
Roosevelt, recommended that the U.S. send only the best planes and equipment to Russia.128    
Establishing the Technical Committee  
While serving as a critical element in the effort t determine a long-term aid policy for 
the Soviet Union, the Special Observer Group also attempted to address the communication and 
coordination issues that plagued Lend-Lease and information sharing operations in Britain. 
Chaney and Lee together began the effort back in August.  When they got wind that there were 
plans for the U.S. to send aid to the Soviet Union as well as Britain, they came to the conclusion 
that the time was right to implement the machinery fo  vetting Lend-Lease requests and 
gathering information that Lee had suggested to Hopkins in July.  On 26 August Chaney sent a 
cable to the War Department that urged the following: 
 It is urgently essential to organize at once in Great Britain a technical section of 
air, ordnance, and signal specialists to plan and coordinate with the British the 
exchange of equipment and information concerning research, development, 
methods of manufacture, military characteristics, and modernization to meet 
operational requirements under actual war conditions; to maintain contact with 
and assist manufactures' representatives; to supervise the activities of U.S. service 
teams, technical observers, and test of U.S. equipment in campaign.  This section 
would also be available to advise on Lend-Lease and administer details delegated 
to military authorities when the situation crystallizes.129 
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In the rest of his cable, he provided a detailed list of personnel he needed for the organization, a 
total of ten officers and three civilian clerks, and noted that his staff was fully occupied with the 
group's original mission and could not undertake this kind of work without additional 
personnel.130  
 Lee also sent a cable to Miles the following day that gave his views on the matter:  
Three major tasks are I believe are taking form.  First a group of specialists should 
exist who will work alongside the British watching, and even helping to evolve, 
new developments in tactics and material both air and ground, with view both of 
aiding British and keeping our weapons abreast of and coordinated with British . . 
. Second, a group of officers to vet at this end British supply requirements . . . 
Third, a considerable and continually increasing force of maintenance specialists 
who are needed to introduce, demonstrate, and instruct in the use of USA material 
of all sorts in this country.131  
 
Lee went on to say that the immediate difficulty Chaney and he had in solving these problems 
was personnel, asserting that Chaney’s staff was “at full stretch” making plans to implement 
ABC-1 and that he would need more people if he tookon these tasks as additional duties.  He 
also noted that he could not give Chaney enough people from his own office to meet 
requirements in terms of qualifications or numbers.  Additionally, he asserted that the War 
Department would need to make a clear decision on who ould be responsible for these 
duties.132   
   In a 25 September cable to Chaney and Lee, the War Department demonstrated its 
willingness to expand the scope of the Special Observers’ duties to respond to problems it had 
not foreseen.  It also indicated that it was willing to ignore the advice of its agents abroad.  The 
cable essentially assigned SPOBS all of the duties that Chaney and Lee had outlined in their 
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separate messages in August.  However, instead of allotting additional personnel to perform 
these tasks, as Chaney and Lee urged was essential, the War Department merely added the tasks 
in Chaney's cable to the list of duties it required of the Special Observer Group and authorized 
him to transfer personnel from the Military Attaché's office by agreement with Lee.133 In short, 
while Chaney and Lee’s superiors acknowledged that there were problems with the machinery 
for administering U.S. aid in Britain, SPOBS and the Military Attaché’s office were on their own 
when it came to resolving them.          
 Although they had a green light from the War Department to solve the communication 
and coordination problems that plagued U.S. aid in Br tain, a number of factors prevented 
SPOBS and the Military Attaché’s Office from resolving these problems quickly.  One factor 
was Chaney’s absence for much of September, October, and November.  When the cable from 
the War Department arrived, Chaney was already in Russia deeply engaged in negotiations.  He 
briefly returned to London in October, but, at Harriman’s request, accompanied him to 
Washington D.C. where they engaged in a series of briefings with Roosevelt, Stimson, Marshall, 
and Arnold, along with members of the British mission to the U.S., on the results of the 
Harriman-Beaverbrook Mission. Chaney also took the opportunity to brief Marshall and Stimson 
on the status of SPOBS’ planning work and provided th m with updated assessments regarding 
the status of Britain’s defenses.134  His duties in Moscow and Washington on matters that were 
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admittedly higher priority, delayed approval for the plans that McNarney and the other members 
of the Special Observer Group worked on with the Military Attaché’s Office in his absence.        
Another factor was friction between members of SPOBS and the Military Attaché’s 
Office regarding the form and function of the techni al committee.  This came, in part, from the 
War Department’s inadequate division of responsibilities between SPOBS and the Military 
Attaché's office.  Indeed, given the intelligence app ratus the Military Attaché office had created 
in London, Lieutenant Colonel Homer Case, the SPOBS G-2, would have performed tasks that 
were largely redundant, if he had decided to set up his own intelligence gathering program.  He 
was certainly qualified to do so.  Case was a Coast Artillery officer of wide experience.  He 
received his commission in August, 1917, leaving for France seven months later with the 54th 
Artillery.  He arrived at the Western Front in time to participate in the St. Mihel and Meuse-
Argonne offensive, later becoming wounded in action.  In the interwar years, he served in 
numerous command, staff, and instructor positions, including overseas service in the Philippines.  
His last assignment, prior to coming to England, was as the Assistant to the Chief of the 
Intelligence Branch of the Military Intelligence Division (MID) of the War Department General 
Staff.  One of his duties at MID had been to supervis  the British Empire Section, a job that had 
given him a familiarity with the current status of Britain and its possessions that rivaled Lee’s, 
although admittedly, much of his information must have come from the reports that Lee’s office 
sent back to MID.135  To forestall conflict with Lee’s office and prevent duplication of effort, 
Case confined himself to intelligence and security planning for the RAINBOW-5 tasks forces, 
leaving most information gathering to the Military Attaché’s office.                
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The arrangement Case and the Military Attaché’s office had worked well in terms of 
gathering general information about the British military as well as British policy and strategy.  
However, it broke down in areas where information of a technical nature was involved and the 
War Department failed to provide enough guidance concerning the role of the Technical 
Committee to effectively delineate who was responsible for what. In its 25 September cable to 
Chaney and Lee the War Department stated that the Military Attaché would retain all “normal 
intelligence duties.”136  The problem with this instruction was that since Britain had gone to war 
against Germany, what constituted a normal intellignce duty for the Military Attaché 
continually changed.  Arnold’s assignment of additional Air Corps officers to the Military 
Attaché’s Office is a case in point.  The Assistant Military Attaché for Air, Brigadier General 
Ralph Royce, opposed the assignment of technical and operational studies to the Special 
Observers because he saw it as his prerogative.  Arnold had previously directed him to gather 
this type of information and he felt strongly enough about keeping these duties that he brought 
the matter up with the U.S. Ambassador to Britain.137  
The SPOBS staff had their own objections to the WarDepartment’s directive to establish 
a technical committee.  Middleswart argued that the guidance the War Department provided in 
its cable to Chaney was too ambiguous and did not effectively delineate responsibilities between 
the technical committee, the Harriman Mission, and the various War Department agencies that 
had been involved in Lend-Lease up to that point.138  Dahlquist, Bolte, Hawley, Hinman, 
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Davison, Coffey, and Matejka all argued that the tasks assigned to the Special Observer Group 
needed to be accomplished within SPOBS’s special staff sections, rather than setting up a 
separate organization.  To do so, they argued, would result in more duplication of effort, as the 
members of the special staff had to obtain much of t e same information from the British in their 
efforts to develop plans for implementing ABC-1 and RAINBOW-5 that the technical committee 
would in performing its technical and operational studies.  Their solution to the increased 
workload that attended the group’s assumption of the tasks outlined in the War Department’s 
instructions was to increase the number of personnel assigned to each staff section.139                 
  Finding personnel, whether as members of a separate committee or as members of the 
special staff section that already existed also posed a problem.  Lee, as opposed to Royce, was 
glad to transfer responsibility for Lend-Lease and the exchange of technical information between 
the U.S. and Britain to SPOBS.  He saw the technical and operational studies as encumbrances 
that had nothing to do with the primary mission of his office.  However, adamantly resisted 
giving SPOBS any of his personnel.  Neither he nor Chaney had the people to spare, and the War 
Department's directive that SPOBS and the Military Attaché's office essentially figure it out 
themselves left them at an impasse.140  
 McNarney and the SPOBS staff worked with the Military Attaché’s Office through 
October and most of November to overcome these obstacle .  As the majority of this work at the 
time involved examining Britain’s use of U.S. aircraft, Lyon was tasked to develop an 
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organizational scheme for the committee and submit it to the rest of the SPOBS staff for 
comment.141  At the same time, McNarney, Brett, Case, and Chaney, i  the brief period he was in 
London between his Moscow and Washington trips, negotiated areas of responsibility for 
SPOBS and the Military Attaché’s office and jointly determined how the two organizations 
would man the committee.142 
The end-result was a compromise between all actors involved.  On 22 November, 
Chaney, after returning from Washington D.C., issued a general order establishing a committee 
with responsibilities that conformed to the ones the War Department had sent in its cable on 25 
September, with further clarification based on agreem nts made with Lee and his staff.143  While 
ostensibly a separate section of the SPOBS staff tht reported directly to the SPOBS chief of 
staff, the members of the committee were from the SPOBS special staff sections with Lyon 
serving as head.  To work under these officers, a special order from the Military Attaché's office 
dated 21 November, temporarily assigned thirteen officers to SPOBS.144  Thus, by 7 December 
1941, the machinery for resolving the communication and coordination problems that plagued 
Lend-Lease and the exchange of technical information between Britain and the United States 
was in place. 
 The development of the Technical Committee, a manifest effect of SPOBS’ pre-Pearl 
Harbor work, was one among many ways in which the Sp cial Observer Group served as a 
mechanism through which the War Department and the Roosevelt Administration responded to 
the unforeseen challenges of preparing for coalition war.  Neither the Roosevelt Administration 
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nor the War Department anticipated the communication and coordination problems that would 
arise as a result of sending aid to Britain and the Soviet Union.  When the U.S. Army Air Corps 
began receiving reports that Britain was not using aircraft that the U.S. provided, the SPOBS 
staff began, at Arnold’s request, to serve as ad-hoc technical observers, investigating the veracity 
of the rumors and ensuring that the War Department received the information concerning the 
operational deficiencies of U.S. aircraft.  Hopkins tapped the expertise of the group to assist him 
in his negotiations with the British and to provide technical advice during his mission to Russia.  
By sending McNarney to Russia with Hopkins, Marshall also took advantage of the group’s 
expertise to get a more objective assessment of Soviet prospects for survival than either Hopkins 
or Yeaton could provide.  The Special Observers also played a key role in assisting the Harriman 
mission in negotiations with the British and the Soviet Union, as Churchill and Roosevelt’s 
decision to provide aid to Russia necessitated a complete reassessment of Anglo-American aid 
policy.  With the creation of the Technical Committee, SPOBS sought to rationalize, formalize, 
and properly resource the work that the group and the Military Attaché’s office had been doing 
to resolve the communication and coordination problems that plagued the U.S. aid program in 
Britain.  The system would be one of their lasting contributions to Anglo-American cooperation 
in the ETO.    
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Chapter 7: Command Relationships 
On the morning of 3 September, 1941 Lieutenant Colonel John E. Dahlquist found 
himself speeding along a British road at a brisk sixty miles-per-hour in a RAF car driven by a 
member of the Women’s Auxiliary Air Force (WAAF).  Accompanying him were Coffey, 
Snavely and Wing Commander Cozens.  The group was traveling to a bomber station to observe 
how the British conducted their bombing operations.  The drive was pleasant for the most part.  
Dahlquist noted that the WAAF was a good driver although he was sure that she had worn out 
the brakes by the time they arrived at their destinatio .  Over the course of their four hour 
journey, he admired the countryside and stone villages they passed.  After arriving, the group 
met with the Air Officer Commanding of the Bomber Group HQ, had lunch, and looked over the 
station.1   
 That afternoon, the party sat in on a pilot briefing.  As Dahlquist watched the 
proceedings, he took note of the youth of the crews: “these plane crews, pilots, co-pilots, 
navigators, wireless operators, and gunners, were just a bunch of kids, nineteen-twenty-one years 
old.”2  Once the briefing was complete, the party had tea with their hosts and then looked on as 
the ground crews loaded the bombers for the mission.  When it was nearly dark, they watched 
the bombers take off, one plane at a time, all bound for Germany loaded with bombs and 
incendiaries.  All watching wondered how many of these “kids” were coming back.3 
 The party then had dinner and talked until about midnight.  Dahlquist slept for about an 
hour and a half and then rose to join the others in the operations room.  For the rest of the night, 
                                                          
     
1 Dahlquist Diary, 2-3 September, 1941; and Letter, Dahlquist to wife, September 3, 1941, Personal 
Correspondence, Box 5 Personal Correspondence 1941-1945, John. E. Dahlquist Papers, USAHEC.   
     
2
 Letter, Dahlquist to wife, September 3, 1941, Personal Correspondence, Box 5 Personal Correspondence 1941-
1945, John. E. Dahlquist Papers, USAHEC.   
     
3
 Dahlquist Diary, 2-3 September, 1941; and Letter, Dahlquist to wife, September 3, 1941, Personal 
Correspondence, Box 5 Personal Correspondence 1941-1945, John. E. Dahlquist Papers, USAHEC.   
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the party watched as the staff tracked the progress of the mission.  In the early morning hours 
planes began to return, making their approaches to fields that were pitch black until the planes 
were just ready to land, fearful that “Jerry” was circling above, ready to pounce on a plane when 
it turned on its navigation lights.4   
 Dahlquist and his companions listened intently as the Bomber Group’s intelligence 
officer interrogated the crewmembers after landing. I  response to the intelligence officer’s 
inquiries, each crew provided its own narrative of the mission, what they had bombed, what they 
had done, and what they had seen.  During the bombing m ssion, Dahlquist also observed the 
behavior of the group’s commanding officer, noting the suspense that the unit’s Group Captain 
went through as he stayed up all night, waiting for his crews to return.  Fortunately for the group, 
all crews had arrived back at the British Isles safely, with the last one reporting in by 6:30 AM.  
Dahlquist thought that the whole process was one of the most impressive and emotional sights he 
had ever seen.5   
 In spite of the emotional turmoil of the night, Dahlquist was relieved that he had a chance 
to escape from Grosvenor square.  Although he was an able staff officer, he yearned to be back 
in a line unit leading soldiers.  Observing the boming operation allowed him to experience 
vicariously the camaraderie and clear sense of purpose that existed among those who were 
conducting combat operations.  In contrast, he felt his staff work was frustrating and often 
wondered whether anything he was doing would make a difference.  He had found his most 
recent project, the development of a headquarters to oversee U.S. forces in Britain, particularly 
vexing.      
                                                          
     4 Ibid. 




  Dahlquist was not alone in his frustration.  During the summer and fall of 1941 the entire 
SPOBS staff attempted to resolve issues with ABC-1 and RAINBOW-5 that concerned 
command organization of U.S. forces in Britain and command relationships between the U.S. 
Army, the U.S. Navy, and the British services.  They found that ABC-1 and RAINBOW-5 as 
well as current Army and Navy doctrine was inadequate in addressing the issues associated with 
establishing a theater headquarters in Britain as well as defining joint and combined command 
relationships.  Further complicating the group’s tasks were attempts by various War Department 
agencies to impose their own visions of command organization on U.S. forces in Britain, visions 
that failed to meet the requirements of ABC-1 and RAINBOW-5.  Although the SPOBS staff 
was unable to completely resolve these issues priorto 7 December 1941, their planning work did 
have the latent effect of highlighting the inadequacies of Anglo-American war plans and forcing 
a vital dialogue about command organization to takeplace between SPOBS and the War 
Department.   
Developing Plans for a Theater Headquarters 
 As the SPOBS G-1, the job of developing the headqurters to support RAINBOW-5 fell 
to Dahlquist.  His was not a simple task.  In 1941 the Army prescribed the composition of its 
units in Tables of Organization (T/O), documents that specified the number and type of officers 
and soldiers in a military unit, as well as its equipment and organization.  There was a T/O for 
every unit from division level downward as well as corps and army headquarters.6  The elements 
that were to make up each of the task forces in RANBOW-5 conformed to these T/Os.7  These 
tables, however, did not account for the organizational and geographic separation required for 
                                                          
     6 Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley, The Army Ground Forces: The Organization of Ground Combat Troops, 265. 
     
7
 War Department Operations Plan Rainbow No. 5, 1941, paragraph 28c., Forces; and Annex II, Concentration 
Tables to War Department Concentration Plan Rainbow N . 5, 1941, Table 6, Force B-5; both on file at USAHEC. 
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each force to perform its mission.  Rather, the figures developed for the T/Os assumed that the 
units they represented would be functioning closely under the operational and administrative 
control of a higher headquarters, an impossibility according to the dictates of RAINBOW-5.8  
These forces essentially had to operate independently of one another, many under the operational 
control of the British, necessitating that each unit be able to act with more autonomy than was 
typically delegated to a unit of its size.  Dahlquist noted: "Their functions and responsibilities 
with regard to administration will be comparable in character, although on a much lesser scale, to 
those of an Army," the largest administrative unit the U.S. Army had for a combat zone.9  
Dahlquist would have to revise the troop complement for each of these forces to account for the 
increased administrative demands that would be placed on their headquarters.    
 Developing a headquarters to oversee these disparate fo ces posed its own challenges.  
The War Department did not come to a decision regarding the relationship between the Military 
Mission and the commander of U.S. forces in Britain until after U.S. entry into the war, leaving 
Dahlquist unsure whether he should base the headquarters round SPOBS or develop a 
completely separate staff organization.10  Additionally, the task forces collectively did not 
conform to any standard U.S. Army organization.  After subtracting the reinforced division in 
Iceland, the raw numbers of troops in Great Britain roughly equaled what the U.S. Army would 
                                                          
     
8 Dahlquist, "Draft Wording to Outline Suggested by Gen. Chaney," date unknown, G.B. U.S. Troops in U.K., 
Box 6532, ETOUSA USFET Decimal Files 1941-47, RG 498, NARA.  Dahlquist most likely wrote this document 
between July 9 and September 22.  See Dahlquist Diary, 9-10 July 41, 19 August 1941, and 27-29 August 1941.  
Also see Memo, Summers to All Officers, Special Observer Group, Sub: Organization of Headquarters, United 
States Army Forces in Great Britain and of commands immediately subordinate thereto, September 22, 1941, G.B. 
U.S. Troops in U.K., Box 6532, ETOUSA USFET Decimal Files 1941-47, RG 498, NARA.        
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 Dahlquist, "Draft Wording to Outline Suggested by Gen. Chaney," date unknown, G.B. U.S. Troops in U.K., 
Box 6532, ETOUSA USFET Decimal Files 1941-47, RG 498, NARA; and Office of the Chief of Staff, FM 100-10: 
Field Service Regulations Administration, 9 December 1940 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1940), 47.    
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 Thurman et al., "SPOBS," 119-20; and Memo, Dahlquist to McNarney, Sub: The problem of command and 
administrative arrangements, July 10, 1941, G.B. U.S. Troops in U.K., Box 6532, ETOUSA USFET Decimal Files 
1941-47, RG 498, NARA. 
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assign to a corps.  But numbers were not the only indicator for staffing requirements.  The 
headquarters had to be able to manage the logistics apparatus that supplied these widely 
separated forces, provide for their administration, coordinate with the British for those forces not 
under its operational control, be capable of absorbing additional forces as the war progressed, 
and assume all the functions of a theater level command.11 
 Dahlquist, working with his colleagues, spent the summer and fall of 1941 solving the 
headquarters problem.  Since SPOBS was unable to obtain a decision from the War Department 
regarding the relationship of the headquarters to the military mission, he convinced McNarney to 
allow him to proceed with planning with the assumption that the theater headquarters would also 
serve as the Army’s staff for the U.S. military mission in London.12  Based on this assumption, 
the recommendations of the SPOBS staff members, and a revision of the total troop basis after 
conducting a study of requirements with the British, he developed a plan for a command staff 
that generally corresponded to that of a General Hedquarters (GHQ), an organization designed 
to oversee the actions of multiple independent war-time operations.13    
Anglo-American and Army/Navy Command Relationships                   
 While Dahlquist grappled with the headquarters problem, Bolte dealt with a more basic 
question that RAINBOW-5 had failed to adequately address: How would the U.S. Army, U.S. 
Navy, and the British work together in accomplishing the tasks called for in RAINBOW-5?  If 
any member of the SPOBS staff was equipped to answer this question it was Charles L. Bolte.  
                                                          
     11 Memo, Dahlquist to McNarney, Sub: The problem of command and administrative arrangements, July 10, 
1941, G.B. U.S. Troops in U.K., Box 6532, ETOUSA USFET Decimal Files 1941-47, RG 498, NARA; and Office 
of the Chief of Staff, FM 100-10, 9. 
     
12 Memo, Summers to All Officers, Special Observer Group, Sub: Organization of Headquarters, United States 
Army Forces in Great Britain and of commands immediately subordinate thereto, September 22, 1941, G.B. U.S. 
Troops in U.K., Box 6532, ETOUSA USFET Decimal Files 1941-47, RG 498, NARA. 
     
13 Memo, Chaney to the Adjutant General of the Army, (For WPD., G.H.Q., and Chief of Engineers.), Decembr 
17, 1941, G.B. U.S. Troops in U.K., Box 6532, ETOUSA USFET Decimal Files 1941-47, RG 498, NARA; and War 
Department, Table of Organization No. 300-1, Headqurters, GHQ, May 1, 1940.     
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Bolte had served on the faculty of the Army War College until Marshall closed it in 1940, a job 
that required that he be well acquainted with both the War College’s “Participation with Allies” 
exercises and Army doctrine.14  Bolte found that current doctrine, however, was prt of the 
problem.  The U.S. Army and U.S. Navy had a publication covering joint operations called Joint 
Action of the Army and Navy, but the manual viewed Army/Navy cooperation in ambiguous 
terms.  As Charles E. Kirkpatrick has noted, "existing doctrine and plans, and procedures for 
joint action in 1941 consisted of an intentionally vague set of generalizations that preserved the 
independence of each armed service as much as possible."15  In the process of planning for the 
implementation of RAINBOW-5, Bolte and planners from SPENAVO, found this doctrine to be 
inadequate for defining relationships between U.S. Army and U.S. Navy forces operating in 
Britain. 
 While there was at least some doctrinal basis for SPOBS and SPENAVO’s to work 
regarding Army/Navy cooperation, there was none for combined action with the British.  Instead, 
the Special Observers had to draw on historical preced nce as Dahlquist did in one of his many 
critiques of RAINBOW-5. "To me it is simply another indication of the fact that we should play 
our own show,” Dahlquist observed. “Rightly or wrongly, the involvement in small echelons will 
only lead to irritation and trouble.  I got out Pershing's book to read to get some background on 
the trouble we may expect."16  Although Pershing himself would have sympathized with 
Dahlquist's assessment, as well as many officers in the War Department, the provisions of ABC-
1 and RAINBOW-5 would not allow SPOBS to develop a l n where the U.S. performed its 
                                                          
     
14 Burg/Bolte Interview, 26.  
     
15 Charles E. Kirkpatrick, "Joint Planning for Operation Torch," Parameters 21, no. 2 (Summer, 1991), 74-76.   
     16 Dahlquist Diary, 21 July 1941.  The book Dahlquist is most likely referring to is John J. Pershing's 1931 
memoir, My Experiences in the World War.  For a more recent edition, see John J. Pershing, My Experiences in the 
World War, 2 vol. (Summit: TAB Books, 1989).    
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"own show."  U.S. and British operations would have to be much more integrated than they were 
during the Great War. 
 All of the tasks the U.S. Army was to perform under RAINBOW-5 raised questions 
concerning methods of cooperation between the U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, and British forces, but it 
was planning for the defense U.S. naval installations in Britain that prompted SPOBS and 
SPENAVO to conceptualize fundamental relationships that could serve as the basis for joint and 
combined action in the British Isles.  By mid-summer, 1941, SPOBS, Fighter Command, and the 
Air Ministry, had a basic plan for incorporating the U.S. task force defending the naval 
installations into Britain's network of air and ground defense.  The inadequacies of RAINBOW-5 
as well as joint Army/Navy doctrine, however, made it difficult to determine precisely what 
command relationships would govern the operation and administration of this task force.  In an 
attempt to address this ambiguity, Ghormley sent a message to the Commander of Support Force, 
U.S. Atlantic Fleet, on 29 July 1941 requesting that he obtain a directive from the Chief of Naval 
Operations (CNO) indicating the method of command for U.S. forces defending the naval 
bases.17  After a delay of some two months, the CNO directed him to discuss the problem of 
command with SPOBS, and submit his recommendations back to the Department of the Navy.18  
Ghormley subsequently requested comments on the problem of command from SPOBS.19 
 Bolte studied the problem of command relationships for almost three weeks before 
presenting his recommendations to McNarney in a memo on 10 October.  In the memo, he 
                                                          
     
17 Message, Ghormley to Commander Support Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, Sub: Operation Plan - Rainbow No. 5, 
U.S. Naval Forces, North Europe, July 29, 1941, Commander and Command Relations 1942, Box 2119, AG, RG 
498, NARA. 
     
18 Message, Ingersoll (Acting) to Ghormley, Sub: Method of Command within U.S. Forces for the defense of 
Bases One, Two, A, and B, September 17, 1941, July 29, 1941, Commander and Command Relations 1942, Box 
2119, AG, RG 498, NARA.  
     19 SPOBS Routing Sheet, Sub: Method of Command within U.S. forces for the Defense of Bases One, Two, A, 
and B, From Special Naval Observer to Special Army Observer, October 6, 1941, Commander and Command 
Relations 1942, Box 2119, AG, RG 498, NARA. 
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highlighted the basic problem confronting the Army task force designated to defend naval 
installations under RAINBOW-5, noting that the elements that physically occupied the naval 
installations, such as anti-aircraft units, would have to come under the control of three separate 
agencies: Fighter Command, the headquarters for the naval base these elements were guarding, 
and the headquarters for U.S. Army forces in the British Isles.20   
 This situation was unprecedented for the U.S. Army.  U.S. units, did, at times, fight under 
the operational control of the French and British during World War I.  The integration between 
French, British, and U.S. forces during the Great Wr, however, was much more provisional in 
nature.  Pershing had been continually committed to the creation of an independent American 
army that would conduct its own separate operations on the Western Front, only placing 
American units under British and French command for training or in special cases, such as when 
he agreed to provide the French with four Negro regim nts to incorporate into their divisions.21   
 SPOBS planners contemplated a relationship between U.S. and British forces in the U.K. 
and Iceland that was much more integrated and stable han what had characterized inter-allied 
operations during the Great War.  This was due to several related factors.  First, the provisions of 
ABC-1 and RAINBOW-5 placed U.S. forces in Britain ad Iceland in an operational context that 
demanded close cooperation with the British.  The projected task forces were simply too small 
and too dispersed to perform their missions independently of British forces.  
                                                          
     20 Memo, Bolte to McNarney, Sub: Command relationship between Army and Navy forces in the naval bases in 
the United Kingdom, October 10, 1941, Commander and Command Relations 1942, Box 2119, AG, RG 498, 
NARA.  A brief discussion of the command problems Bolte studied can be found in Johnsen, “Forging the 
Foundations of the Grand Alliance,” 256-57.  
     21 John S. D. Eisenhower, Yanks: The Epic Story of the American Army in World War I (New York: The Free 
Press, 2001), 111-20; Coffman, The War to End All Wars, 171; and David E. Trask, The AEF and Coalition 
Warmaking, 1917-1918 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1993), 53, 59, and 65.  The U.S. 27th and 30th 
Divisions, originally placed under the British for training, stayed at the British front for the rest of he war.  
However, they operated together as a single U.S. corps, the American II Corps.  See Coffman, The War to End All 
Wars, 171.   
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 Second, the scope and tempo of warfare in the Second World War made it necessary for 
the U.S. and Britain to establish a more integrated command and control structure.  During 
World War I, all participants had suffered from technological and organizational constraints that 
had greatly inhibited information management and coordination between different combat arms.  
Units had to rely on field telephones and primitive radio telegraphs to communicate.  At the 
front, enemy artillery often cut phone lines, causing communication between units and their 
higher headquarters to breakdown.  Additionally, units on the offense had to leave their 
communications systems behind, forcing them to rely on messengers to relay information to 
commanders.  Under these limitations, it could take hours for the commander of an offensive to 
receive reports from the front.22   
To cope with the challenges posed by inadequate communications, corps and army 
headquarters typically used rigid timetables and phase lines to control coordination between the 
various elements of their commands, including allied units, as they conducted frontal assaults on 
flankless trenches, creating a system of command and co trol that was fraught with delays.  As 
such, it was incapable of responding quickly to rapidly changing situations.  Due to the slow 
movement of information in this system, allied units working together in Western Europe merely 
had to assume a section of the front line, and withthe assistance of messengers and liaison 
personnel ensure their units attacked in coordinatio  with their allied counterparts.23     
 The fall of France to German invasion in 1940 demonstrated that this inflexible system of 
command and control was not adequate for dealing with the rapid tempo of mechanized and 
                                                          
     
22 Jonathan M. House, Combined Arms Warfare in the Twentieth Century (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 
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aerial warfare.  Despite advances in communications technology, the British and the French had 
adhered to a centralized approach to conducting war on land.  When German mobile forces 
pierced the linear defenses that the Western Allies had established, the Allies were unable to 
move units quickly enough to seal the breaches.  This system similarly proved inadequate for 
coping with Luftwaffe aircraft that were supporting the invasion force.24   
Fortunately for the British, the command and control system they had in place to defend 
the U.K. during the Battle of Britain was much more capable of responding rapidly to German 
attacks.  To function effectively in this system, the RAINBOW-5 task forces would have to be 
equally responsive, as any forces defending Britain would have to be prepared for attack by land, 
sea, and air, including attacks by parachutists. Chaney’s staff had to establish command and 
coordinating relationships with the British that were more stable and integrated than Pershing 
had been willing to provide because of his abhorrence of amalgamation.                   
 The introduction of the U.S. Navy into the equation only complicated this task. Prior to 
World War II, the U.S. Army and Navy had been able to operate without the requirement for 
extensive cooperation.  Kirkpatrick notes that, "as a general rule, when American troops had 
been sent to overseas theaters, they had been able to land on friendly shores and organize for 
battle with little interference from the enemy.  The Navy's contribution to such tasks was in 
escorting convoys to the theater of operations and securing lines of communications to support 
the Army in the field."25  To be sure, the Navy would still perform these missions if and when 
the U.S. entered the war, but it would do so partly f om bases in the U.K. that were exposed to 
attack by enemy ground and air forces, requiring antiaircraft and infantry units from the U.S. 
                                                          
     24 See John Keegan, The Second World War (New York: Penguin Books, 2005), 54-87 for an overview of the 
Fall of France. 
     25 Kirkpatrick, "Joint Planning for Operation Torch," 1-2.   
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Army to contribute to their defense.  As some of these units would have to occupy the bases, 
Navy officers had to exercise some level of control over Army troops.    
 The problem of dividing control among these three different agencies brought to light 
inadequacies in RAINBOW-5 and joint Army/Navy doctrine.  In terms of doctrine, Bolte noted 
that, "there is no provision in law or regulation for vesting in a Navy officer command of Army 
elements in the sense that he commands a Navy element."26  Joint Action of the Army and Navy 
attempted to define relations between the Army and Navy according to a doctrine called 
"paramount interest."  According to this doctrine, overall command of Army and Navy elements 
during a joint operation would be vested in the servic  "whose operations are of greater 
importance for the accomplishment of a joint mission."27  The Army and Navy had intended this 
provision to delineate command between the two servic s during operations that had a relatively 
short duration, such as the movement of an expeditionary force or cooperation in the defense of a 
coastal frontier in the face of an invading enemy.28  Army and Navy planners had simply not 
envisioned the longer-term mission of defending a U.S. naval installation on foreign shores when 
they published Joint Action of the Army and Navy.     
 RAINBOW-5 did attempt to define command relationship  between U.S and British 
forces.  The document stated that the commander of United States Army forces in Great Britain 
would exercise administrative command of all U.S. land and air forces stationed in Britain, that 
these forces would function under the strategic direction of the British, and that the commander 
of U.S. forces in Britain had the authority to arrange with the War Office and Air Ministry 
                                                          
     26  Memo, Bolte to McNarney, Sub: Command relationship  between Army and Navy forces in Northern Ireland 
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28 Ibid., 8-9.   
236 
 
provisions for the British to have operational contr l of the necessary U.S. task forces to 
implement ABC-1 and RAINBOW-5.29  Bolte, however, noted that this organizational pln had 
basic flaws: no one had bothered to define what "administrative command," "strategic direction," 
and "operational control" actually meant in this context.  This deficiency was already causing 
issues among planners in Washington as Brigadier General Harry J. Malony, Deputy Chief of 
Staff for GHQ noted in a letter to Chaney about planning for the U.S. occupation of Iceland.  
Malony wrote: “I find certain terms not susceptible of standard interpretation by our people, with 
the general result of a somewhat cloudy issue.  I keep struggling with “strategical direction,” 
“operational control,” and “administrative command.”30  To proceed any further with planning 
for Anglo-American cooperation in Britain, SPOBS and SPENAVO would have to determine the 
scope of responsibility and authority that each of these command relationships entailed. 
 To solve the conundrum of command relationships Bolte made the following 
recommendations.  First, in keeping with the plans that SPOBS had developed with the British, 
he advised that the U.S. place all antiaircraft, balloon barrage, and pursuit aircraft units under the 
operational control of Fighter Command.31 For day to day housekeeping, he advised that these
units conform to the orders of the naval base commander for the base they were occupying.  The 
headquarters of U.S. Army forces in Britain would then retain overall responsibility for all other 
issues relating to command of these elements as the headquarters for all U.S. Army forces in 
Britain. 32  Second, Bolte proposed that the coalition clearly define the command and control 
terms used in RAINBOW-5 for future use among the U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, and British forces: 
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(1) The term "command" be understood and employed to mean that control of 
individuals, forces, functions and establishments that has been and is now 
normally vested in and exercised by commanders of United States Army and 
Navy units, forces and establishments by law, regulations and competent orders. 
 
(2) Where and when certain if the lesser included functions, responsibilities, or 
authorities of "command" as defined in paragraph 1 next above are for the time 
being to be delegated to another agency, appropriate terms, such as 
"administrative control" or "strategic direction" (avoiding the use of the term 
"command") be employed, together with such definitio s or explanation of the 
term used as may be necessary to the proper comprehension by all of the meaning 
implied thereby. 
 
(3) The term "strategic direction" be understood anemployed to mean the 
function of prescribing for a force as a whole the general mission which it is to 
carry out over a long period of time, and such modification of that general 
mission as may from time to time become necessary or desirable, without any 
control of details or tactical operations or administrative matters.  
 
(4) The term "operational control" be understood anemployed to mean the 
function of prescribing initially and continually the details of tactical missions and 
operations to be carried out by forces and by any and all elements of those forces, 
together with modifications thereof, without the responsibility or authority for 
controlling matters of administration, discipline or statutory authority and 
responsibility, for such matters as promotion, transfer, relief, and assignment of 
personnel. 
 
(5) The term "administrative control" be understood an  employed to mean the 
function of prescribing and directing the conduct of th se activities, other than 
tactical, pertaining to supply, evacuation, transportation, personnel and training.33   
 
Bolte obtained the concurrence of his fellow SPOBS staff members for these modified policies 
before forwarding his recommendations to SPENAVO.  After reviewing his comments Hart 
recommended that the Navy adopt of both his command scheme and his proposed definitions.34  
Ghormley and McNarney then issued joint memorandums to the War and Navy Departments 
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recommending Bolte's solution to the problem of joint and combined command.35  Although 
Bolte appeared to have devised a workable solution to the problems posed by command relations 
in the U.K., neither SPOBS nor SPENAVO received a response from their respective higher 
headquarters prior to Pearl Harbor.  
Theater Command Organization 
However, stateside officials were not completely passive regarding the subject of 
command in Britain.  In addition to problems concering inter-service and coalition relations, 
SPOBS had to cope with various U.S. agencies that atempted impose their own visions 
concerning the command organization of U.S. forces in Britain on the war plans the Special 
Observers were developing.  This created friction between the these agencies and SPOBS and 
while the tension between all these organizations remained small prior to Pearl Harbor, it was an 
indicator of growing dissonance between the Special Observers and U.S. Army organizations 
back in the U.S. 
 One example of this dissonance was GHQ’s effort to influence the command 
organization of U.S. forces in Iceland.  According to RAINBOW-5, if and when the U.S. entered 
the war, the commander of U.S. Army forces in Britain would assume administrative control of 
all United States land forces stationed in the British Isles and Iceland.36  This commander would 
further possess the authority to arrange details concerning the location of the tasks forces called 
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for in RAINBOW-5 and operational control of these forces with the War Office and the Air 
Ministry.37   
GHQ, however, espoused different ideas concerning command responsibility for U.S. 
forces in Iceland.  While Griner was in Washington D.C. helping GHQ develop plans for the 
U.S. occupation of Iceland, Malony, asked him to approach Chaney and get his views on a 
change in the command structure.  Rather than group t o s in Iceland with troops in Britain, 
GHQ planners wanted to group U.S. forces in Iceland with U.S. forces in Newfoundland and 
Greenland.38  
 Chaney’s response to Malony’s proposition reflected his conservative, by-the-book 
approach to war planning.  In a letter to Maloney h asserted that the plan that would govern 
U.S. actions in Iceland if and when the United States entered the war was ABC-1.  Under ABC-
1, Iceland was a strategic responsibility of the British and an integral part of the United 
Kingdom’s defense.  According to ABC-1, he argued, “supreme responsibility, and hence the 
authority, for directing the defense therof [is] placed physically in the United Kingdom.  It 
follows that when United States troops are placed in the United Kingdom and Iceland, they 
should be grouped together for command.”39 In short, ABC-1 was the strategic plan that U.S. and
British officials had agreed to and any command arrangement regarding Iceland needed to 
conform to that agreement.   
Malony did not accept Chaney’s line of reasoning and cited a number of reasons why, 
despite the provisions of ABC-1, U.S. troops in Iceland should fall under the same command as 
those in Greenland and Newfoundland.  One was that Iceland would not play a significant role in 
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any future operations except as an air base for ferrying or as a base for joint naval operations.  He 
also argued that the defense of Iceland would soon be a U.S. responsibility and reinforcements 
and supplies necessary for its defense would come from the U.S.  Under these circumstances, he 
asserted, it would be more appropriate to have the Commanding General in Iceland report 
directly to GHQ or some other War Department organiz tion, than to go through an intermediate 
command in Britain.40  
 Eventually, the War department recognized the strategic significance of Iceland to 
operations in the European Theater and placed control of Iceland under its commander in June, 
1942 as Chaney had argued.41  In this case, Chaney’s unwillingness to deviate from the 
provisions of ABC-1 had proven appropriate.  Still, the disagreement between Chaney and 
planners at GHQ reflected a general trend that was beginning to take shape in the final half of 
1941.  While SPOBS continued to adhere strictly to its mandate to implement the provisions of 
ABC-1 and RAINBOW-5, War Department agencies were beginning to rethink both plans, 
placing Chaney’s staff and the agencies at home on disti ctly different planning trajectories.    
One of the most significant differences taking shape in 1941 was between Arnold and 
Chaney’s vision of how the U.S. Army Air Force should organize its aviation units in Britain. 
Chaney's dialogue with Arnold over the organization of air assets in the U.K. began after the U.S 
Army Air Force sent its own independent observer to Britain in the summer of 1941.  The officer 
on this mission, Major Haywood S. Hansell, coordinated closely with SPOBS while he was in 
Britain.  However, his recommendation regarding the organization of U.S. Army aviation assets 
in the U.K. contradicted Chaney's plans for implementing ABC-1 and RAINBOW-5.  Arnold 
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ultimately was to favor Hansell's organizational formula while Chaney remained inflexibly 
committed to the task force concept, setting the stage for a conflict that would ultimately lead to 
a falling out between the two officers.            
    Hansell originally went to England at the invitation of the RAF to observe British 
intelligence operations.42  At the time of his visit, he was serving in the Intelligence Section, 
Office of the Chief of the Air Corps, overseeing a division that gathered information on foreign 
air forces, air facilities, and economic, industrial, and sociological data for use in target selection 
for bombardment operations.43  By the summer of 1941, the British had obtained extensive 
information about Germany's economic and defensive infrastructure, information that Hansell 
hoped to obtain for the U.S. Army Air Force.  He spnt his time in England gathering data from 
the British regarding their bombing effort as well as German air defenses, returning to the United 
States with nearly a ton of target folders.44  Hansell also compiled his observations into a repo t 
that included recommendations regarding the employment of U.S. bombers in Britain.  He sent 
this report to Arnold, forwarding it through Chaney first for comment. 45 
 Chaney was generally laudatory regarding Hansell's performance during his mission in 
England and concurred with almost all of his recommendations.  Both agreed with the main 
targets that the British had identified in German industry, both advocated daylight precision 
bombing, and both saw a need for an air force capable of deep penetration into Germany and 
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high altitude bombing.  Both also advocated for the development of a fighter capable of escorting 
bombers at least 1,000 miles.46   
 It was in the organization of U.S. air units in the British Isles that the two differed. 
Hansell called for the creation of an "air force, haded by a General officer with a staff, and that 
key members of the command be sent to England to study the conditions under which they have 
to operate."47  Implicit in Hansell's description of the air force ommand was an organization 
separate from the ground forces.  Chaney agreed with the idea of sending officers to Great 
Britain for training, but he withheld his concurrenc  regarding Hansell's recommendation for the 
establishment of an air force, stating "in a separate communication, which presents at one time 
the proposed troop dispositions, problems involved in operating in this theater, and command 
echelons required, I will make specific recommendations as to the command relationships and 
officers and men that should be sent to this country for preliminary training."48   
 Chaney made his recommendations approximately one month later, and they did not 
conform to the organizational model that Hansell had advocated.  Based on the study of 
command requirements for RAINBOW-5 that Dahlquist had developed over the summer of 
1941, Chaney implicitly argued against the idea of consolidated air force headquarters by 
asserting that each task force under RAINBOW-5 needed to serve directly under the theater 
commander.49   
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 The organizational model that Chaney and his staffdeveloped was logical.  As Dahlquist 
had noted in his study, each of these task forces were entirely independent from one another and 
under current war plans, many would function under th  operational control of the British.  
Dahlquist’s recommendation that the Army organize the theater staff along the lines of a GHQ 
instead of a standard theater headquarters reflected an understanding of the political and 
geographic constraints imposed on coalition war planning in Britain.  Each of the task force 
commanders would require an unusual level of independence to execute their missions in widely 
separate areas under British operational control.  Inserting an additional level of command with 
consolidated control of widely separated air assets had the potential of undermining the ability of 
these commanders to accomplish their mission.  So long as ABC-1 and RAINBOW-5 served as 
the basis for Anglo-American war planning in Britain, creating an independent air force 
command was deemed inappropriate.          
 Arnold did not agree, largely because the U.S. Army Air Force (USAAF) had developed 
a strategic plan that was not entirely compatible with the provisions of ABC-1 and RAINBOW-
5.  While Chaney was back in Washington meeting with officials about Lend-Lease, Arnold 
indicated to him that he believed that a theater level air force was the most appropriate way to 
organize U.S. Air forces in the European theater.  According to Arnold's plan, air and ground 
units in the theater were to be organized under separate commands that answered to an overall 
theater commander.  Subordinate to the Air Force would be three commands: a bomber 
command, an interceptor command, and a service command to provide maintenance and 
supply.50  This organization favored function over geography and mission, a concept that did not 
meet the political and geographic requirements of ABC-1 and RAINBOW-5.   
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 However, the USAAF was beginning to deviate in its strategic thinking from ABC-1 and 
RAINBOW-5.  Arnold's proposed organization supported plans that the USAAF had developed 
as part of its portion of the Victory Plan, the Army and Navy's estimate of the forces needed to 
win in a war against Germany and Japan.  After Hansell returned from England, he and other Air 
Corps officers were assigned to the newly formed Air War Plans Division (AWPD) to develop 
war plans for the USAAF.  Working over of nine days in August, 1941, the staff at AWPD 
determined the U.S. Army Air Force's own estimate of requirements, encapsulating it in a 
document titled AWPD-1.51  Under the plan, the U.S. Army Air Force had four missions: 
conduct air operations in defense of the Western Hemisphere, assist in the defense of the Pacific, 
conduct a massive and unrelenting air offensive against Germany and the territories occupied by 
its forces, and provide air support for ground forces invading the continent.52  To implement this 
offensive, AWPD-1 stated that the U.S. would need to position a total of ninety-eight bomber 
groups in Britain and the Suez area, substantially more aircraft than that called for in 
RAINBOW-5. Arnold's organizational scheme called for b mber forces and their supporting 
fighter aircraft, ten pursuit groups according to AWPD-1, to have unity of command instead of 
being dispersed among the numerous tasks forces the Army developed for RAINBOW-5. 53  
Given the direction that U.S. plans for the air war against Germany were taking, Arnold’s 
proposed model did make sense. 
 Chaney, however, opposed Arnold’s model for command organization.  In a letter to 
Arnold on 5 December 1941, he provided a critique of Arnold’s plan as well as arguments in 
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favor of his own plan for command organization.54  Most influential to his line of thinking was 
his legalistic approach to war planning and his prior experience as a diplomatic official.  ABC-1 
and RAINBOW-5 called for the U.S. Army to establish task forces separated geographically that 
would conduct missions that were independent from one another within the British defense 
establishment.  This was the concept that U.S. and British war planners had agreed upon during 
the American-British Conversations and his directive from Marshall explicitly stated that ABC-1 
and RAINBOW-5 were to serve as the basis of war plans that SPOBS developed.  It is obvious 
from Chaney’s concept and his defense of it, that he felt duty-bound to honor U.S. commitments 
to Britain and the mandate that he had received from Marshall.   
 One can also see the influence of his time as the head of Air Defense Command and his 
close association with the British in his argument about command organization.  Chaney’s trip to 
England in the fall of 1940 to observe British air defenses and the subsequent integration of 
British concepts during the Test Sector exercise convinced him that the British had developed the 
most advanced system for commanding and controlling aircraft.  Key to the success of this 
system was the complete integration of air assets in a given geographic sector.  Arnold’s plan 
called for an Air Force that would operate independently from the Royal Air Force.  Chaney 
could not even imagine how such a bifurcated system might function.  In his mind, it was 
essential that the U.S. integrate its air units, especially its pursuit aircraft, into the British system 
for command and control.55  All of the air plans that the Special Observers developed were based 
upon this premise.  In essence, Chaney had “gone native,” so much so that he was willing to 
subordinate most U.S. pursuit assets to British operational control for the defense of Great 
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Britain, rather than use them in offensive operations, an idea that would have been anathema to 
many War Department planners.56   
 Given the direction that plans for the air war were taking, one has to wonder why Chaney 
and his staff remained wedded to a concept that was more appropriate for the defense of Great 
Britain rather than focused on offensive operations  the continent.  Chaney’s unwillingness to 
deviate from ABC-1 and his enchantment with British air defense certainly made him resistant to 
Arnold’s proposals.  However, the War Department played a role in this as well.  In terms of 
information, communication between War Department Officials and the Special Observer Group 
had been distinctly lopsided.  While SPOBS continually provided information about the group’s 
activities back to Washington, the U.S. agencies thy primarily worked with–the War 
Department General Staff, GHQ, and the Air Staff–often failed to keep the group apprised of the 
work taking place on the other side of the Atlantic.  An extract from a report of an inspection trip 
to England and Iceland by the Assistant GHQ Air Officer is illustrative: 
Again may I emphasize the fact that General Chaney’s staff should have a 
complete set of all plans that call for joint U.S. Army-British action.  That staff, 
for reasons unknown, is considered by the British to be a “Liaison” staff.  
Consequently, much embarrassment is caused by the British asking questions that 
cannot be answered, due to lack of information.  The British may form the 
opinion that we have little coordination among our staffs.57    
 
The communication problems highlighted is this repot c ntinued to plague Chaney and his staff 
throughout their time in Britain.   
 The Air Staff made their own contribution to the lack of communication that 
characterized SPOBS’ relationship with the War Department.  Outside of Hansell’s initial report, 
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there is little evidence that the Air Staff included the Special Observer Group in its efforts to 
develop AWPD-1.  Indeed, SPOBS’ participation in the Victory Program focused on British and 
Russian needs rather than the strategy that underpined requirements for the USAAF.  Including 
the Special Observer Group in the process would have allowed Chaney’s staff to do a formal 
study of AWPD-1 and make recommendations to Chaney in terms of its suitability for offensive 
operations in Europe.  Granted, the Air Staff had only nine days to draft the plan but, next logical 
step would have been to provide the plan to Chaney’s staff, the core of the future staff for the 
European Theater, for study and comment.  Instead, Arnold presented Chaney with his proposal 
for command organization of U.S. air units in Britain without the requisite strategic planning 
context.  As a result, Chaney believed that Arnold an his staff fundamentally misunderstood the 
mission of U.S. forces under RAINBOW-5 and the requirements for waging an air war alongside 
the British when in actuality, a change in strategy was what Arnold and his staff were seeking.  
However, the Air Staff’s failure to include SPOBS in the development process precluded 
effective conversation between the two agencies.  A a result, both Chaney and Arnold would 
steadfastly cling to their respective visions for organizing U.S. air forces in Britain.         
 On the eve of U.S. entry into the Second World War, highly placed men and their staffs 
had vastly different conceptions concerning how the U.S. should organize its forces in Britain.  
Arnold and the Air Staff were firmly committed to the expanded and independent air war 
articulated in AWPD-1, a formidable group to any who would oppose them.  Chaney, however, 
was not without his resources.  As the U.S. Army Special Observer in Britain he worked directly 
for Marshall, not Arnold.  His position as the head of the organization responsible for developing 
plans for combined U.S. and British action in the British Isles as well as his status as the 
potential theater commander for U.S. forces in Europe gave him great influence in determining 
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how the U.S. would meet the provisions of ABC-1 andRAINBOW-5.  Ultimately, Marshall 
would have to decide between Chaney and Arnold’s two competing visions, a decision he would 
not make until the U.S. was at war.      
 Although many issues remained unresolved on 7 December 1941, SPOBS’s work had the 
latent effect of highlighting the inadequacies of Anglo-American war plans in terms of command 
structure and coalition command relationships.  Thegroup’s work also forced a vital dialogue 
about command organization to take place between SPOB , GHQ, and other agencies back in 
the U.S. Dahlquist and the rest of the Special Observers, had developed a headquarters plan that 
met the unique requirements of commanding and controlli g the widely separated tasks forces 
called for in RAINBOW-5.  Bolte, through his work on the Northern Ireland command problem, 
found that current Army and Navy doctrine for joint operations was inadequate, that doctrine for 
coalition command was nonexistent, and that ABC-1 and RAINBOW-5 had inadequately 
defined terms used in the plans to explain command relationships between British and U.S. 
forces.  To resolve these issues, he developed a system for joint and combined command and as 
well as defining fundamental terms for use in governing relations between forces operating in the 
Anglo-American alliance.  Chaney and his staff also engaged in vital debates with the War 
Department, GHQ, and the Air Staff concerning the organization of U.S. forces in Britain, 








Chapter 8: Operation MAGNET  
Dahlquist spent the morning of 7 December 1941 in his London office, checking over 
papers he was sending back to the United States with the group’s soon-to-be former Chief of 
Staff, Brigadier General Joseph T. McNarney.  McNarney had received orders recalling him to 
the U.S. to serve on the War Department General Staff, and Dahlquist, being an efficient G-1, 
was taking advantage of an opportunity to get paperwork back to Washington more quickly than 
would have been possible using regular mail.  After saying good bye to McNarney, he went back 
to his room at the Dorchester.  At 9:00 PM, the SPENAVO duty officer called to inform him that 
Hawaii had been attacked.  Dahlquist and some of the o er Special Observers rushed to the 
office at Grosvenor Square to receive the official reports of the incident.1 
Other SPOBS staff, such as Hawley, did not get the news until next morning.  He found 
out as he walked to catch a tube to visit Southern Command and saw papers with large headlines 
blaring the news of Japan’s attack on U.S. facilities and warships in Hawaii.  Having scanned the 
papers, Hawley stopped, turned around, went back to his room, and donned his uniform.  Later, 
as he walked through the door to his regular Monday morning meeting with the British Director 
General of Army Medical Services and his staff, he was greeted with yells and cheers.2 
The other members of Chaney’s staff found it almost impossible to work as they tried to 
comprehend the implications of the attack.  The only communications coming from Washington 
were reports indicating that the attack had caught U.S. forces in Hawaii completely off guard. 
That evening, Coffey hosted a party for Case in his room. It was his birthday, one he said that he 
would have little difficulty remembering.  For entertainment, Davison brought down his radio, 
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one of his most prized possessions as it had an extra-large battery that greatly increased its range 
of reception.  As the Special Observers celebrated Case’s birthday with cocktails, they listened to 
President Roosevelt’s speech to Congress.3 
The rest of December was a frustrating time for the group.  They had been working since 
May to prepare for this moment.  Every day, they anticipated the call from the War Department 
to activate the headquarters and begin to implement RAINBOW-5. However, the call never 
came.  Instead they received sporadic reports among, which were Germany and Italy’s 
declaration of war on the United States and news of Japan’s invasion of the Philippines.  During 
the day the staff continued working on their projects, wondering if their efforts were in vain.4  At 
night, they took solace in small groups of friends, meeting in their rooms after work for cocktails 
and spending their evenings discussing strategy for the war, probable future policy, and theories 
as to how Japan was able to surprise U.S. forces in Hawaii.  As the battle for the Philippines 
raged, they pondered the fate of their friends in the Pacific.  Many wondered if they were 
destined to spend the war in limbo.5  In a letter to his wife, Dahlquist expressed a sentiment that 
many on the staff shared: “I will do whatever I am ordered to but still, I wish I were with troops.  
I cannot but feel kind of useless here.”6   Frustration set in among the staff as feelings mounted 
that they were cut off from Washington.7 
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Although a cloud seemed to hang over their heads, not all was doom and gloom for the 
Special Observers in December.  Red Middleswart, after dragooning money from all the staff 
members, used his expertise as the SPOBS Quartermas to engineer a Christmas party at Saint 
Thomas Hospital for 150 children from the worst bomed districts in London.8  On Christmas 
Day, Dahlquist, Davison, and other members of the saff went to a broadcast station and were 
able to speak to their families back in the states over the radio.  Dahlquist later noted, “I was so 
overcome with emotion that I did not say many of the t ings I had planned to say and wanted to 
say.”9  Bolte’s younger cousin, who was in officer cadet training with the British Army, came to 
London for Christmas with a group of friends, whom Bolte and Dahlquist generously supplied 
with cigarettes, candy, and drinks.10 Events like these offered the Special Observers a brief 
respite from the anxiety they felt because of the ambiguity of their situation.  Most of the time, 
however, they felt disconcerted, unsure of what they should be doing because of the War 
Department’s virtual month-long silence. 
That silence ended with the coming of the New Year, bringing the group an entirely new 
set of problems.  On 2 January 1942, SPOBS finally received a directive from the War 
Department. It read: 
The British Joint Staff Mission in agreement on January 2nd in Washington 
agreed to dispatch to Northern Ireland of United States Force . . . MAGNET has 
been designated as code name.11 
                                                          
     8 Letter, Dahlquist to his wife, December 20, 1941, Personal Correspondence, Box 5 Personal Correspondence 
1941-1945, John E. Dahlquist Papers, USAHEC. 
     
9 Letter, Dahlquist to his wife, December 25, 1941,  Personal Correspondence, Box 5 Personal Correspondence 
1941-1945, John E. Dahlquist Papers, USAHEC. 
     10 Letter, Dahlquist to his wife, December 26, 1941, Personal Correspondence, Box 5 Personal Correspondence 
1941-1945, John E. Dahlquist Papers, USAHEC.  Charles Guy Bolte joined the British 60th Rifles with a group of 
friends from Dartmouth and Harvard.  After completing his officer training, Bolte went to North Africa and 
subsequently lost a leg at the Battle of El Alamein.  See Letter, Winant to Carleton, November 12, 1946, Bolte, 
Charles G. (KRRC), John Gilbert Winant Papers, Ambassador to Great Britain, 1941-1946, Franklin D. Roosevelt 
Presidential Library; and “Charles G. Bolte, 74, Viking Press Executive,” New York Times, March 9, 1994. 
     
11 Cable, AGWAR to SPOBS, June 2, 1942, Magnet Plans, Training Tactical, January 1942 ETO, Box 6532, 




The next day, SPOBS received additional instructions: 
The Northern Ireland Force eventually will consist of a reinforced Army corps of 
three square divisions (less one infantry regiment each), one armored division, 
and auxiliary supporting troops.  The composition of the latter and the total 
strength of the force is now in the planning stage . . .The Northern Ireland Force is 
superimposed on the troops basis set forth in RAINBOW-5.12 
 
With these two messages, the War Department notified h  Special Observer Group that 
American entry into the war had prompted U.S. and British officials to change the tasks the U.S. 
Army was to perform in the British Isles.  This decision had the effect of rendering many of the 
plans SPOBS had made with the British obsolete.  Many on Chaney’s staff, upon receiving this 
news, must have questioned the relevance of their work for the past seven months. 
 They were unable to execute their plans as written.  That, however, did not mean their 
efforts had been wasted.  The latent effects of SPOBS’ pre-Pearl Harbor planning had done much 
to prepare Chaney’s staff and their British counterparts for the post-Pearl Harbor influx of 
American forces.  Both the Special Observers and the British had learned much in the past seven 
months in their attempts of cope with the reality of implementing ABC-1.  SPOBS was now 
deeply imbedded within the British defense establishment and both Special Observers and their 
British counterparts had experience in developing combined theater level plans.  In the process 
of theoretical war planning, the staffs had learned much about the organizational and 
environmental constraints and limitations they faced in any attempt to employ U.S. forces in the 
British Isles.  This experience was critical to thesuccess of the Special Observers’ execution of 
MAGNET, while MAGNET itself yielded benefits in terms of providing the U.S. and Britain 
experience in conducting combined logistics operations.      
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The ARCADIA Conference       
That the War Department had momentarily forgotten about SPOBS is understandable.  
The attack on Pearl Harbor had focused everyone's att ntion on the Pacific.  Few had thought 
that Japan could penetrate as far as Hawaii, leading some to wonder if the west coast might be 
their next target.  There was a flurry of activity in Washington as military and government 
officials attempted to cope with the new strategic situation.  The War Department, in this 
uncertain strategic environment, placed a temporary h lt on its Lend-Lease shipments and troop 
movements to Iceland, while Army logistics experts scoured the country for planes and 
antiaircraft guns to send to the west coast to defend against a possible Japanese invasion.13  If the 
U.S. had to defend its western shores against an inv sion by Japan, it could not afford to send 
men and material overseas.  Fears of a continental inv sion proved to be ill-founded.  Still, 
Japan’s attack complicated the strategic situation.  U.S. strategic planners had to ask themselves:  
Given Japan’s aggressiveness in the Pacific, to what extent could the U.S. afford to remain on 
the defensive while focusing its efforts on Europe?       
The British, for their part, were determined that Europe remain the priority effort.  The 
entry of the U.S. into the war prompted Churchill to recommend to Roosevelt that he come to 
Washington with the heads of the British military services to discuss grand strategy for the 
Anglo-American alliance.  On 14 December, he set out with the British Chiefs of Staff on the 
HMS Duke of York for an eight-day trip across the Atlantic.  After brief meetings between 
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Roosevelt and Churchill and the U.S. and British servic  chiefs, the formal staff conference, 
dubbed “ARCADIA,” began on 24 December.14 
For the military portion of the conference, the participants discussed five principal topics: 
the fundamental basis of joint (combined) strategy, interpretation of strategy into immediate 
military measures, allocation of forces, a long-term program to raise and equip forces required 
for victory, and the machinery for implementing thefour other topics.15  Decisions made during 
this conference both drew upon the work that SPOBS had engaged in prior to Pearl Harbor and 
would have consequences for the group’s work in the future. 
One consequence was the determination of U.S. and British officials that Europe would 
not become a secondary theater for the Anglo-American coalition.  The fundamental basis for the 
strategy outlined in ABC-1 remained unchanged.  In spite of the threat Japanese forces posed in 
the Pacific, the conferees agreed that Germany still constituted the greater threat.  Reflecting this 
view, U.S. and British officials confirmed that the primary strategic objective for Allied forces 
was still to defeat Germany.16  For SPOBS, this meant that the group would not spend the war 
sitting in limbo in London while the rest of the Army fought against Japan in the Pacific, as some 
staff members had feared.     
Although the fundamental basis for Anglo-American strategy remained the same, there 
were unresolved issues with ABC-1.  The participants recognized that in many ways, ABC-1 did 
not adequately outline how the coalition was to function, and SPOBS was partly responsible for 
this awareness.  Bolte’s study in 1941 had highlighted the inadequacy of ABC-1 in defining 
command relationships between U.S. and British forces.  To resolve this problem, the conference 
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planners followed Bolte’s recommendations and used his analysis and the definitions he 
developed to frame command relationships between U.S and British forces in the British Isles.  
In this way, SPOBS’ work prior to U.S. entry in the war had a direct effect on the formulation of 
coalition policy at the strategic level. 17     
Conference participants also recognized the need for a mechanism to coordinate Anglo-
American strategy and policy. The Special Observers’ discussions with the British about the 
General Strategy Review offered one example of how inadequate the current system for 
coordination was.  The conference participants devised a solution to this problem by creating a 
body called the “Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee.”  The committee came about as a result 
of a proposal the British presented during the conference called “Post-ARCADIA 
Collaboration.”  In that document, the British Chiefs of staff proposed that they leave 
representatives in Washington to meet regularly with the U.S. Chiefs of Staff.  Originally both 
the British and the U.S. Chiefs of Staff intended for the group to collaborate on developing a 
program of requirements to meet strategic policy, issue directives governing the distribution of 
weapons, and settle issues concerning priority for ove seas movement.18  However, over the next 
three years, this committee, which became known as the Combined Chiefs, would gradually 
assumed more responsibility for implementing Allied strategy.  Eventually it would be the 
predominant agency providing strategic direction for American and British forces.19  
SPOBS’ role in the new system for Anglo-American collaboration was still unclear.  The 
War Department had never defined what the responsibilities of the Military Mission would be in 
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terms of Anglo-American collaboration and ARCADIA yielded no guidance on the Military 
Mission’s relationship to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.  What was clear from the conference was 
that Chaney and his staff would be responsible for implementing MAGNET.  On 8 January, the 
War Department sent Chaney a directive to activate the headquarters for U.S. forces in Britain.  
At that point, SPOBS ceased to exist.  Chaney and his staff now served in a headquarters dubbed, 
“United States Army Forces in the British Isles” (USAFBI).20  The War Department directive 
also designated Chaney as the Army member of the Unit d States Military Mission to Great 
Britain.21  Thus, in this case, the Nucleus Mission was fulfilling its intended function.  As 
planned, the heads of the staff divisions in SPOBS became the heads of the staff divisions in 
USAFBI with Chaney wearing two hats as commander and military diplomat.22 
While the transition from SPOBS to USAFBI was the realization of pre-war planning, 
MAGNET was not.  Where RAINBOW-5 called for the Army to send pursuit planes, antiaircraft 
forces, and a small number of infantry battalions to defend naval installations in Northern 
Ireland, the new concept for Northern Ireland develop d at ARCADIA called for three infantry 
divisions and an armored division.  This was a substantially larger ground force than what 
planners had envisioned when they drafted ABC-1 and RAINBOW-5. The mission U.S. forces 
were supposed to perform in Northern Ireland had changed substantially as well.  Instead of 
defending U.S. naval installations, U.S. Army troops sent to Northern Ireland were to “relieve 
mobile elements of the British forces in North Ireland and, in cooperation with British local 
defense forces . . . defend North Ireland against attack by Axis Powers,” with an additional 
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mission to “be prepared to move into South Ireland for the defense therof.”23  In terms of 
Northern Ireland, the War Department had completely changed RAINBOW-5. 
American and British planners at the ARCADIA conference changed the strategic 
concept for sending U.S. forces to Northern Ireland for a number of reasons.  The first had to do 
with the fact that British forces were overextended in attempting to meet the requirements for 
fighting in the Middle and Far East.  By January, 1942 numbers were so short that the British 
were unable to send any more forces abroad without considerably increasing the risk of an 
invasion of the British Isles.  Sending U.S. forces to Northern Ireland would allow the British to 
remove the forces currently there to meet its global commitments.24  Additionally, Churchill and 
Roosevelt supported the change for political reasons.  Both thought that sending a large 
contingent of U.S. forces to the U.K. would improve th  morale of the British people.  They also 
thought that sending Americans to Northern Ireland would improve relations with the Irish Free 
State, which up to this point had remained neutral and had offered only limited cooperation in 
terms of security.25  Given the strategic situation facing Britain and the United States in 1942, 
participants in the conference felt compelled to change the provisions of ABC-1 and 
RAINBOW-5 that pertained to Northern Ireland and develop a plan that would allow more U.S. 
ground forces to deploy to the British Isles. 
This change is one of the factors that has made it ifficult to assess the significance of 
SPOBS’ pre-Pearl Harbor planning activities with the British.  Since the plans for Northern 
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Ireland changed dramatically, it is difficult to establish direct cause and effect relationships 
between RAINBOW-5 planning and MAGNET.  Some historians, such as Ronald Ruppenthal 
and William T. Johnsen, have attempted to establish links between the two, asserting that plans 
SPOBS developed for Northern Ireland served as the basis, at least in part, for MAGNET.  
However, the scope of their studies did not permit them to adequately examine this relationship.  
As such, one of the issues that still needs analysis in the historiography of World War II is the 
extent to which the manifest and latent effects of SPOBS’ pre-war planning activities influenced 
the planning and execution of MAGNET. 
GHQ-NIST   
 One of the ways SPOBS’ work influenced plans for the movement of U.S. forces to 
Northern Ireland was in the development of the operations plan for MAGNET.  After the 
American and British delegations at ARCADIA decided to deviate from provisions of ABC-1 
and RAINBOW-5 pertaining to Northern Ireland, the staff at GHQ began work on an operations 
plan dubbed “Operations Plan of Northern Ireland Sub-Theater (GHQ-NIST).  This plan, with 
minor amendments, would serve as the primary document on which the War Department based 
U.S. troop movements for MAGNET.26 
 The most explicit evidence that SPOBS influenced the development of GHQ-NIST can 
be found in the directives and references section of the operations plan.  In the plan, the staff at 
GHQ list three sources from SPOBS that they relied on: the reconnaissance report of Northern 
Ireland that SPOBS sent to Marshall on 3 September 1941, Bolte’s study of command relations 
between U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, and British forces in Northern Ireland and Scotland, and an 
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interview the staff at the War Department conducted with Dale Hinman who, like McNarney, 
had returned to the United States in December, 1941.27 
 As the strategic concept for sending U.S. troops in Northern Ireland had changed, much 
of what GHQ planners borrowed from SPOBS dealt with logistics, infrastructure, and command 
relationships, elements that would be present in any plan involving the use of U.S. forces in 
Northern Ireland.  Planners drew heavily on the ground logistics plans that Griner and 
Middleswart had made for Northern Ireland, especially their assessments of local resources.28  
The staff at GHQ also made extensive use of Davison’s construction plans, so much so that they 
devoted an entire section of the Engineer Annex to ex racts from one of his engineer reports.29  
For the medical portion of the plan, GHQ adopted Welsh and Hawley’s recommendations 
concerning estimated hospitalization rates, medical supply stockpiling, and evacuation policy.30   
Additionally, according to GHQ-NIST, two pursuit groups would still go to Northern 
Ireland as part of MAGNET.  Instead of protecting the naval installations, their mission would be 
to protect U.S. ground forces.  However, in spite of a change in mission, GHQ adopted many 
aspects of SPOBS’ original plans for defending U.S. naval installations, including the same unit 
distribution plans that SPOBS had made with the British and provisions for the pursuit groups to 
function under the operational control of the Royal Air Force until U.S. forces had completed 
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relief of British forces.31  In essence, a new strategic concept did not mean a completely new 
plan for Northern Ireland.  Rather than start from scratch, the staff at GHQ recognized the value 
of the work in which SPOBS had engaged with the British prior to U.S. entry into the war and 
put it to use in developing the operations plan for MAGNET.  Now it was up to Chaney and his 
staff to oversee its execution.  
The First Contingent of Operation MAGNET 
 And oversee it they did.  At midday on 26 January, 1942, Chaney and Dahlquist stood on 
the pier at West Dufferin Dock in the port of Belfast in their “pinks and greens,” wearing 
overcoats to protect themselves from the cold.  They w re waiting for a tender from the ship 
carrying the first contingent of U.S. troops to come to Britain under operation MAGNET.  After 
Griffiss had left for his special mission to the Soviet Union, Chaney had taken to using Dahlquist 
as his aide, a situation the more junior officer found exasperating.  However, with Griffiss gone, 
there was no one left to assist Chaney, and Dahlquist, a consummate professional in spite of his 
privately grumpy demeanor, performed his additional tasks diligently.32 
 A large part Dahlquist’s disgruntlement with his additional responsibilities had to do with 
the personnel situation at USAFBI headquarters.  USAFBI still had a chronic shortage of staff 
members.  A few had trickled in since November.  SPOBS had received a new antiaircraft 
officer, Colonel Aaron Bradshaw, to replace Hinman.33  Coffey also received an assistant to help 
him with his ordnance work, a young tank expert named Second Lieutenant John H. Savage.34  
The War Department had also transferred responsibility for the administration of a program for 
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training U.S. servicemen in the operation of British radar to SPOBS.  These trainees were 
collectively known as the Electronics Training Group (ETG).  When ETG came under the 
control of SPOBS, its staff came with it, although they were overstretched in attempting to meet 
all the administrative requirements for managing the program.35   Two assistants out of the 
original group that the Military Attaché had temporarily transferred to SPOBS to participate in 
the Technical Committee remained, assisting Lyon with technical committee work.36  Most 
sections, however, still did not have assistants, forcing the primary staff officers to do all the 
planning and coordination for the various activities USAFBI was involved in, with only a few 
enlisted clerks to help the staff with typing and manual labor.37 
 McNarney’s departure and U.S. entry into the war had prompted a few organizational 
changes as well–changes that had increased Dahlquist’s workload and responsibilities.  Bolte, 
Case, Matejka, Griner, Dahlquist, and Summers all received promotions to full Colonel.38  The 
War Department also selected Bolte to be McNarney’s replacement as Chief of Staff for 
USAFBI, resulting in an additional promotion to Brigadier General less than a month after his 
promotion to Colonel.39  Dahlquist replaced Bolte as the USAFBI Plans officer.  However, 
because the staff was short-handed he still had to serve as USAFBI’s G-1.40  Throughout the 
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winter and spring of 1941, he had to perform the duty of two staff heads with little in the way of 
support. 
Although Dahlquist worried about the work that was not getting done while he was away 
from London, he did derive some satisfaction from being able to see, first-hand, the result of 
USAFBI’s efforts in implementing MAGNET.  The British, who had played no small role in the 
preparations to receive this force, had also turned out for the occasion.  Standing with Chaney 
and Dahlquist were Sir Archibald Sinclair, the British Minister for Air, John Hamilton, the 3rd 
Duke of Abercorn and Governor General of Northern Ireland, John Miller Andrews, Northern 
Ireland’s Prime Minister, Sir Charles Wickham, Chief of the of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, 
Lieutenant General G. E. W. Franklyn, Commander of BTNI, Admiral R. M. King from the 
Admiralty, and small crowd of people.41  In celebration of this moment, as a symbol of Anglo-
American amity, the British had decked the dock shed with U.S. and British flags and bunting.  
The Royal Ulster Rifles band played patriotic music as the people anxiously awaited the arrival 
of the first landing party.42   
The first to come ashore was Major General Russell P. (Scrappy) Hartle, commander of 
the 34th Infantry Division, the first among the MAGNET forces to send its troops to Northern 
Ireland.43  Scrappy was an appropriate nickname.  The General had a short, stocky figure, a large 
square-shaped head, and a weathered face.  Chaney and the others loomed over him has he 
greeted each with a shake from his large, thick hand.44 
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After welcoming Hartle to Northern Ireland, the officers and dignitaries quickly turned 
their attention to the men who still had yet to debark.  Sinclair, in black suit and overcoat, 
stepped forward from the crowd and looked at the men standing on the rail of the former 
Channel steamer “Canterbury,” a veteran of the Dunkirk evacuation.  Pulling out a sheet of notes 
he began to speak: 
General Hartle and officers and men of the 34th Division of the United States 
Army, it is my privilege, on behalf of His Majesty’s Government, to bid you 
welcome to Britain.  From the prairies and teeming cities of the North West you 
have come many thousands of miles across land and sea to these islands–not to 
sojourn among strangers but to find yourself among friends who are grateful for 
your presence, and comrades in the British fighting services who know the mettle 
of the American soldier and will be proud to share with you a place of honor in 
battle.45  
   
He went on, extolling the virtues of the American soldiers and highlighting their arrival as a new 
stage in the war against totalitarianism.  His speech alluded to a previous association between the 
two nations more than twenty years ago, when U.S. and British forces, along with France, had 
worked together to battle a determined German adversary. 
The soldiers waiting on the Canterbury played their own part in contributing to the 
association of this moment with the First World War.  Taking the advice of the Chaney, GHQ 
had them equipped in WWI era Brodie “soup bowl” helm ts, rather than the new style helmets 
the Quartermaster Corps had recently procured for the U.S. Army.  Officials in Britain were 
concerned that the new American helmet looked too much like a German helmet and felt that 
British troops would need more time before they could distinguish between the two.46  The men 
marched off the dock carrying an assortment of packs, bags, and gear, flanked by crowds of 
observers on both sides.  Many carried water-cooled Browning machine guns that looked almost 
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identical to the ones Doughboys had used over two deca es before.  The debarktion looked as if 
it could have happened in 1918 instead of 1942.47 
For a moment, Dahlquist forgot the frustrations he and the other members of Chaney’s 
staff had felt the past few weeks in preparing to receive U.S. troops in Northern Ireland.  He 
circulated among the men as they ate sandwiches and dr k hot coffee on the dock.  Initially 
acting subdued and bewildered by the rough sea voyage and the new environment, they quickly 
“pepped up,” once they ate and had a chance to stand on land.48  Dahlquist wrote to his wife: “I 
got a great lift out of seeing the troops.  They are wonderful looking kids and I know they will 
give a good account of themselves.”49  Briefly, Dahlquist was able to fulfill his desire to be back 
in a line unit.  However, the troops quickly finished their meals and marched off to board trains 
bound for various camps in Northern Ireland and Dahlquist had to return to his tasks at 
USAFBI.50 
The successful movement and reception of the first con ingent of MAGNET forces owed 
much to the work that the Special Observers and their British counterparts had conducted prior to 
U.S. entry into the war.  MAGNET was where the latent ffects of SPOBS’ pre-Pearl Harbor 
work began to influence post-Pearl Harbor Anglo-American cooperation.  After the activation of 
USAFBI and the assumption of MAGNET as a mission, the Chaney’s staff and their British 
counterparts drew on the experience they had in combined theater level planning to prepare for 
and execute MAGNET.  When the new mission was annouced, USAFBI and the British were 
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intimately aware of the operational limitations they faced in Britain.  They had pre-established 
policies and relationships they were able to draw on when planning and executing their new 
mission.  As such, in addition to influencing delibrations at the ARCADIA conference, as well 
as the development of GHQ-NIST, SPOBS’ planning activities prior to U.S. entry into the war 
played a critical role in the successful execution of MAGNET.   
Sources of Friction: The War Department, GHQ, and Chaney  
 Their early planning work with the British was espcially important because the War 
Department and GHQ, USAFBI’s higher headquarters, failed to provide Chaney with adequate 
support and authority to accomplish his mission.  USAFBI’s specific mission as it related to 
MAGNET was to arrange for the “reception, distributon, accommodation and maintenance of 
U.S. Army forces in Northern Ireland.”51  This directive should have given Chaney the power 
execute his mission.  However, in implementing MAGNET, GHQ and the War Department did a 
number of things to complicate the work of his staff, forcing them to rely heavily on the planning 
system they had established with the British. 
The first problem USAFBI encountered from GHQ and the War Department was another 
instance of the one-way communication that had characte ized relations between SPOBS and 
agencies back in the U.S.  Although, GHQ had begun working on the operations plan for 
Northern Ireland by 20 December, nobody from GHQ or the War Department bothered to inform 
Chaney and his staff that the concept for Northern Ireland had changed. The Special Observers 
did not find out about the change until they received their directive on 2 January.  To make 
matters worse, GHQ did not send the operations plan for MAGNET to USAFBI until 20 
February, when Brigadier General Ira Eaker arrived in England to begin establishing a 
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headquarters for U.S. bombers.52  Prior to Eaker’s arrival, the only information Chaney’s staff 
received were bits and pieces of the plan in cables from the War Department.53 
The War Department also failed to provide Chaney with the staff he needed to execute 
MAGNET.  War Department planners originally envisioned that the SPOBS staff would more 
than double after U.S. entry into the war.54  Dahlquist later revised these figures upward, 
calculating that to receive, command, and control four divisions, USAFBI would have to expand 
from its current strength of forty-two officers and enlisted men to over two-hundred and thirty.55  
After Chaney and his staff received the directive activ ting the headquarters for U.S. forces in 
Britain, Dahlquist attempted to implement the staffing plan that he developed in 1941.56  
However, between January and May 1942 USAFBI receivd only a trickle of personnel from the 
states.57  Ultimately, Chaney and his staff would oversee 36,000 soldiers in Northern Ireland 
with a staff that was smaller than what the U.S. Army typically assigned to a regimental 
headquarters, an organization responsible for one-te th those numbers.58 
The War Department further complicated USAFBI’s work by creating a dual command 
structure for Chaney and his staff to respond to.  As the Commanding General of U.S. forces in 
the British Isles, Chaney reported to GHQ, as GHQ was initially the organization that was in 
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charge of all field forces.  However, as the Army member of the U.S. Military Mission to Britain, 
Chaney reported directly to Marshall.59  The arrangement seemed simple but neither Marshall 
nor GHQ adequately delineated what matters Chaney had to submit to what authority.  Further, 
GHQ and the Office of the Chief of Staff were inconsistent with that matters they involved 
themselves in.  At times, the staff at USAFBI would submit a matter to one office and have the 
other respond.60  Ultimately, communications would become more streamlined with the 
dissolution of GHQ and the establishment of an operations division within the War Department 
General Staff in March, 1942.61  However, this dual command structure proved to be a
significant source of friction for Chaney and his staff in their first three months executing 
MAGNET.   
Another source of friction with which the staff at USAFBI had to cope was GHQ and the 
War Department’s tendency to undermine Chaney’s authority.  Both organizations frequently 
bypassed Chaney’s headquarters and communicated directly with Hartle.62   They also granted 
Hartle powers independent of USAFBI.  For example the force temporarily was given the power 
of the purse.  On 31 December 1941, the War Department granted the CG of United States 
Northern Ireland Force (USANIF), the official name for MAGNET forces, the power to use 
$10,000,000 from the “Contingent Fund, Chief of Staff, 1942.”63  By granting USANIF direct 
access to this fund, the Commander had the power to spend this money without conferring with 
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Chaney and his staff.  The War Department failed to correct this situation until February, 1942, 
when it invested Chaney with budget authority for U.S. forces in Northern Ireland.64 
GHQ further undermined Chaney’s authority by permitting the forces participating in 
MAGNET to develop their own operational plans, based on GHQ-NIST, but without 
coordination with Chaney and his staff.  As a result, forces under USANIF often arrived with 
plans that were at odds with the arrangements that C ney and his staff made with the British.  
One prime example occurred when the advance party from V Corps, the main headquarters for 
USANIF, arrived in Great Britain.  Lieutenant Colonel Charles E. Brenn, the Corps Surgeon, had 
the understanding that U.S. forces in Northern Ireland were to be independent from USAFBI.  As 
such he had developed his own medical plan without c nsultation with Hawley, one that did not 
include agreements with British authorities.65    
The independence GHQ and the War Department fostered among the units going to 
Northern Ireland created many problems for the staff at USAFBI.  Hawley noted in a letter to a 
colleague in the U.S.:  
The Commanding General here and all the staff were v y much upset.  
MAGNET arrived and practically thumbed their collective noses at USAFBI . . . 
all funds were allocated direct to MAGNET.  And all this despite an order of the 
President placing General Chaney in command of all U.S. troops in the British 
Isles.  And there are many repercussions of that error.  MAGNET still feels, I 
think that the USAFBI are a bunch of interlopers trying to usurp the divine 
authority of MAGNET.66 
Both GHQ and the War Department denied Chaney the resources and powers he needed to 
execute his mission effectively, creating unnecessary friction between USAFBI and the 
                                                          
     64 Ibid. 
     
65 Cosmas and Cowdrey, The Medical Department: Medical Service in the European Theater of Operations, 17. 
     
66 Letter, Hawley to Colonel Fred A. Blesse, 18 April 1942, HD 024 ETO Kirk-Hawley Correspondence, Box 2, 
Refiles from CMH, RG 112, NARA.  The final sentence was quoted in Cosmas and Cowdrey, The Medical 
Department: Medical Service in the European Theater of Operations, 17.    
269 
 
MAGNET forces.  Based on the actions of these two organizations, one has to wonder if anyone 
back in the U.S. actually considered Chaney to be a commander.  
Some of the blame for this situation, however, lay with Chaney himself.  In the aftermath 
of Pearl Harbor and during the execution of Operation MAGNET, he displayed characteristic 
reticence for taking action without explicit guidance from his superiors, causing his staff much 
consternation.  Shortly after the activation of USAFBI Dahlquist vented to his diary about 
Chaney’s lack of action in solving the personnel problem, “I harangued the General this 
afternoon about cabling General Marshall direct,” he wrote on 9 January.  “I have little 
confidence in him and it is growing less with every contact.  We are due for a terrible shellacking 
unless he wakes up.”67  About a week later he wrote, “The General is still hesitating over 
piddling details and refuses to demand anything of the War Department.  I may be wrong but I 
cannot help feeling that he is utterly misplaced.  It seems to me he has no conception of the tasks 
or responsibilities which are going to be his.”68 By allowing situations like this to continue 
instead of challenging them, Chaney failed to fulfill his responsibility as a commander to ensure 
his command functioned effectively. 
One could argue that Dahlquist’s critiques were merely the rantings of a disaffected staff 
officer who was frustrated that he was not leading troops in combat.  However, this was not an 
isolated incident, and it was in keeping with Chaney’s personality and past performance of duty.  
Chaney was a reserved man, tactful, and inclined to keep his opinions to himself until he thought 
the time was right.  This characteristic had served him well for most of his career, especially in 
his diplomatic posts.  Many in the War Department, because his previous assignments had kept 
him out of the controversial battles over the establishment of an independent air force, 
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considered him a deferential airman, stable and safe with good character and judgement, as 
opposed to most of his peers.69 The skills that had served him well as a military diplomat, 
however, were inadequate in his dealings with the War Department and GHQ.  This situation 
needed a commander who was very assertive and, to a certain extent, ruthless.  Thus far, Chaney 
had failed to demonstrate these qualities.  A former subordinate, Gordon P. Saville may have put 
it best by saying that he had “too much gentlemen in him.”70 
Pre-Pearl Harbor Planning Pays Off 
Ironically, Chaney’s staff found working with the British far easier than working with 
their own higher headquarters elements and subordinate units.  That a majority of the problems 
in executing MAGNET came from GHQ, the War Department, USANIF, and in part, Chaney 
himself was completely unexpected by the staff at USAFBI.  In preparing to conduct coalition 
war, their concerns and preparations had centered on forestalling friction with the British.  This 
situation was due, in large part, to the preparatory work SPOBS and their British counterparts 
engaged in as well as the climate of cooperation Chaney and officials in the British defense 
establishment had fostered prior to U.S. entry intothe Second World War.  Bolte, recalling his 
work in SPOBS, described this environment, “God, I had passes to everything, the War Office, 
and the Admiralty, and so on.  We were taken right into the fold so far as the British were 
concerned.”71  Hawley had a similar experience: “The British just adopted me down in the 
Surgeon’s Office . . . these were major generals and I was just an unknown colonel [but] they 
took me in.”72   
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Chaney reciprocated this generosity by creating a command climate conducive to 
adapting to British military culture and staff methods.  This was most likely the result of his prior 
experience as a military diplomat.  Bolte noted, compared to subsequent U.S. commanders, 
Chaney, “was more inclined to work with the British; t at is, into their setup.”73  Chaney also 
adapted more readily than most Americans to British social conventions.  When comparing 
Eisenhower and Chaney’s command styles Bolte stated, “General Chaney, I think, had a feeling 
of obligation, of social obligation, of doing things.  He [Eisenhower] was not a society bud of 
any kind.”74  Where Eisenhower tended to view British social events as relatively unimportant, 
Chaney was astute in figuring out that these events were where a lot of the business of running 
the British defense establishment was done.  As such, he had his staff members participate in a 
number of cocktail parties and dinners, where they often met key British officials that were 
important for their work.75  Britain’s willingness to incorporate the Special Observers into their 
defense organization as well as Chaney’s philosophy f adapting to British methods was what set 
the conditions for the collaborative work the Special Observers and their British counterparts 
engaged in prior to Pearl Harbor.        
This collaborative work and the relationships the Sp cial Observers had established were 
critical to the planning and execution of MAGNET.  Chaney and his staff began tackling the new 
mission with their British counterparts before they even received the order to activate USAFBI.  
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Although they had no operations plan from GHQ, Bolte warned the staff that they, “should not 
let down because of [a] lack of objectives.”76  On 7 January 1942, Bolte, Dahlquist, Case, Griner, 
Davison, Coffey, and Middleswart met with most of the War Office officials they had been 
working with the past seven months, as well as Cozens and representatives from Home Forces, 
BTNI, and NID.77  That the participants were already well acquainted with the multitude of 
problems associated with establishing U.S. forces in the Britain was apparent in the proceedings.  
Their discussion was comprehensive, covering security for the operation, units that U.S. forces 
were to relieve, debarkation, accommodations, movement, storage, command and control, 
medical care, postal services, post exchanges, transportation capability, and legal jurisdiction to 
name a few.  Despite having no operations plan fromGHQ and receiving only piecemeal 
information about the operation over cables the past few days, the participants were able to 
rehash logistical and administrative issues they had discussed during the theoretical planning 
they had engaged in in 1941, anticipate the problems the new mission would pose, and agree to 
tentative solutions.78  
Having no operations plan from GHQ, the staff at USAFBI, with British help, spent the 
following two and a half weeks drafting their own.  Because they were short-staffed, each 
section head had to essentially coordinate for and write their own portion of the plan.  There was 
a beneficial effect to this arrangement however, as each staff head already had established 
planning relationships with British officers in the various directorates and ministries that made 
up the British defense establishment.  In executing the plan, USAFBI drew heavily on British 
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support, as support from GHQ and the War Department proved to be lackluster the entire winter 
and spring of 1942. 
A cursory examination of USAFBI’s efforts to conduct operation MAGNET reveals the 
extent to which the operation depended on the work SPOBS had completed with the British as 
well as the support the various British directorates and ministries provided.  As McNarney’s 
replacement as Chief of Staff, Bolte was responsible for overseeing the work of all the staff 
members in the planning and execution of MAGNET.  There was one issue, however, that he 
took on directly: command relations.  His solution was essentially a continuation of the work he 
had done as the SPOBS Plans Officer in fall 1941.  Where the participants in the ARCADIA 
conference adopted portions of his study that dealt with strategic level command issues, Bolte 
adapted the operational components of his study to MAGNET command relations.  The fact that 
the main mission of U.S. forces was to serve as a mobile reserve for the British simplified 
command requirements.  As MAGNET forces would no longer be collocated with U.S. naval 
forces, Bolte merely had to negotiate with the War Office in determining command relations 
between U.S. Army and British forces in Northern Ireland.  The solution that he ultimately 
worked out was to place MAGNET forces under the operational control of the General Officer in 
Charge of BTNI, an arrangement similar to the plan SPOBS developed to place U.S. pursuit 
units under the operational control of Fighter Command for RAINBOW-5.79  This arrangement 
was to hold until U.S. forces had arrived in sufficient numbers to take over responsibility for the 
security of Northern Ireland.  When defining the parameters of “operational control,” he used the 
definition he developed in fall 1941 verbatim. 
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While the U.S. Army moved forces to Northern Ireland i  a manner radically different 
from the original plan envisioned in ABC-1 and RAINBOW-5, establishment of communications 
infrastructure for these forces proceeded largely along the lines Matejka previously negotiated 
with the British.  U.S. forces took over as many existing British signal facilities as possible, and 
when units needed additional communications equipment or construction, they went through 
their corresponding British service.  Additionally, as U.S. units relieved British units in Northern 
Ireland, the British left behind their signal personnel to operate communications equipment until 
U.S. signal personnel could receive proper training in the operation of British signal equipment..  
Matejka's planning for the use of British equipment proved fortunate, as GHQ provided the first 
units to come to Northern Ireland with only five perc nt of their signal supplies.80 
The unique conditions of the Northern Ireland garrison also called for USAFBI to 
develop a new local communications policy with the British.  The forces for the Northern Ireland 
Garrison did not come in all at once.  Rather, many u its coming to Ireland initially came under 
the control of British commanders in the area.  To forestall any confusion between U.S. and 
British units, USAFBI formed an agreement with the War Office that American units under 
British operational control would adopt British signal operating procedures.  To ensure 
interoperability of British and U.S. forces, USAFBI also worked out an agreement with the War 
Office that U.S. Army units would receive any British communications equipment that did not 
have a U.S. equivalent, even if that unit had enough of its own signal equipment to meet its own 
basic needs.81  
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Plans for moving U.S. forces in Britain similarly relied on work SPOBS had conducted 
with the British prior to 7 December 1941.  Initially, USAFBI relied completely on the British to 
receive American soldiers from their ships and transport them throughout the British Isles, and 
the U.S. would continue to rely heavily on the British transport system throughout the war.82  
Since the staff at USAFBI depended on the British for these services, planning for the reception 
and movement of MAGNET forces fell largely to Napier as a Deputy Director of Movements (P) 
at QMG.  In overseeing movement planning, Napier was able to draw on work he had done with 
Griner and Middleswart in 1941.  
 Napier’s association with the Special Observer Group had begun when he and Griner 
had together examined the logistics problems associated with moving U.S. forces to Iceland as 
part of Operation INDIGO.  After Iceland planning, Napier continued his association with the 
group, working on a project with Griner and Middleswart shortly after the Anglo-American 
conference that preceded the Harriman-Beaverbrook mission to Russia.  All three participated in 
an effort to determine if Britain’s shipping capacity would be able to accommodate supplies sent 
to the U. K. under the Lend-Lease program.  Napier’s role had been to study possible bottlenecks 
in port and rail capabilities to receive cargo coming from the United States.83 
Even though the content of the ships carrying MAGNET forces was different from that of 
Lend-Lease, his study of the problem of receiving Lend-Lease materials from the U.S. provided 
Napier with the foundational knowledge he needed to make plans to debark and move U.S. 
forces.  He oversaw the creation of movement instructions distributed to all agencies involved in 
receiving the various MAGNET convoys.  These plans included procedures for disembarking 
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U.S. troops, required documentation, plans for transportation, and security.84  Additionally, 
Napier, with the informal review of Griner and Middleswart, drafted procedures to integrate 
American movement officers into the British system of movement control.85 
When formulating a supply program for MAGNET forces, Middleswart drew on the 
connections he had with many organizations within te British defense establishment, especially 
those that had been involved in SPOBS’ efforts to develop logistics plans for RAINBOW-5.  
Foremost among his problems in providing adequate support to MAGNET was the failure of 
GHQ to send Quartermaster soldiers in the first troop shipments to Britain.  As a temporary fix, 
he issued a series of circulars that told MAGNET units how to arrange for local British 
organizations to provide support that Quartermaster troops would normally have provided, using 
information he obtained from the War Office, the Air Ministry, MAP, the Ministry of Supply, 
the Ministry of Food, the Ministry of Petroleum, the Ministry of Wool Control, and the Navy 
Army Air Force Institute (NAAFI).86  
Middleswart also entered into extensive negotiations with the British regarding 
USFABI’s supply program, a necessity since shipping constraints limited his ability to ship 
supplies from the U.S.  Much of his work involved meeting with organizations he had worked 
with in developing a supply program for RAINBOW-5.  Although the composition of forces in 
Northern Ireland had changed, the concept of providing Northern Ireland its own separate supply 
system did not.  Middleswart merely had to adjust hi  plans to handle the greater influx of troops 
from what SPOBS and the British had originally anticipated.  A key characteristic of 
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Middleswart’s new plan was to provide U.S. forces with food from local sources as much as 
possible.  Bringing his plan into action involved meeting again with officials from various 
directorates in the Ministry of Food, QMG, and NAAFI to determine how much food U.S. forces 
could use without placing British citizens under und e hardship, and what resources in terms of 
goods and storage each organization could provide to MAGNET.87  As one element of these 
agreements, QMG agreed to provide U.S. troops with a British ration that Middleswart modified 
to be more compatible with American cultural prefernces.88  Middleswart also used his 
knowledge of the British logistics establishment to obtain agreements from the British to supply 
MAGNET forces with petroleum and coal.89  In sum, because Middleswart and his counterparts 
at QMG and the Ministry of Food had already engaged in supply planning for RAINBOW-5, 
they were able to adapt quickly to changing circumstances to meet the supply needs of U.S. 
forces in Northern Ireland.   
American forces arriving under MAGNET similarly relied heavily on the British for their 
accommodations and construction needs.  Fortunately for USANIF, housing American troops 
was a problem that the British had already considered in their planning with SPOBS in 1941.  
Davison, Griner, and officers from QMG, and the engineering and quartering staff from the 
geographic commands had conducted detailed analysis of construction and quartering 
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requirements when making plans for the RAINBOW-5 task forces.  Benoy, in particular, had 
been heavily involved in quartering planning throughout the RAINBOW-5 planning process. As 
such, all parties involved were very aware of the limitations USAFBI and the British military 
services would face in providing U.S. forces with housing and facilities.   
After meeting with the staffs at BTNI and NID and conducting his own on the ground 
survey of conditions in Northern Ireland in 1941, Davison noted a number of engineering 
limitations the U.S. and Britain would face in establishing U.S. forces in Northern Ireland.  The 
biggest problem, as he saw it, was Britain’s labor shortage.  Britain had already mobilized the 
vast majority of its skilled labor for its own war effort and the various organizations within the 
British defense establishment were already competing w th one another for the labor that was 
available.90  Additionally, he noted shortfalls in electric power, machinery, and certain 
construction materials, all problems that would be difficult to solve given the limited shipping 
available to transport supplies from the U.S. to the U.K.91  In short, Britain did not have the 
supplies or manpower to meet the needs of U.S. forces going to Northern Ireland as a part of 
RAINBOW-5.  Davison had found similar limitations when conducting surveys of construction 
requirements for the other task forces as well.92 
Chaney had considered it essential that the U.S. adopt a construction program as quick as 
possible in order to resolve these problems, indeed h  felt so strongly about it that it was one of 
the few things he pressured the officials in Washingto  to take action on while SPOBS awaited 
instructions from the War Department after Pearl Harbor. Still operating under the paradigm that 
the U.S. would execute RAINBOW-5, he advocated an ambitious program in which the U.S. 
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would provide all skilled labor, much of the unskilled labor, and the construction materials the 
British did not possess, to build accommodations for the all the task forces.  He also urged that 
Davison return to the U.S. on temporary duty to assist in planning, as he had first-hand 
knowledge of all the construction requirements for each of the sites SPOBS had selected and was 
familiar with British views regarding construction for the RAINBOW-5 task forces.93  While 
waiting for an answer from the War Department, Davison had begun working with Benoy to 
draw up current estimates on the amount of unskilled labor and materials the British would be 
able to provide.94 
Davison received orders to return to Washington less than two weeks after Chaney had 
sent his recommendations to the War Department, but changes to Anglo-American war plans 
made at ARCADIA delayed his departure.  In mid-January, he departed Britain, carrying a letter 
for Dahlquist’s wife and promising that he would spend at least one evening with the “widows,” 
the collective nickname Chaney’s staff had for their spouses back home.95  After arriving in the 
U.S., he temporarily joined the staff at the War Department, where he used his knowledge of 
conditions in the U.K as well as British organizational strengths and weaknesses, to make 
substantial revisions to the engineering annex for the MAGNET operations plan.96  
In Davison’s absence, the British took the lead in solving the facilities and 
accommodation problem for MAGNET forces, a task actu lly made easier with the changes 
made at the ARCADIA conference.  The original plan for sending U.S. forces to Northern 
Ireland under RAINBOW-5 called for the addition of a U.S. task force whose mission it was to 
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protect U.S. naval installations in Northern Ireland.97  This force was to be added to British 
forces already in Northern Ireland serving in BTNI and NID. Thus the Special Observers and 
their British counterparts originally envisioned having to conduct a substantial amount of 
construction to provide facilities and housing for s ldiers in the task forces, although the British 
had planned to surrender a number of their own facilities as well.98 
With the change in concept from RAINBOW-5 to MAGNET, the staff at USAFBI and 
their British counterparts faced a problem that wasremarkably similar to the problem they faced 
in planning and executing the relief of British forces in Iceland.  As with the contingent of 
Marines sent to Iceland in July, 1941, U.S. forces w re to serve as a mobile reserve, replacing 
most of the mobile formations that were a part of BTNI and assisting the forces remaining as part 
of NID in repelling any attempt by Axis forces to invade Northern Ireland.99  Like the Iceland 
relief, this involved phased integration of U.S. forces into the British defensive scheme, with 
units from BTNI vacating facilities shortly before U.S. units arrived to relieve them.100  SPOBS 
and the staff at the War Office had already been doi g this for months prior to U.S. entry into the 
war with the Iceland Force and had continued to do so after the War Department activated 
USAFBI as the headquarters for U.S. forces in Europe.101  It did not require a huge leap in 
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imagination on the part of Chaney’s staff or the staff at the War Office to apply the methods they 
used for the relief in Iceland to the relief in the Northern Ireland.  One key difference was the 
amount of facilities available in Northern Ireland ow that British units were vacating camps as 
Americans arrived.  Instead of having to build camps, as Chaney and Davison had originally 
planned, the British were able to solve the accommodati n and facilities problem largely by 
surrendering their own facilities to incoming MAGNET forces as they did for later contingents 
of U.S. forces arriving in Iceland.102  Similar to the occupation of Iceland, they also left British 
equipment behind that Americans had been unable to take with them because of shipping 
constraints.103 Additionally, they negotiated agreements regarding the division of labor between 
U.S. and British engineers for construction projects in Northern Ireland as they had in Iceland.104  
Thus the provision of accommodation and construction for U.S forces in Northern Ireland was 
another case in which the staff at USAFBI and their British counterparts were able to draw upon 
their pre-Pearl Harbor planning experience in the planning and execution of Operation 
MAGNET. 
The provision of medical services for MAGNET forces similarly drew on SPOBS’ 
planning efforts in 1941, specifically the plans Welsh and Hawley had developed to provide 
medical support for the RAINBOW-5 task forces.  Charles W. Sole, a staff sergeant on SPOBS’ 
enlisted staff, asserted that, when judging the SPOBS special staff, Hawley accomplished most 
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during his time as a member of SPOBS and USAFBI.105  Hawley certainly had one of the more 
proactive and forceful personalities within the group and no one on the staff was more integrated 
with his British counterparts than he, likely the result of the fact that they shared membership in 
two professional associations: the military and the medical profession.   
Hawley, a man whose wrinkled face and deep-set eyes made him look much older than 
his age of 50, had extensive experience as both a soldier and a doctor.  He entered the U.S. Army 
in 1916, approximately two years after earning his medical degree.  Hawley was a veteran of the 
First World War, having served as a regimental surgeon and a sanitary inspector while in France.  
After the war his assignments included service in the Philippines and Nicaragua as well as a stint 
teaching biostatistics and epidemiology at the Army Medical School.  Like most of the other 
Special Observers, he was a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff School.  
Unlike the other members of Chaney’s staff, he had taken the time to earn a doctorate from John 
Hopkins University in Public Health.  Prior to coming to England to replace Welsh, he had been 
serving as the Assistant Commandant of the Medical Field Service School at Carlisle Barracks, 
Pennsylvania.106  
Hawley’s transition from stateside service to service in England was far from smooth.  
Less than two days after being notified that he was going to England, he found himself on a B-24 
bomber flying across the Atlantic.  He had little cothing, no passport, and neither he nor the pilot 
had ever flown over water before.  He spent his initial days in England working out of a small 
office, and like most of the other staff members, did not have anyone to assist him.107  Hawley 
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worked through these difficulties, and eventually, as Graham A. Cosmas and Albert E. Cowdrey 
noted in Medical Service in the European Theater of Operations, “more than any other man, was 
to dominate medical service in the European Theater.”108              
Hawley was both genial and strong-willed, traits that contributed to his effectiveness.109  
He was so strong-willed that he would defy authority if he felt the situation called for it.  After 
Pearl Harbor, Hawley, in cooperation with his counterparts in the British medical services, had 
developed a hospital construction program with a cost of $70,000,000.00.  When he presented 
Chaney with the plan, Chaney balked, refusing to sign it in the absence of definitive guidance 
from the War Department.  Rather than see the program founder, Hawley went to his British 
counterparts and told them to proceed with the program, assuming personal responsibility should 
the War Department object.110 
Hawley’s behavior was less risky than it sounds.  For all the frustrations Chaney’s staff 
had with his lack of assertiveness, in terms of character, they held him in high esteem.  Dahlquist 
recalled this respect in a letter to his wife, writing “no matter what his faults were he was the 
most considerate, courteous, loyal man I have ever met.”111   If one of Chaney’s faults were that 
he was not forceful enough with the War Department the same could be said of his relationship 
with his subordinates.  Chaney lacked the ruthlessnss eeded to bring insubordination like 
Hawley’s to heel and Hawley was certainly perceptive enough to pick up on this.  In defying 
Chaney and telling the British to proceed with the hospital program, he placed Chaney’s neck on 
the chopping block not his.  Chaney, as the head of USAFBI was responsible for controlling the 
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conduct of his staff, and if the War Department hadobjected to the program, he would have had 
to answer for it as the Commander and explain why he allowed his subordinates to defy him.  
Hawley’ disdain for propriety was certainly in contrast with Chaney’s respect for the rules of 
military etiquette.  His ultimate fate, however, is an indication of the views of officials in 
Washington in prioritizing proper behavior vs. result .  Of all the Special Observers, Hawley was 
the only member to remain on the theater staff until 1945, the whole time serving as Chief 
Surgeon for U.S. forces in Europe.112 
The War Department valued his services, in part, because he implemented an effective 
medical program for MAGNET.  Shortly after SPOBS received word that plans had changed as a 
result of the ARCADIA conference, Hawley went to Northern Ireland and began survey of 
current conditions in terms of British medical facilities.  While he was there, he made plans with 
the staff at BTNI to hand over British medical facilities and supplies as part of the phased 
withdrawal of British forces and integration of U.S. forces into Northern Ireland.  He also made 
arrangements for BTNI to treat U.S. soldiers in British hospitals until U.S. Army hospitals were 
operational.113  This particular aspect of his planning proved fortunate, as the medical units that 
landed with the first contingent of MAGNET, because of mismanagement and a shortage of 
shipping, landed without a majority of their equipment.  As a result, the first two contingents of 
MAGNET forces had to rely of the British for almost all their medical services.114  Eventually, 
the MAGNET forces had enough personnel and equipment to staff their own hospitals.115  In 
terms of medical policy, despite having developed his own separate plans, Lieutenant Colonel 
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Charles E. Brenn, the Chief Surgeon for MAGNET forces, adopted Hawley’s plans, which 
themselves were revisions on pre-war plans that Welsh and Hawley had developed.to provide 
medical support for U.S. forces operating under RAINBOW-5.116  As such, the provision of 
medical support to U.S. forces in Northern Ireland depended to a great extent on the experience 
Hawley had gained as a result of his pre-war planning activities with his counterparts in the 
British medical services. 
 Ultimately, the War Department never completed operation MAGNET.  Of the four 
divisions projected to move to Northern Ireland only two, the 34th Infantry Division and the 1st 
Armored Division, arrived before Anglo-American plans changed again.  In the summer of 1942, 
the U.S. Army, acting on guidance from President Roosevelt, began preparing to invade North 
Africa.117  Within months, the U.S. Army removed virtually all of its combat troops from 
Northern Ireland to take part in the invasion.  Once again, plans that Chaney and his staff had 
developed and executed seemed to have been for naught.   
 The changes wrought by ARCADIA and the decision to invade North Africa has made it 
difficult to assess the significance of the Special Observers in planning and executing coalition 
operations.  Plans to invade North Africa seem to have had little bearing on plans for guarding 
Northern Ireland, and one could say the same in plas for MAGNET and RAINBOW-5.  To hold 
this view however, is to underestimate the importance of planning as a continuous process, an 
evolving dialogue that addresses both the current military situation and how planners want to 
shape the military situation in the future.  This is a process the produces many byproducts that 
staffs can use to prevent themselves from having to start from scratch each time they begin 
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planning for a new operation.  It is also an education l process, allowing staffs to better 
understand the problems they confront and the constrai ts and limitations they operate under.  
Thus, there is value, even in theoretical war planning, a value recognized in war colleges and 
staff schools around the world.   
 In assessing the role of the Special Observers in preparing the U.S. for coalition war with 
Britain, operation MAGNET is significant because it highlights the threads of continuity that 
existed between SPOBS’s prewar-planning with the British and the execution of post-Pearl 
Harbor collaboration in the British Isles.  In spite of the changes that took place at the 
ARCADIA conference, Chaney’s staff, their British counterparts, the ARCADIA conference 
committees, and the staffs at GHQ and the War Department were able to draw on aspects of 
SPOBS’ preparations for ABC-1 and RAINBOW-5 to plan and execute the first deployment of 
U.S. combat troops to the British Isles.  Additionally, SPOBS’ pre-Pearl Harbor work provided 
all parties involved with an awareness of the limitations they would face in attempting to 
establish U.S. forces in Northern Ireland, limitations that they were able to factor into their plans. 
 To be sure, Chaney and his staff were not able to foresee all the problems they 
encountered after the U.S. entered the war.  But meeting these unforeseen challenges served a 
vital function in the development of the Anglo-American coalition.  One has to remember that 
neither the U.S. nor Britain, had ever planned and coordinated in such a close fashion before.  
Unlike WWI, U.S. forces could not receive their own portion of a line and establish a separate 
line of communications from their Allies, at least, not in Europe.  The strategic situation in 
Europe required that Anglo-American logistics be closely intertwined.  MAGNET not only 
highlights the significance of SPOBS’ pre-Pearl Harbor work, but also highlights the group’s 
role as a learning instrument for both the British defense establishment and the U.S. Army.  In 
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executing MAGNET, the staff at USAFBI and their British counterparts conducted the first 
attempt at a logistical build-up of U.S. combat forces in Britain during the war.  In doing so, 
Chaney and his staff bridged the gap between theory and reality.  Where their plans to implement 
RAINBOW-5 provided the Anglo-American coalition with an idea of how they would work 
together in establishing U.S. forces in Britain, it was MAGNET that provided them with actual 
experience in conducting combined logistics operations, experience that would prove important 





Chapter 9: Policies and Systems 
On the evening of 17 April 1942, General George C. Marshall was riding in a convoy 
with Chaney, Hartle, Hopkins, and Harriman. They were traveling from Limvady, a brigade-
sized camp the British had turned over to USANIF, to Ashbrook, the sixteenth-century estate of 
Major Douglas and Lady Helena Beresford-Ash.  Marshll ad just finished inspecting U.S. 
troops that had arrived in Northern Ireland under operation MAGNET and, along with the rest of 
his party, was to attend a dinner given by the descendants of General Thomas Ash, who had 
received Ashbrook from Elizabeth I as a reward for helping to put down the O’Neil Rebellion 
during Ireland’s Nine-Years’ War.1  
 Marshall had reason to enjoy the evening.  He and Hopkins, had recently convinced the 
British Chiefs of Staff and Churchill to accept hisscheme for a combined U.S. and British attack 
across the English Channel in 1943.2   From his perspective it was a signal victory.  A group of 
British and U.S. officials, notably including Roosevelt and Churchill, had championed operations 
in the Mediterranean, which Marshall thought would be a strategic dead end.  From the 
perspective of Marshall and senior American colleagues, a direct attack across the Channel into 
France was the best and only way to achieve a decisiv  victory against Germany, and 
temporarily, at least, he and Hopkins had brought the British around to his point of view.3 
 Whatever thoughts were on Marshall’s mind during the ride to Ashbrook were certainly 
interrupted as the convoy neared Ballykelly.  A busdriving in middle of the road had begun 
moving into the line of cars.  In response, Sergeant W. V. Clipsham, one of the non-
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commissioned officers guarding the convoy, moved his vehicle to intercept, firing his machine 
gun, and killing, Albert Rodden, the thirty-year-old driver.4  The local population became furious 
once word of the incident got out.5  
 The shooting is an extreme example of the problems attendant with the mere presence of 
U.S. forces in the Britain.  Over a period of months, thousands of U.S. troops had come to the 
U.K. and thousands more were to follow.  There simply was not enough room in the British Isles 
to isolate U.S. forces and prevent their actions from affecting local citizens.  Indeed, because the 
War Department had not allocated enough logistics per onnel in the initial contingents of 
MAGNET, U.S. forces in Northern Ireland had to interact with the local population on a daily 
basis.  In this environment, the possibility of accidental injury or damage to private property due 
to regular Army operations was high.6  Added to this situation was a host of G.I.s who had little 
to do and lots of money to spend relative to British men the same age.  There would be many 
conflicts between G.I.s and their British counterparts s they pursued both liquor and women.7  A 
small proportion would act on more malevolent impulses, engaging in crimes ranging from petty 
theft to murder and rape.8  The friction generated by such incidents had the pot ntial of placing 
great strains on the Anglo-American coalition, as British officials, both locally and at the highest 
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levels of government, were obligated to address the demands of any citizens who suffered as a 
result of the presence of a foreign military force.         
 Friction with the local population was only one among many issues involving the 
integration necessary to conduct Anglo-American coaliti n warfare.  The Allies had yet to fully 
develop the policies and systems that would allow the military forces of both nations to 
cooperate effectively in an environment that required the U.S. and Britain to integrate more 
closely than any two nations had previously.  A failure to do so threatened to undermine the 
Allied war effort, as uncoordinated policy-making and incompatible bureaucratic and logistics 
systems could cause systemic paralysis and at timesvicious competition over limited resources.  
The necessity of developing the means to effectively integrate into Britain’s defense 
establishment was imperative in a fully industrialized war where effective human and material 
management was a requirement for victory.  
Fortunately for the Anglo-American coalition, Chaney and his staff, along with their 
British counterparts, had already begun the process of e tablishing the systems and policies 
necessary for integration.  A latent effect of developing plans to implement ABC-1 and 
RAINBOW-5 was to highlight many areas where the U.S. and Britain needed to develop 
common policy.  Another was the bureaucratic integration of the Special Observer Group into 
the British defense establishment. By the attack on Pearl Harbor, Chaney and his staff had 
intimate knowledge of the various directorates and committees that ran the British war effort and 
the policy problems they needed to solve in order to cooperate with the British. 
 However, policy and systems planning had remained i choate before U.S. entry into the 
war.  Solutions to policy problems had been mostly theoretical in 1941.  Still, there was value in 
this theoretical policy and systems planning as it influenced USAFBI’s deliberations with the 
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British during its six-month existence.  Chaney andhis staff certainly did not solve all the 
problems plaguing Anglo-American cooperation.  However, Chaney’s staff, along with their 
British counterparts, played a critical role in establishing systems and policies for Anglo-
American cooperation in the European Theater.  The policies and systems the USAFBI staff and 
their British counterparts developed in 1942 were manifest effects of the group’s work in Britain.  
Notably, their development was made possible by the latent effects of their work in 1941.   
The Question of Legal Jurisdiction              
 Sergeant Clipsham’s shooting of the bus driver in Northern Ireland raises many legal 
questions.  Who was responsible for investigating the incident?  Would Sergeant Clipsham be 
tried under the British or U.S. justice system?  Could either the British or the Americans be 
trusted to try the case impartially?  Would American itizens tolerate their soldiers, many of 
whom were conscripts, coming under the jurisdiction of British law?  Would British citizens 
tolerate the U.S. military having exclusive legal jurisdiction over its own forces while in their 
country?  What were the implications for the Anglo-American alliance if neither side could come 
to an agreement regarding legal jurisdiction?   
Chaney’s staff had already been discussing the question of legal jurisdiction over U.S. 
forces with the British when the shooting incident occurred.  Dahlquist began to examine the 
issue of legal jurisdiction in October, 1941, when he started talking to a Foreign Office official, 
Jack Ward, after meeting him at a cocktail party.9  His interest piqued, Dahlquist conducted 
informal talks with Ward throughout the fall while also beginning his own study of the problem.  
He found that his inquiries were not the first time that the question of legal jurisdiction of U.S. 
soldiers in British territory had come up.  The 1940 Destroyers-for-Bases Agreement, in which 
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the Roosevelt Administration gave Britain fifty World War I era destroyers in exchange for 
basing rights on British possessions in the Western Hemisphere, addressed British jurisdiction 
over U.S. forces.  In this case, the British had retain d legal jurisdiction over U.S. forces if they 
committed, “non-military offenses outside the limits of naval and air bases.”10  Dahlquist, 
working through the War Office, obtained copies of the agreement to see how the provisions for 
legal jurisdiction might apply to ABC-1.11  He also began consulting with a retired Judge 
Advocate Colonel who was on a special mission in Lodon for Secretary of War Stimson.12  
Additionally, Dahlquist’s inquiries prompted McNarney, who was acting head in Chaney’s 
absence, and Ghormley to jointly send a letter to Ambassador Winant inviting him to designate a 
member of his staff to meet with the Special Observer Group to collectively work on the problem 
of legal jurisdiction before the Americans met with the British Chiefs of Staff and members of 
the British government.13   However, prior to Pearl Harbor, the only official discussion with the 
British regarding legal jurisdiction was a letter SPOBS sent to the War Office stating that the 
group regarded members of the Electronics Training Group as falling under the legal jurisdiction 
of the U.S. Army rather than the military units to which the RAF and British Army attached 
them.14 
The news that thousands of U.S. troops would be coming to Britain prompted Dahlquist 
to raise the issue of legal jurisdiction at the first meeting between USAFBI and the British to 
discuss operation MAGNET.  Recognizing that it would take a substantial amount of time and 
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negotiations to develop a legal policy acceptable to both sides, he suggested that USAFBI adopt 
an interim policy based on the legal policies of U.S. forces operating in Iceland.  In essence, U.S. 
commanders would exercise their own military jurisdiction to deal with all offenses U.S. troops 
committed, both military and civil and that the U.S. courts martial system begin functioning in 
Britain when the first troops arrived.15  He also proposed that the U.S. Army allow local and
British Army police to arrest U.S. Army personnel committing offenses if U.S. Military Police 
were not present.  The British participants in the meeting agreed to function under this temporary 
arrangement.16  
A little over a month later, Dahlquist came to the conclusion that the time had come to 
establish a more permanent policy regarding jurisdiction.17  On 24 February, he along with five 
others, met with twenty-five British officials including the Permanent Secretary of the Lord 
Chancellor, an undersecretary from the Foreign Office, a representative from the Home Office, 
the British Judge Advocate, a representative of the Lord Lieutenant of Scotland, two 
representatives from Northern Ireland, and representatives from all the British military 
services.18  Having examined the issue for months, Dahlquist came to the conclusion that the 
only acceptable arrangement concerning legal jurisdiction over U.S. forces in the British Isles 
was for USAFBI to have complete legal jurisdiction ver its troops.  Cutting through the 
diplomatic formality, Dahlquist presented the U.S. position plainly and bluntly, noting gleefully 
in a letter to his wife that his strait talk shocked the British participants.19  The British, for their 
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part, found Dahlquist’s proposal for exclusive legal jurisdiction completely unacceptable.  As a 
result, negotiations for a long-term legal policy for U.S. forces dragged on for months. 20 
The problem was not so much that the British military believed that it needed to have full 
jurisdiction.  Indeed Britain’s military officials would rather not have had to take on that 
additional responsibility.  The problem had more to do with British conceptions of the 
relationship between legal jurisdiction and sovereignty.  Bolte recalled, “for the old fellow sitting 
down in his club there, the idea that there was any jurisdiction over anybody there, other than His 
Majesty’s courts was unthinkable.”21  Any other arrangement would be a violation of British 
sovereignty.   
  Most interpretations of international law at the ime held that armed forces in a foreign 
territory in the service of their own state were extraterritorial, thus remaining under the 
jurisdiction of their home country.22  British law, however, did not conform to this view.  Prior to 
the Second World War, the legal system of the U.K. had made no provisions for foreign armies 
to have legal oversight over their own forces.  As such, according to the British legal 
interpretation, any attempt by a foreign army to conduct a court martial was illegal in the British 
Isles or any other British territory.23   
The first time the British had to grapple with the question of legal jurisdiction of foreign 
forces during the Second World War was immediately after the fall of France. At that time, many 
countries occupied by the Axis Powers established governments-in-exile in the U.K. To provide 
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these governments with the ability to exercise control over their own military forces, Parliament 
passed the Allied Forces Act.24  This act provided that the army, navy and air force of any allied 
or associated power could “exercise all such powers as are conferred upon them by the law of 
that power.”25  Through the act, the governments-in-exile had complete internal legal jurisdiction 
over their own forces, including the ability to arrest, try, and punish legal offenders.  However, 
the British Government held that foreign forces were still subject to the civil law of the United 
Kingdom.  Therefore, if a member of a foreign force committed a crime in Britain, British 
officials could arrest him and he could undergo trial in a British civil court.26          
The British solution to the problem of legal jurisdiction over American forces in the U.K. 
was simply to apply the Allied Forces Act to U.S. forces as well as the governments-in-exile.  
Bolte recalled the reaction of Chaney’s staff to this proposition: 
And I remember the British saying–I think, to Homer Case in a discussion–‘Well, 
we have the Poles, and the Dutch, and the French here.’  DeGaulle and so on, ‘and 
we have an arrangement, what we call the Foreign Forces Act [Allied Forces Act] 
here.’ So Case replied, ‘Do you mean to think you cnsider the forces of the 
United States, if they ever come over here, in the same category as these refugee 
governments, because nothing could be further from the truth.’27 
 
Case had astutely pointed out that the political dynamics between the U.S. and Britain were 
different than those between the British government and the governments-in-exile.  The 
governments-in-exile, their home countries occupied, were completely dependent on Britain for 
their survival.  They had little choice but to accept the conditions under which Britain was 
willing to support them.  The U.S. however, was a different story.  U.S. officials certainly 
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considered Britain’s survival essential to U.S. security, but Britain was more dependent on U.S. 
support to win the war than vice-versa.28   
 Recognizing their predicament, British negotiators attempted to walk the tightrope 
between complete concession to U.S. demands and adherence to the proposition that to remove 
legal jurisdiction from British courts was a violation of British sovereignty.  Bolte remembered 
another meeting where Chaney’s staff was discussing the jurisdiction problem with their British 
counterparts, “and I remember getting into a discusion, and they said, ‘Well, we’ll waive 
jurisdiction.’  And I said, “You can’t waive anything you don’t have.  Jurisdiction over the 
American troops, if, as, and when they come here, rsts in the United States laws and in the 
Congress.’”29  Bolte and the other member of the staff were unwilling to concede even the 
illusion that Britain had legal jurisdiction over U.S. forces in Britain.  
 By April, 1942 references to the problem of legal jurisdiction are absent from Dahlquist’s 
diary.  This is likely because on 3 April, after almost three months of waiting, USAFBI finally 
received additional personnel to serve on the staff, a grand total of six officers.  Among them 
was Colonel Edward C. Betts, from the Judge Advocate General Department.  Dahlquist wrote to 
his wife, “I will be awfully glad to see him because I have been doing all that work as well as my 
own.  As a matter of fact I have been doing little of my own work.  We have been so short of 
personnel I not only have been G-1, I have been Welfare Officer, J.A., Inspector, Chaplain, 
Provost Marshall, Headquarters Commandant, and what have you.”30  When given the 
opportunity to hand off the legal work to another officer, Dahlquist did so gladly.   
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 Dahlquist did well to hand off the work to another, for there was nothing much else he 
could have done at his level. By the summer, discussion of legal jurisdiction had risen beyond 
the echelon of military staffs and lower diplomatic posts to Ambassador Winant and Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs, Anthony Eden.31  In May, 1942 the British put through an Orders in 
Council that officially put American troops under the provisions of the Allied Forces Act of 
1940.32  Until this point, USAFBI and its subordinate agenci s had addressed legal issues 
according to the informal arrangement that Dahlquist had made with the British on 7 January.   
Adhering to the position that Chaney’s staff articulated in their initial discussions with 
the British, American negotiators held that the provisi ns of the Allied Forces Act were not 
adequate in defining legal jurisdiction for U.S. forces.  Echoing Cases’ objections, U.S. officials 
refused to allow the British to put the United States in the same category as the governments-in-
exile.  They also concurred with Bolte’s interpretation, holding that since American soldiers 
were conscripts and had no choice in whether or not they were sent abroad, they were always on 
duty and therefore always subject to military law.33  Bowing to the reality that they needed 
American support in the war against the Axis, the British capitulated and Parliament Passed the 
United States of America (Visiting Forces) Act, 1942, which granted the U.S. military exclusive 
jurisdiction over its forces for criminal prosecution.  Additionally, while under the act American 
military personnel could still be subject to civil suits, civil judgements would be referred to 
American authorities for settlement.34   Although most of the Special Observers had left by the 
time Parliament had passed the act, Dahlquist remained in England long enough to attend a 
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luncheon in honor of the settlement of the jurisdiction problem on 5 October 1942, seeing the 
work he had begun almost a year before come to fruition.35   
   One question remains: What happened to Sergeant Clipsham?  Thanks to the interim 
solution Dahlquist arranged with his British counterparts, the U.S. Army took responsibility for 
the investigation and Sergeant Clipsham gained the ubious distinction of being the first U.S. 
soldier to undergo a court-martial in Great Britain during the Second World War.  The trial was 
open to both the U.S. and the British press.  During the proceedings, the defense claimed that 
when Clipsham moved to intercept the bus, it bumped his vehicle.  The defense further claimed 
that the machine gun was defective, and it had accidently discharged when the vehicles collided.  
Clipsham’s lawyer then produced the machine gun and demonstrated that it actually did have the 
defect.  Based on this evidence, the members of the court-martial acquitted Clipsham, ruling that 
the shooting had been accidental.36  
Joint Organization and Maintenance (U.S. Army Air Corps) and S.D. 348                    
 Less controversial but no less significant than Dahlquist’s efforts to resolve the problem 
of legal jurisdiction were the efforts of Chaney’s staff and officials in the Air Ministry to develop 
policy for cooperation between the RAF and the USAAF.  Lyon’s introduction into policy-
making had begun with his work on aviation logistic problems associated with implementing 
ABC-1 and RAINBOW-5.  In planning to support the tasks forces called for under RAINBOW-
5, he along with representatives from British agenci s involved in aviation logistics, had 
developed a tentative policy for combined maintenance between British and U.S. forces, one that 
Chaney forwarded to the War Department in August, 1941.   
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While the maintenance planning had been a good first step in establishing cooperation 
between the RAF and USAAF, the process of developing an Anglo-American aviation logistics 
program made apparent the need for the U.S. and Britain to develop broader policy for Anglo-
American cooperation between the two nations’ air arms.  Portal had seen this as an urgent 
requirement, and had pressed Chaney in August of 1941 to designate representatives from 
SPOBS to begin working with their British counterparts in developing a more comprehensive 
policy for cooperation.  Chaney had agreed and promised Portal that he would designate 
representatives in the near future.37  However, consumed by the Atlantic Conference, the 
incorporation of Britain into the Victory Program, and the Harriman-Beaverbrook Mission to the 
Soviet Union, the Special Observers and their British counterparts failed to make any further 
progress in developing a comprehensive policy for cooperation between the two air forces.38    
That changed with U.S. entry into the war.  The pros ect of U.S. soldiers coming to Great 
Britain triggered for officials in the Air Ministry a sense of urgency that had not been present 
since September, 1941.  The Air Member for Supply and Organization, Air Marshal Sir C. L. 
Courtney, writing to an unidentified staff officer xpressed his concerns: 
What is regrettably lacking however, is any form of agreement in regard to the 
principles of administration of these forces in conjunction or otherwise with our 
own administrative system . . . I therefore suggest that you write to General 
Chaney, with the suggestion that these discussions hould be renewed . . . I may 
add that we have always been in some doubt as to whether these discussions 
would be likely to make much progress with the Special Observer Group as now 
constituted.  My impression is that General Chaney has little authority to finalize 
[sic] anything at all with us and that he receives little guidance from his 
authorities in the U.S.A.  You may consider it desirable to take advantage of the 
C.A.S.’s presence in Washington . . . with the object of ensuring, either that 
General Chaney receives the necessary guidance, or that a small team of U.S. Air 
officers from Washington, who have such authority, should be sent over.39  
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That Courtney was attempting to use Portal to solve the dysfunctional relationship between 
Chaney, GHQ, and the War Department reflects just how bad relations were between SPOBS 
and the agencies at home.  Courtney would get neither a clear directive for Chaney, nor a 
contingent of Air officers with the broad powers he desired.  However, through the diligent work 
of Lyon, Cozens, and many others, the coalition would ultimately have a comprehensive policy 
on cooperation between the RAF and USAAF in Britain. 
 Courtney did his part within days of articulating his concerns over both the lack of 
combined air policy and Chaney’s apparent lack of delegated authority.  Reflecting the priority 
that he accorded the development of a combined policy, Courtney created a new branch in his 
department.  Titled “Joint Organization and Maintenance (U.S. Army Air Forces)” (JOM (U.S.)), 
its stated function was “to draw up the principles for the organization and maintenance of the 
Units of the U.S. Army Air Corps [Air Forces] operating with the RAF in the United Kingdom 
and in other theatres of war.”40  To head the special branch, Courtney chose Air Comm dore G. 
E. Gibbs.  While playing an important role in JOM (U.S.) for the first few months of its life, 
Gibbs would only spend a short time with the organiz tion.  Ultimately, his assistant and 
eventual successor as head of JOM (U.S.) would do the lion’s share of the work in coordinating 
Britain’s part of the policy.  Fortunately, the man in this position had a lot of experience in 
working with SPOBS.  Cozens, the RAF officer who had been the Special Observers’ primary 
liaison to the Air Ministry for the past eight months, was selected to assist Gibbs in developing 
combined policy with the Americans.41 
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 Courtney attempted to sell Chaney on the development of combined air policy at a 
meeting between the two and their staffs on 21 January 1942.  Chaney was receptive, and the 
participants in the meeting worked out a tentative procedure for policy development.  Gibbs, 
through JOM (U.S.) would coordinate the work of all the departments of the Air Ministry 
involved in the project, as well as any War Office or Admiralty sections that the policy would 
affect.  Lyon, in turn, would coordinate the work of the USAFBI staff in reviewing British 
proposals and contributing American input for combined policy.42  After Lyon and Gibbs 
obtained the agreement of both staffs on individual sections of the policy, they were to submit 
the results of their deliberations to Chaney and Courtney, who would choose to accept or not 
accept the provisions.  If both Chaney and Courtney concurred with the draft, the procedure 
called for exchanging letters of agreement.  If problems arose, Lyon and Gibbs would go back to 
the drawing board and attempt to fix any deficiencis Courtney or Chaney identified.43  
 Over the next couple weeks, Lyon, Gibbs and Cozens coordinated the efforts of staff 
members in the directorates of the Air Ministry as well as USAFBI to draft the first sections of 
the policy for Chaney and Courtney to review.  In producing the documents, they drew upon the 
preliminary work that British staffers had created when attempting to start the policy committee 
in September, 1941.44  Chaney’s staff and their British counterparts similarly drew on the 
elements of the planning for ABC-1 and RAINBOW-5 that pertained to cooperation between the 
two air forces.  One example of this was in a section covering maintenance policy.  The 
provisions of the policy covering aircraft maintenance allocated resources and delineated 
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responsibilities between the USAAF, MAP and RAF essentially as Lyon and the British had 
planned in 1941.45  That Lyon, Gibbs, and Cozens were able to obtain the agreement of staff 
members in the Air Ministry and USAFBI about these initial provisions so quickly was a 
testament to the excellent policy foundation the two organizations had developed as a result of 
their planning work prior to Pearl Harbor.  All tha remained to get the first sections of combined 
air policy approved was to obtain the formal acceptance of Courtney and Chaney.      
 Formal acceptance, however, was not forthcoming.  By 11 February, Gibbs and Cozen 
presented the initial sections of the policy to Courtney.  Finding the arrangements acceptable, he 
signed the documents and forwarded them to Chaney for his formal approval.46  Chaney 
demurred.  In a 24 February letter to Courtney he explained why: 
 While I agree with the underlying principles, as stated therein, I think it would be 
wiser if, at this stage, these papers were accepted as preliminary drafts for the 
guidance and further study of those concerned, without any formal approval by 
yourself and me . . . therefore I suggest that the opening paragraph be amended to 
delete reference to your authority and to mine.47    
 
Gibbs had his own interpretation of why Chaney hesitated to put his authority behind the 
document: 
As you are aware, there is a great deal behind General Chaney’s reluctance to add 
his formal authority to those papers which have been agreed to by his staff.  His 
reluctance is mainly due to: 
(i) A certain peace time rigidity still existing inU.S. Army affairs that, 
were he to  give his formal approval . . .these papers would have the force of  . . . 
regulations, binding all to implicit obedience , and so exposing him to criticism by 
his superiors . . .  
(ii) Considerable sensitiveness of the U.S. Army . . . to agreeing to any 
proposals which might be construed as weakening national identify of U.S. forces 
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in the British Isles, or as implying that the U.S. Army Air Force might possibly 
operate . . . in a role subordinate to the Royal Air Force.48  
 
It was unlikely that Gibb’s second point concerned Chaney overmuch.  He was already arguing 
that U.S. pursuit aircraft needed to function under th  operational control of Fighter Command, 
just as his staff and their British counterparts had planned for in 1941.  Gibb’s first point is more 
accurate.  Chaney knew that this initial agreement would require many revisions before it could 
be finalized.  Additionally, while the War Department had sent him a directive to receive U.S. 
forces in Northern Ireland, he had no overall strategic directive from GHQ or the War 
Department to tell him what his objectives were as Commander of U.S. forces in Britain.49  As 
such, Chaney, recognizing the ambiguity of his situat on, had logical reasons for withholding his 
official acceptance of the combined policy documents.  
 Courtney reluctantly accepted Chaney’s proposal, recognizing that if he did not, it was 
unlikely that the Americans and the British would be able to make further progress in developing 
a combined air policy.  Through February and early March, Lyon, Gibbs, and Cozens worked 
with the staffs at USAFBI and the Air Ministry to develop additional sections for the policy.  By 
23 March, the first eight sections, each dealing with a discrete subject pertaining to cooperation 
between the British and U.S. air forces were ready for release. JOM (U.S.) published this first set 
of agreements in a document titled “Principles for the Operation, Organization, and Maintenance 
of U.S. Army Air Force Units operating in the same Theatre of War as the Royal Air Force,” 
with a shorter reference title of Secret Document (S.D.) 348.50   
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Chaney’s conception of the policy as a working document actually proved fruitful.  For 
months Lyon worked with JOM (U.S.), eventually headd by Cozens after the Air Ministry 
reassigned Gibbs, to revise many of the sections cotained in S.D. 348 as well as add new 
agreements.  In total, the policy addressed forty-four topics dealing with the administrative and 
logistical integration of both air forces, ranging from command relations to how the two air 
forces would link their postal systems.51  Upon its publication, it became a fundamental, though 
unofficial, policy document governing relations betw en the RAF and USAAF in Britain.52  
Eventually, after the establishment of the U.S. Eighth Air Force in the U.K, Major General Carl 
Spaatz, the Eighth Air Force Commander, would make S.D. 348 official by giving it his formal 
approval.53            
 The process of developing S.D. 348 had another effct that facilitated Anglo-American 
cooperation.  JOM (U.S.), created for the express purpose of developing S.D. 348, continued to 
serve as a conduit for collaboration between the RAF and USAAF.  After most of the Special 
Observers had left theater, Lyon and Cozens continued to work together, serving as liaisons for 
their respective services.  JOM (U.S) operated until the following winter, when the Air Ministry 
transferred its functions to a different department and the British sent Cozens to an operational 
assignment.54  S.D. 348 ultimately outlasted JOM (U.S.), serving as a living policy document 
that the Americans and the British revised throughout the war to meet current conditions.55  
 While it is clear that Chaney’s staff played a direct role in developing the fundamental 
policy for cooperation between the RAF and the USAAF in Britain, the group’s role in creating a 
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unified policy for cooperation between the U.S. Army and the British Army is less clear.  The 
War Office did issue a document in July, 1942 called “Handbook of Administrative Instructions 
for the Co-operation of the British and United States Armies in the British Isles.”56  The 
document is suspiciously similar in format and substance to S.D. 348, covering the full gamut of 
administrative arrangements necessary for the two armies to collaborate in Britain.57  However, 
there is no direct evidence linking any of Chaney’s staff to the preparation of the policy.  Given 
that there are no preparation documents for this handbook in USAFBI’s files, it is likely that S.D. 
348 merely inspired the War Office to develop its own unified policy for cooperation.  
Committees and Boards   
 While S.D. 348 and Anglo-American legal policy certainly represented important 
contributions to the Anglo-American Alliance, of equal significance was USAFBI’s participation 
in boards and committees.  Boards and committees would serve as some of the key points of 
interface for the Anglo-American alliance during the Second World War.  During the war, a 
plethora of these problem-solving bodies addressed the myriad of complex issues involved in 
fighting as a coalition.  During its brief existenc, USAFBI contributed its members to some of 
the first boards and committees designed to grapple with the challenges of fighting coalition war 
in Europe.  By doing so, the staff at USABI created some of the first institutional links between 
the British and U.S. military services.    
 Chaney’s staff had started this process in 1941 when t e British began having them 
participate in their own committees, especially those that had a direct interest in ABC-1 
planning.  Additionally, SPOBS and representatives of the War Ministry and Air Ministry had, in 
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one of their initial meetings, established combined committees designed to study problems 
pertaining to employing U.S. forces in Britain.  They designed each of these committees to deal 
with a particular category of problem, and composed each of representatives from SPOBS, the 
War Ministry, and the Air Ministry.  Although SPOBS conducted most of its work outside of 
these initial committees, they did serve as key entry points for the group to embed itself into the 
British defense establishment.58   
 The RDF policy sub-committee was one committee in which SPOBS continued 
involvement after Pearl Harbor.  Throughout December and January, Matejka continued to 
attend committee meetings and provide the American perspective regarding RDF policy.  The 
sub-committee was so successful in furthering the progress of both British and Anglo-American 
RDF policy that the Chiefs of Staff Committee decidd to expand its scope in the winter of 1942.  
By 10 February, the Chiefs of Staff changed the RDF policy Sub-Committee to the “Radio 
Policy Sub-Committee,” with the task of advising the War Cabinet on all policy matters 
concerning radio-based technology.  Ultimately, American participation in the committee 
outlasted the tenure of Chaney and his staff in theater.59   
 SPOBS and SPENAVO’s efforts to establish a combined communications policy making 
structure similarly continued after Pearl Harbor, and its fate provides as an example of how 
SPOBS and SPENAVO served as learning tools for boththe War and Navy Departments as well 
as their British counterparts. Although the War andNavy Departments designated its members in 
November, 1941, the two organizations did not set up a Washington-based communications 
board to work in conjunction with the Associated Communications Committee in London until 
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after Pearl Harbor.60  According to Annex IV of ABC-1, the Associated Communications 
Committee in London was supposed to be the “supreme controlling body with relation to 
intercommunications by radio (W/T), wire, visual, and sound affecting the armed services and 
merchant marines of the two nations.”61  However, the drafters of the document had based that 
provision on the assumption that there would be only a single committee to determine Anglo-
American communications policy and that the U.S. and Britain would jointly establish it in 
London.  With the implementation of SPOBS and SPENAVO’s suggestion that there be two 
committees came the question of which organization w uld be predominant in terms of 
determining combined policy.  The Washington board an the London committee could not 
agree on which had precedence over the other.  As are ult, from a policy making standpoint, the 
U.S. and Britain initially considered both to be equal.62 
This arrangement sufficed when the committees considered communications policy that 
was either very minor or confined to a very local area.  To address a specific question for 
communications in the U.K., like frequency allocation for U.S. forces, Matejka merely had to 
submit a letter to the London-based committee with data on the types of radios the unit would 
have and the frequencies they operated on.63  The committee would then discuss the matter and 
determine policy within its own deliberative body.64   
Determining communications policy that affected the Anglo-American alliance as a 
whole, however, proved substantially more difficult.  In order to get any proposal for combined 
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Anglo-American communications policy enacted, both rganizations had to agree to the 
proposal.  This was a very cumbersome process which fostered duplication of effort.  One 
example of this system in action was Matejka’s participation in an attempt to develop a common 
phonetic alphabet for the Anglo-American alliance.  In a cable to the War Department’s Chief 
Signal Officer, Matejka noted that the London-based committee, now known as the London 
Communications Committee (LCC), was going to consider a phonetic alphabet designed for both 
American and British army, navy, and air forces to use, based, in part, on the U.S. Army and 
Navy joint alphabet.65  Shortly before the meeting to consider the alphabet, however, Matejka 
learned from British sources that the Washington-based committee was considering a proposal to 
adopt a phonetic alphabet for all U.S. armed forces based on the British Army’s phonetic 
alphabet.  Matejka ended his note with an urgent request to the Washington-based board for its 
views on the proposal so the groups did not work at odds with one another.66  The two 
committees encountered similar difficulties in determining combined policy in other areas as 
well and, as Vernon E. Davis noted in a volume of the History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff During 
World War II, came to “a virtual impasse on several urgent matters.”67      
The whole arrangement proved too cumbersome to meet th  xigencies of war.   Matters 
that one organization should have been able to resolv , such as radio policy affecting only the 
European theater, were difficult to implement as the proposals continually passed back and forth 
across the Atlantic.  The Allies did not resolve this issue until the summer of 1942, when they 
were preparing for the invasion of North Africa.68  Seeing the need for one committee with 
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executive authority to implement policy, Britain and the United States finally established one 
“Combined Communications Board.”  Imbued with the authority to make sweeping policy 
decisions concerning Allied communications, the committee was able to delegate approval for 
local communications policy to respective theater leve  sub-committees, removing the obstacles 
to Anglo-American cooperation inherent in having two separate organizations for determining 
combined signal policy.69  
 SPOBS and SPENAVO bore much of the responsibility for the initial failure of the U.S. 
and Britain in establishing an effective system for determining combined signal policy.  The 
original Annex IV to ABC-1 called for one committee in London to determine combined 
communications policy.  It was the staff members at SPOBS and SPENAVO who proposed that 
there should be a committee in Washington as well.  Officials in Washington took this proposal 
and ran with it while the British acquiesced in order to get their Associated Communications 
Committee running as soon as possible.  U.S. and British officials may have been able to avoid 
the subsequent inefficiency of the system if all parties involved had agreed to stick to one 
committee for determining policy.  However, to be fair to the observer missions, their revision of 
Annex IV to include two committees reflected an astute awareness of the ambiguity of their 
situation in 1941.  They had no authority to make any binding commitments with the British.  
Proposing a Washington committee was probably the only way to get the Chief of Staff and 
Chief of Naval Operations to approve their participation in the London committee prior to U.S. 
entry into the war.   
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 While their proposal for two committees resulted in a failure of early policy development, 
the five months of trial and error SPOBS and SPENAVO engaged in prior to U.S. entry into the 
war saved the Allies invaluable time.  Ironically, their failure was what educated the Combined 
Chiefs of Staff as to the importance of having one rganization responsible for combined 
communications policy.  By saving the Allies time through early experimentation and by 
educating the U.S. and British Chiefs of Staff on the problems associated with having coequal 
organizations determine Allied communications policy, the two-committee system the Special 
Observer missions initiated proved to be an important milestone in developing an Anglo-
American communications program.  
 The Technical Committee, while not an Anglo-American body like the Combined 
Communications Board, proved valuable for the institutional integration of the Anglo-American 
alliance during this period.  After Pearl Harbor, it churned out detailed reports regarding the 
performance of aircraft the U.S. and the British used.  It also began to fulfill the other tasks 
delegated to it in Chaney's general order of 22 November.  From January to July its members 
facilitated the exchange of technology between the U.S. and Britain; served as an advisory board 
for Lend-Lease affairs concerned with production, experimentation, testing, maintenance, and 
supply; coordinated with representatives of American manufacturers in Great Britain on matters 
concerned with research, experimentation, procurement, production, and maintenance; and 
monitored the production, allocation, and distribution of American equipment to both Britain and 
Russia.70  The primary way that Lyon and his staff accomplished these tasks was by establishing 
                                                          
     70 SPOBS General Order Number 4, Establishment of Technical Committee, November 22, 1941, Special 
Observers General Orders, Box 3845, Administrative History 1942-1946, Historical Division, RG 498, NAR. 
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routine data gathering relationships with the various British agencies involved in aircraft testing, 
production, and maintenance.71   
 They also participated in British committees.  One of the most important of these was the 
Air Assignment Sub-Committee of the London Munitions Assignment Board.  The London 
Munitions Assignment board and its Washington counter-part were responsible for deciding 
where to allocate Lend-Lease materials among the Alli d forces.72  The Air Assignment Sub-
committee dealt specifically with aircraft.  At each of the meetings, representatives from the Air 
Ministry, MAP, each of the British Dominions, and Lyon or one of his representatives examined 
world-wide requirements for aircraft among British forces.  The subcommittee then decided 
which requests the board should approve and subsequently submitted their recommendations to 
the London Munitions Assignment Board.73 
 Lyon and the Technical Committee continued to fulfill all of these functions down to 
June, 1942.  When Eisenhower replaced Chaney as the theater commander, Lyon was one of the 
few original members of SPOBS to remain.  Almost immediately after Eisenhower took over, the 
Technical Committee lost most of its duties involving operational maintenance and increasingly 
focused on its research and Lend-Lease mission, although Lyon continued to oversee the 
maintenance efforts of the advance elements of the Eighth Air Service Command.74  Once the 
main body of the command arrived in July, now Brigadier General Lyon (the War Department 
                                                          
     71 "Nature of Duties and Scope of Authority in the Case of Brigadier General Alfred J. Lyon, January 29, 1943, 
Box 2 Correspondence, Dahlquist Papers, USAHEC. 
     72 Richard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940-1943, (Washington D.C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955), 253-55.   
     73 For example of meetings, see Air Assignment Sub-Committee (U.K.), Notes of 2nd meeting held on 10th April 
1942, Air Assignment Sub-Committee, Box 2140, AG, R498, NARA.  See Leighton and Coakley, Global 
Logistics and Strategy, 1940-1943, 253-55; and H. Duncan Hall, C. C. Wrigley, and J. D. Scott, Studies of Overseas 
Supply (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1956), 253-61 for the Munitions Assignment Boards assignment 
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promoted him in May) in cooperation with the staff from the Eighth Air Service Command, 
divided up responsibilities between the service command and the Technical Committee, 
identifying which divisions within the Air Ministry and MAP the two would have responsibility 
for coordinating with.75  This delineation of duties marked the end of both Lyon's and the 
Technical Committee's involvement in matters pertaining to the coordination of aviation logistics 
between British and U.S. agencies.  The group, now known as the "Air Technical Section," 
focused completely on its Lend-Lease duties and observation of British and American equipment 
on campaign, continuing to send periodic reports back to the War Department.76  
 The Technical Committee was one among many systems Chaney and his staff established 
to effect organizational integration between the U.S. and British militaries, systems that they had 
inaugurated in 1941.  Lyon’s work on the Technical Committee ensured that the exchange of 
technical information between U.S. and British force became more rational and organized.  After 
Pearl Harbor, the Technical Committee expanded its role, serving as a key node of interface 
between U.S. and British officials involved in Lend-Lease, aircraft production, and aircraft 
allocation.  Matejka’s work on the RDF sub-committee was similar in many respects.  Matejka 
began as a non-participating member, using the committee as a vehicle for sharing technical 
information about RDF between the U.S. and Britain.  After the War Department activated 
USAFBI, the RDF subcommittee, like the Technical Committee, expanded its role, serving as a 
key node of interface between U.S. and British officials involved in all matters concerning radio.  
The eventual development of the Combined Communications Board, the supreme body for 
formulating Anglo-American communications policy, also owed its existence to SPOBS and 
                                                          
     75 Technical Report, Air Technical Section, Sub: Modification of American Built Aircraft, July 23, 1942, 
Maintenance of Aircraft, Repair, & Assembly - 1942, Box 2259, AG, RG 498, NARA.   
     76 For example, see Technical Report, Air Technical Section, Sept 14, 1942, Technical Reports, 1942, Box 2068, 
AG, RG 498, NARA. 
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SPENAVO’s pre-Pearl Harbor work.  Although SPOBS and SPENAVO had developed an 
organizational structure that was unwieldy and unworkable, their efforts provided the concrete 
evidence U.S. and British officials needed to accept the need for a single policy-making board 
that had executive power for implementing coalition c mmunications policy.   
  Chaney and his staff also played a significant role in policy development.  Lyon’s early 
work in developing Anglo-American aviation logistics policy in support of RAINBOW-5 
highlighted the need for a wide ranging policy for c operation between the RAF and USAAF.  
Courtney eventually developed an organization to develop this policy, and through JOM (U.S.), 
Lyon, Gibbs, and Cozens coordinated the work of both U.S. and British staff sections to create 
S.D. 348, a document that served as the fundamental basis of cooperation between the RAF and 
USAAF in Britain.  Chaney’s contribution was to make the document a living document, easily 
changed to meet contemporary needs.  No less significa t was Special Observers’ work on legal 
policy.  Dahlquist’s work began as a result of his attendance at a cocktail party prior to Pearl 
Harbor.  By the time the U.S. entered the war, he had developed a plan for an interim policy for 
legal jurisdiction of U.S. forces in Britain.  This interim policy was significant because it took 
U.S. and British officials months to hammer out a final agreement.  
 These policies and systems were manifest effects of USAFBI’s work in Britain, but they 
rested on a foundation of latent knowledge and experience.  The SPOBS staff and their British 
counterparts had to figure out what policies and systems the coalition needed and how these 
policies and systems had to work   When the Special Observers arrived in England, neither the 
British, nor the U.S. had the systems needed to wage coalition war with one another.  The 
British, although their war organization was substantially more mature, had only a few tenuous 
connections with the U.S. before SPOBS began its work.  U.S. war organization was in a much 
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worse condition, with command organization being so bad that Chaney had his staff actually 
found it easier to work with the British than their own parent government.  It was Chaney and his 
staff that began to actually embed themselves in the British defense establishment in the pre-
Pearl Harbor period and began the preliminary work in developing these systems and polices. 
When the U.S. entered the war, Chaney’s staff and their British counterparts largely expanded 
upon work that had already begun in 1941.  By no means can we ascribe all or even most of the 
machinery through which the coalition ultimately waged war to the Special Observers.  
However, they, along with the British counterparts, created some of the first systemic 
connections between the military forces of the two nations, connections future organizations 











Chapter 10: Planning for Operations BOLERO and ROUNDUP  
On 7 December 1941, Colonel Ray W. Barker was serving as commander of the 30th 
Field Artillery at Camp Roberts, California.  Barke’s unit was one of many that were swept up 
in the panic that ensued on the west coast in the af ermath of Pearl Harbor.  For a period of two 
months, Barker and his men shifted up and down the coast in an attempt to foil Japanese raids on 
the continental United States.  Recalling this time period, what Barker remembered most was, 
“the almost chaotic fears that seemed to prevail through the populace.”1  
 After chasing phantoms throughout California, Barker’s career took a surprising turn.  
On 7 February 1942, he received a cryptic telegram directing him to report to the New York port 
of embarkation (NYPE) without delay and to be prepad for service in a temperate climate.2  He 
turned over his regiment to his second-in-command and was on a train to Fort Dix, New Jersey, 
headquarters for NYPE, within forty-eight hours.  Barker stopped in Washington D.C. enroute 
and called on General Robert Melville Danford, the Chief of Field Artillery, in an attempt to find 
out where he was going and what he was going to be doing.  Danford told him, “I’m afraid this 
may interfere with your expected promotion,” (Danford had previously told Barker he was to be 
promoted to Brigadier General) “I was called upon t designate an officer to take over the 
artillery section at a large headquarters being organized in London for operations in Europe.  
That’s about all I can tell you.”3  Little did Danford know that there was, in fact, no artillery 
section to take over, as Barker was to be the first field artillery officer to be assigned to USAFBI.   
                                                          
     
1 Interview between General Ray W. Barker and Maclyn Burg on July 15, 1972, for Dwight D. Eisenhower 
Library, on file at Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, 25.    
     2 Ibid. 
     3 Ibid., 26. 
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Barker didn’t seem to mind that the assignment might deny him advancement, telling 
Danford “Well, never mind about the promotion part of it, if I can just go where the war is.”4  
Barker had been to England numerous times and was confident that he would do well there.  He 
proceeded to Fort Dix and met other officers the War Department had selected to supplement the 
meager number of personnel USAFBI had in its staff.  Shortly after arriving, the War 
Department sent Barker and a few others ahead of the rest to the British Isles on a Pan American 
aircraft by way of Bermuda, the Azores, and Lisbon.5    
Barker spent his first days at USAFBI serving as the artillery planner on Chaney’s staff 
but was soon selected to serve in a position that would eventually have him at the center of 
Anglo-American planning for the cross-channel invasion.  After McNarney’s departure, and 
Bolte’s subsequent elevation to Chief of Staff, Dahlquist was supposed to have taken Bolte’s 
place as the group’s plans officer.  However, the War Department failed to provide the additional 
staff that Dahlquist had requested, forcing him to retain his responsibilities as G-1 and leaving 
USAFBI without a dedicated plans officer for months.  Chaney’s staff felt this absence keenly 
during Marshall’s visit to London, which happened shortly after Barker and the other staff 
members had arrived in England.  Barker quickly went from heading the SPOBS artillery section 
to assuming Bolte’s old job.   When asked why he had been selected for the job as head of the 
plans section, Barker responded, “Because I happened to be standing there, and there was no one 
else available . . . I was told out of the blue oneday that I was designated as head of the War 
Plans Section, and I was directed to report to General Marshall at 2:00 o’clock . . . at Combined 
Operations Headquarters.”6   Barker noted, “From this time on, then, my involvement with the 
                                                          
     4 Ibid. 
     5 Ibid., 29. 
     
6 Ibid., 31.  Combined Operations Command was a headquarters composed of representatives from the three
British military services.  It primary function was to provide training for amphibious warfare and to plan and execute 
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planning for operations in northwest Europe was continuous.”7  Thus, the shortage of resources 
that USAFBI had been coping with throughout the group’s existence placed Barker on the path 
to one of the most significant planning efforts in h story.   
Barker represents a direct physical link between USAFBI and subsequent planning 
efforts for an invasion of Western Europe.   But he was only one of many connections that 
bridged the gap that existed between RAINBOW-5 and MAGNET and planning for the cross-
channel invasion.  After Marshall’s visit and the British acceptance of his scheme for a cross-
channel attack, members of Chaney’s staff, including Barker, began participating in Anglo-
American planning committees for operation BOLERO, the build-up of U.S. forces in Britain, 
and operation ROUNDUP, the initial scheme for an invasion of German occupied France.  Their 
work on these committees served a vital role in continuing the planning dialogue that had taken 
place in the U.K. between the British and the Americans, providing an avenue through which 
they could harness the effects of their prior planning work and pass on the experience they had 
gained over the past year to organizations that would inherit responsibility for Anglo-American 
war-planning in Britain.  
The Combined Commanders, OPD, and Planning to Return to the Continent   
 Planning for a return to continental Europe had begun almost immediately after the 
British evacuated Dunkirk in 1940.8  Indeed, the British returned to the continent many times, 
temporarily at least, conducting numerous raids.  However, the lack resources they had at their 
disposal after the fall of France limited their initial efforts to “a few raids by a few men on a few 
                                                          
raids on the coasts of Europe.  See Combined Operations Command, Combined Operations: The Official Story of 
the Commandos (New York: Macmillan, 1943), vii.  
     7 Ibid. 
     8 Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume I, 175. 
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unimportant enemy posts.”9  As Britain’s strength grew, so grew the strength of the raids.10  But 
in December 1941, the Commonwealth forces still did not have the strength to carry out an 
attack that would result in a permanent lodgment on the coast of Europe.11  
 That, however, did not prevent the British Joint Planning Staff from examining how 
Commonwealth forces could conduct an assault on the continent if supplied with sufficient 
resources.  By 24 December 1941, the group had developed a plan for landing a force on the 
Continent called “Operation ROUNDUP.”12  The planners had developed the study primarily to 
identify the fundamental problems that a force would encounter when attempting an amphibious 
invasion of the European coast as well as to determin  the administrative and material 
preparations required for a return to the continent.  They were forthright in admitting that their 
scheme was “not yet a practicable proposition,” as it was based on the premise that Germany no 
longer had any prospect for victory and had adopted a strategy of withdrawal and resistance to 
dissuade the Allies from invading the German homeland.13  However, they recommended that 
the Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces, in conjunction with the Naval and Air Commanders-in-
Chief and the Special Operations Executive (SOE), conduct a detailed study of the problems they 
had identified, as they would be the primary executors of a continental invasion as well as any 
attendant supporting operations.14  
For the next four months, General Sir Bernard Paget, now Commander-in-Chief Home 
Forces, Admiral Sir Bertram H. Ramsay, and Air Marsh l Sholto Douglas began working 
                                                          
     
9
 Combined Operations Command, Combined Operations, 2. 
     
10 Ibid. 
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 Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume I, 175. 
     12 J.P. (41) 1028 Operation “Round-up” Report by the Joint Planning Staff, CAB 79/17, BNA; and Horst Boog, 
Gerhard Krebs, and Detlef Vogel, Germany and the Second World War, Volume VII: The Strategic Air War and the 
War in the West and East Asia 1943-1944/5 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006), 479.  
     
13 J.P. (41) 1028 Operation “Round-up” Report by the Joint Planning Staff, CAB 79/17, BNA. 




together informally to examine the problems the Joint Planning Staff had identified in their study 
as well as develop their own plans for continental invasion.  Eventually, the Combined Chiefs of 
Staff formalized their association, calling them the “Combined Commanders.”  Vice Admiral 
Lord Louis Mountbatten, the Chief of Combined Operations, later joined their ranks.  By May, 
1942, the Combined Commanders were the principal British organization responsible for 
planning the invasion of Europe.15  
The British initially studied the problem of invading Europe from a different perspective 
than War Department planners in Washington D.C.  While “Germany first” had been the agreed 
upon policy between the British and American military services since the American-British 
Conversations, they had not fully determined how to implement this policy.  Negotiations at the 
ARCADIA Conference had highlighted different views, already broached in discussions about 
the British General Strategy Review, concerning how t  defeat Germany that fell largely along 
national lines.  British representatives at the conference proposed what would become known as 
the “peripheral strategy,” attacking at the fringes of Axis expansion, tightening the ring around 
Germany, and supporting the populations of areas the Axis occupied with arms to provide them 
with the means to resist their oppressors. Once Germany was sufficiently weak, the Allies could 
conduct a successful invasion of northwest Europe and defeat the Axis.16  U.S. representatives 
favored what would come to be known as the “direct approach.”  Many American planners 
thought that the main theater for the Allies in the west should be on the plains of northwestern 
Europe.  Fortress Europe constituted the center of German strength and, in their minds, attacking 
this center directly was the surest way of achieving ictory over the Axis.17  Both interpretations 
                                                          
     15 Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, 6. 
     
16 Higgins, Winston Churchill and the Second Front, 1940-1943, 84-86. 
     17 Ambrose, The Supreme Commander, 24. 
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envisioned sending Allied forces to Europe across the English Channel. They differed mainly in 
timing and the estimated size of the invasion force.18  
During the winter and spring of 1942, OPD planners under Eisenhower conducted their 
own parallel examination of the problems associated with conducting an invasion of Northwest 
Europe.  They developed an outline proposal in which the U.S. would concentrate forces in 
Britain for a forty-eight division attack across the channel.  The proposal also called for the 
British and the Americans to conduct an emergency operation in 1942 if Germany was severely 
weakened or the Soviet Union faced immanent defeat.  This was the proposal that Marshall and 
Hopkins carried with them to England in April, 1942, one which they were able to get Churchill 
and the British Chiefs of Staff to temporarily agree to.19              
Thus, by May, 1942, the British and the Americans toge her were analyzing three 
different major planning problems pertaining to an invasion of the continent.  One was the cross-
channel attack in 1943.  This scenario assumed the cod name for the outline plan the British JPS 
drafted in 1941, “Operation ROUNDUP.”  Another was the 1942 invasion.  Churchill dubbed 
this plan “Operation SLEDGEHAMMER.”  The third planni g problem concerned the build-up 
of combat power in Britain to support ROUNDUP.  Planners called this effort, “Operation 
BOLERO.”20  In the aftermath of Marshall’s visit to the British Isles, Chaney’s staff became 
involved in planning for ROUNDUP and BOLERO.  The staff’s participation in planning for 
                                                          
     
18 Russel F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977), 318; and Forest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Ordeal and Hope, 
1939-1942 (New York: Viking Press, 1966), 266.     
     
19 Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, 18.  The British, however, would only conduct theoperations if the conditions 
were favorable.  See Arthur Bryant, The Turn of the Tide: A History of the War Years Baed on the Diaries of Field 
Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, 1957), 287. 
     20 See Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, 6-19 for an overview of American and British planning for cross-channel 
operations up to the spring of 1942. 
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SLEDGEHAMMER was minimal, because most of them considered it to be unfeasible given the 
resources available to the Allies in Britain at theime.21  
USAFBI and Planning for BOLERO and ROUNDUP  
 Compared to officers like Barker who remained in theater after 1942, the original Special 
Observers, with the exception of Hawley, spent a rel tively short amount of time working on 
plans for Operations BOLERO and ROUNDUP. After assuming command the ETO, Eisenhower 
sent some of the original Special Observers, like Bolte, Dahlquist, Griner, and Case back to the 
states.22  Others, like Davison and Matejka, he took with him to serve on his staff in the fall of 
1942 as he led the effort to invade North Africa during Operation TORCH.23  By December, 
1942, Hawley was the only member of the original group to remain involved in planning for the 
invasion of Northwest Europe.  Given that Chaney’s staff was involved in planning for only a 
few months after Marshall’s trip to England, historians have generally ignored the group’s 
influence on planning for BOLERO and what would eventually become Operation OVERLORD. 
 The best assessment of the role Chaney’s staff played in setting the conditions for 
BOLERO and planning for a cross-channel attack is in Ronald Ruppenthal’s Logistical Support 
of the Armies, Volume I: May 1941-September1944: 
Despite their many difficulties and the fact that they were overruled on some 
matters, SPOBS and USAFBI made many positive contributions toward the 
development of the theater.  Perhaps most tangible of their accomplishments were 
the preparations they made for the first American troop arrivals and the planning 
they carried out for the reception of greater numbers later.  The reception of the 
U.S. units in Northern Ireland constituted a “preliminary canter” in which many 
of the problems that were to arise under the BOLERO build-up were resolved in 
minor form.  In making these preparations SPOBS and USAFBI established an 
early liaison with the British on all types of military matters, thus laying the 
                                                          
     
21 The group’s views on the feasibility of cross-channel operations in 1942 are examined in Chapter 11. 
     22 Burg/Bolte Interview, 167 and Dahlquist Diary, 14 September 1942. 
     23 Thompson, Harris, Oakes, and Terrett, The Signal Corps: The Test, December 1941 to July 1943, 353; John C. 
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322 
 
foundation for one of the most intimate collaborations ever achieved by two 
allies.24   
 
Nothing that Ruppenthal says is wrong, however his assessment is somewhat myopic.  His focus 
on Northern Ireland obscures the significance of the entire planning process Chaney’s staff 
participated in with their British counterparts.  As such, his analysis does not capture the extent 
to which SPOBS/USAFBI’s planning work facilitated common understanding regarding the 
problems American and British planners would have to solve to build up combat power for a 
cross-channel attack.   
  Chaney’s staff bridged the gap between their earlier work and planning for the build-up 
of U.S. forces in Britain through their participation in two organizations designed to carry out 
planning for BOLERO and ROUNDUP: the BOLERO Combined Committee and the 
ROUNDUP Administrative Planning Staff.  The BOLERO Combined Committee (London), was 
a counterpart organization to another BOLERO Committee hat the War Department had formed 
in Washington D.C.  The primary mission of the Washington-based BOLERO Committee was to 
develop plans for shipping U.S. forces and equipment across the Atlantic to Britain.25  The 
mission of the BOLERO Combined Committee (London) was “to prepare plans and make 
administrative preparation for the reception, accommodation, and maintenance of United States 
Forces in the United Kingdom and for the development of the United Kingdom in accordance 
with the requirements of the ‘ROUNDUP’ plan.”26  Participants developed most of these plans in 
the BOLERO Combined Committee’s various sub-committees, each divided along functional 
                                                          
     24 Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume I, 50. 
     25 Bykofsky and Larson, The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas, 71. 
     26 BCC(L) Minutes, 6th Meeting, 26 May 1942, ETO Pre-invasion 322; quoted in and Ruppenthal, Logistical 
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lines to deal with particular problems associated with the build-up of U.S. combat power in 
Britain:27 
Where the BOLERO Committee’s main concern was the rec ption and accommodation 
of U.S. combat power in Britain, the ROUNDUP Administrative Planning Staff’s mission was to 
coordinate “the detailed administrative arrangements which must be made . . . in order to enable 
the plans of the Combined Commanders for offensive operations on the Continent of Europe.”28  
Like the BOLERO Committee, the ROUNDUP Administrative Planning Staff organized 
numerous subsections, each responsible for a particul r problem associated with administrative 
or logistical preparations for an invasion of Europe.  Where it differed was in the number of 
separate sections involved.  Instead of having five major subcommittees conduct detailed 
planning like the BOLERO Committee, the ROUNDUP Administrative Planning Staff divided 
itself into thirty-nine separate sections, a reflection of the complicated logistics requirements for 
conducting an amphibious invasion.29  As both the BOLERO Committee and the ROUNDUP 
Administrative Planning Staff dealt with logistical preparations that would enable a cross 
channel attack to occur, there was considerable overlap in terms of function.  To prevent the 
development of conflicting logistics plans, the main committees and sub-committees from each 
planning group maintained a coordinating relationship with one another.30  Together, the 
committees were supposed to cover all aspects of logistical planning pertaining to the 
establishment of U.S. combat power in Britain as well as the subsequent cross-channel attack. 
                                                          
     27 The sub-committees were: Supply, Movement and Transportation, Accommodations, Medical Service, and 
Labor.  See Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume I, 61-63. 
     28 “ROUND-UP” Administrative Planning Staff, Terms of Reference, Composition, and Section Organization, 
File 437 “Round Up” Adm. Planning Staff, 2 of 2, Pre-invasion planning files, RG 407, NARA. 
     29 Ibid. 
     30 Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume I, May 194-September 1944, 63. 
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Chaney’s staff, along with their British counterparts drew on the effects of their earlier 
work in their attempts to solve problems associated with BOLERO and ROUNDUP, beginning 
this process in May with their participation in the BOLERO Committee.  Bolte, McClelland, 
Barker, and Griner attended the first meeting of the committee on 5 May to discuss how the staff 
at USAFBI would participate in planning for BOLERO.  Sir Findlater Stewart, Chairman of the 
British Home Defense Committee, chaired the meeting while representatives from the principle 
supply and logistics agencies of the British military services sat in attendance.  The British 
representatives collectively argued that U.S. representation was essential on the main committee 
and urged the Americans to identify regular U.S. memb rs that could attend.  Bolte responded 
that he agreed.  However, because USAFBI was still in he process of establishing its own 
logistics organization, he was unable to identify exactly who would serve as the U.S. 
representatives for the committee.31  He promised Stewart and the other representatives that he 
would ask Washington to send representatives at the earliest possible moment.32   
In the meantime Chaney’s staff served as the U.S. points of continuity for both the 
BOLERO Committee and the ROUNDUP Administrative Planning Staff.  Griner and Barker 
were the principle U.S. representatives for both planning efforts.33  This allowed them to help 
insure that the two groups did not develop plans that would conflict with one another.  Other 
staff members participated in meetings as well, attending when the planning groups discussed 
issues that pertained to their particular areas of expertise.34  Additionally, Chaney’s staff were 
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active participants in various subcommittees and sections that were subordinate to the BOLERO 
Committee and ROUNDUP Administrative Planning Staff.35   
  Chaney’s staff and their British counterparts bridged the gap between RAINBOW-5 and 
preparations for BOLERO and ROUNDUP by drawing on bth the manifest and latent effects of 
their earlier planning work.  In terms of strictly manifest effects, the Anglo-American coalition 
continued to use many plans and policies that SPOBS/USAFBI had been involved in developing 
during the build-up of U.S. forces in Britain.  By the autumn of 1942, Dahlquist’s initial efforts 
to establish a policy for legal jurisdiction for U.S. force in Britain bore fruit with Parliament 
passing the United States of America (Visiting Forces) Act, 1942.36  The fundamental agreement 
that governed cooperation between the RAF and USAAF in Britain remained S.D. 348, a set of 
policies Lyon and the rest of Chaney’s staff had developed with their British counterparts over 
the winter and spring of 1942.37  The theater staff continued to maintain representation on the 
Radio Policy Subcommittee long after Matejka stopped b ing the Theater Signal Officer.38  The 
Technical Committee (later referred to as the Air Technical Section) Lyon and the other Special 
Observers established continued to facilitate the exchange of technical information between the 
British and the Americans, while also making recommendations on what type of aviation 
technology the U.S. should employ as part of BOLERO and in operations against the continent.39  
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The definitions Bolte developed for “strategic direction” and “operational control” continued to 
serve as the basis for command relations between U.S. and British Forces in the ETO.40    
Additionally, new plans and policies developed for BOLERO and ROUNDUP drew on a 
combination of the manifest and latent effects of the group’s prior planning work with the 
British.  In some cases, the BOLERO Committee and ROUNDUP Administrative Planning Staff 
were able to incorporate and expand on prior plans that Chaney’s staff and their British 
counterparts developed in 1941 and 1942.  More significa t, however, was the fact that the 
members of the BOLERO Committee and ROUNDUP Administrative Planning Staff were 
developing plans to solve the same types of problems that Chaney’s staff and their British 
counterparts, who were also involved in the planning committees, had examined repeatedly since 
May, 1941.  Thus they began the planning process for BOLERO and ROUNDUP with an 
understanding of the problems associated with establi hing U.S. combat power in Britain.         
To be sure, the abandonment of RAINBOW-5 as the strategic plan for the British Isles 
made much of their previous work obsolete.  While th  USAAF still planned to place much of its 
assets in Eastern Command, the shift in strategy to a cr ss-channel invasion required the 
Americans and the British to analyze a completely nw area of Britain for staging U.S. forces: 
Southern Command.  British and American officials ba ed their selection of Southern Command 
on a planning assumption that ROUNDUP planners had m e concerning the relative position of 
U.S. forces in any assault on the continent.  To simplify command and control and logistics, the 
planners placed American forces on the right flank of the invasion force and British forces on the 
left. This simple arrangement had significant consequences concerning logistics.  With the 
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Americans on the right flank, they would have to embark using England’s southwestern ports.  
Thus, Southern Command was the most logical area to b se the Americans, as it was in the line 
of communications between the western ports U.S. forces would be using to enter Britain and the 
southwestern ports from which they would invade the continent.  Basing the Americans in 
Southern Command would also prevent cross traffic between U.S. and British forces during 
embarkation.41  Prior to the adoption of a cross-channel attack as a strategy, Chaney’s staff and 
their British counterparts had done no planning for incorporating U.S. forces into Southern 
Command. 
Although Chaney and his staff had not developed plans for basing U.S. forces in 
Southern Command specifically, integrating U.S. forces into British operational schemes was an 
issue that Chaney’s staff and their British counterparts had examined repeatedly.  They first 
examined this problem with representatives from the War Office and the Iceland Force during 
the summer of 1941 as part of planning for INDIGO.  The process of determining how to 
integrate the initial set of U.S. forces to arrive in Iceland as well as synchronizing subsequent 
U.S. arrivals with British withdrawals required the Special Observers and the staff at the War 
Office to become intimately familiar with the capabilities and limitations of British and 
American military units.42  The Special Observers and their British counterparts engaged in this 
type of analysis for the other RAINBOW-5 task forces as well.   From May to December, 1941, 
SPOBS conducted joint planning with the staffs at Fighter Command, Bomber Command, the 
Air Ministry, South Eastern Command, Eastern Command, BTNI, NID, Home Forces, and the 
War Office, to determine how to integrate U.S. troops, equipment, vehicles, and aircraft, into 
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British military areas.43  The staff at USAFBI put the experience they gained i  their prior 
planning efforts with the British to good use during MAGNET, working with the staffs at BTNI, 
NID, Home Forces, and the War Office to develop plans for replacing British with U.S. forces 
while ensuring adequate combat power remained to defen  Northern Ireland.44  Concurrently, the 
USAFBI staff worked with the staffs at Fighter Command, Bomber Command, and the Air 
Ministry, to determine how to incorporate U.S. aviation assets into areas the RAF already 
occupied.45  As planning transitioned from Chaney’s staff to Eisenhower’s, the Americans, along 
with the staffs at Home Forces, the War Office, Fighter Command, Bomber Command, and the 
Air Ministry examined the same type of problem when co ducting planning to integrate U.S. 
forces into base areas in Southern Command and Eastern Command.46  As such, both the 
American and British staffs had experience gained from a year of developing plans to integrate 
U.S. forces into British operational schemes that tey could apply to preparations for BOLERO 
and ROUNDUP. 
Additionally, many elements from SPOBS/USAFBI’s prior plans with the British made it 
into subsequent plans for building up U.S. forces in Britain.  While basing U.S. forces in 
Southern Command was a completely new planning concept, plans that Chaney and his staff had 
developed for basing U.S. bomber forces remained largely intact.  The majority of the U.S. 
Bomber forces remained in the vicinity of Eastern Command, utilizing all eight airfields SPOBS 
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had surveyed and selected with the British, incorporating more as the USAAF presence grew in 
size.47  The U.S. also continued to use all three aircraft maintenance depots that Lyon and been 
instrumental in establishing as part of prior plans for RAINBOW-5 and the establishment of the 
USAAF in Britain48 
Anglo-American planners also incorporated prior plans for receiving and transporting 
U.S. forces in Britain into preparations for BOLERO and ROUNDUP.  In this area, the policies 
that Napier, in consultation with Griner and Middleswart, had developed for MAGNET had a 
direct influence on BOLERO planning.  The committee m mbers elected to maintain the system 
of liaison that he had developed for MAGNET, the only change being that the BOLERO 
Committee wanted the War Office to keep the committee informed of all arrangements it made 
regarding force movements for BOLERO.49 
U.S. and British participants in the BOLERO Committee and ROUNDUP Administrative 
Planning Staff were also able to draw on the experience Chaney’s staff and their British 
counterparts in the War Office had from their work in movement planning in 1941 and early 
1942.  The problem of how to transport and receive U.S. combat power was a planning problem 
that Chaney’s staff and their British counterparts had examined repeatedly.  Griner conducted 
planning with Napier and other representatives from the War Office Directorate of Movements 
to solve the problem of how to move American forces to Iceland and how to receive U.S. troops 
and equipment at British controlled ports.50  Griner worked with Napier again in the autumn of 
1941, to determine how much American equipment, in the form of Lend-Lease, Britain could 
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receive at a given time.  This time, their planning effort included officials from the Ministry of 
War Transport.51  Griner worked with Napier and other officials from the Directorate of 
Movements on a similar problem once again in the winter of 1942, this time in developing plans 
to transport and receive U.S. forces as part of operation MAGNET.52  By late spring 1942, 
Griner, as well as Napier, and other representatives from the Directorate of Movements and the 
Ministry of War Transport found themselves trying to solve the same sorts of problems they had 
worked on before, albeit on a much larger scale, as members of the BOLERO Committee, the 
BOLERO Movement and Transportation Sub-Committee, and the ROUNDUP Administrative 
Planning Staff.53  Thus, the U.S. and British participants came to these planning groups already 
aware of the capabilities, constraints, and limitations associated with the problem of receiving 
and transporting U.S. forces in British controlled t rritory.   
Anglo-American war planners similarly took many of the supply plans SPOBS/USAFBI 
developed with the British and applied them to BOLERO and ROUNDUP.  Shipping priorities 
for BOLERO favored combat units over logistics organiz tions, making it necessary for planners 
to expand Middleswart’s program of relying on British organizations to provide supply services 
for U.S. forces.54  Limited shipping space also prompted them to maintain Middleswart’s policy 
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of purchasing as many supplies as possible in the U.K.55  Planners in the U.K. also adopted the 
logistics model Chaney’s staff had developed for Nothern Ireland and applied it to the rest of 
Great Britain, establishing “base sections” that corresponded closely to the British home 
commands.56 
In addition to having Middleswart’s supply plans as a tarting point, the members of the 
BOLERO Committee and ROUNDUP Administrative Planning Staff were able to draw on the 
experience they had gained in developing Anglo-American supply programs over the course of a 
year.  Supplying U.S. forces in British controlled t rritory was a problem that Chaney’s staff and 
their British counterparts had examined continuously.  Planning for the maintenance of U.S. 
forces in Iceland had forced the British and the Americans to learn about one another’s’ supply 
requirements and supply systems.  After conducting supply planning for Iceland, Griner, 
Middleswart, Matejka, Coffey, Davison, Lyon, and Welsh (later Hawley), continued working 
with the principle supply agencies for the War Office and the Air Ministry: QMG and the 
Department of the Air member for Supply and Organiztion (AMSO).  Planning a supply 
program for the RAINBOW-5 task forces significantly expanded the list of agencies they 
conducted planning with: MAP, the Ministry of Food, the Board of Trade, the Ministry of 
Supply, the Ministry of Agriculture and Lands, and the supply staffs of Eastern Command, South 
Eastern Command, BTNI, and NID.57  Chaney’s staff and their British counterparts were able to 
draw on a portion of RAINBOW-5 planning as well as their planning experience to implement a 
supply program for MAGNET, which in turn served as the basis for BOLERO’s initial supply 
program.  Additionally, many of the agencies they had conducted supply planning with over the 
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course of the year were the same agencies that they and their successors conducted supply 
planning with for BOLERO and ROUNDUP, allowing the British and the Americans to draw on 
a shared understanding of the issues pertaining to supplying U.S. forces in the U.K. to develop 
programs for BOLERO and ROUNDUP.58 
BOLERO planners also drew on prior analysis the staff a  SPOBS/USAFBI had 
conducted with QMG when determining construction requirements for U.S. forces coming to 
Britain.  Planning for RAINBOW-5 and MAGNET had identified the problems the Americans 
and the British would face if they attempted to rely too much on new construction for American 
forces.  Shortages of imported materials, such as timber and steel, as well as labor remained.59  
Davison, well aware of these limitations, served as the initial negotiator with the British 
concerning matters of construction on both the main BOLERO Committee and the 
Accommodation Subcommittee.60  Taking a cue from Operation MAGNET, the American and 
British members of the committee decided that the best course of action was to attempt to meet 
as much of the U.S. accommodation requirements as possible through transfer of existing British 
structures to American forces, with Davison asserting hat what remained should constitute the 
construction program for U.S. forces.61  Delays in supply shipments because of the invasion of 
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North Africa, led the staff at SOS to continue to rely on buildings transferred from the British to 
accommodate American forces as USAFBI had during MAGNET.62 
The awareness that participants in the BOLERO Committee and Accommodations 
Subcommittee had regarding the limitations the Allies would face in accommodating U.S. forces 
in Britain was the result of a year-long process in which Chaney’s staff and their British 
counterparts repeatedly examined this issue.  Once again, planning for Iceland set the template 
for what followed.  Davison, Benoy, and other officials from QMG as well as the quartering staff 
from Curtis’ command jointly examined what facilities were available for U.S. forces to occupy 
in Iceland and developed a construction program to cover the shortfalls.  Although SPOBS’ 
construction calculations were flawed, the planning process provided both sides with an 
awareness of the limitations they would face in attempting to implement a construction program 
for U.S. forces in the North Atlantic region.  The process also familiarized both parties with one 
another’s different standards for construction and ccommodations.63   
 Accommodation and construction planning for the remaining RAINBOW-5 task forces 
brought in additional British agencies.  For U.S. pursuit forces in Northern Ireland and Scotland, 
the Special Observers, with Cozens and Benoy, had to conduct joint analysis and negotiations 
with the Air Ministry Directorate of War Organization, MAP, and the administrative staffs of 
Fighter Command, RAF in Northern Ireland, and BTNI as well as QMG.64  For U.S. 
bombardment forces, the Special Observers conducted joint facility and construction analysis 
with the administrative staff at Bomber Command as well as QMG and the staff at the Air 
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Ministry.65  Preparations for the Token Force required the Special Observers to look at the 
problem of procuring and constructing facilities for U.S. forces with the administrative staffs at 
Home Forces and South Eastern Command.66 Finally, construction and accommodation planning 
for the Base Area involved planning with the Ministry of Food, the Ministry of Supply, the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Lands, and the administrative staff at Home Forces.67     
The staff at USAFBI and their British counterparts continued to examine the problem of 
construction and accommodations with the concurrent preparations for Operation MAGNET and 
the establishment of the USAAF in Britain.  Drawing on knowledge they had gained from 
planning with Chaney’s staff in 1941, the British developed and implemented a plan to house 
American troops that arrived in Northern Ireland while Lyon and Brigadier General Ira C. Eaker, 
the officer selected to command U.S. Bomber Command, coordinated with the Air Ministry and 
MAP to build depots and airfield facilities for inbound aviation units.68  By the time the USAFBI 
staff and their British counterparts established the BOLERO Combined Committee and the 
ROUNDUP Administrative Planning Staff, they had spent almost a year examining ways to 
solve the same type of accommodation and construction problems they faced when planning for 
the build-up of U.S. forces in the British Isles during BOLERO.69 
 Hawley adapted much of the data he had collected in his and Welsh’s prior medical 
planning to meet the needs of BOLERO and ROUNDUP.  He began meeting with medical 
officials in the British Army to discuss medical plans for the two operations before the BOLERO 
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Committee and ROUNDUP Administrative Planning Staff had even formed, fitting given his 
proactive and aggressive nature.  When they formed, h  became a key figure in both.70  After 
studying World War I casualty rates, casualty rates for the British Army in the interwar years, 
and casualty rates for fighting in France, Norway, and North Africa, he refined the basis for 
calculating total hospital beds required that he and Welsh had used throughout medical planning 
for RANBOW-5 and MAGNET.  Instead of using a flat requirement of ten percent of the total 
force as the requirement for hospital beds he calculated percentages based on discrete categories 
of casualties.  He now calculated that the U.S. Army would only need to use the ten percent 
figure for the total number of troops actually committed to combat.  The U.S. Army could meet 
its medical needs prior to the invasion with hospital capacity for four percent of the ground force 
and five and a half percent for the USAAF.71  He also slightly reduced his estimate of the 
percentage of soldiers who would be hospitalized for non-battle injuries and increased the theater 
evacuation policy from 120 to 180 days.72   
Hawley’s revision was also a reflection of the challenges he and his British counterparts 
faced in procuring enough hospital space to meet the needs of the enlarged American forces that 
were to come as a part of Operation BOLERO, challenges he and Welsh had identified early on 
in RAINBOW-5 planning.  As part of their planning for RAINBOW-5, Welsh and Hawley found 
that the Royal Army Medical Corps and British Emergency Medical Services did not have 
enough facilities to transfer to the U.S. Army to meet its medical needs.  Consequently, Hawley 
identified hospital construction as the biggest medical problem that the U.S. Army would face in 
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attempting to establish its forces in Britain.73  The change in strategy and the drastically 
increased troop numbers only exacerbated this problem.  With limited shipping to send 
construction supplies and labor for building, Hawley had to develop a more realistic figures for 
providing medical support to the U.S. Army in Britain. 
In addition to these major planning problems, each member of Chaney’s staff continually 
worked with their opposites in British organizations to identify and solve problems specific to 
their areas of expertise that helped U.S. and British staffs prepare to plan for BOLERO and 
ROUNDUP.  With experts from the War Office, the Air Ministry, the Admiralty, and the 
Wireless Telegraphy Board, Matejka developed communications plans and policies for the 
RAINBOW-5 task forces and MAGNET that provided all involved with an awareness of the 
issues involved with integrating U.S. and British communications systems.74  Coffey worked 
with his British counterparts in the Royal Army Ordnance Corps, Royal Army Service Corps, 
and Royal Engineers to develop ordnance programs to support SPOBS/USAFBI’s plans.75  
Hinman and his replacement A. A. Bradshaw worked with the War Office Directorate of Anti-
Aircraft and Coast Defense and antiaircraft staff sections in the geographic commands to develop 
plans for integrating U.S. anti-aircraft units into the British defenses as part of their planning for 
RAINBOW-5 and MAGNET.76  Dahlquist worked with a plethora of British organizations to 
develop plans regarding personnel administration and soldier welfare in the British Isles to 
support RAINBOW-5 and MAGNET.77  By conducting this planning throughout their time in 
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Britain, each of these officers, along with Griner, Middleswart, Davison, Hawley, Lyon, and 
their counterparts in British organizations, became familiar with issues that they later 
encountered in planning for BOLERO and ROUNDUP.78 
 In sum, Chaney’s staff, in working with their British counterparts over the course of a 
year identified the principal problems associated with a build-up of U.S. forces in Britain.  
Planning for the U.S. relief of Iceland, the RAINBOW-5 task forces, MAGNET, and the 
establishment of the USAAF in Britain was integral to this process.  In attempting to solve these 
similar problems, SPOBS/USAFBI and their British counterparts identified the capabilities, 
limitations, and constraints that affected the establishment of U.S. combat power in Britain, 
continually gathered and updated relevant data, determined which organizations had to be 
involved in solving specific problems, and created plans others could draw elements from for 
future efforts, preventing their successors from having to start from scratch.   
Although plans had changed repeatedly and Chaney’s staff only worked on the BOLERO 
and ROUNDUP for a few months, their continuous planning dialogue with the British, coupled 
with their reports back to the War Department provided all involved with a shared understanding 
of the problems inherent in establishing U.S. combat power in the U.K.  In essence, what 
SPOBS/USAFBI did over the course of the year with the British was maintain a running estimate 
of requirements for waging Anglo-American coalition war from the British Isles.  While 
Chaney’s staff and their British counterparts had set out to make very specific plans for very 
specific purposes, some of which they later incorporated into preparations for BOLERO and 
ROUNDUP, the latent effect of their efforts was to develop a combined continuous assessment 
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of the operational environment in Britain, an assesment that they, their British counterparts, and 
War Department planners were able to draw upon eachtime the strategic concept for employing 
U.S. forces in Britain changed.   
USAFBI’s Successors 
The BOLERO Combined Committee and the ROUNDUP Administrative Planning Staff 
served as the mechanisms to transfer an understanding of this assessment to new members of the 
theater staff and SOS, as well as introduce them to the planning relationships that Chaney’s staff 
had already developed with the multitude of British agencies they had worked with.  While the 
British and Chaney’s staff were establishing the BOLERO Combined Committee and the 
ROUNDUP Administrative Planning Staff, USAFBI/ETOUSA finally began to receive 
additional personnel to fill the shortages the group had been experiencing its entire time in 
Britain.  The staff section heads in USAFBI/ETOUSA and SOS immediately assigned these new 
officers to the various committees and sections associated with planning for BOLERO and 
administrative and logistical preparations for ROUNDUP.79  Under the supervision of Griner and 
other members of Chaney’s staff, these officers took part in the transition from RAINBOW-
5/MAGNET to BOLERO and planning for the invasion of c ntinental Europe, becoming 
familiar with the planning problems that the original Special Observers and been attempting to 
solve with the British for over a year.    
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Barker was probably the most significant among the new officers to benefit from this 
introduction to British bureaucracy and the common understanding that Chaney’s staff shared 
with the British defense establishment.  As Barker noted, from the time he arrived in England, he 
was continuously involved in planning for operations i  Northwest Europe, long after most of 
the original Special Observer Group had left theater.  In the summer of 1942, Barker became the 
head U.S. planner for ROUNDUP.80  Although Operation TORCH, the Anglo-American 
invasion of North Africa, delayed the build-up of U.S. forces in Britain, Barker and his planning 
staff continued to examine the problems associated with cross-channel invasion.  At the 
Casablanca Conference in January, 1943, Allied leaders agreed that the time had come to 
establish a combined staff for the yet-to-be selectd ommander for the Allied invasion of 
Europe.  Until they selected a commander, the staffwould be headed by an officer known as 
“Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (Designate)” or “COSSAC” for short.81  The 
Combined Chiefs of Staff selected British Lieutenant General Sir Frederick Morgan to assume 
this position and assigned Barker as his deputy.82  Together, the two oversaw a combined Anglo-
American staff in developing the plan for Operation OVERLORD that Eisenhower would 
execute, with modifications, as head of Supreme Headqu rters Allied Expeditionary Force 
(SHAEF.).83 
In his personal account of planning for Operation OVERLORD, Morgan highlighted the 
value of Barker’s work before he came to COSSAC: 
For the past year he had been working in close conjunction with the British 
Combined Commanders on all the various projects in connection with the cross-
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channel operation.  Ray Barker was thus able to gall p strait on without missing a 
beat.  He had already met most of the personalities connected with our activities, 
and his information was up to the moment.  He was fully acquainted with all the 
complicated ins and outs of the Whitehall organization and, moreover, had no 
illusions whatever as to the difficulties that beset us.84  
 
Barker owed much of the understanding he brought to COSSAC to the preliminary work that 
Chaney’s staff had conducted with their British counterparts for almost a year before he arrived.  
It was they who determined which British organizations were connected to specific activities.  It 
was they who formed the initial planning relationship  between the elements of the British 
defense establishment and what would become the U.S. headquarters in Britain.  It was they, 
with their British counterparts, who maintained a continuous awareness of the operational 
environment in Britain.  Through the BOLERO Combined Committee and the ROUNDUP 
Administrative Planning Staff, the original Special Observers and their British counterparts 
transferred the accumulated knowledge of a year of continuous planning to Barker and other new 
members of the theater staff and SOS.85   
 SPOBS was one among many organizations that had engag d in prior planning for 
massing combat power in Britain in preparation for c mbat operations and Morgan spoke of the 
effect these prior plans had on the development of BOLERO and Operation OVERLORD: 
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 On the British side of the Channel there was already in existence a very 
considerable mass of groundwork that had been executed under the direction of 
our many generations of predecessors in the planning li e.  The more we became 
aware of what had been done, the more we came to realize that we were heirs to a 
considerable fortune . . . various ideas had sprung up, had their day, and withered 
away from various causes . . .but almost every suchidea must have left its mark . . 
. in actuality little original work was needed.  COSSAC’s first mandate, it will be 
remembered, had been to give ‘cohesion and impetus’ to the planning that had 
been going on for so long.  In fact had not planning a d preparation been carried 
out for many months before the COSSAC organization was conceived there could 
have been no possibility whatever of launching the op ration in 1944.86  
 
Morgan’s statement encapsulates the fundamental value of any planning effort.  Every plan is 
essentially an attempt to solve a particular problem or set of problems.  Morgan’s staff found 
value in this prior work because the officers befor them had been attempting to solve the same 
types of problems that COSSAC was.  The staff at COSSAC, manned by officers like Barker 
who had a clear understanding of the organizational a d operational environment in Britain, took 
bits and pieces of different plans that others had developed before and knitted them together to 
produce a plan for continental invasion.87   
Chaney and his staff’s role in BOLERO and the cross-channel invasion was a relatively 
small one.  He and most of the original Special Observers left the theater not long after planning 
for both had begun and these plans would go through multiple iterations over the next two years.  
To be sure, some of the plans and policies that SPOBS/USAFBI developed survived to be 
incorporated into BOLERO and preparations for the cross-channel attack, but it was their 
successors along with the British who would do the lion’s share of the work in massing U.S. 
combat power in the U.K. for an Allied invasion of the continent. 
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The fact that their role was small compared to those who came after them, however, does 
not mean that it was insignificant.  When they began pl nning for BOLERO and ROUNDUP, the 
group encountered many of the same planning problems that they had been examining the past 
year with the British.  Planning for RAINBOW-5, MAGNET, and the establishment of the 
USAAF in the U.K. had provided Chaney’s staff and their British counterparts with an 
awareness of issues involved with massing U.S. combat power in Britain and what it would take 
to conduct combined operations from the British Isles.  The BOLERO Combined Committee and 
the ROUNDUP Administrative Planning Staff served as mechanisms through which the original 
Special Observers and their British counterparts imparted this shared understanding as well as 
knowledge of British bureaucracy on new U.S. staff members, such as Barker, who continued 














Chapter 11: Command Relationships Revisited 
One day in mid-June, 1942 Bolte went into his office to begin his morning routine.  
Among the tasks he performed daily was to bring his papers into Chaney for approval.  This 
particular morning, after taking Bolte’s reports, Chaney sat back in his chair and said, “Well, you 
know, I’m being relieved.”1  Shocked, Bolte felt like he had been hit between th  eyes.  Chaney, 
seeing the disbelief of his subordinate, pulled out a cable from General Marshall which stated, 
“we have decided over here that we need somebody over in London who is more au courant 
with the plans we have in Washington here, and so I have decided to send General Eisenhower 
over and you can leave whenever you wish.”2 
 Bolte, expressing his loyalty, said, “Well, General, I will go with you wherever or 
whatever you want on the thing.”3  Chaney, not wanting to damage the reputations of his 
subordinates, replied, “No, I’ll just go.”4  As he rose to go off and pack his belongings Bolte 
stopped him.  “General, you can’t go without going i  and seeing the British Chiefs of Staff.”5  
Chaney, thought for a brief moment and decided, “Well, I’ll go down and say good-bye to 
Portal.”6  Chaney’s selection of Portal was logical.  Much of the planning for RAINBOW-5 had 
dealt with matters pertaining to the employment of U.S. air power in Britain.  As such, Chaney 
had worked more closely with Portal than any of the other Chiefs of Staff.7   
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After saying goodbye to Portal, Chaney packed a trunk, a bag, and a suitcase and went to 
the airport to catch a plane back to the states.  Hi  departure happened to coincide with that of 
King Peter of Yugoslavia, who was traveling on the same plane.  Overshadowed by the 
excitement surrounding the departure of the young royal, Chaney quietly slipped out of England 
and returned home.8   
 Chaney’s relief from command of the European Theater has never been adequately 
explained.  General Marshall’s statement that he selected Eisenhower because he was more 
familiar with current war plans seems rather flimsy.  Plans in war change continuously, and 
while there would be advantages to having a commander i  Europe who had been a member of 
WPD, known as the Operations Division (OPD) by March, 1942, the advantages would certainly 
be offset by removing a man from command who was more acquainted with local conditions.9   
 Perhaps the explanation is that Marshall was dissatisfied with Chaney’s performance.  
The historiography has been vague in this regard.  Ronald Ruppenthal listed some likely reasons 
for Chaney’s relief in Logistical Support of the Armies, among them the idea that officials 
thought he lacked the necessary drive to implement the War Department’s expanded plans for 
war in Europe, though he was careful not to identify which officials held this opinion.10  A few 
authors such as James Parton and Tom Ricks have castigated Chaney, saying he was relieved for 
incompetence, but have provided little evidence as to what Marshall actually thought about 
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Chaney’s performance.11  Marshall himself left no record of his thoughts regarding Chaney and 
even Arnold, with whom Chaney would ultimately clash, poke tactfully on the subject.12   
Their reluctance to present their views likely deriv s from several factors.  First, Chaney 
was universally recognized as a man of good character.  Even those who clashed with him 
generally chose to keep quiet or talk about Chaney circumspectly, rather than criticize him 
directly.13  Second, there was recognition, by some at least, that the War Department and GHQ 
had been wanting in its communication with SPOBS.  Eisenhower acknowledged this in his 
memoir, and Marshall’s note emphasized this fact to help Chaney swallow a bitter pill.14  As 
such, there seems to have been a general consensus by War Department officials to avoid in-
depth discussion of the reasons Eisenhower replaced Chaney.    
Still, careful analysis can yield more insight into the factors leading to Chaney’s relief.  
As noted in previous chapters, Chaney was operating under conditions that inhibited his ability 
to command effectively.  The War Department, in organizing forces for the European Theater, 
would continue to pursue policies that undermined Chaney’s authority.  Also noted was 
Chaney’s penchant for being too subdued in advocating for the needs of USAFBI.  However, 
during the winter and spring of 1942, Chaney became uncharacteristically assertive about the 
organization of U.S. Army Air Forces in Britain, anssertive stance that placed him in direct 
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confrontation with Arnold and his compatriots in the Army Air Force.  As the head of the Army 
Air Force, Arnold certainly had influence with Marshall.  While all certainly played a role in 
setting the conditions for Chaney’s removal, it was his overall lack of assertiveness and 
unwillingness to take risks that most influenced War Department officials in deciding to relieve 
him from command.  A closer examination of the factors leading to his relief provides a better 
understanding of the challenges his staff faced in attempting to adapt to the circumstances that 
existed in Britain after Pearl Harbor.  
The Army Air Force in Britain               
 The attack on Pearl Harbor had not changed Arnold’s mind about how he thought the 
U.S. Army should set up its air forces in Britain.  Quite the opposite, he became even more 
determined to get Chaney, one way the other, to adopt his plans.  Arnold employed several 
methods to implement his organizational vision.  One was to go through Chaney’s immediate 
higher headquarters, GHQ.  In January, 1942 he sent GHQ his plans for the organization of the 
Army Air Force in Britain, hoping that the headquarters would adopt his organizational model.  
However, he only achieved partial success.  GHQ agreed to approve the organization he had 
outlined, but the headquarters notified Arnold that its ultimate approval depended on Chaney’s 
concurrence.15 
 Stymied at GHQ, Arnold pursued two different avenus simultaneously.  On 26 January, 
he sent a letter Chaney in another attempt to get him o agree with his proposal.  His opening was 
polite: 
I have given careful consideration to your letter of December 5, 1941 in reply to 
my suggestions on organization of the United Kingdom Theater, from an air point 
of view.  The reasons you advanced for not desiring to create an American Air 
Force at that time seemed quite valid to me, and I di not intend to explore the 
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matter further at this [that] time.  However, our entrance into the War has changed 
the circumstances quite materially.16   
 
Whether or not Arnold was sincere in stating that he had intended to accept Chaney’s 
organizational model, he did have a point.  One of Chaney’s main critiques of Arnold’s 
organization was that the number of troops called for in RAINBOW-5 did not justify 
establishing a separate headquarters for the ground f rce.17  With the changes made at the 
ARCADIA conference, the ground component of U.S. forces was to expand substantially 
over what the War Department had planned for in RAINBOW-5.  Arnold argued that 
Chaney’s task force-based organization would not be abl  to cope with this influx of 
troops.18  He also provided Chaney with an estimate of the total number of airplanes U.S. 
and British planners in the states had calculated th  United States would ultimately send 
to Britain, over 4,700.  A force of this size, he argued needed its own separate command 
echelon for air.19            
 The same day he sent his letter to Chaney, Arnold sent his plans for the 
organization of the U.S. Army Air Force in Europe to Marshall.  He requested that the 
War Department activate the air headquarters units he had listed in his plans, 
headquarters that Chaney had argued against.  Again, Arnold achieved a partial success.  
He got the War Department to issue orders to activate the headquarters, but did not 
persuade Marshall to commit to his organizational model.20 
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 In the meantime, Arnold’s maneuvering began to cause consternation among the 
USAFBI staff.  In his diary entry for 28 January, Dahlquist characterized the Air Staff in 
Washington as being “drunk with power.”21  In his entry for 29 January, he expressed 
frustration with how Chaney was handling the issue, “h  will not say anything that might 
be interpreted as criticizing the War Department.  Bolte is quite upset.  I feel we are in for 
a bad time.”22  Dahlquist’s criticisms of Chaney in this regard were unfounded.  While 
Chaney was certainly tactful in all his interactions with the U.S. Army agencies that were 
stateside, he remained firm in his opposition to Arnold’s plans, explicitly rejecting them 
again on 30 January.23   
Chaney had good reason at to believe that he would be successful in his contest 
with Arnold.  As Commander of U.S. forces in Britain, t was supposed to be his 
prerogative, not Arnold’s, to determine how he organized his forces in Britain.  Further, 
he had the support of the British.  On the afternoon f 29 January, Chaney went to 
Portal’s office and showed him the diagrams of Arnold’s organization, arguing that it was 
unworkable and that he intended to reject it.  Portal agreed, asserting that Arnold’s plans 
were “only suitable for a virgin theatre of war and could not possibly be superimposed on 
the present defenses of this country without the utmos  confusion.”24  For the time being, 
Chaney had his way.  Although Marshall and the staff at GHQ had enacted policies for 
the MAGNET force that undermined Chaney’s authority, when it came to air forces in 
Britain, they seemed to respect Chaney’s command prerogative to influence the 
organization of combat forces in Europe. 
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 Arnold remained undaunted.  In spite of the fact tha Marshall and the staff at 
GHQ had not committed to his proposal, he proceeded as if they had already accepted it.  
In a letter to Chaney dated 31 January 1942, Arnold informed him that he had selected 
the officer who would head the U.S. Bomber Command, “[Brigadier General Ira C.] 
Eaker has been selected as Bomber Commander, Army Air Forces in England.  In that 
capacity he will be subordinate to you as Theater Commander and to the Commanding 
General, Army Air Forces in England.  He was selectd by me without prior consultation 
with you because I felt certain you would agree andbecause of the great need for haste in 
accomplishing a directive from the highest source.  As you know, he will be as loyal a 
subordinate as you ever had.”25  The letter was a clear indicator of Arnold’s 
determination.  Not only did he not consult Chaney on his selection of Eaker, but he 
explained Eaker’s role in terms of his vision and not Chaney’s, acting as if he had already 
won.   
Chaney was certainly gaining a talented subordinate i  the form of Eaker.  
However, Eaker, who was a protégé of Arnold’s, received orders from Arnold that were 
at odds with Chaney’s vision for the theater.  Osten ibly, Eaker was to head the bomber 
force that SPOBS and the British had planned to base in Huntingdon.  Arnold, however 
had additional tasks that he wanted him to perform.  Eaker received orders, not only to set 
up his own bomber command, but to also prepare for the establishment of an intermediate 
headquarters between the U.S. Bomber Command and USAFBI.  He also received verbal 
instructions to prepare to establish an air base and an independent interceptor command.26  
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All of these were key features of Arnold’s organizational model and, except for the 
bomber command, were all organizations that Chaney d his staff opposed.  
Years later, when an interviewer questioned Eaker on the controversy over the 
establishment of the USAAF in Britain he claimed, “I don’t know much about those 
differences between Chaney and Arnold.”27  If Eaker was being sincere, his memory was 
failing him.28  Arriving in England on 20 February, he wasted no time in attempting to 
implement Arnold’s vision.  Dahlquist noted in a diry entry for the next day, “Had a 
long conference in General Chaney’s office with Eaker, Bolte, Lyons [sic], McClelland.  
Arnold is hell bent for an independent air force ovr here regardless of any other 
considerations.  General Chaney is getting very fed up and maybe he will finally blow 
up.”29  Perhaps, but not yet.  Instead, he sent a cable to Marshall and Arnold in which he 
expressed that he had no desire to change his viewsregarding Arnold’s proposal.30   
 Eaker grew equally frustrated with the conflict bew en the two competing 
generals.  Although he found some of the staff at USAFBI, such as Lyon and Snavely, to 
be open-minded towards Arnold’s proposals, many on Chaney’s staff, particularly 
Dahlquist and Griner, stonewalled him in his efforts to establish anything outside of the 
bomber command.  Their opposition was so firm neither would accept any staff papers 
that contained the words “Army Air Forces,” insisting the offending staff officer delete 
the word “Air” before they would accept it.31  Eaker noted in a report back to the states, 
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“I found a complete inflexibility of mind on that subject in the Chaney staff.  They made 
up their minds and no argument would change them in the slightest.32  Eaker failed to 
understand why Chaney and his staff resisted Arnold’s proposal.  In his mind, the 
intermediate command would elevate Chaney to a position coequal to the highest military 
echelons in Britain.33  He also was flabbergasted that the staff at USAFBI would 
advocate any arrangement that would place U.S. Air Forces in a position subordinate to 
the British.34  Eaker and the small staff that had come with him, it seemed, would have to 
set up the USAAF in Britain on their own.   
At least, that is how Eaker and historians of World War II have portrayed the 
establishment of the Eighth Air Force in Britain.  When discussing the topic with Eaker, 
an interviewer stated, “I don’t think this point has been stressed enough in the literature, 
the point being that the U.S. Air Force at that time was a very negligible force.  It was 
just building up in 1942.”  Eaker replied, “When I landed in England there were six of us.  
A month later it was built up to nineteen . . . We started out as a very small nucleus.”35  
From this nucleus, the Eighth Air Force was born.  Eaker similarly took credit for 
obtaining the cooperation of the RAF in setting up airdromes, maintenance facilities, and 
training areas.36  When Eaker or historians of the Air Force mention SPOBS/USAFBI, 
the focus is typically the group’s conflict with Arnold and interference with Eaker rather 
than the role Chaney and his staff played in setting he conditions for the employment of 
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U.S. air power from the British Isles.37  A few of the official histories have credited Eaker 
with using some of SPOBS’ logistical preparations in formulating his own plans.38  But 
they fail to indicate the extent to which he did so. 
In spite of the fact that Chaney and most of his staff opposed Arnold’s 
organizational scheme, Eaker benefitted from the manifest effects of SPOBS/USAFBI’s 
work.  The establishment of a bombardment force was one of the few elements of 
RAINBOW-5 to survive, though the U.S. ultimately sent a much larger force to Britain 
than what the War Department had initially planned for. As such, Chaney’s staff was 
able to continue with and expand on the planning they had conducted with the Air 
Ministry and Bomber Command in 1941.   Eaker’s account and others have downplayed 
the role USAFBI played in establishing the Air Force in Britain.  To be sure, Chaney and 
Arnold had extreme disagreements about organizational structure.  However, U.S. 
aviation units in Britain would have to cope with fundamental logistical and 
administrative problems, regardless of the way theyw re organized.    It was in these 
areas that USAFBI decisively influenced the establishment of the Eighth Bomber 
Command and by extension, the Eighth Air Force.   
 The small size of Eaker’s staff, as well as their inexperience, dictated that they 
rely heavily on the Chaney’s staff for administrative, logistics, and policy planning.  
Lyon’s contributions in the establishment of an Anglo-American logistics program and 
S.D. 348 have already been covered in detail.  Eaker certainly participated in negotiations 
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with the British on these matters.  However, in doing so, he reaped the benefits of the 
work Lyon had done with the British in 1941 and throughout early 1942.  
 Lyon also assisted Eaker by continuing his work to establish an Anglo-American 
air logistics program in Britain.  After the attack on Pearl Harbor, the War Department 
assigned General Brett to duties in the Far East, leaving Lyon to continue the work they 
had collaborated on since September.39  While Brett had still been in England, he and the 
Special Observers had identified the Lockheed Corporation as the one organization that 
could best execute the project at Langford Lodge.40  When the War Department requested 
that Lockheed undertake the Langford Lodge project at the end of December, Lyon 
assumed responsibility for coordinating between Lockheed's overseas representatives, the 
Air Ministry, MAP, and the War Department, since each had particular responsibilities 
for completing the project.41  When the War Department approve construction of an ther 
depot at Wharton, his work in this regard doubled within days after Lockheed accepted 
the Langford Lodge project.42  
After Eaker arrived in England, Lyon worked with him to find an operating 
British facility to serve as an interim depot until Langford Lodge and Wharton were up 
and running.  When it became apparent in March that they could expect greater numbers 
of both ground and air forces, the two began searching for a British facility that could 
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service both American airframes and American engines.  They finally decided on 
Burtonwood, a site near Liverpool.  They both inspected the installation in April and after 
Chaney sent their recommendations to the War Department, Arnold quickly authorized 
negotiations to obtain it for American use.  By theend of May USAFBI negotiated an 
agreement with MAP to gradually assume control of the facility, maintaining the services 
of British technicians until civilian workers from the U.S. as well as USAAF personnel 
could replace them.43  With the appropriation of Burtonwood, the U.S. Army Air Force 
had secured the three depots that would maintain American aircraft, both U.S. and 
British, operating out of the British Isles in the air war against Germany.   
Eaker was certainly aware of how important Lyon was to his work.  When Lyon 
later died from pneumonia contracted while manning a machinegun position on a battle-
damaged bomber, Eaker acknowledged his importance in a letter to Middleswart, one of 
the few members of USAFBI with whom he got along, “I suppose you heard about the 
death of Al Lyon.  It was a great blow to us and has left a great vacancy in our staff 
here.”44 
While important, Lyon was not the only member of USAFBI that Eaker and his 
group relied on establishing the initial contingents of the USAAF in Britain.  Eaker’s own 
plan for setting up bomber command explicitly stated that his group would draw on the 





                                                          
     43 Goldberg, "Establishment of the Eighth Air Force in the United Kingdom," in The Army Air Forces in World 
War II, Volume One,  628 and 636. 
     44 Letter, Eaker to Middleswart, December 12, 19[42], Folder 9: General Correspondence Dec. 1942, Box I: 7, Ira 





a. Representatives of the four G’s work with the four G’s in General Chaney’s 
staff obtaining all information possible that affects our work, and making 
necessary contacts. 
 
b. Study plans already prepared by General Chaney’s staff which affect Bomber 
Command. 
 
c. Study the Hintingdon [Huntingdon] Airdrome set-up. 
 
d. Obtain the necessary maps and landing field data.45 
 
Eaker recognized early in the process of setting up the USAAF in the U.K. that he would need to 
use SPOBS’ pre-Pearl Harbor work with the British a the basis for his own project. 
Eaker needed the experience of the USAFBI “G’s,” because most of his staff were 
recently civilians and had little experience with this type of planning.  After telling Eaker that he 
was going to England to form a U.S. bomber command, Arnold had said: “There are only a 
handful of top-notch senior officers in this Air Force of ours, and you know’em and I know’em 
and I’m going to keep them because I have to command the Air Forces worldwide . . . You can 
take a smart reserve officer or civilian executive and make a passable Army officer out of him in 
a very brief period of time . . . So pick anybody you want.  I’ll commission him to any grade you 
recommend that is within legal limits.”46  Reflecting their green status, his staff quickly came to 
be known as “Eaker’s Amateurs.”47 
 Upon reviewing the composition of Eaker’s staff, Chaney expressed profound 
disappointment.  He explained in a cable to Arnold: 
                                                          
     
45 Memo, Eaker to CG, USAFBI, Sub: Suggested Plan, for Shadow Staff Bomber Command, 23 February, 1942, 
Air Plans and Operations, Box 6534, ETOUSA/USFET Decimal Files 1941-47, RG498, NARA. 
     
46 Interview, Captain Joe Green and General Ira C. Eaker, Senior Officers Debriefing Program, 1972 USAHEC, 
15; Donald R. Miller quotes another account of the same conversation in Masters of the Air: America’s Bomber 
Boys Who Fought the Air War Against Nazi Germany (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2007), 49.  
     
47 Robert F. Dorr, Mission to Berlin: The American Airmen Who Struck the Heart of Hitler’s Reich (Minneapolis: 
Zenith Press, 2011), 23. 
356 
 
I am considerably disturbed about the staff furnished Eaker for the conduct of 
actual bombing operations . . . a large number have come direct from civil life 
without any military background of any kind . . .it is essential that prior to the 
start of bombardment operations his staff should be supplied with more officers 
experienced in the conduct of bombardment under modern conditions.48  
 
The officers Chaney requested, however, were not forthc ming, leaving him no choice but to 
direct Eaker to conduct a study of RAF Bomber Command nd create a plan for a U.S. bomber 
command without a staff that had the necessary expertise to do so.49   
 By 18 March, Eaker and his staff produced a plan for a U.S. bomber command that was a 
synthesis of British organization and USAFBI logistic .  Eaker drew heavily on British practices 
for headquarters organization, communications, intell gence, and target selection, differing from 
British doctrine mainly in the commitment to daytime vs. nighttime bombing.50  The rest of his 
plan drew heavily on the work of Chaney’s staff.  One of templates he used in making the plan 
was the operations plan for Iceland, a document that SPOBS had greatly influenced.51  The 
airdromes listed in his plan were the same Huntingdo  airdromes that SPOBS had negotiated for 
in 1941.52  The hospitalization plan relied on agreements Hawley had made with the British to 
treat U.S. forces in RAF hospitals until the Americans were able to construct their own.53   
Middleswart himself calculated the data needed for quartermaster support for the bombardment 
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forces.54  The Bomber Command’s ordnance plan was essentially Coffey’s ordnance plan.55  
Eaker himself, acknowledged how his staff depended on the USAFBI staff to get its work done 
in a memo he wrote to Chaney, “Request a cable be snt a king the early dispatch to Bomber 
Command of suitable special staff officers, particularly Quartermaster, Ordnance, Signal, and 
Engineer . . . The presence of the above named staff officers are vital to our work . . . Thus far, 
their absence has placed an overload on your special staff as we have come to them frequently 
for help.”56 Eaker knew the significance of the group’s contribution in 1942.  Time, however, 
erased his memory of that reality.  
 Time has also virtually erased memory of the group’s contributions from the 
historiography.  The conflict between Arnold and Chaney has overshadowed USAFBI’s role in 
the establishment of the U.S. Air Force in Britain.  Chaney’s staff certainly obstructed Eaker in 
his efforts to create the organizations Arnold wanted.  However, they played a significant role in 
setting up the USAAF in Britain by providing Eaker with access to their pre-war plans, 
integrating him into a British defense establishment they were already well acquainted with, and 
using their own expertise to draft the logistics plans for the initial Air Force units that were to 
come to England.  Their involvement in the process wa so important that, for a while, it looked 
as if Chaney would be able to achieve his organization l vision for the Air Force in Britain.   
 Chaney’s vision, however, collapsed with the demis of RAINBOW-5.  In March, the 
task forces called for in the plan evaporated in rapid succession.  MAGNET had already made 
the plans for Northern Ireland obsolete.  The Navy canceled its plans to build facilities in 
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Scotland, removing the need to provide air defense for the installations. The War Department 
canceled the Token Force.  Finally, Marshall sent Chaney a message stating that he needed to 
prepare to receive ground and air forces in numbers far greater than planners had anticipated in 
RAINBOW-5.57   
 The staff at USABI soon learned what was behind the changes.  In April, 1942, Marshall 
arrived in England with Hopkins to convince the British Chiefs of Staff and the Prime Minister 
to adopt his plan for a cross-Channel attack.  Thoug  the timing remained a source of debate, the 
commitment to cross the Channel did occur, and as a re ult, a new operation was to replace the 
one for which SPOBS had originally planned, a build- p of U.S. forces in Britain under the code 
name BOLERO in preparation for an invasion of the continent.58  Chaney’s role in these 
proceedings was minimal.   His most notable contribu ion was to provide staff support to 
Marshall in the form of Barker.59  As Wesley Frank Craven noted in one of the official histories 
of the Army Air Force in World War II, “Chaney’s scheme to build his organization around 
territorial task forces had become obsolete.”60    
 Chaney clung to his organizational vision until the end of April, but soon recognized that 
he would have to bow to the inevitable.  While Marshall was in London, the War Plans Division 
approved Arnold’s organization for the USAAF in Britain.61 By 1 May, Chaney stopped resisting 
Arnold’s plans, and directed his staff to prepare fcilities for the Eighth Air Force and its 
component Bomber, Fighter, and Service Commands.62  Chaney now had to implement a system 
of organization that he did not believe in.   
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 He began doing so a week later.  On 8 May, he took McClelland, Bolte, and Snavely to a 
meeting at the Air Ministry to discuss where to station U.S. air assets, now that there was a new 
plan for employing American forces in Britain.  Almost as soon as the meeting began it became 
apparent that Chaney and the British had very different interpretations of how the change of 
plans would affect the deployment of U.S. pursuit un s.  Sir John Slessor, Assistant Chief of the 
Air Staff (Policy), presented a scheme where one U.S. fighter group would go to No. 12 Group’s 
area of operations in the Midlands, Norfolk, Lincolnshire and North Wales, while two others 
would go to Northern Ireland.  When this group was operationally fit, it would move to south 
and southeastern England, take over responsibility for fighter sectors there, and be in a position 
to escort U.S. bombers on missions over the continet.63 
 Chaney, in keeping with Arnold’s vision, argued against Slessor’s proposal.  He told 
Slessor and the other British representatives that the provisions for sending U.S. pursuit units to 
Northern Ireland and Scotland were applicable to the old plan, not the new system of 
organization the War Department charged him with imple enting.  Under these new plans, he 
asserted, the U.S. pursuit force had to operate independently of the British system of air defense, 
focusing its efforts solely on conducting offensive operations alongside the bomber force.  As 
such, he urged that the British provide the U.S. with facilities as close as possible to U.S. bomber 
units.64   
 The British responded to Chaney’s request with the same arguments that Chaney himself 
had used against Arnold.  In their view, the fighter facilities near Huntingdon were an integral 
part of the air defense organization of Great Britain.  They argued that the U.S. would not be able 
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to base units there unless they were fit to conduct operations.  Further, they held that there was 
no separation between offensive and defensive operations in terms of the British system of sector 
control and communications.   They asserted that the U.S. would not be able to conduct offensive 
operations independently.  If the British were to evacuate airdromes to accommodate American 
fighter forces, they told Chaney, the RAF expected the USAAF to take on defensive 
responsibilities for the sectors they were in.  Slessor asked Chaney to consider these points and if 
he was still unable to agree to what the Air Staff h d proposed, to come up with his own 
alternative proposal for placing U.S. fighter forces in Britain.65   
 Chaney presented his alternative proposal four days later.  His plan reflected his inability 
to craft an effective argument against a position that he himself held regarding the requirement to 
integrate U.S. pursuit forces into the British system of air defense.  To avoid having to take 
responsibility for the defense of a fighter sector, Chaney asked that the first two pursuit units to 
come to England divide themselves among three separate irdromes, each in a different fighter 
sector.  He further asked that the British provide the Americans with airdromes that were as close 
to Huntingdon as possible and that for the time being, the U.S. limit the movement of its pursuit 
units to the first two being set up.66   
 In a memo to Portal, Slessor expressed virulent opposition to Chaney’s proposal.  He 
challenged Chaney’s statement that the U.S. had abandoned its commitment to provide forces for 
the air defense of Northern Ireland.  He concluded that Chaney’s attitude regarding the 
independence of U.S. pursuit units was largely due to ignorance.  Slessor stated that he had 
received reports from Chaney’s staff (he did not specify if this came from Eaker’s group or 
Chaney’s personal staff), that in the year that he had been in Britain that he had only spent an 
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hour at Fighter Command, and “knows absolutely nothi g about the system of fighter operations 
in this country.”67  Recalling his interactions with Chaney years later, Slessor said, “He was a 
nice old thing, but quite frankly, he was a rather stupid officer, and I think a good many 
American Air Force friends of mine shared that view.”68  Little did he know that the reason that 
his Air Force friends did not think well of Chaney was because he held many of the same 
opinions as Slessor.   
 Although Chaney sympathized with British views regarding the air defense of Great 
Britain, he did not retreat.  Portal, responded to Chaney’s alternative proposal by reiterating the 
plan that Slessor had presented in his meeting with Chaney on 8 May.69  Chaney, in-turn, 
remained inflexible.70  By the end of May it had become apparent to the British that they would 
be unable to reach an agreement as long as Chaney was doing the negotiating.   
The deadlock, however, coincided with a visit Arnold made to England, and British 
efforts to resolve the issue through him signaled the end of Chaney’s influence in the U.K.  
During the visit, Arnold grabbed Eaker, Lyon, and Snavely and took them to a meeting with 
Slessor, Courtney, and other members of the Air Staff to conduct negotiations regarding the 
placement of U.S. air units in Britain.71  Chaney was not invited.  In response to this violat n of 
his prerogative as Commander of U.S. forces in Britain, Chaney uncharacteristically lost his 
composure.  He confronted Arnold in his office. “You went down there and made commitments 
on the location of air squadrons . . . you’re meddling in things that don’t belong to you!” he 
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said.72  Arnold responded dismissively: “Oh, those were just recommendations.”73  The minutes 
from his meeting with the British, however, show that e and Eaker came up with a compromise 
to satisfy all parties involved in the debate over U.S. fighters in Britain.  The U.S. would commit 
two fighter groups to conduct air defense of Northern Ireland.  However, the first two pursuit 
groups to come to England would go to airfields in No. 8 Group area (Huntingdon), as Chaney 
had asked.74  Arnold later admitted to making the arrangements, arguing that it was his 
responsibility as Chief of the Army Air Forces, to make sure that everything was ready for the air 
units that would be arriving in Britain.75  Given the impasse between Chaney and the British, 
Arnold’s intervention was necessary.  However, his direct dealings with the British destroyed 
any possibility that Chaney could further influence th  organization of the USAAF in Britain.  
He was now sidelined.    
The Services of Supply (SOS)   
 The conflict with Arnold over the organization of the USAAF in Britain so consumed 
Chaney that he proved ineffective at checking another c allenge to his authority as Commander 
of USAFBI.  While the War Department cancelled most of the task forces called for in 
RAINBOW-5 and forced Chaney and his staff to accept Arnold’s vision for the USAAF in  
Britain, their plans for organizing logistics had remained essentially intact, even if there was not 
                                                          
     72 Burg/Bolte Interview, 101. 
     73 Ibid. 
     74 Accommodation of U.S. Army Air Forces in the United Kingdom.  Note of Meeting in the Air Ministry on 
28.5.42, AIR 20/3040 Arrangements for Reception of American Forces, TNA. 
     75 Arnold, Global Mission, 314-15.  Arnold planned to make provisions in his agreement with the RAF to allow 
Major General Carl Spaatz and Brigadier General Frank O. Hunter, the heads of the Eighth Air Force andVIII 
Fighter Command respectively, to make changes if necessary.  This may have been why he referred to the formal 
agreement as a recommendation in his discussion with Chaney.  See John W. Hutson, ed., American Airpower 
Comes of Age: General Henry H. “Hap” Arnold’s World War II Diaries, Volume I(Maxwell Air Force Base: Air 
University Press, 2002), 303.  
363 
 
enough staff to actually carry them out.  In May, a logistics staff came, but with them also came 
a radically different scheme for organizing logistic  n Britain.   
 By 1 May, the American footprint in Britain had grown large enough that Chaney and his 
staff determined that the time had come to establish an organization to oversee logistics for U.S. 
forces in the U.K.  To oversee the Base Area, the staff at USAFBI planned to create the Services 
of Supply (SOS), an organization that would be respon ible for managing depots, transportation, 
replacements, evacuation, construction, and administration.  The organization was in keeping 
with current Army doctrine, doctrine based on the American experience during the First World 
War.76    As Chaney and his staff identified construction of facilities for incoming U.S. forces as 
the largest problem that USAFBI’s SOS would have to deal with, Chaney directed that Davison 
would serve as the head of the organization.77 
 While Chaney and his staff were working to establish an organization to manage 
USAFBI’s logistics, the War Department was developing its own plans for establishing a supply 
service in the British Isles.  The organization was similar in function to Chaney’s in many 
respects.  However, War Department planners envisioned an organization that was much more 
independent than Chaney’s staff had planned for.  Under this plan, USAFBI staff members 
involved in logistics and administration would transfer to SOS and work directly under its 
commanding general.  Chaney was to strip down his headquarters “along the general pattern of a 
command post with a minimum of supply and administrative services.”78  Under this design, the 
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organization of U.S. forces in Britain would mirror that in the United States, with separate 
commands responsible for ground forces, air forces, and the logistics and administrative 
services.79   
 Dahlquist and the rest of the staff received the first indications that the War Department 
had a different vision for managing logistics in Britain shortly after Chaney announced that he 
was establishing an SOS headquarters in Britain under Davison.  In his diary entry for 4 May 
Dahlquist wrote, “Received War Department cable about the SOS which indicates that General 
Marshall is going to run this theater.  Prepared an answer but the General took the sting out of 
it.” 80  Two days later he noted: “Received another cable out the SOS indicating more strongly 
to me than ever that the old man is finished.”81  In Dahlquist’s mind, these were signs that 
Chaney was to be removed from command.  At the very least, as in the establishment of the 
USAAF in Britain, it appeared that the War Department was going to sideline Chaney.      
 Dahlquist’s entry was prophetic, but the War Department did not design the SOS in 
Britain to make Chaney impotent, at least not intentionally.  Under the new system of 
organization, Chaney would hold a position analogous t  Marshall in the United States.  After 
McNarney had returned to the United States, Marshall put him at the head of a project to make 
the War Department more efficient.  Under McNarney’s leadership, the War Department 
redesigned itself along functional lines with commands for ground forces, air forces, and the 
logistical and administrative services, in order to elieve Marshall of responsibility for the 
numerous administrative details that had occupied hs time prior to U.S. entry into the war.  With 
OPD serving as his command post, he could focus on run ing the overall war effort for the U.S. 
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Army, while the commanders of these sub-commands took care of administration and policy 
specific to their functional responsibilities.82   
Ostensibly, the system in Britain was supposed to work the same way, with the functional 
commands communicating back to their parallel commands in the states in order to improve 
efficiency and allow the commander in Britain to focus on theater level war planning and 
operations.  Chaney’s conflict with Arnold over the establishment of the U.S. Air Force in 
Britain, however, was already demonstrating that the Army could not apply the War Department 
reorganization to a combat theater and expect it to work exactly the same way.  The three 
commands in the War Department had no parallel commands at a higher echelon to coordinate 
with.  If the commands wanted to pursue a policy that was contrary to Marshall’s vision, their  
only recourse was to appeal to the Secretary of War, the President, or members of Congress, a 
difficult proposition given the confidence of all in Marshall’s abilities as Chief of Staff of the 
Army.   
With the application of the War Department reorganiz tion to Britain, however, Chaney’s 
subordinate commands now had the means to circumvent his authority.  Although these 
commands were subordinate to Chaney in name, they could appeal to their parallel commands in 
the War Department, whose chiefs, in turn, could appe l to Marshall.  Further, as Arnold was 
demonstrating through his use of Eaker as an agent in implementing his vision, the adoption of 
the War Department organization in Britain provided the chiefs of the coordinating commands in 
the U.S. with a means to circumvent the commander of U.S. forces in the United Kingdom.  This 
system, coupled with the War Department’s propensity to ignore Chaney and his staff, would 
make it increasingly difficult for him to command effectively in the U.K.    
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In the case of SOS, however, Chaney himself contributed to the erosion of his own 
authority in Britain.  As Dahlquist’s diary entries indicate, Chaney was hesitant to contest War 
Department policy, and as a result, he muted the critiques his staff officers attempted to send 
back to the states.  When Marshall, gave him an official directive on 14 May to implement the 
War Department’s plan for establishing SOS, he quickly gave in, as he was too focused on 
attempting to reconcile himself with Arnold’s organizational model for the USAAF in Britain to 
give adequate attention to the Services of Supply.83  In one discussion over SOS he told Bolte, “I 
don’t want to have anything to do with it.”84  Thus, Chaney’s staff would have to cope with the 
new organization without strong backing from their commander.   
Marshall’s selection for commanding general of SOS made their job even more difficult.  
Instead of allowing Chaney to put Davison in charge, Marshall ignored him and put Major 
General John C.H. Lee in command instead.85  Lee had many attributes that made him a good 
choice to serve as head of the Services of Supply in Britain.  Like Davison, he was an Engineer 
that had graduated from West Point.  He had attended the Army General Staff College in France, 
the Army War College, and the Army Industrial College.86  Additionally, he had worked on 
numerous engineering projects throughout his career, experience that had prepared him for the 
task of establishing a logistical and administrative infrastructure from which to support a cross-
channel invasion of France.87  However, many contemporaries thought him arrogant, egotistical, 
and difficult to work with. 88  Bolte referred to Lee–following a single interview–as a “bastard,” 
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a “martinet,” a “Christ-like character,” and a “dynamic . . . very capable engineer officer.”89  Lee 
would call on these attributes throughout the war to amass as much power as he could over U.S. 
logistics in Europe.90   
Lee and the nucleus of his staff arrived in England o  24 May, and received a reception 
that was similar to what Eaker had experienced when he had arrived in February.  Recalling his 
first days in England, Lee noted that his “welcome was not particularly warm at Chaney’s 
headquarters.”91  The staff’s attitude towards Lee chiefly had to do with the broad powers that 
Marshall had given to him as commander of SOS.  Marshall’s directive essentially gave Lee 
carte blanche to establish the U.S. logistics infrastructure in Britain including the power to 
approve all plans and contracts, the power to determin  labor policy, the power to purchase 
supplies and real estate, the power to settle all claims, and the power to take any measure to 
expedite the movement of personnel, supplies and equipment to Britain as well as preparations 
for their reception.92  As with the commander of the MAGNET force, the Chief of Staff gave Lee 
the power of the purse, providing him with a discretionary fund of $20,000,000.00 that he could 
use in any way that he felt that Marshall and Stimson would approve, with no requirement to 
obtain Chaney’s concurrence.93  Marshall’s memo to Chaney also directed that his administrative 
and supply officers transfer to Lee’s command.94 
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 The USAFBI staff objected most to the provision that Chaney transfer his administrative 
and logistics staff to SOS.  Lee interpreted Marshall’s directive widely, producing a draft order 
for Chaney to sign that placed all U.S. Army supply and administrative services in Britain under 
his command, with the exception of a minimal staff o take care of routine administration of the 
USAFBI headquarters.95  Each member of the USAFBI staff commented on the draft order and 
most rejected Lee’s interpretation of his own powers in some way.  Coffey, argued that Lee’s 
authority should remain confined to communications zone (rear area) activities and not extend to 
tactical supply areas.96  Middleswart argued that USAFBI would still need to maintain a small 
staff of officers for each of the supply and administrative services to ensure that that proper 
coordination between SOS and Chaney’s headquarters would take place.97  Matejka noted that 
USAFBI would need to retain a signal staff for basic command and control, to negotiate signal 
policy with the U.S. Navy and the British, and determine signal policy for all coordinate 
commands.98  Griner noted that each supply service would need r presentation in USAFBI in 
order to serve as advisors to the theater commander.99  The rest of the staff offered similar 
objections.100  In sum, Chaney’s staff, for the most part, argued that SOS could not or should not 
divorce certain functions from USAFBI, as it would inhibit the commanding general’s ability to 
accomplish his mission. 
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 Another objection that echoed throughout the staff comments was opposition to the idea 
that SOS would control agencies that had theater-wide functions.  Dahlquist provided the most 
cogent argument against this idea, noting that staff officers such as the inspector general, the 
chief finance officer, and the adjutant general could not perform their theater-wide tasks as part 
of SOS because the command was coordinate with not superior to the ground and air commands 
in Britain.  To effectively perform their duties, he asserted, they would have to remain with a 
higher headquarters.101 
 For the remainder of Chaney’s time in Britain, his staff and Lee’s argued back and forth 
over the proper scope of Lee’s authority.  Dahlquist went to work revising the draft general order 
that Lee had produced, finishing his first attempt by 8 June.  The unanimous objections of the 
staff prompted Chaney, initially, to support the changes that Dahlquist had called for.  He and his 
staff met with Lee that day, and all involved agreed to adopt Dahlquist’s version of the order.  
However, when it came to discussing the particulars regarding the organization of Chaney’s staff 
vs. Lee’s the talks broke down.  Dahlquist noted, “I was completely and ignominously [sic] 
licked.  I believe I had General Lee convinced but General Chaney backed out on me.”102  
Apparently, Chaney was still hesitant to adopt any course that could be construed as defying 
Marshall’s directive.   
 In the meantime, Lee, fully confident in the scope f his authority, began to do essentially 
whatever he wanted.  Bolte noted that one of his first actions was to hold a dinner in an attempt 
to influence British logistics officials.  By British standards it was lavish, with filet mignon, 
oranges, apples and other items that people in the U.K. had not seen for months due to rationing. 
All was available to Lee because he had access to money and ships.  Bolte, who was more 
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culturally attuned to the environment in London, noted that his actions were in poor taste given 
the sacrifices that the British had to make to support their war effort.  He cited the incident as an 
example of how Lee and Americans in general attemptd to bulldoze their way through the U.K. 
with the vast sums of money available to them, upsetting local conditions.103 
 In spite their difficulty dealing with Lee’s powerful personality and Chaney’s virtual 
abstention from the SOS debate, Dahlquist and the rest of the Chaney’s staff did finally succeed 
in curbing some of Lee’s power. On 16 June, Dahlquist published a circular that more 
specifically outlined the responsibilities that SOS would have in the newly established European 
Theater of Operations (ETO).104  Carefully worded to meet the directive that Marshll ad sent to 
Chaney on 14 May, it highlighted twenty areas of supply and administration that were to be the 
province of Lee and his command.105  The circular also allowed him to communicate with o er 
commanders for supply and administrative matters.  However, it dictated that SOS would 
perform its functions through directives from the Theater Commander. Communications 
concerning items of major policy or that affected other commands in the theater still had to go 
through the theater headquarters. 106    Finally, it gave Lee control of eleven out of the fifteen 
staff sections that he had included in his original dr ft order.107  Chaney’s staff were able to 
achieve this minor victory, in part, because Chaney had finally received a strategic directive from 
the War Department that specified his powers in Europe.  Also, Chaney already knew that 
Eisenhower was going to replace him, and it’s likely he felt he had nothing to lose by providing 
his staff with more forceful backing.  It was a compromise that satisfied no one, and theater 
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leadership would continue to grapple with the issue caused by the War Department’s policy of 
imposing its own organizational scheme on Britain lo g after Chaney and most of his original 
staff had departed the U.K.108  
The Establishment of ETOUSA      
 In the months after Pearl Harbor, officials in theWar Department and its subordinate 
agencies had done much to undermine the authority of Chaney as commander of U.S. forces in 
Britain.  While drawing upon the work the Special Observers had completed in 1941, GHQ 
planned MAGNET as an operation that was essentially independent of USAFBI, even though 
U.S. forces in Northern Ireland were subordinate to the U.S. headquarters in London.  In the 
process of implementing his vision for the Army Air Force in the U.K., Arnold had bypassed 
Chaney, demonstrating that he was no longer relevant in the process of establishing the USAAF 
in the British Isles.  In the establishment of the SOS, Marshall provided Lee with a budget 
independent of USAFBI’s control and granted him broad powers that Chaney’s staff had found 
difficult to reign in.  Chaney himself assisted with the erosion of his own authority by remaining 
quiet, his conflict with Arnold being the sole exception, rather than assert the needs of his 
headquarters.   
 All of these issues, however, were symptoms of a more fundamental problem in the War 
Department’s relations with USAFBI: a chronic lack of strategic direction.  To be sure, Marshall 
as well as other officials in the War Department had issued plenty of directives to Chaney and 
his staff.  These directives, however, were all piecemeal instructions designed to have the group 
facilitate discrete organizational and logistical programs that the War Department attempted to 
implement in Britain.  For sixth months after Pearl Harbor, Chaney and his staff operated 
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without an overall strategic directive from the War Department, an issue that Marshall did not 
resolve until 8 June 1942, when he directed Chaney to disband USAFBI and establish the 
European Theater of Operations.  For most of the months between Pearl Harbor and the 
establishment of European Theater of Operations, United States Army (ETOUSA) Chaney and 
his staff had little understanding of Marshall’s viion, and their preparations reflected this lack of 
understanding.  As a result, officials in the War Department developed the perception that 
Chaney lacked the initiative and technical expertis needed to oversee the U.S. war effort in 
Europe.  This was by far the most influential factor that led War Department officials to replace 
him with Eisenhower.   
 Chaney’s staff were fully aware that they lacked strategic direction, feeling it most keenly 
in the weeks between 7 December 1941 and early January, when they received the cable telling 
them to establish USAFBI.  Having already developed lans with the British to implement ABC-
1, they were at a loss on what steps to take next. They anticipated that the War Department 
would eventually give them an order to implement their plans.  In the meantime, however, they 
spent their energies on a lot of fruitless activity, attempting to guess what strategic direction 
whey would be operating under.  Dahlquist provides a glimpse into the nature of their 
conferences in his diary entries for December.  For9 December he wrote, “General Chaney held 
a conference this morning.  Just why I could not make out.”109  Dahlquist was equally confused 
at a meeting on 12 December, “Another one of General Ch ney’s funny conferences.  I cannot 
figure them out.  Today we discussed, ‘Should Russia enter the war (against Japan) and what 
should our fleet do.’”110  Dahlquist noted that Chaney was still grasping for strategic direction at 
a meeting on 22 December, “General Chaney had a staff conference and discussed by questions 
                                                          
     
109 Dahlquist Diary, 8 December 1941. 
     110 Dahlquist Diary, 12 December 1941. 
373 
 
what form the high direction of the war would take.” 111  By 27 December, Chaney seemed to 
have accepted the futility of these exercises, “At his conference this afternoon General Chaney 
spent most of his time talking about Maundy Money.”112  The group was in strategic limbo.  
They were not an official headquarters yet and had no mandate for action.  Only a directive from 
the War Department would change that.    
 Eventually, the group received a directive to establish a headquarters for U.S. forces as 
well as instructions on the staff’s responsibilities n receiving U.S. forces in Northern Ireland.  
However, that was where their instructions ended.  Bolte recalled, “General Chaney had his 
telegram on 6 January 1942, and it said, ‘You are in command,’ but it gave him none of the 
instructions that General Pershing had when he wentover to be a theater commander.  Nothing 
had been given to him, and he had no administrative instructions, or authority, or anything.”113  
Even the operations plan for MAGNET failed to provide Chaney with any hint on how he was 
supposed to fight the war in Europe.  Dahlquist railed, “The operations plan he [Eaker] brought 
for MAGNET is enough to make one cry.  It is about five inches thick and contains a lot of 
useless tripe.”114  Recalling this period in an interview Dahlquist noted, “The War Department 
set up a theater without saying so, sent soldiers over without saying who they were to fight.”115  
Even with U.S. combat forces arriving in Britain, Chaney had yet to receive a directive on what 
his strategic objectives were supposed to be.  In the absence of strategic guidance, Chaney and 
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his staff proceeded under the assumption that ABC-1 and RAINBOW-5 still governed their 
preparations for war in Europe.   
 Not until March, over three months after Pearl Harbor, did the staff at USAFBI receive 
any indication that the War Department was going to shelve RAINBOW-5.  During that month, 
pivotally, Marshall wrote Chaney to tell him that he should plan to receive ground and air forces 
in numbers much greater than what they had previously planned.116  The War Department 
cancelled most of the RAINBOW-5 task forces soon after, yet provided Chaney and his staff 
with no alternative plan or strategic guidance.117  What Marshall did do was tell him to look 
again at his plan for command organization, implying that he should consider adopting Arnold’s 
proposal.118  While Marshall’s messages indicated change was coming, they did nothing to help 
clarify Chaney’s mission in the U.K. 
 Chaney and the staff at USAFBI finally learned that t e new strategy was to be a cross-
channel attack into France in April, when Marshall and Hopkins traveled to England to convince 
Churchill and the British Chiefs of Staff to adopt the new scheme.  Yet Marshall still did not 
provide Chaney with any guidance concerning his role in implementing the new plan.  In an 
attempt to resolve this issue, Dahlquist approached Colonel John E. Hull, who had been 
participating in discussions with the British regarding Marshall’s new plan.119  Hull was the head 
of two sections in OPD: the Future Operations Section of the Strategy and Policy Group and the 
European Theater Section of the Theater Group. These s ctions together were the primary War 
Department agencies planning BOLERO, and Hull, as head of both, was responsible for 
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supervising the overall planning effort for building up U.S. forces in Britain. 120  Dahlquist, 
recognizing Hull’s influence, told him that USAFBI needed a theater directive.121  When Hull 
was unable to provide one, Dahlquist took it upon himself to write a draft for him, drawing 
heavily on the directive that Pershing had received when he departed the U.S. with the AEF in 
World War I.122  Hull promised Dahlquist that he would attempt to get it approved.123  In the 
meantime, Marshall and his party returned to the United States, leaving Chaney and his staff to 
guess how best to prepare for BOLERO.        
 Marshall had not had much time to observe American preparations while he was in 
London, but he had seen enough to come to the determination that the staff at USAFBI did not 
have adequate knowledge of War Department plans.  Major General Dwight D. Eisenhower, then 
Chief of OPD, himself had come to the conclusion that “either we do not understand our own 
commanding general and staff in England or they don’t understand us.”124  To assess the 
situation, Marshall sent Eisenhower to London along with Major General Mark Clark, the Chief 
of Staff for Lieutenant General Leslie McNair, head of Army Ground Forces.  Both Eisenhower 
and Clark glossed over their visit to England in their memoirs.  Eisenhower wrote that during his 
ten days in England, he found that Chaney and his staff, “were completely at a loss in their 
earnest attempts to further the war effort.  They wre definitely in a back eddy, from which they 
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could scarcely emerge except through a return to the United States.”125  Eisenhower artfully 
constructed his account of the visit and subsequent report to Marshall, providing an explanation 
for Chaney’s relief where no one was to blame.  Both USAFBI and the War Department had 
merely been overcome by events, forcing Marshall to ch ose a new person to lead the war 
effort.126  Eisenhower’s account was so uncontroversial that at least one author used it in writing 
one of the U.S. Army’s official histories of the war.127   
 Eisenhower’s account as well as Marshall’s explanatio  to Chaney for his relief are 
suspect.  That plans change in war is axiomatic.  The U.S. Army expected officers to be able to 
adapt to changing circumstances.  So why did Eisenhower and Marshall feel that a change in 
leadership was in order?  Did they recognize that te War Department had failed to provide the 
group with adequate strategic direction?  Why not merely provide Chaney with an explicit 
directive rather than relieve him?  Neither man has left records that provide a satisfactory 
explanation.  
 Eisenhower definitely realized that USAFBI needed a strategic directive after his visit to 
the U.K.  As he neared the end of his tour, he went to Bolte and asked him if there was anything 
that he wanted him to carry back to Washington.  Bolte responded by typing up a single page 
memo.  Bolte summarized its contents in an interview with Forrest C. Pogue in 1958: “I said, he 
[Chaney] needs a directive.  I said, he hasn’t got any directive to fight the enemy.  All Chaney 
had been told was that he had had an original directive to go over and negotiate, etc.  And this 
was March [May] and we had been at war since December.  And not only no directive, but Gen. 
Chaney had no authority, no court-martial authority, no disciplinary authority, no command 
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authority, no money, he had nothing in the way of aletter like Gen. Pershing.”128  Given personal 
access to Eisenhower, Bolte was finally able to expr ss what the USAFBI staff had been trying 
to communicate to the War Department for months, but co ld not because Chaney had virtually 
forbidden them to criticize War Department policy.129    
 Regardless of the War Department’s role in creating the current situation in England, 
Eisenhower recommended a change in leadership after he returned home and reported to 
Marshall.  The reason he cites in his memoir is that t e effort in Europe needed “someone 
thoroughly indoctrinated in the plans of the United States Government, with working knowledge 
of our capabilities in the production of land, air, nd naval units and materials to support them in 
offensive fighting.”130  When Marshall asked him who should have the job of heading the war 
effort in Europe, Eisenhower told him that McNarney should do it, citing his experience in 
working with the British defense establishment.131  McNarney had also overseen the 
reorganization of the War Department and, as Marshall’  deputy, was thoroughly familiar with 
his objectives and plans for the U.S. Army.132  Marshall, however, quickly disabused Eisenhower 
of any notion that McNarney would head the war effort in Europe, stating that there was 
currently no other officer suitable to serve as his deputy.133 
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 Marshall revealed who he had in mind to command the European Theater to Eisenhower 
on 8 June 1942.  That day, Eisenhower submitted a draft directive for the Commanding General 
of the European Theater of Operations, telling Marsh ll that he should read this document in 
detail since it would be important for future operations in Europe.  Marshall replied “I certainly 
do want to read it.  You may be the man who executes it.”134  Eisenhower received confirmation 
that he would command the European Theater three days later.135  
 The same day Marshall revealed to Eisenhower that he was a candidate to lead the war 
effort in Europe, Chaney finally received the directive from the War Department that formally 
established Europe as a theater of war for the United States and outlined his powers and 
responsibilities as theater commander.  As the Commanding General, ETO, Chaney was 
responsible for theater level war planning and had operational control over all U.S. forces in 
theater, to include U.S. naval forces.136  The War Department also directed that Chaney 
cooperate with the British Empire and any other natio s fighting against the Axis, with the 
restriction that he had to maintain U.S. forces as eparate and distinct combat elements.137  Most 
important, the directive assigned Chaney a mission: “t  prepare for and carry on military 
operations in the European Theater against the Axis Powers and their allies, under strategical 
directives of the combined U.S. British Chiefs of Staff.”138  Chaney had finally received 
adequate strategic guidance from the War Department, although the directive was really intended 
for Chaney’s successor in Europe. 
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 The composition of the directive complicates Marshll and Eisenhower’s assertions that 
Chaney and his staff were not familiar enough with the current strategic situation to serve as the 
command and staff for the ETO.  The directive was almost an exact copy of the draft directive 
that Dahlquist wrote for Hull.139  In the absence of strategic guidance from the War Department, 
the staff at USAFBI essentially created their own, hich the War Department subsequently 
adopted.  This demonstrates that Chaney and his staff were actually ahead of the War 
Department in terms of awareness of what powers and responsibilities the Commander of the 
European Theater needed.  
 The continual reliance of organizations like GHQ, the U.S. Bomber Command, and the 
War Department on the work of Chaney and his staff imilarly challenges Eisenhower’s 
assertion that they “were completely at a loss in their earnest attempts to further the war effort.”  
In terms of logistics and administration in Britain, as well as the requirements for interfacing 
with the British defense establishment, the staff at USAFBI were subject matter experts.  With 
each piecemeal change that had occurred in during the previous six months, Chaney’s staff had 
proved adept at adapting the arrangements they had made with the British to fit each new 
situation.  There was no reason to believe that they would not have been able to do the same for 
the new strategic concept coming out of Washington.  
 Unless, that is, there were other factors involved that Marshall and Eisenhower had 
neglected to mention.  Ironically, Chaney may have be n relieved because he and his staff were 
too aware of the strategic limitations U.S. forces faced in the European Theater.  Chaney, for his 
part, did not believe that the U.S. and Britain would be prepared to conduct a cross-channel 
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invasion for several years, and he had indicated his views in a letter to the War Department.140  
Dahlquist echoed Chaney’s sentiment in a conversation w th Albert C. Wedemeyer, who had 
accompanied Marshall during his visit to England in May, 1942.  Describing the conversation in 
a 1958 interview he stated, “As soon as I finished [talking to Marshall] I moved back to Al and 
said, ‘What the hell is this all about?’ Al says, “we’re coming over to settle this thing.  We want 
to attack this fall.’  I remember saying, ‘for God sake with what?’”141  Chaney’s staff maintained 
this attitude after he left.  In July, Bolte attendd a meeting at Claridge’s at which Marshall, on 
another visit from the Washington, discussed a planfor the U.S. and Britain to conduct a cross-
channel attack in 1942.  Bolte recalled, “And I remember when he went around the room and he 
said, ‘Bolte, what do you think of it?’  And I said, ‘Well General, I think from a military 
standpoint it isn’t feasible’ . . . He didn’t like my answer.  General Eisenhower didn’t like my 
answer . . . I mean it was absolute fairy tales to talk of going across the Channel in anything in 
1942.”142  Hawley similarly objected to a 1942 invasion, noti g the inadequacy of current 
medical arrangements to support an operation of that nature.143  Marshall and Eisenhower likely 
decided that the war effort in Europe needed a man who believed in the strategy he would have 
to carry out.   
                                                          
     140 Interview with Major General John E. Dahlquist, G-1 of original Special Observer Group, and Brigadier 
General William H. Middleswart, Quartermaster of original group, by Colonel S. L. A. Marshall, Theater Historian, 
and T/3 Henry G. Elliot, Hotel George V, Paris, 1700-1845 hrs, 15 July 1945, Interviews, Ltrs., Training Memos, 
Interview Notes, Box 3915, Administrative History 1942-1946, Historical Division, RG 498, NARA. 
141
 Interview with Gen. John Dahlquist by F. C. Pogue, Washington D.C., October 29, 1958, George C. Marshall 
Research Library. 
     142 Burg/Bolte Interview, 90.  McNarney’s views on the possibility of a successful cross channel invasion did not 
conform to those of the rest of Chaney’s staff.  Eisenhower notes that McNarney was one of the first officers to 
support OPD’s proposal for an invasion of France.  S e Notes, Eisenhower, January 27, 1942, in Alfred Chandler, 
Stephen E. Ambrose, Joseph P. Hobbs, Edwin Alan Thomps n, and Elizabeth F. Smith ed., The Papers of Dwight 
David Eisenhower, The War Years: I (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970).        
     143 Dahlquist Diary, 23 July 1942. 
381 
 
Chaney’s conflict with the most powerful man in theU.S. Army Air Force certainly 
didn’t help him.  Arnold held Chaney in very low est em after their fight over the organization of 
the USAAF in the U.K.  When Chaney later served as the Commanding General of First Air 
Force, Arnold had him relieved.  He explained in Chaney’s efficiency report: 
I have known this officer for many years and have complimented him on many 
occasions on the superior quality of his work.  However, his weakness is in 
knowledge of actual flying and methods and technique of training combat units.  
This showed up to such an extent in the units being trained in the First Air Force 
that in order to get the desired results he was transferred to another command 
where his experience and ability could be used to be ter advantage.144 
 
In the same evaluation, Arnold stated that Chaney should be placed in an assignment  
 
commanding a base depot.145  His assessment, however, conflicts with Chaney’s prior 
evaluations, in which he received excellent ratings as a command pilot as well as excellent and 
superior ratings in all categories of leadership.  Included among his prior evaluations are two in 
which he received superior ratings for his service as the Commanding General of the Air Corps 
Training Center.146  Chaney, like many regular officers who made the transition from peace to 
war, may have found line service to be beyond his abilities.  However, Arnold’s assessment that 
he did not know how to train troops or fly seems unduly harsh, given that Chaney had already 
proven himself in these areas, indicating that Arnold may not have been able to view Chaney 
objectively after their argument.  Additional evidenc  of bias is Arnold’s unambiguous 
declaration in his memoir that he recommended that C ney be replaced with another officer as 
Commander of U.S. forces in Britain.147   
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Probably the most important factor in Chaney’s relief was the perception of officials in 
the War Department that he was not effective as a leader of U.S. forces in Britain.  Prior to his 
assignment to serve as head of SPOBS, Chaney’s future had looked very bright.  Major General 
Virgil Peterson, Inspector General for the U.S. Army, noted that at the beginning of the war, 
officials in Washington had considered Chaney as a potential replacement for Marshall as Chief 
of Staff.148  Henry L. Stimson, the Secretary of War, similarly noted the high opinion officials 
had had of Chaney, “Chaney is an officer of good character and started off with high hopes and 
great opportunities . . . He was sent over to Great Britain with the chance of getting the position 
which Eisenhower afterwards was chosen for and possibly succeeding Marshall as Chief of 
Staff.”149  Indisputably, Chaney had been on the fast track to the highest position in the U.S. 
Army.   
That changed after his time in Britain.  Stimson wrote, “I talked this over . . . with 
Marshall . . . He [Chaney] proved to be unequal.  He was slow, lacking in initiative, and not at all 
the type which this war requires . . . It is just one of those cases where, in spite of good character 
and good wishes, he is not good enough.150  General Thomas T. Handy, who had served as Chief 
of the Strategy & Policy Group while Eisenhower was head of OPD, recalled during an 
interview, “I got the impression that General Eisenhower was not enthusiastic about the group in 
London . . . [H]e didn’t feel they were acting like the urgency of the situation demanded and in 
line with the position they were in.151  Eisenhower himself observed, “It is necessary to get a 
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punch behind the job or we’ll never be ready. . .”152  The general view in the War Department, it 
seemed, was that Chaney and his staff had been too slow in making progress in England.   
Some members of Chaney’s staff agreed.  Dahlquist, recalling his time in SPOBS and 
USAFBI stated, “General Chaney was a fine man and a brilliant one, but he was too retiring–not 
a ‘pusher’–and not the man for the job."153  Hawley noted that Chaney, “had an excess of 
caution, was afraid of sticking his neck out, was reluctant to do things on his own, even though 
the country was at war.”154  Chaney’s conservative approach to problem solving in Britain had 
given his staff an assessment of Chaney’s energy and initiative that was on par with what 
officials were thinking in the Washington.   
Based on Stimson’s entries, one can infer that Marshall replaced Chaney with 
Eisenhower because he was lacking in two qualities necessary to head the war effort in Europe, 
determination and a willingness to take risks.  People like Arnold and Eisenhower thrived during 
the Second World War, in part, because they manifested both qualities.  Arnold demonstrated a 
force of will that few could resist and was willing to use it, even against close friends, if any 
stood in the way of his vision.155  His force of will was matched only by his ambitious vision of 
what the Air Force could and should be, and he continually risked his own reputation and the 
reputation of the Air Force to achieve that vision.   
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Eisenhower is popularly known for his winning smile and ability to get U.S. and British 
forces to cooperate with one another with his astute diplomatic and political sense.  But Ike also 
had the ability to take risks, the most famous of his career being the decision to launch the cross-
channel invasion.  He could be assertive and ruthless as well.  The differences between 
Eisenhower and Chaney were immediately apparent to Dahlquist. When talking about his 
relations with the other commands in Britain Dahlquist wrote, “Eisenhower indicated in no 
uncertain terms that he planned to run the theater.” 156  Within twenty-four hours of arriving in 
England he told Bolte, “You’re going home.”157 Dahlquist later noted that Eisenhower stated, “ 
he definitely had sent Charlie [Bolte] home because he flet [sic] it was his fault that the staff was 
not oriented,” and that “the original staff were not aware of the war situation and had 
slumped.”158  Eisenhower’s treatment of Chaney’s staff after his departure may not have been 
fair, but his ability to be ruthless and assertive as well as politically astute and enabled him to 
cope with the flaws associated with the imposition of the War Department’s organization on the 
ETO.   
In many ways Chaney’s relief was unjust, but it was necessary.  To a certain extent 
Chaney, as were many other commanders early in the war, was a victim of circumstance.  A. T. 
Harris, the former head of British Bomber Command, described this phenomenon when talking 
about the relief of Ira Eaker from U.S. Bomber Command, “he [Eaker] was removed for the 
same reason that all commanders are removed in the early stages of the war, because they’re not 
given the straw with which to make the bricks.  The lucky guys are the guys who come along 
                                                          
     156 Dahlquist Diary, 29 June 1942. 
     157 Burg/Bolte Interview, 116. 
     158 Dahlquist Diary, 13 August 1942. 
385 
 
after the straw has been supplied.”159  One could make the argument that Chaney did not receive 
enough “straw” while he was in Britain while Eisenhower had plenty.    
  To adopt that view, however, is to ignore Chaney’s role in his own relief.  His sin was 
that he failed to fix problems caused, for the most par , by the War Department.  Throughout the 
existence of SPOBS and USAFBI, Chaney had received inadequate guidance as well as 
inadequate resources to accomplish his mission, which itself had been hazy and ill-defined.  
Officials in the War Department did not seem to have  clear conception of what 
SPOBS/USAFBI was, its scope of authority, and what its relationship to other organizations was 
supposed to be.  Many saw Chaney and his staff as merely liaison officers.160  Others saw them 
as a headquarters staff but did not have a clear conception of what they were actually in charge 
of.  The result of this confusion was the implementation of plans and policies that undermined 
the ability of Chaney and his staff to serve as an effective headquarters.  Marshall and others 
certainly did not create this situation by design.  They, like everyone else, were learning through 
trial and error.  Essentially, they had to deal with the complex and novel challenges posed by a 
global conflict.   
Chaney did not have the temperament to command in this type of environment.  His 
character was almost too decent.  He was kind and co siderate.  He spoke only when necessary.  
He was deferential to authority.  He was conservative is his approach.  These were all attributes 
of a good diplomat but not a commander in war.  Marsh ll needed generals who had the ability 
to be unkind and at times unjust.  He needed generals who spoke out frequently.  He needed 
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generals who were willing to challenge War Department policies when they were problematic.  
And he needed generals willing to take action in the absence of guidance to get the job done.  
Only with these qualities could his leaders overcome the myriad of friction points that existed in 
a global coalition war.    Chaney had been too much of a gentleman to adjust to these 
requirements.   
 What is remarkable is what Chaney’s staff was ableto accomplish in spite of problems 
that arose from the War Department’s lack of coordination with SPOBS/USAFBI and Chaney’s 
unwillingness to be more forceful and decisive.  The strategic concept for employing U.S. forces 
in Europe had changed significantly throughout the group’s time in Britain.  But, they had been 
able to identify fundamental requirements for waging war with the British, negotiating logistical, 
administrative, and command arrangements that they,ir British counterparts, and planners 
back in the United States as well as successor organizations that the War Department established 
in Britain to meet new conditions as they arose.  The subsequent adoption of their work 
highlights the importance of their efforts in the long process of continual planning and execution 











 On 26 September 1942, Dahlquist, now a Brigadier General, made the following entry in 
his diary: “This morning I received my orders effective on or about November 1st returning me 
to Ground Forces.  How glad I am!”1  His cheery response was prompted by the fact that he was 
going to an assignment with ground troops, something e had been wanting virtually his entire 
time in Britain.  However, the prospect of a potential command was not the only reason the 
reassignment made him happy.  In the months since Eisenhower had taken command, Dahlquist 
had felt increasingly marginalized by the new staff.  The biggest blow came when Eisenhower 
sent Bolte home and replaced him with Brigadier General Walter Bedell Smith.2  Dahlquist had 
dreaded his colleague’s departure, “It will be a terrible wrench to me when Charlie goes because 
we have been as close to each other as two men could be.”3  After Bolte left, Dahlquist became 
depressed, “Theater Headquarters is fast becoming a moubund [sic] body.  Nobody knows one 
another.  There is no life, no excess energy.”4  His new assignment offered him both an 
opportunity for command and an escape from his unhappy experience with ETOUSA. 
 Dahlquist and many of the other original Special Observers expressed profound 
disappointment with their time in Britain.  With all the changes that had taken place since they 
had first arrived, as well as the circumstances under which the War Department replaced Chaney 
and most of his staff, they could not help but feelpessimistic about the value of the work they 
had done with the British.  Even members of Chaney’s staff such as Bolte, who asserted that 
their plans and preparations saved the Allies months of work, struggled to articulate how exactly 
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their efforts contributed to coalition war in Europe.  Absorbed in their failures and the problems 
they encountered in dealing with agencies back in the United States, they themselves failed to 
assess the significance of their work.5 
 To be sure, they could look back and identify certain aspects where the benefits to Anglo-
American cooperation in Europe were immediately apparent.  The group was instrumental in the 
process of sending U.S. forces to Iceland.  Chaney, McNarney, and Lyon provided valuable 
assistance in Russia to Harry Hopkins and the Harrim n-Beaverbrook Mission.  The group also 
established the Technical Committee, which lived on, under various names, as a means for 
exchanging technical information between the U.S. and Britain for the rest of the war.    Matejka 
and the other Special Observers developed communications policies with the three British 
military services that U.S. forces made use of when t y finally arrived in Britain.   Lyon was a 
key figure in establishing the aircraft depot and logistics system that serviced American-built 
airplanes throughout the war.  The group similarly developed S.D. 348, the policy document that 
governed relations between the RAF and the USAAF throughout the war.  Dahlquist was 
instrumental in beginning the long and torturous negotiations with the British over legal 
jurisdiction of U.S. forces in the U.K. as well as developing a strategic directive for the 
Commander of U.S. forces in the ETO.  Bolte’s fundamental definitions for Anglo-American 
relations in Britain influenced Allied strategic policy at the ARCADIA Conference and 
continued to govern Anglo-American relations in theater.  And, the USAFBI staff established 
a force of 36,000 U.S. soldiers in Northern Ireland via their execution of Operation MAGNET. 
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 Less apparent, even to the Special Observers themselves, but more significant were the 
latent effects of their planning and problem solving work with the British.  Planning for 
RAINBOW-5, MAGNET, BOLERO, and ROUNDUP constituted a year-long dialogue in which 
the Special Observers, their British counterparts, nd planners back in the U.S. continually 
examined problems associated with establishing U.S. combat power in British areas of 
responsibility.  SPOBS’ work, overall, provided a running estimate of conditions in Britain that 
facilitated the development of subsequent plans as str tegic concepts for the employment of U.S. 
forces in Europe changed.  In their initial planning efforts, they and their British counterparts 
identified organizational friction points between U.S. and British staff organizations and systems 
and determined spheres of responsibility for Anglo-American war planning in Britain.  While 
developing plans for implementing RAINBOW-5, they larned about the capabilities and 
limitations of U.S. and British forces and engaged in some of the first theoretical planning for 
Anglo-American integration at the theater level.  They also learned about the environmental and 
organizational challenges they would face in attempting to bring U.S. forces to Britain.  The 
influence of their planning work in fostering a shared understanding of the problems associated 
with establishing U.S. forces in Britain can be seen in the number of operations plans, such as 
INDIGO, GHQ-NIST, and Eaker’s plan for the U.S. Bomber Command, which relied heavily on 
the planning work Chaney’s staff engaged in with the British.  The group’s participation in early 
planning for BOLERO and ROUNDUP was the twilight of the group’s influence in Britain.  
Through their participation in the BOLERO Committee and ROUNDUP Administrative 
Planning Staff, they were able to pass on the shared understanding they had developed with their 
British counterparts to their successors, essentially allowing the planning dialogue to continue 
after most had left the theater.  
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SPOBS/USAFBI was certainly not the only agency involved in Anglo-American war 
planning and one would be hard-pressed to argue that it w s the most important, even in 1941.  
However, Chaney and his staff, along with their counterparts in the British defense establishment 
performed a vital function for the Anglo-American alliance between May, 1941 and June, 1942.  
By planning for U.S. forces to come to Britain, they kept both U.S. and British officials steeped 
in the character of the problems that they would one day be called upon to solve.   
 Most of Chaney’s staff did not have time to ponder th  implications of their work in 
Britain, as they quickly had to adjust to new responsibilities.  Dahlquist finally got his time with 
troops, although his experience in command was somewhat controversial.  After going back to 
the states, he served as the Assistant Commander for the 76th Infantry Division at Ft. Meade, 
Maryland and the Commanding General for the 70th Infantry Division at Camp Adair, Oregon 
before receiving an assignment as the Commanding Geeral for the 36th Infantry Division, a 
Texas National Guard unit that had been activated for service in Europe and the Mediterranean.6  
Dahlquist gained notoriety while leading the 36th in an attack into the Vosges Mountains in 
Southern France, during which he over-utilized the Japanese-American 442nd Regimental 
Combat Team.  Critics assert that it was because of his poor decisions during this campaign that 
the unit took heavy casualties, a contributing factor in the 442nd becoming one of the most 
highly decorated units of World War II.7  Dahlquist led the 36th Division in subsequent fighting 
in Europe, ending the war with the Division in the Austrian Tyrol.8  After the war, Dahlquist 
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served in a variety of command and staff positions, retiring as a full general in 1956.  He died on 
30 June 1975.9    
 Bolte, Griner, and Case also got commands. After going back to the states, Bolte became 
the Assistant Commander of the 91st Infantry Division at Camp White, Oregon and subsequently 
commanded the newly activated 69th Infantry Division at Camp Shelby, Mississippi.  He later 
assumed command of the 34th Infantry Division in Italy, successfully leading the division all the 
way through to the surrender of Axis forces in Italy s well as the Allied occupation afterwards.  
Bolte continued to serve after the war, eventually being selected to be the Vice Chief of Staff of 
the Army in 1953.  He retired as a full general from active service in 1955.10  Bolte passed away 
from a stroke on 11 February 1989.11       
 The Army assigned Griner, to serve as the Assistant Commander for the 77th Infantry 
Division at Ft. Jackson, South Carolina.  After his time with the 77th, he served as Commanding 
General for both the 13th Airborne Division at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina and the 98th Infantry 
Division at Camp Rucker, Alabama.  Unlike Bolte and Dahlquist, he eventually saw combat in 
the Pacific, serving as Major General Ralph C. Smith’s replacement as Commanding General of 
the 27th Infantry Division after that individual was relieved.  Griner took command of the unit 
fourteen days into its assault on the island of Saipan and later led the division in fighting on 
Okinawa.  He retired from the U.S. Army in 1946.12  Griner died on 30 October 1975.13  
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 Case also eventually served in the Pacific.  Returning to the states at the same time as 
Bolte, he assumed command of the 31st Coast Artillery Brigade (Antiaircraft) at Camp Wallace, 
Texas.  After commanding the 31st for approximately hree months, he assumed command of the 
32nd Coast Artillery Brigade (Antiaircraft) at the same post, taking the unit to the Southwest 
Pacific in August, 1943.  He stayed with the 32nd util July, 1945, when he assumed command 
of the 102nd Coast Artillery Brigade (Antiaircraft).  He stayed in the Army after the war, 
subsequently serving in the Korean conflict.  He retired as a Brigadier General in 1955.  In 1996, 
he temporarily had the distinction of being the nation’s oldest retired general officer at the age of 
101 before he died that year.  In 2010 his hometown f Marshfield, Missouri established the 
Homer Case Medal of Patriotism to memorialize his service.14 
 Most of the original Special Observers were reassigned after Eisenhower took command 
of ETOUSA, but a few remained, serving on the theater staff or in SOS.  Some even went on to 
serve with Eisenhower during Operation TORCH, the Allied invasion of North Africa.  Lyon 
remained on the theater staff as the head of the Technical Committee, renamed the Air Technical 
Section after the activation of ETOUSA.  While heading the Air Technical section, he continued 
to facilitate the exchange of technical information between Britain and the U.S. while also 
working hand in hand with Cozens to update Anglo-American aviation policy for the theater.  
Fate decreed, however, that he would not remain long.  After he caught pneumonia during an ill-
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timed participation on a bombing mission, the Army returned him to the states in an effort to let 
him recover from his illness.  He died at Walter Reed General Hospital on 1 December 1942.15   
His legacy lived on in a secret USAAF project begun at the end of 1943 called “Ivory 
Soap.” Its purpose was to create floating aircraft repair depots to service airplanes fighting in the 
Pacific. 16   As part of the project, the U.S. Army Air Force had six Liberty ships and eighteen 
smaller 180 foot freight/salvage vessels converted into maintenance facilities.  The Liberty ships 
had enough space in their machine shops to accommodate the enormous components that made 
up the B-29 bombers the Army Air Force was using in the Pacific, and the smaller ships were 
able to accommodate the relatively smaller components of their P-51 fighter escorts.  Upon 
completion, these ships received new names, the Liberty ships in honor of Army generals and the 
smaller vessels in honor of Army colonels.  Among the six "Generals" commissioned by the 
Army Air Force was the Brigadier General Alfred J. Lyon.17  
Matejka stayed in England, eventually serving as the C ief Signal Officer for Allied 
Force Headquarters, a combined Anglo-American headquarters staff that served under 
Eisenhower in the Mediterranean.  He took part in Operation TORCH and remained with the 
headquarters for the whole North African campaign.  After his Mediterranean service, he 
returned to the states and worked in the Office of the Chief Signal Officer, Washington, D.C as 
the Chief, Personnel and Training Service.18  Matejka also lectured students at the National War
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College on joint and combined communications planning.19    He ended the war in the 
Philippines, serving as the Chief Signal Officer for Army Service Command “O.”20  After the 
war, he served in a variety of assignments before retiring as a major general in 1955.  He passed 
away in 1980.21  
Davison also went to North Africa, serving as Eisenhower’s Engineer Officer.  He stayed 
in that position until March, 1943 when he became the Chief Engineer for the Northwest African 
Air Forces, serving under Major General Carl “Tooey” Spaatz.22  He spent the majority of the 
time in both positions tackling the problem of establishing airfields for Allied air forces in North 
Africa, noting that the principal enemies for the Engineers during the campaign had been “mud” 
and “time” rather than the Axis.23  He briefly returned to Washington D.C. in March, 1944 
before going to India to supervise the construction of B-29 bomber bases.24  He did not live to 
see the end of the war, dying from sudden cardiac collapse in a British hospital in Bangalore, 
India on 6 May 1944.25  Today a small Army Airfield located on Fort Belvoir, Virginia, bears his 
name.26  
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Hawley was the only officer from the original Special Observer Group to remain 
assigned to the ETO for the duration of the war.  From 1942 to 1944, he encountered numerous 
obstacles in his efforts to unify medical policy, planning, and operations for the theater.  Among 
the most difficult was the division of authority betw en SOS and ETOUSA, finally resolved in 
early 1944 when Eisenhower merged the two organizations, and perennial attempts by the U.S. 
Army Air Force to establish a functionally independt medical service in the ETO.27  His 
energy, political savvy, contacts with the British, and his longevity in the theater enabled him to 
establish, as the official history noted, “effective central control over the potentially fragmented 
ETO medical service.”28   
While in Britain, Hawley also served as a lecturer at the “Joint Q Planning School,” a 
U.S.-British course that trained staff officers from both countries to develop administrative and 
logistical plans for combined operations.29    Established in January 1943, the Joint Q Planning 
School formalized the process of learning that the Sp cial Observers began in ad-hoc fashion 
through their work with the British in 1941.  The school utilized officers such as Hawley and 
Napier who had combined planning experience to teach British and U.S. staff officers to 
integrate U.S. and British administrative and logistics systems.  Hawley specifically ran a lecture 
that compared the U.S. and British military medical organization.30   
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Hawley retired from the Army as a Major General in 1946 and became the first Chief 
Medical Director for the Veterans Administration.  Two years later, he became the Chief 
Executive Officer for the Blue Cross and Blue Shield Commissions.  After his time with Blue 
Cross and Blue Shield, he served as the Director for the American College of Surgeons, staying 
in that position until 1961.  He died from cancer in Walter Reed Army Hospital on 24 November 
1965.31   
Middleswart continued to participate in planning for Operation ROUNDUP until 
summer, 1942 when the Allies shifted focus to Operation TORCH.32  He left Britain in 
September, and subsequently served as the Chief Quarterm ster, SOS, for Patton’s Western Task 
Force during the invasion of North Africa.  While in the Mediterranean he successively held the 
positions of Chief Quartermaster, Atlantic Base Section and Quartermaster, SOS, North African 
Theater of Operations.  Middleswart later became the C ief Quartermaster, Southern Line of 
Communications, European Theater of Operations, overseeing logistical support for U.S. and 
French forces invading Western Europe through Southern France.  In 1945 he returned to the 
ETO headquarters, becoming the Deputy Chief Quartermaster for the European Theater.33  He 
continued to serve in staff positions after the war, including a return to Europe in 1951 to head 
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the Quartermaster Division for United States European Command.34  He retired from the Army 
as a Major General in 1954.35  Middleswart passed away ten years later on 2 June1964.36  
Coffey also participated in preparations for the Western Task Force.37  In March, 1943 he 
became the Ordnance Officer, SOS, North African Theater of Operations.  He later served as the 
Chief Ordnance Officer for Allied Headquarters in Italy.  He ended the war commanding the 
Letterkenny Ordnance Depot in Chambersburg, Pennsylvania.38  Coffey commanded at 
Letterkenny until May, 1947.  That year, he became Professor and Head of the Department of 
Ordnance at the United States Military Academy.  He held that position until 8 March 1951, 
when he died while on temporary duty in Germany in a plane crash near Heidelberg.39         
McClelland returned to the states in July, 1942, taking on an assignment that allowed him 
to draw on his technical and operational experience.  As the Director of Technical Services for 
Headquarters, U.S. Army Air Force, he oversaw the development of tactics and techniques for 
anti-submarine warfare as well as the development of radar equipment, radio, and radar 
countermeasures for the U.S. Army.  He spent the latt r part of the war on the Air Staff as the 
Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, Operations and later as the Air Communications Officer.  When 
the war ended, McClelland shifted went to work on projects for developing and expanding U.S. 
airways and airway communications.40  In 1951, after retiring from the U.S. Air Force as  major 
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general, he went to work for the Central Intelligenc  Agency, where he was involved in 
implementing a secure global communications system.41  McClelland passed away on 19 
November, 1965.42  Today, the U.S. Air Force annually awards one Air Fo ce unit that has 
displayed superior performance and professional excellence in providing core communications 
and information support to Air Force and/or Department of Defense operations with the Major 
General Harold M. McClelland Award.43  
 After Hinman left SPOBS in November, 1941, the Army assigned him to be the 38th 
Coast Artillery Brigade (Antiaircraft) and Regional Antiaircraft Artillery Commander at Camp 
Stewart, Georgia.  Over the next two and a half years, he served in a number of Coast Artillery 
command and staff positions, including command of the Antiaircraft Training Center at Fort, 
Bliss, Texas.44  In 1943 he went back to the ETO and oversaw planning for the Ninth Air Force’s 
IX Air Defense Command.45  Heart problems forced Hinman to return to the state  nd retire as a 
brigadier general in 1944.46  He passed away in 1949.47  The Army memorialized his service by 
naming the building that housed its Anti-Aircraft Artillery School and Guided Missile Center at 
Fort Bliss Texas, “Hinman Hall.”  Dahlquist served as the principle speaker for its dedication on 
23 November 1954. 48  
                                                          
     41 Ludwell Lee Montague, General Walter Bedell Smith as Director of Central Intelligence, October 1950-
February 1953 (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992), 100-101.   
     
42
 Burial Detail, McClelland, Harold M.., on official Arlington National Cemetery website, accessed February 20, 
2016 at http://www.arlingtoncemetery.mil/ANCExplorer. 
     43 Air Force Communications and Information Annual Awards Program and Air Force Darryl G. Winters Award 
Interim Policy Guidance for Calendar Year 2005 Award Cycle, accessed February 21, 2016 at 
http://www.afwriting.com/AFCI-InterimGuide-CY05.pdf.  
     44 Hamilton, Blazing Skies, 169. 
     45 Joseph W. Angell and Alfred Goldberg, “The Ninth Air Force,” in The Army Air Forces in World War II, 
Volume Three, Europe: ARGUMENT to V-E Day, January 1944 to May 1945, 115. 
     46 Status card for Hinman, Dale D., “To be retd fr Active Duty eff 30 Nov 44 as Brig. Gen.; and Memo, 
Lieutenant Colonel R. K. Farnham to the Adjutant General, Officers Branch, 27 June 1944; both in OMPF of Dale 
D. Hinman, NPRC. 
     47 Burial Detail, Hinman, Dale D., on official Arlington National Cemetery website, accessed February 21, 2016 
at http://www.arlingtoncemetery.mil/ANCExplorer. 
     48 Hamilton, Blazing Skies, 168-69. 
399 
 
 Welsh, after returning to the U.S. in the fall of 1941 because of illness, spent the rest of 
the war working in the Office of the Surgeon General where he served as a planner and project 
manager for the Medical Department.49  After retiring from the Army as a Colonel in 1954, he 
went to work for the State Health Department of Pennsylvania as the Medical Coordinator for 
Civil Defense.50  He died four years later on 4 September 1958.51   
 Snavely left England a few months after the War Department established the ETO and by 
September, 1942 was serving as the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations for the Fourth Air 
Force in San Francisco.  He spent the next two and a half years of the war in California 
successively serving as Commander for the Los Angeles Fighter Wing, 410th Air Force Base 
Unit, and 319th Wing of the Fourth Air Force.52  Towards the end of the war, the U.S. Army Air 
Force selected Snavely to organize the air component of the U.S. occupation of Austria, an 
operation headed by General Mark Clark.53  It was a daunting task at first.  In an interview in 
1980, Snavely recalled the conditions he encountered upon entering the country, “Everything 
was in dishevel.  Vienna was all boarded up.  People looked awful.  They were suffering from 
malnutrition.  They had no fuel except what twigs they could pick from the trees.  They were in 
really bad shape.  Of course, the Russians were the first in there, and they looted the place, took 
everything of value they could grab, shipped it to Russia, and kicked people out of their homes 
with no advance notice at all.”54   
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After the war, conditions eventually improved enough that Snavely was able to bring his 
wife, Alberta, to stay with him, although her time in Austria was not entirely without hardship.  
On 24 November 1946 she was on a flight from Austria to Italy that ran into bad weather as it 
was crossing the Alps.  Thrown off course by the storm, the plane crashed into a glacier, 
stranding the pilot and passengers.  Snavely participa ed in an aerial search and rescue mission 
that combed the Alps for three days before him and another officer, Major General Robert F. 
Tate, the pilot’s father, spotted the barely visible outline of the plane, which by this time was 
covered in snow.  With the assistance of the Swiss Air Force, they were able to land on the 
glacier and rescue all twelve people that had been stra ded in the crash.55   
Snavely and his wife eventually returned to the U.S. in 1947, at which time he was 
assigned to be the Vice Commander of the Eleventh Air Force.  He held the same position in the 
Fourteenth Air Force in 1948, staying at that assignment until 1950, when he became the Chief 
of the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group to Denmark.  Snavely retired from the Air Force 
in 1953 as a brigadier general.56  He died on 10 February 1995.57   
Summers left England for the U.S. about a month after Eisenhower took command to 
serve as the Adjutant General for the Fourth Air Force.58  The following year, he went to work 
for the Corp of Military Police, where he was responsible the administration of all prisoners of 
war the Army had transferred to the U.S.  He later served as Commanding Officer of the Military 
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Police Training Center at Fort Custer, Michigan, and subsequently as Chief of Staff of the 6th 
Service Command in Chicago, Illinois.  In 1945, he became the Commandant of the Provost 
Marshal School at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, his final assignment in the Army.  He retired in 
1946 as a Colonel.  Summers passed away on 15 August 1972 in Santa Monica, California.59  
McNarney continued to serve as Marshall’s deputy unil October, 1944 when he became 
the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander for the Mediterranean Theater as well as the 
Commanding General for all U.S. Army Forces in the Mediterranean.  After the war ended, he 
became commander for U.S. Forces in the European Theater, a position that Chaney had 
occupied briefly before his replacement by Eisenhower. At the same time, McNarney served as 
Commander in Chief, U.S. Forces of Occupation in Germany.  He returned to the states in 1947 
and assumed a position as a senior member of the Unit d Nations Military Staff Committee in 
New York.  Following his service with the United Nations, he became the Commanding General 
of Air Material Command at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base.  He began his last job as an Air 
Force officer in 1949, serving as the Chief of the Department of Defense Management 
Committee.  He retired from the Air Force in 1952 as a full general.  McNarney died on 1 
February 1972.60   
After his death, Griffiss was memorialized in a number of ways.  In the summer of 1942, 
at the Teddington end of Bushy Park in London, the U.S. Army established Camp Griffiss, 
which served as the headquarters for the USAAF in Europe from July, 1942 to December, 1944.  
The camp also served as the initial site of SHAEF, until Eisenhower transferred it to France after 
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the Normandy Campaign.61  In 1948, the U.S. Air Force renamed its airfield in Rome, New 
York, Griffiss Air Force Base.  The base held that n me until 1995 when it closed.  Today the 
site in known as the Griffiss Business and Technology Park.62  Griffiss’ family also chose to 
memorialize him.  His nephew, Richard Alexander, who had been close to his uncle, named his 
son Townsend Griffiss Alexander.  Like his great uncle, he chose a life of military service and is 
currently serving in the U.S. Navy as a rear-admiral.63 
 After being replaced by Eisenhower, Chaney returned to the states and to rather shabby 
treatment.  Even though he had worked directly for the Chief of Staff, first as the Special 
Observer and then as Commander for U.S. forces in Britain, Marshall elected not to evaluate 
Chaney for his performance of duty from May, 1941-June, 1942.  Instead, he delegated that task 
to his deputy, putting McNarney, now a Lieutenant General, in the awkward position of writing 
his old boss’ evaluation for his time as the Special Observer and Commanding General of 
USAFBI.64   
Chaney’s next assignment appeared, at first, to offer him some relief.  He returned to 
Mitchel Field, to serve as the Commander for Eastern Defense Command and First Air Force, 
essentially the same jobs he had prior to going to England but under a different name.65  In these 
positions he served under his old boss, Lieutenant Ge eral Hugh A. Drum, who had always 
thought highly of Chaney as an Army officer.  His situation, however, quickly went south when 
Arnold became his direct superior in January, 1943.  In order to ensure that USAAF pilots were 
adequately prepared for war, Arnold issued a directiv  to all Air Force commanders to fly as 
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many training hours as possible.  Later, Arnold conducted a weekend inspection of fighter units 
in the First Air Force area.66  During the inspection, he concluded that Chaney had not 
effectively carried out his directive.  Barney Giles, who had been Arnold’s Chief of Staff when 
he conducted the inspection noted in a 1970 interview, “General Arnold called me in there one 
morning and he said: ‘I want Chaney relieved and busted.  I want every general officer in that 
command relieved of his command today.’”67  Marshall agreed to relieve Chaney but refused to 
take away one of his stars, “We will relieve him because he is your man, and an air man, but we 
don’t want to bust him . . . we will find a place for him.”68 
Marshall did find a place for Chaney.  Between May, 1943 and November, 1944 he 
served as the commander for the Army Air Force Basic Training Center at Sheppard Field, 
Texas, and the Air Force Western Technical Training Command in Denver, Colorado.  After his 
time in the training commands, the Army sent him to Iw  Jima, where he landed with a small 
element of his headquarters staff in the wake of the Marines’ assault on the island.69  Ostensibly 
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he was there to oversee U.S. forces that were to maintain security on Iwo Jima after combat 
operations had ended, essentially serving as the garrison commander for the island.  After the 
rest of his command arrived and the island was deemed “secure,” most of the Marines departed 
to conduct other operations.  During his tenure, U.S. forces, particularly the 147th Infantry under 
Colonel Robert F. Johnsen, killed 1,602 enemy as well as taking 867 prisoners among Japanese 
forces still holding out on the island.70  He served as the island commander for Iwo Jima until 
August, 1945 when he became the Commanding General of Western Pacific Base Command in 
Saipan.  Later that year, he returned to the states and served on the Secretary of War’s Personnel 
Board in Washington D.C., eventually becoming the board president.  He stayed with the board 
until 1947, when he retired from the Air Force as a major general after almost forty years of 
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